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Glossary1 
 
Business-as-usual 
(BAU) 
Also referred as Baseline or Reference, describing scenarios based on the 
assumption that no mitigation policies or measures will be implemented 
beyond those that are already in force or legislated or will be adopted.2 
Collateral An asset or third-party commitment used by a collateral provider to 
secure an obligation vis-à-vis a collateral taker.3 
Credit risk The potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its 
obligations in accordance with agreed terms.4 
Environmentally 
unsustainable 
asset 
Polluting or high carbon asset, according to the terminology commonly 
used in the financial industry.  
ESG integration An SRI strategy that aims at enhancing traditional financial (risk) analysis 
by systematically including ESG criteria in the investment analysis to 
enhance risk-adjusted returns.5 
ESG scoring The scoring methodologies assessing a company’s performance in 
environmental, social and governance aspects based on different 
approaches, such as generating a final numeric score based on weighted 
scores of indicators in the three dimensions.6 
Exposure The inventory of elements/assets exposed to a hazard or risk.7 
Green asset Asset that provides environmental benefits in the broader context of 
environmentally sustainable development.8 
                                                     
1 Definitions, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from the occasional papers or this report. 
2 Adapted from IPCC reports (Allen, M. R., Barros, V. R., Broome, J., Cramer, W., Christ, R., Church, J. A., Dubash, N. K. (2014). 
IPCC fifth assessment synthesis report-climate change 2014 synthesis report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Geneva, Switzerland.). Note that BAU is defined at a general conceptual level here, thus the acute definition of it depends 
on the purposes of the studies and varies in terms of detailed assumptions. 
3 Adapted from glossary of online database of European Central Bank (2020), All Glossary Entries, retrieved April 2020 from 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/glossc.en.html 
4 Adapted from BCBS. (2000). Principles for the Management of Credit Risk. 
5 Adapted from NGFS. (2019). A sustainable and responsible investment guide for central bank's portfolio management. 
6 Note that ESG scoring methodologies vary according to users and purposes, thus the definition here is a general 
conclusion based on some ESG scoring practices by institutions like AXA Investment Managers (2020), Our framework and 
scoring methodology. retrieved from https://www.axa-im.com/responsible-investing/framework-and-scoring-
methodology 
7 Adapted from background papers commissioned by the Global Commission on Adaptation to inform its 2019 flagship 
report: Stadtmueller, D., Jarzabkowski, P., Iyahen, E., Chalkias, K., Clarke, D., & Zwick, A. (2019). Insurance for Climate 
Adaptation: Opportunities and Limitations. 
8 Adapted from the definition of “green finance” in the report by Green Finance Study Group (2016). Please note that the 
scope and definition of “green” now still varies across institutions according to different purposes (See OECD publication: 
Inderst, G., Kaminker, C., & Stewart, F. (2012). Defining and measuring green investments: Implications for Institutional 
Investors' Asset Allocations.). 
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Hazard Potential events with possibilities of occurrence and severity of any 
particular potential disaster, such as a tropical storm or flood, at a given 
location, within a specified time period.9 
Legal risk The risk of a loss being incurred from unexpected application of a law or 
regulations or a contract that cannot be enforced.10 
Liquidity risk The risk that the firm will not be able to meet efficiently both expected 
and unexpected current and future cash flow and collateral needs 
without affecting either daily operations or the financial condition of the 
firm.11 
Market risk The risk of losses arising from movements in market prices of assets, 
including but not limited to equities, bonds, foreign exchanges, and 
commodities.12 
Non-performing 
loans (NPLs) 
Loans that satisfy either or both of the following criteria: (a) material 
exposures which are more than 90 days past due; (b) the debtor is 
assessed as unlikely to pay its credit obligations in full without realization 
of collateral, regardless of the existence of any past-due amount or of the 
number of days past due.13 
Operational risk The risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems or from events, including legal risks, but excluding 
strategic and reputational risks.14 
Physical risks 
 
Economic costs and financial losses resulting from the increasing severity 
and frequency of extreme climate change-related weather events (such 
as heat waves, landslides, floods, wildfires and storms) as well as longer 
term progressive shifts of the climate (such as changes in precipitation, 
extreme weather variability, ocean acidification, and rising sea levels and 
average temperatures), and rises in sea levels. In addition, losses of 
ecosystem services (e.g., desertification, water shortage, degradation of 
soil quality or marine ecology), as well as environmental incidents (e.g., 
major chemical leakages or oil spills to air, soil and water/ocean) also fall 
into the category of physical risks.15 
                                                     
9 Adapted from background papers commissioned by the Global Commission on Adaptation to inform its 2019 flagship 
report: Stadtmueller, D., Jarzabkowski, P., Iyahen, E., Chalkias, K., Clarke, D., & Zwick, A. (2019). Insurance for Climate 
Adaptation: Opportunities and Limitations. 
10 Adapted from glossary of online database of European Central Bank (2020). All Glossary Entries.  Retrieved April 2020 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/glossc.en.html 
11 Adapted from BCBS. (2008). Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision. 
12 Adapted from BCBS. (2016). Minimum capital requirements for market risk. 
13 Adapted from glossary of online database of European Central Bank (2020). All Glossary Entries.  Retrieved April 2020 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/glossc.en.html 
14 Adapted from publication of BCBS. (2011). Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk. 
15 Partly adopted from NGFS. (2019). First comprehensive report: A call for action: Climate change as a source of financial 
risk. Note that the definitions of physical and transition risks in this work are slightly different from (i.e., broader than) the 
definitions provided in the NGFS first comprehensive report where physical and transition risks only focus on climate-
related impacts, while in this report both environment and climate related risks/impacts are taken into account. 
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Representative 
Concentration 
Pathway (RCP) 
Scenarios that include time series of emissions and concentrations of the 
full suite of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and aerosols and chemically active 
gases, as well as land use/land cover. The word representative signifies 
that each RCP provides only one of many possible scenarios that would 
lead to the specific radiative forcing characteristics. The term pathway 
emphasizes that not only the long-term concentration levels are of 
interest, but also the trajectory taken over time to reach that outcome.16 
Stress test The evaluation of an FI’s financial position under a severe but plausible 
scenario to assist in decision making within the FI. The term “stress 
testing” is also used to refer not only to the mechanics of applying specific 
individual tests, but also to the wider environment within which the tests 
are developed, evaluated and used within the decision-making process.17 
Transition risks The risks relate to the process of adjustment towards a low-carbon 
economy. The process of reducing emissions is likely to have significant 
impact on all sectors of the economy affecting financial assets values.18 
Underwriting risk The loss on underwriting activity in the insurance or securities industry19. 
For the insurance industry, is the risk that an insurance company will 
suffer losses because the economic situations or the occurring rate of 
incidents have changed contrary to the forecast made at the time when 
a premium rate was set.20 
Vulnerability The level of damage which would be expected at different levels of 
intensity of a hazard. For example, when a storm surge hits an area with 
weak building regulations and few flood mitigation measures, it is more 
vulnerable to loss compared to an area with strong flood control 
infrastructure and strong building regulations. Vulnerability assessment 
may include secondary impacts such as business interruption.21 
 
                                                     
16  Adapted by IPCC (2014), AR5 Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change; TCFD (2017), Final Report: 
Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure. 
17 Adapted from BCBS. (2009). Principles for sound stress testing practices and supervision. 
18 Adapted from NGFS. (2019). First comprehensive report: A call for action: Climate change as a source of financial risk. In 
its work, the NGFS has incorporated the risk associated with emerging legal cases related to climate change for 
governments, firms and investors, e.g. liability risks, as a subset of physical and transition risks. See also footnote 15. 
19 Adapted from Kumar, R. (2014). Strategies of banks and other financial institutions: Theories and cases: Elsevier. 
20 Adapted from FSA Japan. (2020). Insurance Underwriting Risk Checklist and Manual. 
21 Adapted from background papers commissioned by the Global Commission on Adaptation to inform its 2019 flagship 
report: Stadtmueller, D., Jarzabkowski, P., Iyahen, E., Chalkias, K., Clarke, D., & Zwick, A. (2019). Insurance for Climate 
Adaptation: Opportunities and Limitations. 
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Preface 
 
by 
Frank Elderson, Chair of the NGFS 
Dr. Ma Jun, Chair of NGFS Supervision Workstream 
Over the last few years, the idea that environment-related risks can strand assets in different 
sectors of the global economy has become much more widely accepted. The threat of stranded 
assets, particularly from climate-related physical and transition risks, has spurred work by 
financial supervisors and central banks. NGFS members have announced new supervisory 
expectations and climate stress tests to help improve the solvency of individual financial 
institutions, as well as the resilience of the financial system as a whole.  
We know we must act. But financial institutions and their supervisors are still at an early stage 
in developing and deploying suitable datasets, models, and tools. We urgently need better 
data and analysis in order to properly measure and manage exposures to environment-related 
risks.  
There are barriers that need to be overcome and we know what these are: poor availability of 
consistent, comparable, and trusted data; costs of data and accessing resources to conduct 
analysis; missing standards and norms that hinder the use and flow of data; a lack of 
transparency into data and methods used, resulting in a trust deficit among users; and 
underdeveloped internal capabilities to analyse and interpret data and analysis to aid decision 
making.  
The NGFS is committed to helping the entire global financial system quickly overcome these 
barriers, so environment-related risks can be properly measured and managed, and that is why 
I am excited to see the publication of our first NGFS Occasional Paper, Case Studies of 
Environmental Risk Analysis Methodologies. 
This anthology contains dozens of examples of environmental risk analysis in practice, with 
chapters written by a wide range of different research providers and practitioners. The 
methods and tools they describe can be used by wide range of different financial institutions, 
including banks, asset managers and insurance companies. While we are not recommending 
any particular service or provider, the point of the paper is to showcase the scale and pace of 
innovation currently underway.  
The Occasional Paper is relevant to all central banks, NGFS members, as well as non-members. 
It offers valuable insight into the state of environmental risk analysis and many technical 
details that will be helpful for financial institutions and supervisors. The fact that it showcases 
the adoption of environmental risk analysis by some financial institutions in the world will also 
serve as an important inspiration for many others to follow suit. The views expressed in the 
Occasional Paper are those of the individual authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views 
of the members and observers of the NGFS. 
Finally, I would like to thank all those that contributed to this report, particularly the editors 
of this Occasional Paper—Prof. Ben Caldecott and Prof. Ulrich Volz—as well the NGFS 
Preface 
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Secretariat and Dr. Ma’s team including Dr. Sun Tianyin, Dr. Li Jing, and Zhu Yun for their great 
efforts in organizing the participating authors and editing this volume.    
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 Synopsis of Environmental Risk Analysis by 
Financial Institutions 
 
By 
Central Banks and Supervisors’ Network for Greening the Financial System1 
1 Introduction  
This NGFS Occasional Paper, Case Studies of Environmental Risk Analysis Methodologies, aims 
to provide a comprehensive review of the tools and methodologies for Environmental Risk 
Analysis (ERA) used by a few dozen financial institutions (FIs) including banks, asset managers 
and insurance companies. The term “environmental risks” used in this document refers to both 
environment- and climate-related risks. Climate-related risks are a subset of the broader 
category of environmental risks. 
As stated in the April 2019 NGFS Comprehensive Report, environment-related risks refer to 
risks (credit, market, operational and legal risks, etc.) posed by the exposure of financial firms 
and/or the financial sector to activities that may potentially cause or be affected by 
environmental degradation (such as air pollution, water pollution and scarcity of fresh water, 
land contamination, reduced biodiversity and deforestation) and actions to address these 
environmental challenges. Climate-related risks refer to risks posed by the exposure of 
financial firms and/or the financial sector to physical or transition risks caused by or related to 
climate change (such as damage caused by extreme weather events or a decline in the asset 
values of carbon intensive sectors). 
Environment- and climate-related risks associated with environmentally unsustainable assets 
are still underestimated by many FIs, while many green and low-carbon investment 
opportunities are under-appreciated by them, causing an excessive allocation of financial 
resources to environmentally unsustainable assets and under-deployment of financial 
resources to green assets. This misallocation of resources reflects many institutional, policy 
and technical problems that contribute to the difficulties in measuring and pricing 
environmental externalities. In areas of green finance, these problems include, to name a few, 
the lack of clear definitions of green and environmentally unsustainable assets, inadequate or 
lack of user friendly environmental and climate data, the lack of public knowledge and capacity 
to conduct ERA, and the lack of policy and regulatory incentives for green financial activities.  
Based on the detailed case studies contained in the following chapters, this introduction 
provides an accessible review of the tools and methodologies developed by FIs, third-party 
service providers, research institutions and NGOs. These tools and methodologies cover a 
wide-range of environmental/climate scenario analyses and stress tests as well as 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) analysis and natural capital risk assessment, that 
can be used to analyze the potential impact on FIs from transition and physical risks associated 
with climate and other environmental factors. This introduction also identifies major barriers 
                                                     
1 This chapter is a condensed version of NGFS publication on Overview of Environmental Risk Analysis by Financial Institutions.  
Link: https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/overview_of_environmental_risk_analysis_by_financial_ins
titutions.pdf  
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to the wider adoptions of ERA by the financial services industry and concludes by 
recommending several steps for stakeholders to help enhance the awareness of the need for 
ERA, develop capacities and ERA datasets, support pilot projects, and promote the disclosures 
of ERA results (including stress tests and scenario analyses).  
The rest of this introduction is divided into four sections. Section 1 presents a taxonomy of 
environmental risks, explains how these risks may translate into credit, market, underwriting, 
and operational risks for FIs, and highlights the importance of these risks by reviewing 
literature on the potential magnitude of financial losses they may cause. Section 2 reviews the 
ERA tools and methodologies that have been developed by financial institutions, third party 
services providers, research institutions, and NGOs. Section 3 discusses the major gaps 
between research and application of ERA tools. Section 4 presents a number of 
recommendations for stakeholders, including FIs, central banks and regulators, industrial 
associations, NGOs and academic institutions on how to promote ERA in the financial industry.   
 Classification of environmental risks   
According to the G20 Green Finance Study Group (2017), NGFS (2019a), and other literatures 
such as Ma et al. (2018), the environmental and climatic sources of financial risks can be 
mapped to two key risk categories – physical and transition risks2:  
1) Physical risks that arise from the impact of extreme climatic events (such as 
exacerbated extreme weather events), rises in sea levels, losses of ecosystem services 
(e.g., desertification, water shortage, degradation of soil quality or marine ecology), 
as well as environmental incidents (e.g., major chemical leaks or oil spills to air, soil, 
water or ocean);  
2) Transition risks that arise from human efforts to address environmental and climate 
challenges, including changes in public policies, technological breakthroughs, shifts in 
investor or public sentiments and disruptive business model innovations. 
Physical and transition risks have many categories and subcategories. For instance, “extreme 
weather events” as physical risks include tropical cyclones and typhoons, floods, winter storms, 
heat waves, droughts and hailstorms, among others. Public policy changes, as a category of 
transition risks, include carbon trading systems, carbon taxes, subsidies for renewable energy 
or electric vehicles (EVs) and energy saving projects. There are numerous examples of physical 
and transition risks that may have financial implications for firms and the financial institutions 
that finance their operations. Table 1-1 presents a brief taxonomy of environmental and 
climatic sources of risks under the headings of physical and transition risks.  
 
  
                                                     
2  Note that the following descriptions of physical and transition risks are broader than those used in the NGFS 
Comprehensive Report (NGFS, 2019a), as we now cover both environment-related physical and transition risks and 
climate-related physical and transition risks, while the NGFS (2019a) report focused only on climate-related risks.   
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Table 1-1 Sources of environmental risks 
Physical Risks Sub-categories/examples 
Extreme weather events 
Tropical cyclones/typhoons, floods, winter storms, heat 
waves, droughts, wildfires, hailstorms 
Ecosystem pollution 
Soil pollution and degradation, air pollution, water 
pollution, marine pollution, environmental accidents 
Sea-level rise Chronic sea-level rise or sea surges 
Water scarcity Droughts or insufficient supply of water 
Deforestation/desertification 
Deforestations leading to extinctions of species, changes to 
climatic conditions, desertification, and displacement of 
populations 
Transition Risks Sub-categories/examples 
Public policy changes 
Energy transition policies, pollution control regulations, 
resource conservation regulations 
Technological changes 
Clean energy technologies, energy saving technologies, 
clean transportation, and other green technologies 
Shifting sentiment 
Changes in consumer preferences for certain products, 
changes in investor sentiments on certain asset classes 
Disruptive business models 
New ways to run businesses that can rapidly gain market 
shares from traditional businesses (e.g., virtual meetings 
that significantly reduce business travels; vertical farming 
that challenges traditional farming)  
Source: Caldecott et al. (2013); CICERO (2017); G20 Green Finance Study Group 
(2017); Ma et al. (2018); NGFS (2019a) 
 
 Transmission from environmental risks to financial risks  
As an essential task of FIs, risk management forms the basis of financial stability. 
Conventionally, FIs manage risks through a framework often under regulated prudential 
requirements. They include credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk, underwriting risk 3  and 
operational risk. Risks arising from environmental factors have not been seriously considered 
or even recognized by many FIs, especially those in developing countries, and are therefore 
not yet properly priced. One reason for the lack of ERA and management is the limited 
understanding of the transmission mechanism between environmental and financial risks. This 
section elaborates on how financial firms’ exposures to environmental and climate risks are 
transmitted to financial risks. 
While FIs may have direct exposures to environmental risks (e.g., headquarters of some FIs 
may be located in coastal areas under risks of a sea-level rise), most exposures are indirect and 
arise from their clients’ and investees’ exposures to these risks. As illustrated in Figure 1-1 
(NGFS, 2020c), transition risks will affect the operations of businesses and the wealth of 
households, creating financial risks for lenders and investors. They will also affect the broader 
macroeconomy through investment, productivity and relative price channels, particularly if 
the transition leads to stranded assets. Physical risks affect the economy in two ways. Acute 
                                                     
3 The definition of underwriting risks could be referred to publications by FSA Japan (2020); Kumar (2014). 
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impacts from extreme weather events can lead to business disruption and damages to 
property: historically these impacts were considered transient, but this will change with 
increased global warming. These events can increase underwriting risks for insurers and impair 
asset values. Chronic impacts, particularly from increased temperatures, sea levels rise and 
precipitation, may affect labor, capital and agriculture productivity. These changes will require 
a significant level of investment and adaptation by companies, households and governments. 
Figure 1-1 Schematic illustration of transmission from environmental risks to 
financial risks 
 
Source: Adapted from NGFS (2020c) 
 
Table 1-2 describes 24 categories and sub-categories of environmental risks. Each may result 
in financial risks such as credit (default) risk, market risk (valuation loss), and liquidity risk, as 
well as operational risk with FIs.4 There are therefore numerous scenarios for environmental 
risks to transmit to financial risks. Table 1-2 shows almost 100 possible scenarios of 
environmental risk transmission to financial risks; we select 10 cases to illustrate how such 
transmissions could work. Note that these are just examples of how physical and transition 
risks may result in selected financial risks and operational risks. This does not mean that these 
events could not result also in the other types of risks. For instance, typhoons and floods may 
have implications at the same time for credit, market, liquidity and operational risks of 
financial institutions.  
 
                                                     
4 For formal definitions of these financial risks, please see BCBS (2000, 2008, 2011, 2016).  
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Table 1-2 Examples of environmental risks transmitted to FI financial risks 
                    Financial risks 
For FIs 
Environmental  
risks 
 Market 
risk 
Credit 
risk 
Liquidity 
risk 
Other 
risks 
Physical Risks Sub-categories     
Extreme  
weather events 
Tropical 
cyclones/Typhoon
s 
    
Floods     
Winter storms     
Heat waves     
Droughts     
Wildfires     
Hailstorms     
Ecosystems pollutions 
Soil degradation 
and pollution 
    
Water pollution     
Marine pollution     
Environmental 
accidents 
    
Sea-level rise     
Water scarcity     
Deforestation     
Desertification     
Transition Risks Sub-categories  
Public policy change 
Energy transition 
policies 
    
Pollution control 
regulation 
    
Polices on 
resource 
conservation 
    
Technological changes 
Clean energy 
technologies 
    
Energy saving 
technologies 
    
Clean 
transportation 
    
Other green 
technologies 
    
Shifting sentiment     
Disruptive business model     
Sources: adapted from G20 Green Finance Study Group (2017); NGFS (2019a); Ma 
et al (2018); CICERO (2017); Caldecott et al. (2013); EIOPA (2019).  
Note: Examples of other risks include operational risk, legal risk, underwriting risk 
and liability risk.5    
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Case 1: Transmission from tropical cyclone/typhoon risk to market risk, credit risk 
and underwriting risk 
1) Climate change exacerbates the intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones/typhoons 
(physical risk); 
2) Higher intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones/typhoons lead to more severe 
damages to real estate assets located in coastal areas, reducing the value of properties 
(market risk); 
3) Lower property values reduce collateral values of mortgage loans, and increase loss 
given default (LGD); 
4) Lower collateral values of mortgage loans and disruption to economic activities (e.g., 
income) due to extreme weather events increase mortgage default rates, and higher 
default rates and LGD increase expected losses of banks (credit risk) (Sun & Ma, 2020); 
5) For insurers that provide property insurance for real estate assets in coastal areas, 
larger than expected damage losses of property could result in unexpectedly high 
claims (underwriting risk).6  
Case 2: Transmission from flood risk to operational risk, credit risk and liquidity risk 
1) Climate change will result in more severe and frequent floods (physical risk) (Blöschl 
et al., 2019); 
2) Floods disrupt supply chains and plant operations of some non-financial firms (e.g., 
due to power and transportation disruption) that are banks’ clients, or threaten banks’ 
business continuity by damaging their buildings (operational risk);  
3) Business disruptions reduce revenues and increase repair/maintenance costs, thus 
reduce profit of the affected non-financial firms; 
4) Reduced revenues and profits of these firms weaken their ability to repay bank loans 
and increase loan default rates and LGD (credit risk); 
5) Insurers that provide flood insurance may be under pressure to liquidate assets at a 
loss to cover claims due to major flooding (liquidity risk).  
Case 3: Transmission from high temperatures/heat waves to credit risk and 
operational risk 
1) Climate change results in longer, more frequent and more dangerous heatwaves 
(physical risk) (Pierre-Louis, 2019); 
2) Heatwaves decrease labor productivity (Deryugina & Hsiang, 2014), and may disrupt 
transportation, power generation (e.g., due to a lack of cooling water) of non-financial 
firms that are banks’ clients; 
                                                     
5 Note that legal risk is included in the definition of operation risk by the Basel Committee (BCBS, 2011, Page 3). For liability 
risk, please see the report of Bank of England (2015). 
6 Hurricane Andrew in 1992 in Florida, caused an estimated $15.5 billion (1992 dollars) in total insured losses, resulted in 
the insolvency of 11 insurance companies, link: https://www.air-worldwide.com/news-and-events/press-releases/Twenty-
Five-Years-after-Hurricane-Andrew--AIR-Analyzes-the-Impact-if-it-Were-to--Strike-Again-Today/   
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3) Decline in productivity and business disruptions reduce revenues and increase facility 
maintenance and repair costs of these non-financial firms;  
4) Reduction in profitability of these firms will increase default rates and LGD for banks 
(credit risk); 
5) Damages to transportation and power facilities may cause disruption of banking 
services (operational risk) (Euronews, 2019).  
Case 4: Transmission from drought to credit risk  
1) Climate change causes more severe drought conditions and water shortages (physical 
risk) (Calanca, 2007; Loukas et al., 2008); 
2) Water scarcity may lead to power shortages; 
3) Water scarcity and power shortages reduce revenues and increase operating costs of 
non-financial firms that depend heavily on water (such as those in agriculture, food 
manufacturing, textile & dyeing, and other water intensive industries) and power;   
4) These changes in revenue and cost of non-financial firms may result in higher default 
rates of loans to the companies (credit risk).   
Case 5: Transmission from wildfire to legal risk and credit risk 
1) Climate change leads to global warming and more frequent and intensive droughts 
(Herrera et al., 2017); 
2) Exacerbated droughts increase the probability of wildfires (physical risk);  
3) Wildfires destroy infrastructure and equipment, thus lowering productivity and 
revenues of some non-financial firms. Wildfires may also increase their repayment 
costs; 
4) Losses incurred from more wildfires could also be in the form government penalties 
or legal claims to liable companies that caused or exacerbated the wildfires;  
5) From a lender’s perspective, higher cost, lower revenue and impairment of collaterals 
could reduce the affected non-financial firms’ ability to repay bank loans and increase 
default rates and LGD (credit risk).   
Case 6: Transmission from soil degradation to credit risk 
1) Land degradation (physical risk) lowers agricultural yields (UNDP, 2019; Young, 1994);  
2) Expenditure for remediation measures lead to lower profitability of agricultural firms; 
3) For banks lending to these agricultural firms, lower firm profitability may result in 
higher default rates and LGD (credit risk) (Ascui & Cojoianu, 2019; UNEP FI, 2018b). 
Case 7: Transmission from environmental accidents to legal risk and market risk 
1) Environmental accidents by non-financial firms (e.g., BP’s oil spill) may result in serious 
water and land pollution (physical risk); 
2) Litigation may result in heavy penalties for these companies and associated reputation 
risk; 
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3) Lawsuits and penalties lead to extra costs and tarnish these companies’ reputation 
and reduce their future sales; 
4) From an investor/lender’s perspective, the above-mentioned changes in revenue and 
cost as well as reputational losses of the non-financial firms could lead to a fall in their 
valuation (market risk) and an increase in the probability of loan defaults and LGD 
(credit risk); 
5) From an insurer’s perspective, these could result in an increase in environment-related 
claims under liability policies (liability risk).7 
Case 8: Transmission from energy transition policies to market and credit risks 
1) Energy transition policies may include measures (e.g., carbon tax/pricing scheme) to 
limit utilization of fossil fuels (transition risk); 
2) These measures may result in higher costs for oil & gas companies, coal mining 
companies, and coal-fired power producers, reducing demand for their products; 
3) Higher costs and reduced revenues cut profits and reduce future cash flows of these 
companies; 
4) From a FI perspective, these result in lower asset valuation (market risk) and/or higher 
loan default rates and LGD of carbon-intensive companies (credit risk).      
Case 9: Transmission from technological changes to market risk and credit risk 
1) Technological innovation that results in a decline in renewable energy costs (transition 
risk) reduces market share and pricing power of “environmentally unsustainable 
companies” such as oil & gas companies, coal mining companies, and coal-fired power 
producers;  
2) From a FI perspective, the reduced sales and profits of “environmentally unsustainable” 
companies lead to decreased asset value (market risk) and/or higher default rates and 
LGD (credit risk). 
Case 10: Transmission from shift in market sentiment to market, credit and liquidity 
risks 
1) Market sentiment towards carbon-intensive assets could change suddenly (transition 
risk) due to introduction of new climate policies such as carbon taxes, carbon trading 
mechanisms, reduction in quota for fossil fuel energy, and regulatory restrictions on 
fossil fuel financing, and new technology development in the form of a sharp decline 
in renewable energy costs and energy saving technologies; 
2) For FIs, such sentiment shifts could lead to a sudden decline in price/valuation of 
carbon-intensive assets they hold (market risk); for banks, such a decline in 
price/valuation could increase the default risk and LGD if these assets are held as loan 
collaterals (credit risk); it may also result in difficulties in selling such assets by FIs 
(liquidity risk).  
                                                     
7 For details, refer to Bank of England (2015). 
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 Financial significance of environmental risks 
The lack of recognition and pricing of environmental risks could lead to significant financial 
losses of corporates and FIs that provide financing for those exposed to such risks. It also 
implies an under-estimation of the potential costs (or externalities) of financing or investing in 
environmentally unsustainable assets (including polluting and high carbon assets) by FIs, thus 
leading to excessive allocation of capital into environmentally unsustainable sectors and 
delaying the green transition of the global economy.  
To convince senior managers of FIs to take action to manage environmental risks, it is critical 
for them to get a sense of the potential magnitude of the financial impact of their FIs’ exposure 
to environmental risks. This section reviews literatures that estimate the potential financial 
losses that may be caused by environmental risks. 
As stated earlier, physical risks such as sea level rises and extreme weather events could 
seriously damage or destroy physical assets like real estate in coastal areas, leading to declines 
in property valuation, increases in non-performing Loans (NPLs), and heavy insurance losses. 
Examples of such losses estimated in the literatures are: 
1) A Blackrock study estimates that the financial losses of 15 US cities could amount to 
US$8 trillion due largely to sea level increase and more frequent extreme weather 
events, as a result of climate change (BlackRock, 2019); 
2) An EIU study estimates that, from a private sector investor’s perspective, global 
warming of around 4°C could result in a present value loss of US$4.2 trillion of financial 
assets globally, 5°C warming could result in a present value loss of US$7 trillion, while 
6°C of warming could lead to a present value loss of US$13.8 trillion. These losses are 
caused by direct and indirect harms to portfolios’ growth and returns derived from 
more destructive floods, droughts and severe storms. However, from the public-sector 
perspective, which implies the employment of a lower discount rate, 6°C of warming 
could lead to a present value loss of US$43 trillion (EIU, 2015); 
3) A DNB report entitled ‘Waterproof’ estimates that, in case of 1.5°C to 3.5°C of warming, 
the number of claims on property insurance in 2085 would rise to 131% of that in 2016 
(Regelink et al., 2017);  
4) Swiss Re estimated insured losses in 2016 amounted to less than one-third of the 
approximately US$175 billion in total disaster-related losses, leaving a protection gap 
of US$121 billion. The global protection gap has widened by about 20%8 over the past 
25 years (EESI, 2018; Swiss Re, 2016).  
Transition risks, arising from the process of policy- and technology-driven adjustments towards 
a greener and low-carbon economy, could take the following forms:  
1) Technology innovation, leading to a sharp fall in renewable energy costs and thus 
reduced pricing power and market share for fossil fuels. For example, Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance (Bloomberg NEF, 2019) estimates that the global average wind and 
solar power costs would fall to 87% of coal fired power prices by 2027 and to 73% by 
2030;  
                                                     
8 The protection gap here refers to the ratio of total uninsured losses to total economic losses. 
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2) Policy changes, including those leading to a sharp increase in carbon prices. Based on 
World Bank estimate (Ramstein et al., 2019) current global average carbon price is at 
US$2 a ton, a mere fraction of the estimated US$75 a ton in 2030 required to achieve 
a 2-degree target;  
3) Changes in consumer preference: According to an Accenture survey in 2019 (Long et 
al., 2019), around 72% of respondents indicate that they are currently buying more 
environmentally friendly products than they were five years ago, and this shift in 
consumer preference will likely strengthen going forward.  
These significant transition forces will likely lead to very sizeable financial impact on carbon 
intensive assets in many countries and markets. According to the IEA’s 2012 World Energy 
Outlook (Van der Hoeven, 2013), it was estimated to have a 50% chance of limiting the rise in 
global temperature to 2°C, only a third of current fossil fuel reserves can be burned before 
2050. Another study published in Nature Climate Change (McGlade & Ekins, 2015), globally, a 
third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80% of current coal reserves should remain 
unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet the target of 2°C. In other words, if the world is to 
meet the Paris climate targets, these unburnable fossil fuels must become stranded assets. An 
example of such a risk is the potential sharp decline in demand for coal-fired power generation 
in a few years when renewable energy prices become even more competitive, undercutting 
the economics of new as well as existing coal fired power plants and resulting in stranded 
assets in the coal mining and coal-fired power sectors. The following summarizes the 
preliminary findings of several studies on the financial impact of transition risks: 
1 A study by Tsinghua University estimates that the non-performing loan ratio of 
representative coal-fired power companies could exceed 20% by 2030, up from the 
current level of less than 3%, due to the expected fall in clean energy costs and the 
resulting downward pressure on pricing power of the coal-fired power companies, the 
rise in carbon prices, a decline in demand, and an increase in funding costs for pollution 
and carbon intensive companies (Ma & Sun, 2020);   
2 A study by HSBC Global Research estimates that unburnable fossil fuels may result in a 
40%~60% decrease in enterprise valuations EBITDA for some major resource-focused 
global companies, including Shell, BP, Total and Statoil (Robins et al., 2013);   
3 Studies on the transition risks of climate change have estimated the potential for losses 
as ranging from US$ 1-4 trillion when considering the energy sector alone Mercure et al., 
2018, or up to US$ 20 trillion when looking at the economy more broadly (NGFS, 2019a);  
4 Summarizing the results of 31 models, the IPCC concludes that the mitigation costs of 
limiting warming to 2°C, including consumption losses due to risks of food and water 
security, loss of livelihoods and income, breakdown of infrastructure networks and critical 
services and alike, would be between 1-4% of global aggregate consumption by 2030 
compared to current economic forecasts under cost-effective scenarios with all key 
mitigation technologies available and no delay of mitigation (Allen et al., 2014);   
5 A climate stress-test of the financial system that examines the impact of transition risk for 
the top 20 listed banks in Europe finds, even focusing only on the banks’ portfolio of 
equity holdings, the Value at Risk amounts to about 1% of the banks’ regulatory capital, 
while losses vary between 8% to over 30% of capital across banks under “severe” 
scenarios (Battiston et al. 2017).   
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2 Overview of ERA tools for financial institutions  
This section reviews the framework for ERA and various ERA methodologies. Many of these 
methodologies are developed by specialized third-party vendors and research institutions and 
are used by FIs on a pilot basis due to their complexity and resource intensity.  
Three aspects of the ERA methodologies and their applications are reviewed:9 first, the major 
steps for analyzing environmental and climate-related risks are summarized; second, the 
methodologies for scenarios analysis and stress test are classified by the types of users 
including banks, asset managers and insurance companies, and by the types of risks including 
physical and transition risks; third, alternative methodologies used by FIs in measuring 
environmental risks and opportunities are presented, including ESG ratings and the natural 
capital risk assessment approach. This section also includes a few boxes that describe technical 
details of several ERA methodologies, including frequently used climate scenarios.  
 Steps for environmental risk analysis and management 
The framework for environmental risks analysis and management typically involves four 
steps:10 
• Risk identification: conducting strategic assessment of the types of environmental 
factors that may cause financial risks (e.g., value impairment from sea-level increases, 
extreme weather events, declining demand for or prices of fossil fuels, devaluation of 
associated infrastructure, interruption of supply chains, increased natural capital costs, 
and increased emission and pollution costs); 
• Risk exposure: measuring the sizes of FIs’ exposures to these risks (e.g., 15% loans 
exposed to certain risks); 
• Risk assessment: estimating probabilities and magnitudes of financial losses arising 
from these risks (using ERA methods such as scenario analysis and stress test). The 
results of these ERA could feed into risk pricing;  
• Risk mitigation: taking actions to reduce risks via introducing internal policies and 
processes that discourage exposures to environmentally risky assets. For example, FIs 
can reduce their exposures to carbon-intensive infrastructure assets now to avoid 
carbon lock-in and the risks of holding stranded assets in the longer term; they can 
also assist the green transition and environmental risk management of non-financial 
companies via more active shareholder engagement, requesting better information 
disclosure and providing risk management products.  
 Models used for assessing different types of risks 
This subsection reviews the various models used to assess, on a forward-looking basis, the 
financial impact of environmental risks in the forms of scenario analysis and stress tests.   
Models for assessing physical risks 
Most ERA models assessing physical risks first capture the impact on companies’ financials due 
to environmental risks. The financial impact, such as declining revenues or rising costs, can be 
                                                     
9 There could be more dimensions for classifying the ERA methodologies, e.g., by micro/sectoral/macro perspective, or by 
dynamic/static approach.  
10 As indicated by the “Guide to climate scenario analysis for central banks and supervisors, NGFS (2020b)”, it must be 
recognized that this field is still relatively in its infancy and that there is no universally agreed approach. 
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the direct result of environmental or climate events that cause property and other damages, 
or an indirect or secondary effect of physical events. The most common secondary impact is 
business interruptions and reduced economic activities. Examples include electricity outages, 
disruptions to supply chains and declining demand for the company’s products due to an 
economic slowdown. The resulting changes in financial statements are then integrated into 
financial models (e.g., probability of default (PD) and LGD models or securities’ valuation 
models) to quantify the financial risks (e.g., credit risks for lenders and market risks for 
institutional investors) both on a portfolio basis and individual transaction/client basis. Results 
of these analyses are typically presented as a scenario analysis or a stress test. Examples of 
physical risks analyses include Tsinghua University’s modelling framework for assessing the 
impact of future trajectories of typhoons on default probabilities of mortgage loans in Chinese 
coastal cities under various climate scenarios in Chapter 6, and VfU’s analysis of the impact of 
water stress on corporate bonds’ credit risks, in Chapter 9. Similar approaches should be 
applicable to analyzing impact on stocks and other securities.   
Models for assessing transition risks 
Like physical risk models, typical ERA models assessing transition risks try to first capture the 
financial statement impact of policy and technological changes at the company level driven by 
environmental and climatic factors under various scenarios.  
In a climate-related transition risk analysis, the typical first step is the creation of temperature-
based or event-based scenarios using underlying models, such as sector-specific models, 
macroeconomic models or Integrated Assessment Models (IAM). Given these scenarios, the 
financial models can then quantify the impact of energy transition policies (e.g., increasing 
carbon prices and contracting demand for fossil fuel products) and technology changes (e.g., 
causing downward pressure on the sales and prices of fossil fuel products) on companies’ 
revenues and costs in carbon-intensive sectors such as oil & gas, coal mining, coal-fired power 
generation, steel, cement and transportation. These changes in corporate financial statements 
are then integrated into risk models by FIs to assess financial risks (e.g., credit and market risks) 
both on a portfolio basis and an individual transaction/client basis.  
A major challenge in modelling climate-related transition risks is handling the interactions 
between economic variables, energy sector parameters and corporate reactions. IAM provide 
input to tackle these challenges. Among many methodologies incorporating IAM included in 
the Occasional Paper, two examples are CLIMAFIN methodology in Chapter 4 that explains 
how to use the outputs of IAM (across scenarios) to assess transition risks for investor 
portfolios (Battiston et al. 2017), and the methodology in Chapter 11 that uses an IAM – 
incorporating both energy and land-use systems into a macro model – to translate the 
assumptions under different transition scenarios into key economic variables. The IAM 
approach produces a series of outputs on the energy sector, which are then used to translate 
scenario outputs into shocks on the real economy. Shocks are divided into two types: direct 
shocks (such as carbon price increases), which affect asset value streams through a company’s 
operations or costs, and indirect shocks (such as a decline in demand and a resulting change 
in commodity prices), which affect asset value streams through changes in demand or selling 
prices. 
ERA methods have also been developed to analyze the financial impact of other environment-
related transition risks (such as pollution and water stress), although the number of such 
studies are significantly fewer than those on climate-related risks. For pollution-related 
transition risk analysis, a typical first step is to construct scenarios related to environmental 
policy and regulatory changes, which would have an impact on the costs and/or revenues for 
companies in high-polluting sectors. For example, an ICBC environmental stress test models 
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the impact of possible increases in government levies on air pollution. The impact of such 
policy changes on companies’ financial statements are estimated, and the resulting changes 
in financial variables, such as costs, revenues, profits, and asset/liability ratios are fed into 
valuation models or PD models to quantify the changes in market and credit risks of the 
affected companies and/or investment portfolios (in Chapter 5).   
 Models used by different types of FIs 
Models used by banks 
Most ERA models for commercial banking businesses assess the impact of environmental 
factors on credit risk metrics, such as PD and LGD (see for example the UNEP FI’s pilot project 
for banks, (UNEP FI, 2018a, 2018b). These models – including transition risk models and 
physical risk models – work by first estimating the environment-related losses or changes of 
some metrics that constitute explanatory variables for the loan-related risk models, then using 
these results as inputs for banks’ credit risk models to generate adjusted risk measures 
including PD, LGD and credit ratings. Thus, the adjusted risk metrics produced from the second 
step have incorporated environmental factors, i.e., translated environmental risks into credit 
risks. 
The above-mentioned ERA methodologies apply to banks’ lending business. Banks engaged in 
securities and investment businesses also apply ERA models to analyze the impact of various 
environmental and climate factors on the performance of bonds, equities, other securities and 
their portfolios. These models are in principle the same as those described in the following 
subsection on models used by asset managers.     
Models used by asset managers 
ERA models for asset management first estimate the changes induced by environmental risks 
or factors to metrics that later constitute the determinant variables of valuation models of 
assets such as equities, bonds, real estate and infrastructure. Very often, the direct 
determinant variables of valuation models are dividends or cash flows. In a typical ERA model 
used by asset managers, environmental factors (e.g., energy transition policies) lead to 
declining revenues and increasing costs for a carbon-intensive company or portfolio, which in 
turn reduce the present values of their future dividends or cash flows. The estimated changes 
in the valuation of a security, an asset (e.g., stock, bond, property or infrastructure) or a 
portfolio under various scenarios are the typical “output” of the ERA model.  
Other outputs of the ERA exercise could take the forms of Value-at-Risk metrics (e.g., 5% 
probability of over y% drawdown) as illustrated in Chapter 23 of this report by AVIVA or a 
sensitivity analysis (e.g., a x% share/bond price decline for a 1% increase in carbon price) as 
introduced in Chapter 16 by CUFE.  
Some researchers have used regressions to derive “Carbon-Beta” to capture the “risks and 
opportunities” of stocks or other assets arising from the climate transition, based on stock 
market prices and carefully constructed “environmentally unsustainable” and “green” 
portfolios. The Carbon Beta estimates the impacts or effects on firms, and their values or stock 
prices, of possible changes in expectations that may occur as the present economy moves 
towards a green economy (see for example the CARIMA approach in Chapter 34). The Carbon 
Beta can be determined for different asset classes such as stocks, corporate bonds, loans, 
portfolios, and funds. In portfolio management, the Carbon Beta can be integrated into 
investment strategies, such as Factor Investing and Best-in-class approaches, and can be used 
for hedging carbon risks.  
Chapter 1 
 14 
Models used by insurance companies 
Insurers’ business consists of two categories: (i) underwriting business providing insurance 
services and solutions to policyholders; and (ii) investment business acting as a major 
institutional investor. For the underwriting business, insurance companies mainly face risks of 
increased liabilities from physical risks, such as more frequent and severe weather events. 
Most ERA methodologies applied to the insurance sector (especially by property & casualty 
insurance and re-insurance companies) in this context use catastrophe models to estimate 
potential loss and price premia, see for example case studies by RMS in Chapter 24. They also 
integrate forward-looking climate scenarios in such models to represent the changed patterns 
of possible future losses compared to historical records. 
 Other methodologies 
Two alternative methodologies are also used in ERA by FIs. One is ESG scoring and integration, 
used mainly by institutional investors in assessing the “current” ESG performances of the 
issuers of securities, which may have forward-looking implications. The second, natural capital 
risk assessment, focuses on assessing risk factors that fall into the ecological category, such as 
water availability and soil quality, and how these risks may impact financial performances of 
borrowers or other corporates.   
ESG scoring and integration 
ERA methodologies, often presenting results in the form of scenario analysis and stress tests, 
focus on forward-looking assessments of the financial implications of environment- and 
climate-related risks. Investment managers and banks also evaluate the ESG performance of 
their clients or assets held to facilitate investment/lending decision-making. Some empirical 
studies show that the ESG performance of listed companies and bond issuers has a positive 
correlation with their long-term financial performance.    
ESG scoring and integration methodology can be considered as another major category of 
tools for assessing environmental risks for investment holdings. The assessment of ESG 
performance is typically summarized in ESG scores of the securities (e.g., stocks and bonds), 
which are usually estimated by specialized ESG rating providers. The ESG scores are used 
(integrated) in the investment management practices for selecting securities with a view to 
managing the relevant financial risk exposure (e.g., by excluding stocks and bonds of lower 
ESG scores in the portfolio) and/or capturing upside opportunities (e.g., by giving preferences 
to selecting stocks and bonds with higher ESG scores in the portfolio).   
Major credit rating agencies have incorporated “material” ESG factors in their credit analysis 
(see Chapters 26, 27). “Material” factors are those that increase the likelihood of default and 
credit loss currently or potentially in the future. Several financial data service providers such 
as MSCI and Bloomberg have developed ESG databases that cover most listed companies and 
bonds. Many asset managers use ESG indicators provided by these data vendors, but some 
asset managers also developed their proprietary methodologies for ESG scoring and 
integration. For example, one asset manager constructed an ESG scoring methodology that 
considered six aspects of environmental performance, including “emissions and energy 
management”, “environmental impact of production”, “water management”, “reputation risk”, 
“emission reduction initiatives” and “measures of environmental impact”. A growing number 
of banks has initiated ESG analysis of their loan applicants and other clients. 
The increasing demand for reliable and timely ESG data has given rise to ESG data providers 
that use technology – such as artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms – to 
screen vast quantities of unstructured data from sources external to a company, such as news 
articles, NGO reports, social media and other sources. Automated search tools using pre-
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defined keywords linked to specific ESG issues (e.g., climate change, water scarcity, labor 
relations, corporate governance) can scan vast quantities of data to identify risk incidents and 
controversies related to a company’s ESG performance and sustainability. These data can then 
be used to compile ESG scores and metrics, which are used by banks, institutional investors 
and investment managers for due diligence and risk management (RepRisk’s Chapter 30).  
Natural capital risk assessment 
In 2016, a coalition including environmental NGOs, companies and accounting organizations 
published the natural capital protocol, which called for the application of the natural capital 
risk assessment (NCRA). NCRA is a toolkit to help businesses measure and value the natural 
services that they rely on and their natural capital liabilities, which include the environmental 
damage that may result from their operations. Natural capital in this context refers to factors 
that fall into the ecological category that may have an impact on production activities, such as 
the quantity of natural capital (e.g., water availability, soil depth), quality of natural capital 
(e.g., water, air or soil quality) or the availability of ecosystem services (e.g. water filtration or 
pollination).  
The aim of natural capital risk assessment is to identify the natural capital risks likely to be 
material to corporates and investments in securities. Currently, the most relevant and studied 
sector is agriculture, given its relevance to both the impacts and dependencies on natural 
capital. As in the case of National Australian Bank, the risk assessment model in this sector 
evaluates the future trend of these natural capital risks and their potential impacts on 
agricultural production, which in turn could determine farmers’ profitability and therefore 
ability to repay their loans, see Chapter 8. The result of NCRA could take the form of a ‘traffic 
lights’ system which classified loan applicants’ natural capital risks into high, medium, and low 
risks. These risk measures can be factored into a bank’s overall loan decision-making process. 
3  Gaps in ERA analysis and applications  
While an increasing number of financial supervisors and FIs have recognized the significance 
of ERA for ensuring financial stability and the resilience of FIs to environment- and climate-
related risks, its applications remain limited. Consultation meetings with a few dozen FIs 
indicate that only a fraction of large FIs in OECD countries and China have begun to utilize 
some ERA methods for assessing environmental risks and many of these applications remain 
at the experimental stage. Many FIs are not yet engaged, and most small FIs, especially in 
developing countries, have limited awareness of ERA. This finding is also consistent with the 
NGFS Status Report on Financial Institutions Experiences from working with green, non-green 
and environmentally unsustainable financial assets and a potential risk differential. The 
barriers to wider ERA applications may include the following: 
1) A lack of awareness of environmental risks and appreciation of their relevance 
Many FIs, especially those in developing countries, remain unaware of the significance of 
environmental risks and their potential implications of these risks on their operations. This is 
in part due to the lack of public knowledge, such as media coverage and education, and clear 
and explicit expectations from central banks and other regulators. In recent years, many FIs in 
OECD countries have gained awareness of climate-related risks, in part due to the efforts of 
the NGFS, but some of them remain largely unconcerned, partly because their investee 
companies or borrowers have yet to be significantly impacted by these risks, and partly 
because such risks are perceived to be distant and imprecise. 
2) Inadequate environmental data 
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Effective ERA requires granular data that describe the environmental aspects of companies 
and securities, historical patterns of environmental and climate changes, associated losses, 
forward-looking scenarios and assumptions for future environmental and climate changes and 
losses, as well as impacts of such changes on economies, sectors and companies. To a varying 
degree, the lack of appropriate data forms another barrier to ERA applications. 
In some jurisdictions where corporates and FIs look to regulators for developing or 
recommending specific unsustainable finance taxonomies, the absence of such taxonomies 
becomes a key bottleneck for ERA. Without taxonomies, corporates and FIs are unable to 
clearly define and measure their green and environmentally unsustainable activities, and FIs 
are therefore unable to clearly quantify their green and environmentally unsustainable 
exposures which make it more difficult to conduct ERA. 
In some jurisdictions, there is a lack of regulatory guidance and standards for ESG information 
disclosure. While other jurisdictions have disclosure requirements, the reported data are not 
sufficiently granular nor appropriate for risk assessment purposes. There are many sources of 
publicly available environmental information (G20 GFSG, 2017), but many of them are not 
presented in a usable or friendly format for FIs, or are not easily accessible to FIs.  
3) Limited capacity to develop ERA methodologies 
For a typical financial firm, the development of ERA tools and models requires significant 
resources, including researchers specializing in economics, finance, environment, climate and 
statistics, and spending on manpower, data, and consultants. When the urgency or future 
benefits of such analysis remains unclear, the high cost of development, which is immediate, 
tends to deter many FIs from investing in such an effort. Another explanation for the lack of 
investment in ERA methodologies is that many ERA components are public goods eventually 
to be used widely, but there are no mechanisms for sharing the R&D spending or access to 
data.   
4) Limited application to environment-related risks and emerging market economies  
Compared with the methodologies for assessing climate risks, risk metrics and ERA methods 
for assessing environment-related risks (e.g., pollution, water risk, and biodiversity losses) – 
which are of greater concerns in many developing countries than in OECD countries, are less 
developed. While many developing countries (e.g., some African and ASEAN countries) are 
facing greater challenges due to climate change and environmental degradation, their financial 
sectors’ awareness of environmental risks and capacities for conducting ERA are much more 
limited than those of OECD countries. 
5) Gaps in methodologies and data quality 
a. Most ERA methodologies available today focus on the transmission of environmental 
risks to financial risks via the corporate channel, by working out the impact of 
environmental/climate scenarios on financial statement and using the results for 
quantifying the credit and market risks for investments/loans in financial models. 
These approaches tend to ignore the macroeconomic feedback loop despite that 
environmental and climate changes may well impact many macroeconomic and 
macro-financial variables affecting a company’s performance. The lack of “feedback” 
analysis reflects the underdevelopment of methodologies for capturing the complex 
mechanisms of risk transmission between the real economy, energy sector and the 
financial system.   
b. Very few transition risk analyses have taken into account future adaptive measures of 
the affected entities in estimating their future financial performance (e.g., energy 
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companies’ internal efforts to allocate resources to renewable energies). This problem 
may result in some overestimation of financial risks arising from FIs’ exposure to such 
entities.   
c. Most physical risk analyses focus on direct physical damages of properties, 
infrastructure and agriculture assets, with limited reference to impact of climate 
events on variables affecting firms’ operating environment. For example, it has been 
challenging for these analyses to quantify the relationships between natural disasters 
and the resulting damages to local economic growth, household income, 
unemployment rate, and supply chain conditions.   
d. Most ERA studies by NGOs and academic institutions focus on listed equities and 
publicly traded bonds, as data for these securities are more readily available. This also 
means that environment- and climate-related risks are under-researched in sectors 
such as commercial banking, private equity, real estate and infrastructure.  
e. The baseline, business-as-usual (BAU) scenario selected in many models directly 
impacts the magnitude of results under the policy or transition scenario. Selecting a 
baseline scenario requires an implicit assumption on the current level of policy and 
technical developments, which directly affects results. The fact that there is currently 
no widely accepted baseline scenario makes it difficult to compare results from 
different studies. 
f. On ESG ratings, one major issue is the inconsistency in data definitions between 
different data vendors. A related issue is the lack of transparency on the 
methodologies used to develop ESG ratings. A study published by MIT and University 
of Zurich found that “measurement divergence” (i.e., the different ways ESG criteria 
are measured) explains more than 50 percent of the variations across ESG ratings 
(Berg et al., 2019). In terms of data used, many ESG data vendors rely heavily on 
counterparties’ self-reported information that may not be sufficiently reliable. 
4 Options for mainstreaming ERA  
Given the growing recognition by NGFS members of the significance of environmental and 
climate-related risks to the resilience of the financial system, and the usefulness of ERA 
approaches in helping FIs to identify and manage such risks, some collective efforts are needed 
– by FIs, industry associations, central banks and financial supervisors, NGFS, international 
organizations (IOs), third-party vendors, and academic institutions – to promote ERA 
applications in the financial sector. We recommend the following actions to the 
abovementioned stakeholders, some of which have appeared in other NGFS publications, such 
as A Call for Action: Climate Change as a Source of Financial Risk (NGFS, 2019a), 
Macroeconomic and Financial Stability Implications of Climate Change (NGFS, 2019b), Guide 
for Supervisors – Integrating Climate-related and Environmental Risks into Prudential 
Supervision (NGFS, 2020a), and A Status Report on Financial Institutions’ Experiences Working 
with Green, Non-green and Brown Financial Assets and a Potential Risk Differential (NGFS, 
2020d).  
 Enhancing awareness of the need for ERA  
Central banks and financial supervisors should strive to enhance ERA awareness among FIs, 
including by: conducting ERA themselves to assess the impact of environmental factors on 
financial stability; clarifying the expectations for FIs to assess and manage environment- and 
Chapter 1 
 18 
climate-related risks; sending policy signals that FIs’ disclosures of ERA results could be made 
a semi-compulsory or compulsory requirement in the future (NGFS, 2020a).  
Industry associations servicing the financial community, NGOs and academic institutions and 
the media can also help to raise awareness by advocating the relevance of environment- and 
climate-related risks to financial stability and the green transition of the financial system via 
publications, seminars, and public-private sector dialogues. Such public efforts should 
highlight that the impact of many transition risks (e.g., those associated with energy transition) 
could be felt much earlier and risk hedging and mitigation are feasible even as many physical 
risks associated with climate change may be visible only in the longer term. 
 Developing analytical capacity and databases 
Industry associations, central banks and supervisors, IOs, NGOs and academic institutions 
could organize seminars and training activities on ERA methodologies, with some results 
delivered as public goods to the financial industry. These organizations could host or signpost 
ERA-related information on their websites, including working papers, case studies, as well as 
publicly available environmental data, models and tools. In developing ERA tools for internal 
use, FIs, central banks and supervisors that lack internal resources could work with external 
vendors, academic institutions and NGOs that have invested substantially in this area. 
 Supporting demonstration projects 
The NGFS, IOs, central banks and supervisors should consider supporting (by organizing and/or 
mobilizing research grants for) a few demonstration ERA projects in key sectors such as 
banking, insurance and asset management, and for key regions exposed to substantial 
environment- and climate-related risks. For example, an ERA demonstration project for 
analyzing transition risks to carbon-intensive assets may prove useful to a wide range of FI 
users. Demonstration projects for analyzing risks associated with water shortages, pollution 
and biodiversity losses could also help speed up methodological progress and enhance 
capacities in these areas. It may also be useful to support some case studies, especially in 
developing countries, to understand with more granularity the potential impact of physical 
and transition risks on regions highly vulnerable to environment- and climate-related risks (e.g., 
those with heavy dependence on fossil fuels or subject to higher risks of droughts and extreme 
weather events).    
 Encouraging disclosures of environmental risk exposures and ERA results 
As stated in NGFS (2019a), the NGFS emphasizes the importance of a robust and 
internationally consistent climate and environmental disclosure framework. In countries 
where tools and capacity are relatively more developed, central banks and supervisors can 
encourage disclosures of FIs’ exposures to environment- and climate-related risks (e.g., 
percentages of portfolios in high carbon assets and in heavily-polluting industries) and their 
ERA results (including environmental stress tests and scenario analyses) in line with TCFD 
recommendations. Semi-compulsory (e.g., the “comply or explain” requirement) or 
compulsory disclosures can be considered when capacities are further enhanced.  
As FIs’ abilities to produce decision-useful disclosures depend critically on disclosures by firms 
in the real economy, central banks and financial supervisors could work with securities 
regulators and exchanges as well as environmental ministries to improve corporate level 
reporting on environmental and climate-related information and to ensure the reported 
information is user-friendly to FIs and market participants. Industry associations and NGOs can 
also organize pilot projects for environmental information disclosures by corporates and FIs 
for demonstration purposes. 
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 Developing Key Risk Indicators (KRI) and statistics 
The NGFS and relevant IOs can conduct research and encourage market bodies and academic 
institutions to develop key risk indicators to identify and measure the most important 
environmental and climate-related risks with financial implications and enable data 
comparability and aggregation. Such indicators could be developed along sector lines (e.g., 
commercial banking, asset management, and insurance). Once developed, these indictors can 
be used as the basis for compiling environmental risk statistics for the financial sector at both 
country and global levels. Such statistics will be useful for monitoring and assessing the levels 
and changes of environment- and climate -related risks a country or the global financial sector 
is exposed to, and will enable forward looking risk analysis on an aggregate basis. They could 
also contribute to better understanding of risk classifications, potential mitigants and 
recommended actions.  
 Supporting development and adoption of unsustainable finance taxonomies 
NGFS (2019a) called for policymakers to bring together the relevant stakeholders and experts 
to develop a taxonomy that enhances the transparency around which economic activities 
contribute to the transition to a green and low-carbon economy and are more exposed to 
environment- and climate-related risks (both physical and transition). In jurisdictions where 
the lack of unsustainable finance taxonomies forms a barrier to green finance development 
and environment- and climate-related risk analysis, regulators could take initiatives in 
developing such taxonomies or encouraging the adoption of certain international taxonomies 
already available. For jurisdictions that need help in taxonomy development, IOs and NGOs 
could provide assistance. International platforms and relevant IOs, such as the International 
Platforms for Sustainable Finance (IPSF) and the ISO Technical Committee on Sustainable 
Finance, could explore options for harmonizing sustainable finance taxonomies.   
5 Organization of this Occasional Paper  
The rest of this Occasional Paper, consisting of 36 chapters, is organized as follows. Part I 
includes chapters on ERA methodologies that are or can be potentially applied by commercial 
banks, with a focus on analyzing credit risk implications of environment- and climate-related 
physical and transition risks. Part II includes chapters on ERA methodologies that are or can be 
potentially applied by asset managers to analyze market and credit risks of environment- and 
climate-related physical and transition risks, as well as methodologies developed by or for 
insurance companies to assess liability risks arising from their climate-related exposures. The 
tools and methodologies presented in most of the chapters in Parts I and II take the form of 
scenario analysis and stress testing and thus provide forward-looking assessments of future 
impact of environment- and climate-related risks facing FIs. Part III includes chapters on ESG 
index and rating methodologies already adopted by some asset managers to quantifying the 
current exposure of ESG risks of investment portfolios. Part IV includes chapters on a number 
of cross-cutting issues, including methodology comparison, scenario assumptions, and carbon 
risk assessment tools.   
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 An Approach to Measuring Physical Climate 
Risk in Bank Loan Portfolios  
 
by 
Four Twenty Seven, a Moody’s affiliate1 
Abstract 
Banks’ exposures to physical climate risk are largely determined by extreme weather events 
and chronic changes to climatic patterns at the location of the assets underlying their loan 
portfolios. Banks can leverage forward-looking climate data from global climate models to 
identify and manage this emerging risk. Key elements of an effective physical climate risk 
assessment include mapping assets and assessing each asset’s projected risk using the best 
available science, capturing relative change for each location, and incorporating multiple 
datasets to capture different dimensions of risk across hazards. Four Twenty Seven’s analysis 
includes climate risk scores for heat stress, floods, hurricanes & typhoons, sea level rise and 
water stress, leveraging the downscaled outputs of global climate models alongside other 
environmental datasets. These scores are based on the precise location of assets, but the 
consistent methodology allows for global comparison of risk. Once credit analysts have a view 
of the risk exposure of the assets underlying a mortgage or commercial loan portfolio, for 
example, this knowledge can inform due diligence and annual mortgage review processes.  The 
impacts of climate hazards on clients’ probabilities of default depends on many factors 
including an asset’s sensitivity to the hazards to which it is exposed, as well as asset-level and 
regional resilience efforts. Credit analysts can use forward-looking climate risk scores to ask 
informed questions around sensitivity and resilience to help clients and potential clients to 
mitigate these risks.  
Keywords: physical risk, climate risk, resilience, credit risk, banks, asset-level risk 
1 Introduction  
Banks are under increasing pressure from regulators to integrate climate change 
considerations into their risk management driven by concern about systemic exposure to 
climate change through their loan portfolios (NGFS, 2019a). Banks’ exposure to risks from the 
physical impacts of climate change are in part based on the physical locations of the assets 
underlying the loans or projects they finance. This chapter will present an approach to 
assessing physical climate risk exposures for real assets and provide examples of how credit 
analysts can leverage these data. This process can be used to assess and manage climate risk 
exposure across asset types, including mortgages and real estate investments or debt 
financing, corporations, and infrastructure finance.  
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Natalie Ambrosio, director of communications, Four Twenty Seven (now a Moody’s affiliate), 
email: nambrosio@427mt.com; Emilie Mazzacurati, founder and CEO of Four Twenty Seven; Jing Zhang, Managing Director 
and Global Head of Research & Modelling at Moody's Analytics; Nik Steinberg, Director of Analytics, Four Twenty Seven. 
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2 Purpose: leverage climate data to assess risk exposure for banks 
 From climate risk to credit risk 
Climate hazards can affect credit risks through direct and indirect impacts on the assets 
underlying a loan, including through impacts on real assets, operations, supply chains, and 
markets, 2  which in turn affect credit indicators such as cash flows, capital expenditure, 
profitability, demand, and liabilities. Corporations’ credit risks are driven by climate change 
impacts on corporate facilities and across the value chain, while infrastructure finance and 
mortgages are directly affected by the exposures of the assets underlying the loan. 
To manage their exposures to physical climate risks, banks must first assess to which climate 
hazards the assets underlying their loan portfolios may be exposed. Working from the location 
of the assets underlying their lending portfolios, lenders can obtain forward-looking data from 
global climate models for relevant locations. Banks should strive to use data that is consistent 
and comparable using the most accurate, up-to-date information on projected climate 
changes. The methodology described in the next few sections illustrates how Four Twenty 
Seven recommends banks use climate data to understand and mitigate climate risks in their 
lending portfolios.  
3 Physical climate risk assessment overview 
 Map assets 
The relevance and potential impacts of climate change will depend on the physical locations 
of the assets. Different regions have different elevations, topography and sensitivities and will 
thus be affected differently as the climate changes. It is essential for credit analysts to obtain 
the specific location and features of assets underlying their lending portfolios, including the 
asset type, to factor in the sensitivity of the asset to climate-related hazards. 
In addition to the asset-level view of risk exposure, whenever possible, it is also valuable to 
have a view of how an asset is exposed to climate risk throughout its value chain (Hubert et 
al., 2018). For example, a port may be exposed to increasing hurricanes or typhoons which 
increase repair costs that necessitate reallocations of the budget. However, this port’s revenue 
may rely on transport of crops from agricultural land whose productivity is falling due to 
enduring droughts. Or it may export goods that travel by freight on a coastal railway that will 
experience chronic flooding due to its coastal location. Likewise, operations and revenues at 
corporate facilities often depend on supply chains with wide-reaching global footprints and 
varying exposure to climate hazards. For analysts to obtain a thorough view on the climate risk 
exposure in the value chain, they must understand the underlying geographic locations that 
underpin an asset’s value chain. When available, this information can be leveraged to provide 
a more informed view of how an asset may be exposed to credit risk from climate risk (Stiroh, 
2016). 
 Assess forward-looking risk 
Working with climate models can be challenging – dozens of different models exist, with 
different granularity and time horizons (Flato et al., 2014). Four Twenty Seven recommends 
banks strive to use data that is consistent and comparable – indeed, climate risk assessments 
need to be systematic and comparable across assets to allow for the comparison of risk among 
assets across regions. The data should also lean on best-available science. As climate science 
                                                     
2 Harnish, Molly. Central Banks and Climate Risks. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. 2019. 
https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/econ_focus/2019/q2-3/feature1 
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develops, the precision of characterizing changes in different risks will improve.  Thus, it is 
important to base climate risk assessments on the best-available, peer-reviewed science. 
Leveraging adaptable, science-driven inputs to inform their risk assessments allows analysts’ 
understanding of their underlying climate risk exposure to grow as the science develops. 
Capturing relative change 
As each region is acclimated to specific historical climate conditions, the same extremity of 
event can have different impacts on economies and assets in different locations (Gershunov & 
Guirguis, 2012). For example, the summer of 2019 saw record high temperatures around the 
globe, but these temperatures looked significantly different in different places, with 
Anchorage sweltering at 32C˚ and Paris seeking relief at 43C˚ (Baker, 2019).  Anchorage’s high 
temperatures would have caused less disruptions in Paris. Locations that experience the 
greatest relative changes are often the most vulnerable, even if the absolute temperature, for 
example, is not the highest. Those areas that do not yet experience significant heat waves or 
severe storms are likely to be less prepared for their occurrences than those that have at least 
some experience with these severe conditions.  
Four Twenty Seven’s methodology takes into account the projected relative change, compared 
to a location-specific historical baseline. For example, extreme heat alerts that are based on a 
set temperature, rather than location-specific health thresholds tend to trigger alerts at higher 
temperatures than those systems based on temperatures at which the local population 
experiences adverse health impacts. Thus, when projecting exposures to extreme heat, 
assessments are most effective when leveraging thresholds that indicate when the local 
population is likely to be affected (Steinberg et al., 2018). 
Incorporating multiple datasets 
Four Twenty Seven’s methodology integrates a diverse set of climate and environmental 
datasets to capture different elements of changing conditions. Understanding different types 
of climate hazards requires different types of data. While global climate models can be 
downscaled to provide informative projections of temperature and precipitation changes, 
other phenomenon such as floods and droughts are also affected by other interacting factors. 
Having a view on the different dimensions of risk exposure for each hazard, and how each of 
these elements may change over time, provides for a more nuanced risk assessment.  
 Identify hotspots 
The results of this systematic climate risk screening are rescaled from 0-100 and 
communicated in standardized metrics that can inform decision-making. The most important 
element is that data are applicable to a specific location but conveyed in metrics that are 
comparable across the world. Four Twenty Seven’s analysis captures different dimensions of 
risk from climate hazards including floods, heat stress, hurricanes and typhoons, sea level rise, 
and water stress. Communicating the results with rescaled metrics, allows credit analysts to 
compare risks across a set of assets based on indicators that have different raw values. Credit 
analysts can leverage both standardized values communicating risk to each hazard, as well as 
raw measure values for the underlying risk indicators that can inform further analysis of what 
is driving an asset’s risk. 
Since different levels of exposures have different implications depending on the hazard in 
question, identifying different risk exposure thresholds can help analysts understand what a 
risk value may mean for the asset in question. Four Twenty Seven identifies five risk exposure 
thresholds defined based on the characteristics of the particular hazard to account for 
differences in potential disruption caused by different severities or frequencies of an event. 
Risk thresholds are described in more detail below. 
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How can asset managers assess their exposure to physical climate risks? 
Asset managers can also leverage science-driven climate risk assessments to understand 
and mitigate exposure to climate risk in their investment portfolios. While this chapter 
focuses on the ways in which banks can leverage Four Twenty Seven’s physical climate risk 
data, asset managers are exposed to the impacts of climate change through the ways in 
which climate hazards impact the corporations in which they invest and can also leverage 
forward-looking data to understand this risk. Corporate exposures to climate risk are driven 
by the exposures and sensitivities of their facilities to climate hazards and the businesses’ 
supply chains and markets in which they rely on for sales. As discussed above, corporations 
can experience disruptions due to climate impacts on each element of their value chains. 
Four Twenty Seven also provides science-driven climate risk data that provides a view on 
companies’ risk based on the exposure of their global facilities. This enables asset managers 
to identify and manage the climate risks in their portfolios. They can leverage quantitative 
risk scores to identify hotspots in their portfolios, such as corporations with above-average 
climate risk exposures compared to others in the sector, or corporations that have high 
exposures to specific hazards in multiple regions. This can allow for more thorough climate 
risk disclosures by investors (EBRD & GCA, 2018), can feed into passive investment strategies 
that hedge against climate risk, and can guide shareholder engagement around risk 
disclosures and resilience (LaManna, 2018). 
4 Detailed methodology: location-based physical climate risk scores 
 Climate data 
Four Twenty Seven’s methodology currently includes five major physical climate hazards 
associated with climate change: heat stress, floods, hurricanes & typhoons, sea level rise and 
water stress. 
For temperature and precipitation-based indicators, we currently use outputs from statistically 
downscaled Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) models and indicator 
results are based on an ensemble average of the models. 
Each model provides projections which begin in 2020 and extend to at least 2100, with slight 
variations depending on the indicator. We look at the period of 1975-2005 as a historical 
benchmark,3 and project future states in 2030-2040 under the “Business as Usual” scenario 
(RCP 8.5 concentration pathway). While there are ongoing discussions about which RCP most 
accurately reflects long-term conditions based on “business as usual,”(Hausfather & Peters, 
2020) we believe this scenario is the most valid for business purposes because any potential 
policy actions will only have a discernable impact on climate change by around 2050 (Steinberg 
et al., 2018). 
                                                     
3  This is the standard historical baseline used in climate modeling and provides a perspective on what society’s 
infrastructure and physiological acclimation is prepared for.  
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Figure 2-1 Hazards included in Four Twenty Seven’s physical climate risk application 
 
*Wildfires forthcoming 
 
 Risk indicators 
For each hazard we identify indicators that capture shifts in tail-end distributions, including 
both absolute and relative changes in conditions, and assess exposure at a specific site location. 
Indicator values are rescaled and normalized so that measures can be aggregated into facility 
risk scores that are comparable globally, despite the different units of the raw values. 
Heat Stress 
The heat stress score measures the relative change over time in both the frequency and 
severity of hot days, as well as average temperatures. It includes three different temperature 
indicators based on climate projections. This data is downscaled to a resolution of 25 x 25km. 
We derive heat stress indicators using data from global climate models that are part of CMIP5, 
overseen by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change4 and downscaled by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 5 
Floods 
The flood score measures the severity and frequency of historical floods (both rainfall- and 
riverine-based flooding), the frequency of future heavy rainfall events, and the intensity of 
prolonged periods of heavy rainfall. It includes climate projections for precipitation changes, 
as well as modeled data on historical inundation and simulated extremes that could occur in 
the future based on local rainfall and topography. Flood risk is at a resolution of 90 x 90m. We 
use global climate models for the precipitation data used in our flood scores, alongside 
historical and simulated flood data from Fathom,6 a flood risks analytics firm. 
Hurricanes & Typhoons 
The hurricane & typhoon score captures geographical exposure to hurricanes and typhoons, 
also known as tropical cyclones. Because climate models cannot predict specific instances of 
hurricanes & typhoons, we analyze historical data on wind speed and barometric pressure for 
                                                     
4 https://www.ipcc.ch/  
5 https://www.nasa.gov/ 
6 https://www.fathom.global/  
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1200 hurricanes & typhoons from 1984-2017, from the World Meteorological Organization7. 
This tells us which areas have been most exposed to cyclones historically, and therefore will 
be most exposed to future increases in cyclone frequency and intensity.  
Sea Level Rise 
The sea level rise score estimates the absolute and relative increase in the frequency of coastal 
floods. It includes high-resolution digital elevation model data, as well as estimates of local 
storm surge and sea level rise. The resolution is 90 x 90m. We use data from weather and 
climate data provider CLIMsystems8 for sea level rise. 
Water Stress 
The water stress score measures the projected changes in drought-like patterns over time, 
including changes in water supply and demand. To assess water stress risk we leverage climate 
projections for precipitation changes, and also include data on current water scarcity and 
projected water demand changes in the area, from the World Resources Institute9. The data 
are at the watershed level. 
 Sensitivity factors 
Four Twenty Seven adjusts some risk scores to consider the differing sensitivities of different 
facility types to certain climate hazards. A facility’s heat stress and water stress score will be 
partially determined by its dependence on resources affected by climate change such as water 
and energy, or its reliance on labor. For example, a data center is more energy intensive than 
an office and will thus be more sensitive to increasing temperatures’ effects on energy supplies. 
As a result, an office would receive a lower heat stress score than a data center in the same 
area. We use peer-reviewed research to identify which types of facilities receive adjustments 
for heat and water stress, based on a facility’s industry. For example, to determine adjustments 
to heat stress scores for facilities that are supported by outdoor labor or operate in non-
climate controlled conditions, we reference the article, “Temperature and the allocation of 
time: Implications for climate change,” in the Journal of Labor Economics (Graff Zivin & Neidell, 
2014). 
 Exposure thresholds 
After a facility receives a score for each climate hazard, we assign to it a risk rating. There are 
five risk ratings based on thresholds ranging from “no risk” to “red flag.” For heat stress and 
water stress, the thresholds are based on relative statistical thresholds referring to how 
exposed an asset is compared to other assets in Four Twenty Seven’s database of over a million 
corporate facilities. Floods, cyclones, and sea level rise are based on absolute thresholds due 
to the binary nature of risk for these hazards, where an asset is either susceptible or not to 
flooding due to its elevation or proximity to waterways, for example. 
5 Translating climate risk to credit risk   
As discussed previously, an ultimate goal for banks in incorporating climate assessment is to 
understand the credit consequence of climate factors. We discuss how we can achieve this by 
combining the insights discussed in the previous sections with the well-established credit risk 
modelling techniques for various asset classes.  
                                                     
7 https://public.wmo.int/en 
8 http://www.climsystems.com/  
9 https://www.wri.org/ 
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Publicly Traded Firms  
The so-called structured model framework, first developed by Merton, Black and Scholes in 
the 1970s, further developed and commercialized by KMV Corporation and later bought by 
Moody’s, is widely considered as the industry standard for assessing the credit risk of listed 
firms (Nazeran & Dwyer, 2015). In Moody’s Expected Default Frequency™ (EDF™) framework, 
the initial asset value of an entity can take on many different paths over time, and it captures 
the probability of these asset values falling below the default point (See Figure 2-2).  
Figure 2-2 Normal course of asset values over time for a particular entity 
 
Based on this framework, we acknowledge that negative climate shocks are characterized by 
uncertainty of timing, differential impacts across locations, and variations in the magnitudes 
of depreciation across different entities and assets, affecting an entity’s overall asset value. 
With acute weather events, asset value is more likely to be lower than expected, increasing 
future asset volatility and increasing default risk (Figure 2-3 illustrates different asset value 
paths).  
Figure 2-3 Adjusted asset value paths due to acute weather event 
 
We can incorporate physical climate risks as one dimension affecting an entity’s asset value 
due to extreme weather events. To estimate the frequency and magnitude of these uncertain 
negative shocks, and ultimately their effect on credit risk, we undertake the following steps: 
• Leverage standard Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) to estimate expected 
worldwide damage due to physical climate risk under 2 degrees and 4 degrees 
warming scenarios. 
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• Employ Four Twenty Seven’s climate risk scores to estimate how this global damage is 
distributed to locations with different climate exposure.   
• To calibrate how much an extreme weather event of a certain magnitude affects the 
asset value of an entity, observed asset depreciations due to past extreme weather 
events are used as a proxy for the negative shocks associated with future events. 
• Based on an entity’s location, we have a distribution of the frequencies of extreme 
weather events facing the firm in the future. Combining this with the calibrated 
distribution of the extent an event reduces the firm’s asset value, we increase our 
forecast of asset volatility in the EDF model to reflect this additional source of risk. 
As asset volatility is a main driver of probability of default in the EDF model, the climate-
adjusted asset volatility forecasts result in climate-adjusted PD term structures for each firm.    
Sovereign and Muni   
The spread on a sovereign—either the spread in the CDS market or the difference between 
the sovereign yield and the risk-free rate—is closely linked with the sovereign's credit risk, as 
reflected by the rating. Climate change will affect the rating of a sovereign in many ways: 
weaker economic activity and infrastructure damage will reduce GDP growth while increasing 
growth uncertainty. Natural disasters will tax institutional and fiscal strengths of a sovereign. 
Demographic shifts could reduce a country’s tax base while at the same time contributing to 
political tension. Well established approaches to converting a rating into a Through the Cycle 
PD and LGD as well as on credit spread exist.  
We can create a climate risk adjusted PD for a sovereign as follows: Integrated Assessment 
models (IAMs) models provide estimates of the reductions in GDP growth. Four Twenty 
Seven’s climate scores reflect the vulnerability to heat stress, water stress, sea level rise, floods, 
and hurricanes / typhoons as well as the strength of the economy and social institutions, which 
Moody’s will leverage to determine the impact of climate change on institutional, 
infrastructure and fiscal strength and the corresponding impact on rating at the country 
level. We will use these scores and outputs from the IAMs models to assign the reduction in 
GDP to the countries that are most vulnerable to climate change. With the adjusted GDP 
growth, we will compute the relevant climate adjusted financial metrics. The reductions then 
enable estimation of the impact on the rating, the probability of default, and other 
corresponding risk factors. 
The municipal market includes local government, water and sewer, higher education, public 
power, housing, not-for-profit, airport, state governments, toll facilitates and ports. Like 
sovereigns, municipal issuers’ ratings are shaped by exposures to heat stress, water stress, sea 
level rise, and extreme events as well as the strengths of the economies and social institutions. 
Quantitative models of muni bonds (e.g., Moody’s Qrate Model)10 estimate the rating as a 
function of the economic strength of the municipal issuers using measures like “airline 
payments per passenger,” “per capita GDP,” “operating cash flow,” “age distribution of 
population,” “debt as a percent of revenues,” and “population growth.” Key to evaluating 
climate change impacts on municipal issuers will be linking the municipal issuer’s climate 
scores and credit rating risk drivers. Once these linkages are established, we can estimate the 
impact on the rating, the probability of default, and other corresponding risk factors. 
                                                     
10 QRATE (Quantitative Ratings Estimator). Moody’s Analytics. https://www.moodysanalytics.com/product-list/qrate-
quantitative-ratings-estimator 
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Infrastructure  
Infrastructure is exposed to construction risk, country risk, counterparty risk, market risk and 
operational risk. Infrastructure investment ratings are also influenced by a suite of climate 
hazards as well as the strength of the economy and social institutions. Risk drivers for 
infrastructure investments include revenue and cost stability, political risk, debt service 
coverage, and construction risk. Establishing the impacts of climate change on infrastructure 
investments necessitates linking project climate scores to credit-rating risk drivers. These 
linkages then enable the estimation of rating impacts, the probability of default, and other 
corresponding risk factors. 
Commercial Real Estate   
Commercial property performance is subject to environmental influences on revenue 
generation potential, operating costs, and ultimately, collateral asset valuation. The potential 
impacts of climate change on real estate assets can occur through several channels. Acute 
physical risks, such as hurricanes and floods, represent catastrophic events that can cause 
considerable property damages. Long-term chronic physical risks, like sea-level rise and 
changing precipitation patterns have the potential to impact both supply and demand for real 
estate. Under the most pessimistic climate scenarios such risks are projected to grow in 
frequency and severity during this century. Optimistic climate projections are predicated on 
the assumed adoption of aggressive global decarbonization practices. The transition away 
from carbon sources of energy will require changes in policy and regulation, technological 
investment, as well as market adaptation. Real estate is also subject to these transition risks 
via uncertain future tax policies, environmental and efficiency standards, and changing 
consumer preferences for environmentally conscientious products.  
An accurate assessment of the net income potential for a given property is vital for lenders. 
Typically, these assessments do not account for the impact that environmental factors may 
have on key operating revenue and cost drivers. In this context, a property may face revenue 
headwinds from downtime and business disruptions as a result of a catastrophic climate event. 
Similarly, demand could suffer if tenants prefer space in buildings with improved energy 
efficiency or other green infrastructure. Several significant cost drivers could also be at play in 
a changing climate: higher operating costs, capital expenditure and maintenance costs, and 
higher insurance premiums could impact a borrower’s debt service coverage. The impact on 
collateral is also important, as asset values can shift in climate change effected areas, 
potentially resulting in decreased liquidity in those markets.  
The above-mentioned climate change impacts on properties’ net operating income (NOI) and 
value can be translated into key ratios such as DSCR and LTV, which serve as the most critical 
inputs to real estate loans’ credit risk assessment framework, including Moody’s Commercial 
Mortgage Metrics™ (CMM™) or most internal credit risk models (Chen & Zhang, 2011). The 
end results for this integrated analysis framework can be compared to assess various climate 
change scenarios. 
6 Case studies: evaluating the climate risk exposure of loans  
Physical climate risk data can be systematically integrated into lending decisions through loan 
origination, annual review processes, and risk management and reporting. The case studies 
below provide examples of how credit analysts can leverage Four Twenty Seven’s physical 
climate risk application.  
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Mortgage portfolios 
The annual review process for mortgage portfolios is a good case of application of this 
methodology, because they often contain millions of rows of properties that analysts cannot 
feasibly assess individually. As credit analysts typically have the address underlying each 
mortgage, they can easily upload the portfolio locations into Four Twenty Seven’s physical 
climate risk scoring application to receive risk scores for all the properties. Users need to input 
each asset’s location (street address or latitude/longitude), as well as the facility activity (i.e., 
shopping center or manufacturing facility). Climate risk scores can help analysts by informing 
an initial, automated hotspot analysis that identifies locations above a certain risk threshold 
or have high exposure to multiple hazards. Analysts can then explore the risks at these high-
risk sites more thoroughly.  
The case study below considers a sample mortgage portfolio that has been screened for its 
climate risk exposure11. Given the impacts of flooding on residential real estate and the ways 
in which repeated inundation, insurance costs, and repair expenses, can affect mortgage 
repayments and property values, a mortgage analyst may be particularly interested in the 
properties’ flood risk. After uploading the spreadsheet of mortgage locations and scoring the 
portfolio, the analyst can sort the assets based on their flood risk scores to identify properties 
with the highest risk exposure.  
In this portfolio there are two properties with red flags for flood risk and six properties with 
high risk (Figure 2-4). Properties with red flags for floods are susceptible to high frequency of 
flooding and/or high flooding severity during events that have a 1% chance of occurring 
annually. Likewise, properties with high flood risk are also exposed to some inundation during 
flood events. Even a single severe flood can significantly damage real estate and lead to 
significant costs for homeowners. In the portfolio below, there is one asset with red flags for 
floods, hurricanes & typhoons, and sea level rise, suggesting that this asset carries substantial 
exposure to climate risk. The manifestation of this risk exposure into financial loss will be 
influenced by how structurally prepared both the home and the surrounding area are for 
floods and high winds. Exploring the different dimensions of risk underlying each asset’s 
exposure, alongside any site-specific preparedness efforts and regional climate adaptation, 
will help the analyst obtain a more thorough view of whether the asset’s physical risk exposure 
may affect the chances of mortgage default.  
                                                     
11 The data and visuals used in these case studies are from Four Twenty Seven’s climate risk application. 
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Figure 2-4 The exposure of assets in a sample mortgage portfolio sorted based on 
their exposure to flooding 
 
Source: Four Twenty Seven 
 
 
Promoting Equitable Climate Resilience 
Making lending decisions based on quantitative climate risk scores does have the 
potential to lead to a disproportionate impact on low-income families or other vulnerable 
households that are frequently among the most exposed to climate hazards due to many 
interacting economic and social factors. A lending strategy that prevents loans to low-
income populations would not contribute to systemic resilience but may rather 
perpetuate vulnerabilities. However, banks can engage with mortgage applicants around 
the physical climate risks they’ve identified, helping families to understand and mitigate 
risk exposure that they may otherwise not be aware of if the risks were not disclosed. 
Banks can also identify resources for families striving to mitigate their exposure and 
encourage loan applicants to work with insurers or contractors to implement resilience-
measures.  
Banks also have an opportunity to use a forward-looking view of climate risk exposure to 
ensure that new homes are not built in areas largely exposed to sea level rise or on the 
edges of drought prone forests vulnerable to wildfires, for example. Reducing new 
development in such exposed areas will help to mitigate the climate risk that leads to 
stranded assets and has detrimental impacts on financial systems and communities 
globally. 
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Commercial Real Estate 
Figure 2-5 Sites of commercial real estate highly exposed to floods in Europe 
 
Source: Four Twenty Seven 
Analysts can also integrate climate risk into their due diligence processes, such as for 
commercial loans. Unlike mortgage portfolios, this process may involve fewer assets and may 
allow for a more thorough view of climate risk exposure at each asset.  By inputting the address 
of the assets underlying potential loans, analysts can obtain climate risk scores for each asset, 
as well as more detailed information on the underlying indicators. This informs the due 
diligence process by showing regional trends, based on the geographic distribution of assets 
and climate hazards, and provides insight on the risk drivers at each potential asset. By 
combining this information with the bank’s knowledge of the life of each loan, and the 
activities at each facility, the analyst can make more informed lending decisions to manage the 
bank’s risk.  
In this case study, a credit analyst uploaded a commercial loan portfolio with assets across 
Europe (Figure 2-5) and started by exploring the assets’ exposure to floods. Four Twenty 
Seven’s climate risk scoring application allows users to switch between table and map view to 
identify regional trends. In this case, viewing the assets mapped by their location and colored 
based on their flood risk allowed the analyst to see that there are several assets that are highly 
exposed to floods, while some are less exposed. The analyst may want to review the risk 
exposure of the highly exposed assets in more detail to understand what drives risk at each 
site and identify if these facilities are highly exposed to other hazards. The analyst may start 
with the freight logistics facility in Milan (Figure 2-6), clicking on its location to review the other 
risks at this facility, revealing that it also a high exposure to heat stress and water stress. 
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Figure 2-6 Climate risk scores for one of the most exposed assets in a commercial 
real estate portfolio*  
 
*This freight logistics facility in Milan has a red flag for floods and high exposure to 
heat stress and water stress. 
Source: Four Twenty Seven 
 
The analyst may flag this site as one to examine more thoroughly during the due diligence 
process to understand what drives this facility’s exposure.  This asset’s flood risk shows that it 
experiences relatively frequent flooding and is likely to experience more severe flooding 
moving forward. Analysts can use their understanding of the activities of the asset underlying 
a potential loan, alongside their information on the lifetime of the loan, to guide their 
interpretation of the climate risk assessment.  For example, logistics facilities often rely on 
industrial equipment which can incur costly damage during flood events, and operations 
relying on specific equipment and facilities can be easily disrupted due to inundation. Likewise, 
this facility also relies on regional transportation infrastructure to receive and distribute goods. 
Thus, flooding may be particularly significant for this facility since it is likely to experience 
disruptions if regional infrastructure is inundated even when its own equipment may not be 
damaged. This data highlights the importance of flood preparedness at this asset, as well as 
the preparedness of regional transportation infrastructure to withstand increasing extreme 
precipitation. The analyst may also note the asset’s high exposure to heat stress and water 
stress, since these are applicable due to the energy-intensive nature of freight logistics 
facilities and their reliance on outdoor labor.  After exploring the underlying risk drivers at the 
asset, the credit analyst can discuss this risk with the loan applicant to understand if and how 
the applicant is preparing for these impacts and reducing the risk. Analysts’ well-rounded 
understanding of how an asset is exposed to changing conditions in the next several decades 
can inform their client engagement around risk and resilience, so they can build a thorough 
view on how this risk exposure may translate into credit impacts.  
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7 Limitations and need for further research 
Four Twenty Seven’s climate risk scoring methodology is based on the specific location of 
assets, which provides the projection of how assets may be affected by changing climate 
hazards. However, banks do not currently have complete records of the exact locations 
underlying their loans. This data gap makes it challenging for some banks to leverage this 
category of data12. 
The primary output of this physical climate risk assessment is forward-looking exposure to 
several physical climate hazards out to mid-century, accounting for the sensitivity of different 
asset types. However, the impact of climate hazards on an entity’s credit worthiness depends 
not only on exposure and sensitivity, but also on preparedness. For example, a home that is 
elevated or an office that has elevated its electronics and put tiled floor on the ground floor, 
are less likely to incur costly flood damages than a home that sits on the ground in the 
floodplain and the office without flood defense. Preparedness is a key aspect for credit 
analysts to investigate if they find an asset has high exposure to climate risk.  
An asset’s preparedness will depend both on its own structural resilience to extreme events, 
as well as the resilience of the surrounding region which it depends upon for resources and 
employees or clients (Ambrosio & Kim, 2019). This information is highly specific to the 
characteristics of each asset, but is an essential element in forming a comprehensive 
understanding of the potential material impacts of climate change on an asset or the 
organization that it is part of. There is a need for continued research around systematic, 
context-specific approaches to assessing resilience at scale. In the meantime, credit analysts 
can improve their understanding of their clients’ risks by leveraging the findings from physical 
climate risk assessments to engage with clients or potential clients about the exposure of their 
assets, asking specific questions about an asset’s operations, supply chain dependencies, 
resource use, market positioning, and other elements that will influence how likely a loan is to 
be impacted by the exposure of its underlying asset. 
Four Twenty Seven currently provides an assessment of physical exposure, and is working with 
its parent company, Moody’s Corporation, to provide a quantitative estimate of the financial 
value at risk for each asset class. 
Because banks have not traditionally consistently integrated climate risk into their credit 
evaluation processes, it is challenging to systemically project potential impacts in monetary 
terms. However, as described above, performing systematic climate risk screening is the first 
step from which to build a more sophisticated understanding of credit risk exposure and 
develop new financial metrics that connect financial risk to climate risk. As banks begin to 
integrate climate risk data more systematically into their processes, they have an opportunity 
to translate this information into indicators that speak to traditional financial reporting, such 
as Probability of Default and Loss Given Default.  
Likewise, location-specific climate data can be used to develop scenario analysis, that 
considers the uncertainty of modeling the future. By leveraging science-driven data that shows 
different potential outcomes based on different climate futures, banks can develop 
approaches to understand the range of their risk under different scenarios. This can help 
informed a more nuanced view of loans’ risk exposure and also support growing reporting 
requirements. Four Twenty Seven recommends an approach to scenario analysis that accounts 
                                                     
12 GeoAsset. Spatial Finance Initiative. https://spatialfinanceinitiative.com/geoasset-project/ 
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for the variations in projected physical impacts due to scientific uncertainty (Steinberg et al., 
2019). 
After obtaining forward-looking, location-specific projections that capture the potential 
impacts from a changing climate, banks also need capacity building to help analysts 
understand these impacts and respond accordingly. While it is essential to start with 
scientifically grounded, forward-looking data, the users of this data need to be trained to 
understand what potential impacts can mean for credit risk. As mentioned above, each climate 
hazard can affect corporate facilities, real estate and infrastructure assets, by increasing 
operating or repair costs and decreasing revenue due to business disruptions. These impacts 
can reduce funding reserves or lead to below-target revenues, with implications for loan 
repayment. Credit analysts need to understand these risk pathways so they can make informed 
decisions based on climate risk data. They also need to understand the uncertainty inherent 
in climate projections, the ways in which impacts vary in different regions and sectors, and the 
ways climate risks interact with other credit factors.  
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  Assessing Credit Risk in a Changing Climate: 
Transition-Related Risks in Corporate Lending Portfolios 
 
By 
Oliver Wyman1 
Abstract 
The methodology described in this chapter is designed to assess the impact of climate 
transition scenarios on the creditworthiness of corporate counterparties. In the absence of 
historical data, any credible climate impact assessment requires a form of bottom-up analysis. 
The methodology is anchored in the climate science and is a combination of top-down and 
bottom-up modules to optimize the trade-off between workload and analytical rigour. For the 
most material and/or representative exposures, we condition the financials and cashflows of 
the counterparties before re-assessing their creditworthiness (bottom-up module). We then 
extrapolate the results of the bottom-up approach based on relevant customer characteristics 
to cover the remainder of the portfolio (top-down module). The bottom-up module allows to 
gain a deep knowledge of the potential impact of climate scenarios while the top-down 
module enables institutions to perform a portfolio-wide climate stress-testing, even in the 
context of limitations in data or time and resources. The scope, depth, and complexity of the 
analysis is tailored to be proportionate to the materiality of the exposures 
Keywords: climate risk, transition risk, TCFD, climate scenario analysis, sustainable finance, 
climate stress test 
1 Introduction 
Increasingly, climate change is being recognized as an issue not just for governments and civil 
society but one that the financial sector needs to understand and address. Climate change 
represents a set of risks for banks (such as potential credit losses on borrowers who are no 
longer competitive in the transition to a low carbon economy) as well as opportunities (such 
as lending to new categories of borrowers). Climate scenario analysis is an important tool for 
understanding and integrating climate risks into a bank’s broader risk management framework. 
Climate scenario analysis can be thought of as a “what-if” analysis of one potential state of the 
world under a specific climate scenario that allows institutions to assess their climate-related 
exposures; for example, a scenario under which a low-carbon transition materialises. A 
scenario is therefore a plausible “hypothetical construct” of the future, not a precise forecast. 
Climate scenario analysis helps an institution to explore and better understand their potential 
exposures to climate-related risks.  
                                                     
1  This chapter is written by John Colas, Partner & Vice Chairman, Financial Services Americas, email: 
john.colas@oliverwyman.com; Ilya Khaykin, Partner, email: Ilya.Khaykin@oliverwyman.com; Alban Pyanet, Principal, email: 
Alban.Pyanet@oliverwyman.com. 
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2 Purpose 
The key aim of our methodology is to help financial institutions assess the transition-related 
exposures to climate risks in their corporate loan portfolios where they may have concerns 
about the impacts of a low-carbon transition (for instance due to change in policies, technology, 
or market sentiment), as well as an appetite to explore and capture the associated 
opportunities. Corporate loan portfolios are short-term compared to the time horizon of a 
low-carbon transition, providing financial institutions with the flexibility to adjust such 
portfolios over time. However, financial institutions should not wait to assess the potential 
impacts and opportunities of climate change, because: 
• The transition may unfold in a disorderly manner, for instance triggered by a sudden 
regulatory response, leaving little time for financial institutions and their clients to 
adjust, and potentially creating a “climate-driven Minsky moment”;2 
• Even if the transition happens in an orderly manner, changing the exposures and risk 
profile of a corporate loan portfolio takes time: assessing risks and growth prospects, 
developing a coherent strategy, and building capabilities and relationships to affect 
the profile of the client base require advanced action; 
• Finally, understanding climate risks and opportunities will allow financial institutions 
to engage with their customers to help them manage the transition to a low-carbon 
future and establish themselves as trusted advisors. 
The purpose is to comprehensively assess the impact of orderly and disorderly transition 
scenarios on the creditworthiness of wholesale clients across all sectors and geographies: it 
helps build awareness of climate risks and can be used not only by risk practitioners and 
sustainability teams at financial institutions, but also by the business sector, supervisors, and 
investors.  
Given the end goal is to integrate climate risks into the broader risk management framework 
and within decision-making processes, we believe it is important to leverage existing metrics 
such as probability of default or expected loss, rather than use a standalone, climate-specific 
metric such as a climate score. This will facilitate understanding of the results by stakeholders 
and allow the outputs to be more readily evaluated within the organization’s existing business 
processes. 
The methodology described in this chapter is designed to be compatible with a wide range of 
climate scenarios. While it is focused on credit exposures and risks, the same methodology 
can be applied for other asset classes, such as equity investments, and outside of the financial 
services industry, for instance by corporates who would like to quantify their business 
exposure to climate transition risk. 
3 Methodology 
Our methodology to perform scenario analysis is composed of three modules (Figure 3-1): 
• The climate transition scenarios (both orderly and disorderly); 
                                                     
2 Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority (2018), Transition in Thinking: The impact of climate change on the UK 
banking sector. 
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• A “bottom-up” module, which assesses the impact of transition risk scenarios on a set 
of representative exposures; and 
• A “top-down” module, which extrapolates the name-level information to the 
remainder of the portfolio. 
Figure 3-1 Scenario analysis methodology – overview 
 
The rationale for developing both a top-down and a bottom-up module is to balance accuracy, 
comprehensiveness, and workload. The bottom-up module is critical to driving a deep 
understanding of the risks in the absence of historical data, while the top-down module makes 
its application across the portfolio more practical, for instance when data or time and 
resources are not sufficient to run a bottom-up analysis for all counterparties. In practice, a 
detailed, counterparty-level analysis can be performed on a sample of companies in each 
sector to evaluate the drivers and estimate the impact of the scenario on corporate 
performance. The size of the required sample depends on the homogeneity of the portfolio. 
The top-down module then extrapolates the impact to other companies in the portfolio. This 
technique reduces both the required time and resources, while maintaining integrity and 
accuracy of the analysis. 
The three modules are further detailed in the following. 
Climate scenarios 
Scenario analysis methodologies need to be compatible with a range of climate scenarios so 
that financial institutions can test several plausible “hypothetical constructs” of the future, 
and make strategic decisions based on this analysis. When performing scenario analysis, we 
use two types of climate transition scenarios – temperature-based scenarios and event-based 
scenarios (see Figure 3-2) – which we then apply to specific companies to evaluate their impact. 
Borrower characteristics 
(e.g. rating) 
Intermediary 
output
OutputInput
Climate 
scenarios Top down module
Bottom up module 
C
li
m
a
te
 s
c
e
n
a
ri
o
 m
o
d
e
ls
Impact on 
probability of 
default
Evolution of risk factors (by sector/geography)
Revenue
Low-carbon capex
Emissions cost
Climate credit 
quality index 
(by sector/geography)
The top-down module systematically applies 
the scenario across the portfolio and drives 
consistency and repeatability
Bottom-up analysis of select borrowers is used 
to calibrate the impact of cost and revenue 
drivers on credit ratings
Borrower –level analysis 
A
A-
BBB
AAA
Time
The impact of the scenario on all 
borrowers is assessed through a 
Merton-type model
Legend
 Assessing Credit Risk in a Changing Climate 
43 
Figure 3-2 Temperature and Event-based climate transition scenarios 
 
Temperature-based scenarios are holistic scenarios used by researchers, policymakers, and, 
increasingly, corporations to analyze how the world might achieve a particular change in 
average global temperature. They are essential for understanding and quantifying how the 
economy could evolve. Advanced models to develop these scenarios already exist and can be 
leveraged by financial institutions (Figure 3-3).  
Figure 3-3 Climate scenario models - Representative model structure 
 
Source: Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) 
 
The most sophisticated scenario models, such as the ones used by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), are intended as energy-economy-climate models with policy 
and research applications, leading to three issues: 
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• First, they often describe a smooth and orderly transition to a low-carbon economy, 
which is optimized to minimize the costs on the economy. In the other words, they 
often depict a best-case scenario, rather than stress scenario (such as a disorderly 
transition to a low-carbon economy). 
• Second, critical outputs for financial analysis are often unpublished or unavailable, 
forcing financial institutions to develop their own variables, further interpret some of 
the results, and pilot the analysis on a sample of their exposures. 
• Third, from a model risk management perspective, financial institutions need to get 
comfortable with the modelling assumptions made by scientists in a field they are 
often unfamiliar with. 
Event-based scenarios are scenarios focused on the potential short-term impact of one trigger 
event, such as the sudden implementation of a major carbon price regulation. This type of 
scenario can be used to model aspects of an abrupt or a disorderly transition to a low-carbon 
economy. At this stage, the industry at large is moving towards longer-term, orderly transition 
scenarios (Figure 3-4). However, from risk and stress testing perspectives, we also see value in 
modelling shorter-term, disorderly transition scenarios as they may tie to near-term decisions 
and highlight different risks. 
Abrupt or disorderly transition scenarios are not as well understood, but may create additional 
risks for institutions as, by definition, an abrupt or a disorderly transition would be less optimal 
for the economy. These types of scenarios are therefore useful candidates for climate stress 
testing and have been highlighted by regulators. 
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Figure 3-4 Climate scenarios used in the industry3 
 
Source: “Climate Change, Managing A New Financial Risk,” IACPM and Oliver 
Wyman, 2019  
The remainder of this section describes how we use the variables from the climate scenarios 
to assess the potential credit losses. Note the methodology is compatible with all climate 
scenarios that provide the relevant output variables.  
Bottom-up module 
The purpose of the bottom-up module is to assess the impact of the climate scenarios on the 
creditworthiness of a sample of companies. To this end, we build a linkage between climate 
scenarios, key drivers, and company-level financial statements at the counterparty level for all 
segments, as depicted in Figure 3-5.  
                                                     
3 For more information on climate scenarios, please refer to:  
- www.climatescenarios.org/primer/ 
- db1.ene.iiasa.ac.at/CDLINKSDB/ 
- www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2019 
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Figure 3-5 Bottom-up module overview 
 
 
We begin by assessing the evolution of key business drivers under a transition scenario 
(volume, unit cost, price, capital expenditure) for each segment. Table 3-1 shows an example 
of how the various drivers can be adjusted for oil and gas producers under a carbon tax 
scenario (where the tax is applied to producers). Figure 3-6 illustrates how the resulting profit 
margin of oil and gas upstream companies can be adjusted. 
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Table 3-1 Expected scenario impact on key drivers – Oil and gas Exploration and 
Production 
Driver Expected Scenario Impact Modelling approach 
Volume Some of the additional costs borne by the 
producers due to the tax will be passed 
onto the consumers; increased prices will 
lead to a decrease in demand/production 
Decrease volume of high cost 
producers to reflect the 
decreasing demand 
Unit Cost The marginal cost of extraction will be 
impacted by the cost of emissions: 
Released when oil and natural gas 
products are used  
Generated during the production process 
Shift cost curves upwards to 
reflect the additional costs of 
emissions due to the carbon tax 
 
Price The price paid by consumers will increase 
due to the carbon tax, however the margin 
for the producer will become smaller 
Assess scenario price and 
demand based on carbon 
intensity and elasticities of the 
sector 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Capital expenditure is expected to 
decrease reflecting the lower demand 
Represents investments to maintain 
current production or grow future 
production  
Link level of capital expenditure 
to prices 
 
Asset value Some high-cost oil and gas reserves will 
become uneconomical under the scenario 
due to lower demand and negative 
margins (sometimes referred to as 
“stranded assets”) 
Apply impairment on balance 
sheet of borrowers with high 
cost reserves to account for the 
decreasing demand 
 
Figure 3-6 Illustration of unit cost adjustment – Oil and gas Exploration and 
Production 
 
Once the key drivers have been estimated, we link them to the financials of each company, 
including income statement, cash flow statement, and balance sheet (Figure 3-7). The output 
of this step is scenario-adjusted financials, which can then be re-run through the business-as-
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usual credit rating model, to get to scenario-adjusted ratings and probability of default for 
each counterparty. 
Figure 3-7 Linkage of business drivers to company financial statement 
 
 
Top-down module 
A top-down extrapolation approach is a useful complement to the bottom-up analysis since it 
enables institutions to perform a portfolio-wide climate stress test, even when data or time 
and resources are not sufficient to run a bottom-up analysis for all counterparties. In practice, 
we extrapolate the results of the bottom-up analysis based on relevant customer 
characteristics to cover the remainder of the portfolio. 
Depending on the portfolio and the institution in question, various approaches can be 
considered for extrapolating the results from the counterparty-level analysis and for 
developing a generalisable relationship between credit impact and scenario variables for each 
segment in-scope. Typically, a regression-based “rule of thumb” that uses company data and 
scenario variables as independent variables is calibrated based on the bottom-up analysis to 
predict changes in credit quality. The company data allow to estimate differentiated impacts 
across firms based on initial characteristics (e.g., starting rating, geography), while the scenario 
variables allow to estimate the impact for a range of scenarios and therefore to run recurrent 
and flexible portfolio stress-testing without comprehensive update of counterparty-level 
impact analysis.  
4 Case study and implications 
The methodology allows an institution to estimate the potential financial impact of various 
climate scenarios. An example output is shown in Figure 3-8. The methodology provides the 
scenario-adjusted rating and probability of default for the analyzed companies. Even in a high-
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carbon sector like oil and gas, some companies may be heavily or little impacted by climate 
transition scenarios. For instance, in this sector, key indicators driving financial performance 
under a transition scenario include: 
• Starting financial strength (e.g., whether the company has initially high or low 
leverage), 
• Position on the cost curve (high cost reserves will be the first ones to be impaired shall 
the demand for oil and gas decrease), and 
• Carbon intensity of the extraction process. 
This differentiated impact across customers highlights why a simple top-down, sector-level 
approach is insufficient to model climate risk. 
 
Figure 3-8 Average rating impact by company – Oil and gas Exploration and 
Production – Illustrative  
 
Developing a deep understanding of the key climate risk drivers has multiple benefits beyond 
the “stress number” at the end of the process. When organizations are successful in applying 
the approach, not only do they manage to integrate these drivers into underwriting and credit 
review processes, but the exercise also fosters better engagement with their customers, 
helping them manage the transition to a low-carbon future and mitigate their own climate 
exposures. Thus, understanding climate risks is a way for banks to further position themselves 
as trusted advisors for their clients, rather than a merely “punitive” exercise. 
5 The path forward 
Development of climate scenario analysis capabilities will naturally require multiple phases as 
practices evolve and new data emerges from industry practitioners, corporates, policy makers, 
and climate scenario modelers. We see a number of potential paths for further development 
of the approach. This includes: 
TRANSITION RISK
Average changes in credit ratings by scenario
SCENARIO ANALYSIS
Choose Sector
Choose Geography
CALCULATE
Oil and gas
World
Choose Customer
All
Late policy action Early policy action No additional action Internal scenario 1
Late policy action
Choose Climate Scenario
Starting rating Ending ratingExample: Sudden implementation of a carbon tax
Chapter 3 
 50 
• Creating financially oriented transition scenarios tailored to the vulnerabilities of 
individual institutions, 
• Integrating transition risk assessment within organizations, and 
• Building out climate scenario models to support financial risk analysis. 
 
Most publicly available scenarios are primarily intended for a different purpose from financial 
risk assessment. The most sophisticated scenario models, such as the ones assessed in IPCC 
reports, are intended as energy-economy-climate models with policy and research 
applications, not for financial analysis. As a result, critical outputs for financial analysis are 
often unpublished or unavailable. Over the past few years, significant advancements have 
been made toward building a bridge between the scenario modelling practices of the scientific 
community and the credit risk analysis practices of the financial sector. For instance, the 
SENSES project, in which Oliver Wyman is participating, gathers the climate scenario modelers 
and various stakeholders (such as finance practitioners, policymakers, and corporates) to 
develop the new generation of climate change scenarios.4 This process highlighted a number 
of areas for future development, which include:  
• New types of scenarios (such as disorderly transition scenarios), 
• Improved model granularity, 
• Ex post calculations to generate new financial risk variables, and 
• Redesign of model reporting and outputs to track additional sector variables. 
 
Integration of transition risk assessment in the organization 
The methodology outlined in this chapter provides for scenario-based assessment of transition 
risk. However, institutions need to go beyond risk assessment and disclosure to properly 
manage transition risks. As climate risks materialize, institutions would benefit from their 
broader incorporation into a range of business management and risk management processes 
at financial institutions.5 While specifics may differ across institutions depending on particular 
profiles, potential examples of areas for integration include: 
• Integration of transition risk measurement across other risk measurement processes 
including physical risk, 
• Embedding into risk identification processes, 
• Incorporation of climate risk considerations in underwriting and credit rating 
processes, 
• Consideration of climate-related limits and exposure monitoring, 
                                                     
4 For more information, please refer to: http://senses-project.org 
5 For more details on the integration of climate-related considerations into traditional risk management frameworks, please 
refer to “Climate Change, Managing A New Financial Risk,” IACPM and Oliver Wyman 
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• Climate risk-related portfolio management and structuring, 
• Consideration within business planning, strategic planning, and pricing, 
• Adjustment of governance and organization, and 
• Capturing climate risk in the risk appetite. 
6 Conclusion 
The potential disruption and financial implications of climate change are imminent. As the 
impact of climate change prompts high financial stakes and substantial structural adjustments 
to the global economy, financial institutions will face both climate risks and opportunities. 
Financial institutions need to treat climate risks as a financial risk, not just a reputational one, 
and integrate climate considerations into their financial risk management frameworks. The 
measurement management of climate risks is a new exercise and will continue to evolve. In 
helping financial institutions assess climate risks, we count on the compounding effect of these 
efforts. As the financial services industry adopts sound, analytical approaches for 
understanding climate risks, we believe it will become a significant governance and risk 
management topic. Investors will respond in kind, as the information created by climate 
disclosures drives their own capital allocations. A richer data environment can fuel more 
efficient capital markets. Through all these changes, increasing awareness of climate risks 
within the financial services industry will ultimately generate broad-based benefits for other 
industries and the society as a whole. 
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 Assessing Forward-Looking Climate Risks in 
Financial Portfolios: A Science-Based Approach for 
Investors and Supervisors 
 
By 
Irene Monasterolo and Stefano Battiston1 
Abstract 
Climate risk is a new source of financial risk characterized by deep uncertainty, non-linearity, 
and endogeneity. Neglecting these characteristics leads to a severe underestimation of 
potential financial losses and gains. We present the CLIMAFIN methodology designed to help 
investors and financial institutions to address this challenge and to embed climate risk into 
pricing models and stress-tests. The method builds on the Climate Stress-test by Battiston et 
al. (2017), which has become over the years a reference tool for academics and practitioners. 
CLIMAFIN allows to translate forward-looking climate transition scenarios into financial shocks 
and to provide investors and financial supervisors with scenario-adjusted risk metrics and 
models (e.g. Climate Value at Risk, Climate Spread, Climate Stress-test). The chapter describes 
the technical details of the methodology and some recent policy applications carried out in 
collaboration with leading financial institutions. 
Keywords: climate scenarios, climate transition risk, financial risk, risk management strategy, 
climate VaR, climate spread, climate stress-test, financial stability 
1 Introduction 
There is a growing consensus among scientists, central bank officials and financial supervisors 
that climate change is a new source of risks for the economy and financial stability, at both 
individual institution and system levels (Battiston et al., 2017). Climate-related financial losses 
can result from the misalignment of investments in the economy and finance with the climate 
and energy transition targets. It is broadly recognized that massively scaling up investments in 
low-carbon firms and sectors and phasing-out those in fossil-fuel power plants and carbon-
intensive sectors are both needed to achieve climate targets laid out in the Paris Agreement 
(New Climate Economy, 2018).  
In recent years, many central banks and academic institutions began to analyze climate-related 
financial risks that could stem from a disorderly transition to a low-carbon economy, consisting 
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Irene Monasterolo (corresponding author, IM) and Stefano Battiston (SB). IM is an assistant 
professor at Vienna University of Economics and Business, and visiting research fellow at Boston University’s Global 
Development Policy Center, email: irene.monasterolo@wu.ac.at. SB is SNF Professor of Banking at the University of Zurich, 
and professor of Political Economy at Ca’Foscari University of Venice, email: stefano.battiston@uzh.ch. The authors (IM 
and SB) would like to thank Antoine Mandel (Paris School of Economics), Bas van Ruijven and Keywan Riahi (IIASA), Petr 
Jakubik (EIOPA) for the useful comments and collaboration on the application of the methodology. We acknowledge the 
support of the INSPIRE grant and of the FET H2020 project CLIMEX (Grant number 851876). IM acknowledges the support 
of the Klimafonds+ project GreenFin, the H2020 CASCADES project (Grant number 821010) and of the OeNB’s Maria 
Schaumeyer habilitationsstipendium, while SB recognizes the support of the Schwyzer Winiker Stiftung. 
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in the late and/or sudden introduction of climate policies (e.g., carbon pricing, Stiglitz et al., 
2017) that cannot be fully anticipated by investors. In such a context, firms and investors are 
unable to timely adjust their business and portfolios’ risk management strategies (Battiston et 
al., 2017). Mispricing of climate-related financial risks may reflect in the value of the financial 
contracts and securities issued by low-carbon and carbon-intensive activities, leading to asset 
price volatility. This, in turn, could have potential implications on financial stability at the 
system level if large and correlated asset classes are involved (Monasterolo et al., 2017). Given 
the interconnectedness of financial markets and the strong linkage between finance and the 
real economy, such losses could be amplified by network effects and cascade from 
the financial sector to the economy (Battiston et al., 2017), with destabilizing effects on 
countries’ economic performance and social cohesion (Monasterolo, 2020). 
A main barrier for investors, financial supervisors and regulators to embed climate-related 
financial risks in their decision making is the lack of science-based approaches to quantitatively 
assess the implications of future climate scenarios on the value of financial contracts and 
investors’ portfolios. To fill this gap, we developed an operational framework, CLIMAFIN, to 
assess and manage forward-looking climate risks in investment and financial policy decisions 
under deep uncertainty (Battiston et al., 2019a). CLIMAFIN addressed to questions that are 
relevant to investors and financial supervisors in the low-carbon transition: 
1. How to carry out a quantitative assessment of climate transition risks at the individual and 
systemic financial level that makes best use of the available scientific knowledge on climate 
change and financial risks?  
2. How to price climate risk characteristics (forward-looking, deep uncertainty, non-linearity, 
endogeneity) in the probability of default of financial contracts and investors’ portfolios, 
considering counterparty risks? 
The major challenge in addressing these questions stands in the complex nature of climate 
change, which represents a new type of risk for financial actors and renders standard finance 
approaches to risk pricing and valuation inadequate. In particular, we need to consider that 
climate-related financial risks are endogenous (Battiston et al., 2017). This means that the 
today’s perception of future climate risks held by policy makers and investors can impact on 
their action (or inaction) towards those risks and affect the realization of climate risks 
themselves. Indeed, if the introduction of stable climate policies is delayed by governments, 
firms and financial actors do not align their investments to sustainability. This, in turn, makes 
it impossible to limit global temperature increase below 2 degrees Celsius from pre-industrial 
levels, triggering the realization of climate risks in the economy and finance in the near future. 
Such endogeneity leads to multiple possible pathways (or equilibria, in the sense of strategic 
interaction of economic agents) that are very different based on the future prevalence of 
climate policies, or energy technology shocks, and on investors’ anticipation and reaction to 
them. Moreover, it is very difficult to estimate the probability of such pathways given that we 
are in a context of deep uncertainty (Weitzman, 2009). This information is not contained in 
historical data, thus representing a poor proxy of the materiality of the climate-related 
financial risks we could face in the near future. However, traditional approaches to financial 
risk assessment and portfolio optimization are based on backward-looking benchmarks and 
short-term horizons, as well as assumptions of normal distributions, perfect markets and 
absence of arbitrage.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses why standard economic and financial 
risk models are inadequate to assess such risks. Section 3 presents the details of the CLIMAFIN 
methodology (Battiston et al., 2019a), introducing the workflow, the fundamental components, 
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input metrics and data used. Section 4 illustrates the output of the CLIMAFIN methodology 
(Climate Spread, the Climate Value at Risk (VaR) and the Climate Stress-test) as applied to 
equity holdings, corporate and sovereign bond portfolios held by financial institutions, in 
collaboration with central banks (e.g., Austrian National Bank (OeNB), Banco de Mexico (BdM)) 
and financial regulators (e.g., European Insurance and Occupational Pension Funds Authority 
(EIOPA)). In section 5, we conclude by discussing the applicability of science-based climate-
financial risk metrics and methods to inform investors’ risk management strategies, and to 
support financial supervisors in identifying systemic climate-related financial risks and the 
designing prudential measures to mitigate them.  
2 Climate change as a new type of risks for financial analysis 
Climate change represents a new type of risk for financial actors and decision makers, because 
it is characterized by: 
• Deep uncertainty: Due to the nature of the earth system, climate change is 
characterized by deep uncertainties in forecasting its realization and impact on 
humans and ecosystems. This is in part due to the presence of tail events (Weitzman, 
2009) and tipping points after which the characteristics of the system change abruptly 
(Solomon et al., 2009). The more the system gets closer to such tipping points, the 
more the possibility of irreversible changes in the human-environmental system to 
occur, and with that the possibility of crossing of the planetary boundaries (Steffen et 
al. 2018) and of triggering domino effects (Lenton et al., 2019). Other sources of 
uncertainty refer to the assumptions on agents’ utility function, future productivity 
growth rate, and intertemporal discount rate used in cost-benefit analyses of climate 
change. 
• Non-linearity: Recent research showed that the distribution of extreme climate-
related events (heat/cold waves) is highly non-linear (Ackerman, 2017). Fourteen of 
the 15 hottest years on record were since 2000, while 2015-2019 was the hottest five-
year period on record (WMO, 2019). 
• Forward-looking nature of risk: The impacts of climate change are on the time scale 
of two decades or longer, while the time horizon of financial markets is much shorter 
(few months). 
• Endogeneity: Climate-change risks are endogenous and depend on the risk 
perceptions of the agents involved. Indeed, the achievement of the climate targets 
depends on governments’ and firms’ investment decisions. But both types of decisions 
depend on their perceptions of the risks involved, which differ across the possible 
transition scenarios and trajectories (Battiston, 2019). Thus, the endogeneity between 
policies choices and investors’ expectations on the financial risks resulting from these 
policies generates the possibility of multiple equilibria. Green perception is likely to 
lead to green climate policy and green portfolio.  
Climate change is expected to impact the economy and finance via physical and transition risks 
(Carney 2015). However, while climate physical risks will be more visible in the medium-to-
long term, climate transition risks could happen earlier and be more financially relevant. 
Further, it is now well recognized that in assessing climate-related financial risks, one should 
not only consider the characteristics of climate risks, but also those of financial risks. Research 
developed following the Great Financial Crisis highlighted the key role of financial complexity 
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and financial actors’ interconnectedness in amplifying shocks via the reverberation of losses 
within the financial network (Battiston et al. 2012, 2016) and in contributing to the building 
up of systemic risk (Battiston et al. 2012). 
 
These elements challenge the traditional approaches to financial risk assessment used by 
investors and financial supervisors because they require a rethinking of the notion of 
materiality of risks and, connected to that, the notion of time horizons, benchmarks and 
coordination problems in investment decisions. Indeed, standard approaches to economic 
and financial risk assessment stand on the identification of the most likely scenarios, on the 
computation of expected values and on the calculation of risk metrics (e.g., volatility) based 
on the historical values of market prices. In addition, they rely on strong assumptions of 
market conditions and agents’ behaviors, including perfect information, normal distributions, 
and a lack of arbitrage (Black & Scholes, 1973). These assumptions and characteristics are 
clearly at odds with the characteristics of climate risks (and financial risks) and could lead to 
underestimating the impact of climate change in risk assessment models, with relevant 
implications on policy recommendations (DeFries et al., 2019).  
3 The CLIMAFIN framework 
CLIMAFIN methodology is a transparent and science-based approach to quantitatively 
assessing and pricing forward-looking climate risks and their characteristics (i.e., deep 
uncertainty, non-linearity and endogeneity) in the value of individual financial contracts and 
investors’ portfolio. More specifically, we can embed forward-looking climate transition 
scenarios provided by climate science and climate economic models (e.g., Integrated 
Assessment Models, IAMs) in:  
• Probabilities of defaults of contracts and securities (i.e., introducing climate in 
financial pricing models for equity holdings, corporate and sovereign bonds) 
• Quantitative metrics of financial risks used by investors, central banks and financial 
regulators (e.g., climate VaR, climate spread) 
• A full-fledged Climate Stress-test rooted in financial network models.  
Table 4-1 summarizes the purpose of CLIMAFIN and its characteristics along key dimensions 
such as coverage of scenarios, risk types and financial instrument types.  
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Table 4-1: Purpose and characteristics of CLIMAFIN 
Purpose   
 
To enable investors, central banks and financial regulators to assess 
forward-looking climate risks (transition, physical) and opportunities in 
financial portfolios and identify drivers at the individual and system 
level.  
Target users  
CLIMAFIN can be customized for both private and public financial 
institutions, portfolios and types of financial contracts (e.g. equity 
holdings, corporate and sovereign bonds, loans). Existing applications 
have involved development finance institutions (e.g. China 
Development Bank), national central banks (e.g. OeNB, BdM), financial 
regulators (EIOPA) and commercial banks (European and US banks).  
Climate scenarios 
covered  
CLIMAFIN covers 2°C-aligned climate transition scenarios, including 
those characterized by a disorderly low-carbon transition (e.g., late and 
sudden introduction of climate policies and lack of full anticipation by 
investors). CLIMAFIN builds on the IEA Technological Roadmap as well 
as scenarios of emissions targets, energy technology trajectories and 
national contributions produced by IAMs used by the IPCC (2014, 2018), 
and their scenario databases, such as LIMITS Database 2  and Socio-
Economic Shared Pathways and the most recent CD-Links3.  
 
Risk types covered  
The methodology allows users to compute the probability of default 
(PD) for individual financial contracts, the Climate Value at Risk (Climate 
VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES), and the climate stress-test under 
forward-looking climate transition scenarios (including a disorderly 
transition) aligned to the 2°C target. The sectors covered, such as 
energy, utility, manufacturing and transportation, are those in the IEA 
technological roadmap and in the EU Reference Scenarios. 
Risk transmission 
channels  
CLIMAFIN has focused so far on transition risks arising from asset value 
adjustments according to the types of climate risks, the financial risk 
characteristics of the investors and their expectations of the impact of 
climate policies. Adjustments include economic and financial 
gains/losses (Gross Value Added (GVA), Probability of Default (PD)) due 
to i), exposures to high/low carbon activities (classified in Climate Policy 
Relevant Sectors (CPRS) and ii), delayed and disorderly alignment with 
climate targets that investors do not fully anticipate. If climate policies 
are credible, stable and anticipatable by investors, the portfolios will 
not experience large price volatilities that require asset revaluation. Our 
team is working to include physical risk transmissions. Recent 
application has focused on climate physical risk stemming from floods 
and sea-level rise. 
Financial contracts 
covered 
The methodology applies to loans, corporate and sovereign bonds and 
equity holdings, and cat bonds. Our team is working to integrate 
derivatives.  
Granularity of the 
analysis  
Risks at the firm level can be aggregated to the portfolio level and 
incorporated into standard financial risk metrics (see Climate VaR by 
Battiston et al., 2017). The level of granularity required depends on the 
depth of analysis and would normally include project and/or 
counterparty data.  
                                                     
2  The LIMITS Scenario Database is operated by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/LIMITSDB/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about 
3 https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/iamc-1.5c-explorer/#/login?redirect=%2Fworkspaces 
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Country-specific 
risks  
We elaborate a dataset of proprietary trajectories based on country and 
sector specific progress towards their Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) and climate targets in order to incorporate 
country-level transition risks into standard metrics of sovereign risks 
(see the Climate Spread in Battiston & Monasterolo, 2019). The team is 
working to incorporate country-specific exposures to climate physical 
risks. 
 
The CLIMAFIN framework provides a quantitative assessment arranged in a workflow of four 
modules. Figure 4-1 shows the interplay of the four modules in the CLIMAFIN workflow. 
Module 1 gathers and consolidates a database of climate science scenarios and climate 
transition scenarios, e.g., those provided by the IPCC (2018) and the NGFS (2019).  
Module 2 uses the information from Module 1 to generate a large set of forward-looking 
climate transition scenarios that imply a shock on the low-carbon and carbon-intensive 
economic activities (respectively positive and negative) based on their energy technologies 
(i.e., specific renewable energy or fossil fuels based). Depending on the assumptions on the 
climate economic model used (e.g. IAMs) and the introduction of the policy (e.g. the value of 
the carbon tax), the policy shock can be computed either as difference across trajectories 
(Monasterolo et al., 2018) or as difference along time steps in the same trajectory (Battiston 
et al., 2017). when moving from the initial state of the economy, i.e., the Business as Usual (B), 
to a specific policy scenario (P). Using climate economics models (e.g., the IAMs), we calculate 
economic shocks (market share, Gross Value Added (GVA)) by region and sector of economic 
activity (e.g., low-carbon or carbon-intensive), conditioned to each scenario. The core of the 
feedback mechanism is as follows: the forward-looking climate transition scenarios imply a 
shock to the low-carbon and carbon-intensive economic activities (respectively positive and 
negative) based on their energy technologies (i.e., renewable energy or fossil fuels based). To 
associate a climate financial risk profile to the sectors of economic activities, Battiston et al. 
(2017) introduced the Climate Policy Relevant Sectors (CPRS), i.e., fossil fuels, low/high-carbon 
utility, low/high-carbon transportation, energy intensive manufacturing, housing.  
Module 3 provides the information set of a risk-averse investor and carries out a valuation 
adjustment and a risk adjustment of individual financial contracts, i.e., in their Probability of 
Default (PD) based on the scenarios of economic shocks (by activity and its energy technology) 
obtained from Module 2. In particular, Module 3 uses the outcome of the economic shock on 
each economic activity and assets, and prices it in the PD and value of the financial contracts 
(equity holdings, corporate and sovereign bonds) issued by the activity, or in the loans 
associated to that.  
Module 4 uses information on repricing of the contracts and computes distributions that allow 
to consider non-linearity and deep uncertainty of climate change in climate financial risk 
metrics (e.g. Climate VaR) and the Climate Stress-test. Rooted on financial valuation in network 
models, the Climate Stress-test allows to assess the largest losses for individual portfolios 
conditioned to climate scenarios, considering risk amplification and reverberation driven by 
financial interconnectedness, considering losses generated by direct and indirect exposures 
(second round losses, Battiston et al., 2017, Roncoroni et al., 2019). 
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Figure 4-1 CLIMAFIN framework for climate financial risk assessment under deep 
uncertainty 
 
Module 1 provides the information set combining science-based knowledge and 
market data to be used by financial supervisors and investors. Module 2 provides 
information on the economic shocks (positive and negative) associated with climate 
transition scenarios, at the level of economic activity. Modules 3 and 4 provide 
metrics and methods of financial risks to support investment and policy decision 
making in the transition to a carbon-neutral economy. Source: Battiston et al. 
(2019a)    
 Module 1. Database of climate science scenarios and climate economics 
scenarios 
Module 1 gathers and consolidates the following sets of information: 
• Sets of future climate change scenarios, as from the IPCC reports (IPCC, 2014, IPCC 
2018), forecasts of GHG emission concentrations, temperature changes and 
socioeconomic impacts of climate change conditioned to the scenarios. 
• Sets of economic trajectories under climate policy scenarios as provided by well-
established economic models of climate change, e.g., IAMs 4 , partial or general 
economic equilibrium models that consider GHG emission targets and any physical 
damages resulting from climate change. For instance, the LIMITS database and the 
new CD-Links database provides scenarios of the evolution of different economic 
sectors’ output under various policy scenarios as computed by IAMs developed by 
leading academic institutions such as IIASA, PIK, and CMCC. 
For instance, in the climate risk assessment of the sovereign bond portfolios of insurance 
companies in the European Union (EU), Battiston et al. (2019a) used the climate policy 
scenarios aligned to the 2°C target developed by the international science community and 
reviewed by the IPCC. They considered the stabilization concentration of CO2 at the end of 
                                                     
4 Note that IAMs consider only in very stylized way, if at all, the impact of climate change on the socioeconomic system. It 
can be argued that the convex damage function used in this literature cannot account for the essential characteristics of 
climate risks such as tail risk and climate tipping points. The approach presented here can be adapted to use trajectories 
from economic models that would also account for these effects. 
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century consistent with the 2°C pledge under the Paris Agreement (i.e., 450 and 500 parts per 
million (ppm)). These are associated with two different policy implementation scenarios, i.e., 
Reference Policy (RefPol) and Strong Policy (StrPol) in the exercise conducted by LIMITS IAMs 
(Kriegler et al., 2013). RefPol assumes a weak near-term target by 2020 with fragmented 
countries’ actions to achieve emissions reduction by 2050, while StrPol assumes a stringent 
near-term target by 2020. The 500 and 450 ppm scenarios are associated with a probability of 
exceeding the 2°C target by 35-59% and 20-41% respectively. A change in climate policy (e.g. 
in the value of the carbon tax every five years) implies a change in the sectors' macroeconomic 
trajectory, thus a change in the market shares of primary and secondary energy sources. 
Currently, CLIMAFIN’s new analyses use the CD-Links post-Paris Agreement Scenarios. 
Table 4-2 provides an overview of the scenarios and their comparisons (See Battiston & 
Monasterolo, 2019). 
Table 4-2 LIMITS scenarios’ characteristics 
 
Source: Table based on Kriegler et al. (2013), adapted in Battiston and 
Monasterolo (2019) 
 Module 2. Climate transition shock scenarios 
This module derives scenarios of economic shocks (positive or negative) at the level of 
economic activities, based on their energy technology and relevance for climate policy 
implementation from the information provided by Module 1.  
First, based on climate science evidence from Module 1, we construct an event tree for the 
main possible scenarios relevant for climate transition risk, in a mid-term horizon of 2025-
2030 or in a long-term horizon (2050), following the 5 years calculations of the IAMs. In 
particular, we provide an argument for how the current socioeconomic dynamics of opposing 
vested interests increases the likelihood of a disorderly low-carbon transition. This event tree 
can be defined for the zero-carbon energy transition needed to achieve the climate targets 
(IPCC, 2018) as in Figure 4-2: 
No policy Base Baseline None N/A None
RefPol Reference Weak 2100 None
StrPol Reference Stringent 2100 None
450 Benchmark None N/A 450 ppm
500 Benchmark None N/A 500 ppm
Delayed Policy RefPol-450 Climate Policy Weak 2020 450 ppm
Delayed Policy StrPol-450 Climate Policy Stringent 2020 500 ppm
Delayed Policy RefPol-500 Climate Policy Weak 2020 500 ppm
Delayed Policy StrPol-500 Climate Policy Stringent 2020 500 ppm
Delayed Action RefPol2030-500 Climate Policy Weak 2030 501 ppm
Fragmented action
Immediate action
Scenario class Scenario name Scenario type
Level of ambition 
(near term)
Level of ambition 
(long term)
Level of international 
cooperation
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Figure 4-2 Low-carbon transition’s main transition scenarios: chain of events in the 
transmission of economic and financial shocks 
 
Second, based on the economic trajectories from Module 1, we derive a set of economic 
shocks (on output, market share and GVA) by region and sector of the economic activities (low-
carbon and carbon-intensive). These shocks can be computed either across climate transition 
trajectories (Monasterolo et al. 2018), or within the same trajectory across years (Battiston et 
al. 2017). Since the current classifications of economic activities (e.g. NACE 4 digit) do not 
provide information on the sector’s exposure to climate risks, we classify economic activities 
relevant to climate transition risks into CPRS. These include fossil fuel, utility, energy-intensive, 
transport, housing, infrastructure, identified based on: the direct and indirect contributions of 
economic activities (classified at the NACE 4-digit level) to GHG emissions (Scope 1, 2, 3); their 
sensitivities to climate policy implementation (e.g. the EU carbon leakage directive 
2003/87/EC); the technology mix of the activities and their role in the energy value chain; their 
investment plans, particularly the climate relevant part (e.g. CAPEX in Battiston et al., 2017). 
Doing so allows us to identify activities and sectors that will have the most impact on achieving 
climate targets and will also be impacted by climate transition risks. The CPRS classification 
was used by the European Central Bank (20195) and by EIOPA (20186) to assess financial actors’ 
exposure to climate transition risks in the EU. 
Third, we consider the transition of the economy from a business-as-usual (BAU) trajectory to 
a given policy trajectory (P) compatible with a 1.5°C or a 2°C target:  
• Shocks are obtained as differences in sectors’ output between the BAU and the 
climate policy shock trajectories (P) for the same model (e.g., IAMs7 ) that can be 
calculated either across trajectories or across years (2020 to 2100) within the same 
trajectory; 
                                                     
5 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-stability/fsr/special/html/ecb.fsrart201905_1~47cf778cc1.en.html#toc5 
6 https://register.eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Reports/EIOPA%20FSR%20December%202018.pdf 
7 Note that other climate economic models could be used to provide shocks on output. We opted for IAMs because they 
are the models reviewed by the IPCC report and used to inform climate policy discussion. 
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• We need to depart from the idea of “most likely/feasible scenario” and consider sets 
of several scenarios (see Table 4-2) to be able to determine (in Module 4) how wrong 
could an investor be in computing the Climate VaR of her portfolio. 
• The disorderly transition is thus intended as a temporary out-of-equilibrium shift of 
the economy between two separate equilibrium trajectories based on the energy 
technology that drives the transition. This formulation makes the exercise familiar to 
economists because they are consistent with traditional economic models’ rationale.  
 Module 3. Shock scenario-adjusted financial pricing and risk valuation 
This module integrates forward-looking climate transition risk scenarios in financial risk-pricing 
models and quantitative financial risk metrics used by investors and financial supervisors, such 
as Climate Spread (Battiston & Monasterolo, 2019) and Climate VaR (Battiston et al., 2017). 
The Climate Spread is defined as the change in the spread of a corporate or sovereign bond 
contract conditional on a given Climate Policy Shock Scenario, thus introducing future climate 
risks in the assessment of firms or countries’ financial solvency. The Climate VaR can be defined 
as the “worst-case loss” conditioned to future climate shock scenarios given a certain 
confidence level. 
From the sectorial economic shock trajectories based on climate transition scenarios (Module 
2), we compute the financial shocks on the cashflows of individual economic activities 
comprising the sector. We then translate the shock on the cashflows in the adjustments of PDs 
of individual firms and sovereign governments, and in the adjustment of risks and values of 
the individual risky financial contracts (equity holdings, corporate and sovereign and bonds). 
In this step, we develop climate-based financial pricing models and financial risk metrics (e.g. 
Climate Spread, Climate VaR) embedded in the forward-looking climate shock trajectories, 
accounting for the deep uncertainties of climate risks. 
Our approach stands on the definition of the Information Set of a risk-averse investor who 
aims to minimize the largest climate-related losses to her portfolio. We define an information 
set that can accommodate incomplete information and deep uncertainty (Greenwald & Stiglitz, 
1986) and can cover a time horizon that is relevant both for investment strategies and for the 
low-carbon transition (e.g. from 2020 to 2050). The investor’s information set comprises 
(Battiston et al., 2019a): 
• Climate policy scenarios corresponding to Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emission 
reduction target across regions), provided e.g. by IPCC reports; 
• Future economic trajectories for carbon-intensive and low-carbon activities 
conditioned to climate scenarios, provided by climate economic models (e.g., IAMs);  
• Forward-looking Climate Policy Shock Scenarios intended as a disorderly transition 
from B (Business as Usual) to P (a given climate policy scenario). These can be 
computed either across trajectories or across years within the same trajectory; 
• Climate Policy Shocks on the economic output of low-carbon/carbon-intensive 
activities, on their Gross Value Added (GVA) and their contribution to the fiscal 
revenues of the sovereign government. The policy shocks are under transition 
scenarios and in a specific climate economic model.  
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3.3.1 Pricing forward-looking climate risks into equity holdings 
We introduce a valuation model where 𝑡0 denotes the time at which valuation is carried out 
and E denotes a generic equity contract. In the absence of climate policies, we assume that all 
relevant information is captured by the expected future flow of dividends.  
Following Gordon's formulation (Gordon 1959), we further consider that dividends grow at a 
constant rate 𝑔(𝐵) so that for all 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡0; 𝑑𝑖𝑣(𝑡 + 1) = (1 + 𝑔(𝐵))𝑑𝑖𝑣(𝑡) 
Denoting by 𝑟 the cost of risky capital, the value of equity is then determined as the net 
present value of future dividends equal to 𝑉𝐸
𝐵,𝑡0: 
 
Where 
𝑑𝑖𝑣 (B) = 𝑑𝑖𝑣(𝑡0). 
If we assume a climate policy shock to occur at time 𝑡∗, dividend is assumed to shift to 𝑑𝑖𝑣(P) 
and the growth rate of dividends to 𝑔(𝑃) where P identifies a specific climate policy scenario. 
The value of equity is then determined as 𝑉𝐸
𝑃,𝑡∗  
 
If the climate policy shock occurs at valuation time, i.e., 𝑡∗ = 𝑡0, we have 
 
In a climate policy scenario P, it is expected that 𝑑𝑖𝑣(P)  and 𝑔(𝑃)  decrease for carbon- 
intensive economic activities and increase for low-carbon economic activities. 
From the equity valuation under climate scenarios, we can then assess:  
The change of valuation in the case of a disorderly transition occurring at time 𝑡∗ given by  
𝑉𝐸
𝐵,𝑡0 - 𝑉𝐸
𝑃,𝑡∗ 
Given a probability distribution P on the time of occurrence and/or the impact of the policy 
scenarios, we can compute Climate VaR associated with an equity contract. Climate VaR is a 
quantile of loss distributions conditioned to climate policy shocks scenarios, which could be 
either characterized by physical or transition risks (Battiston et al., 2017), in a given time. The 
Climate VaR, then, defines the largest losses (usually in USD) in the value of a risky asset (e.g., 
equity holdings and bonds) or portfolio that the investor should withstand, conditioned to a 
given scenario, confidence level and time. Thus, the Climate VaR is a measure of risk of 
investment under forward-looking climate scenarios. The Climate VaR Management Strategy 
can be written as: 
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The VaR, despite being well known and used by investors, has two main limitations in this 
context. First, VaR is computed assuming knowing how the loss will be distributed, and 
this leads to model risk. Second, VaR depends linearly on the PD of underlying assets, thus 
implying that small errors have small consequences. However, the PD of leveraged investor 
depends non-linearly on PD of underlying assets, thus implying small errors can have big 
consequences. But, importantly, VaR does not consider leverage. This means that to assess the 
financial risk implications of climate change, we need to go beyond VaR and consider 
interconnected financial actors, leverage financial agents with overlapping portfolios, i.e., the 
conditions for systemic risk in financial networks (Battiston et al., 2016). This is a main feature 
of CLIMAFIN, as well as the possibility to be applied to other risk metrics, such as the Expected 
Shorfall (ES). This is the average of all the losses above the VaR (i.e., the largest losses), and 
gives us a measure of what we can expect in terms of losses on our portfolio. 
For a complete explanation of the pricing of forward-looking climate transition risks in the 
value of equity holdings, see Battiston and Monasterolo (2019). 
3.3.2 Pricing forward-looking climate risks into corporate and sovereign bonds 
We consider a risky (defaultable) bond issued by a corporate issuer j, issued at 𝑡0 with maturity 
T. The value of the defaultable bond at time T, with R being the Recovery Rate of the corporate 
bond (i.e., the percentage of notional recovered upon default), and LGD being the Loss-Given-
Default (i.e., the percentage loss), can be written as: 
𝑣𝑗(𝑇) = {
𝑅𝑗 = (1 −  𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑗)   𝑖𝑓 𝑗 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑠 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑄𝑗)
1                                         𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 −  𝑄𝑗)
 
The unitary price 𝑃𝑗(𝑡) of the bond at time 𝑡 < 𝑇 and 𝑡 > 𝑡0 follows the usual definition of 
discounted expected value at the maturity:  
𝑃𝑗(𝑡)  = exp(−𝑟𝑓(𝑇 − 𝑡)) 𝐸[𝑣𝑗(𝑇)]= exp (−𝑟𝑓(𝑇 − 𝑡)) (1 − 𝑄 𝐿𝐺𝐷) 
The bond price 𝑣𝑗
∗ is equal to the bond discounted expected value, with 𝑦𝑓 risk-free rate, i.e., 
the yield of the bond facing no default risk (e.g. the German bond in the case of sovereign 
bonds, see Battiston & Monasterolo, 2019). The cumulative probability of default Q is related 
to the probability of default at t as follows:  Q =  1 – (1 − q)(𝑇−𝑡). The formula can be used 
to determine, from the market price, the value of the annual default probability q (i.e., q 
implied) for a given risk-free rate and LGD. In the case of a multi-coupon bond, the formula 
gets more complicated since one must sum up the expected value of the coupons, but the 
logic remains the same. For each coupon k, the coupon amount is assumed to be paid only if 
j has not defaulted before.  
The bond price is defined implicitly by the yield 𝑦𝑗  of bond j (under risk neutral measure) as 
follows: 
𝑣𝑗
∗ = 𝑒−𝑦𝑗𝑇 
We can define the Probability of Default (PD) 𝑞𝑗(𝑃) of the corporate bonds’ issuer j under 
Climate Policy Scenario P as: 
𝑞𝑗(𝑃) = 𝒫 (𝜂𝑗 < 𝜃𝑗(𝑃)) = ∫ 𝜙(𝑃)(𝜂𝑗)𝑑𝜂𝑗
𝜃𝑗(𝑃)
𝜂𝑖𝑛𝑓
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where 𝜙(𝑃)(𝜂𝑗) is the probability distribution of idiosyncratic shock 𝜂𝑗, and 𝜂𝑖𝑛𝑓 is the lower 
bound of the range of the value of 𝜂𝑗. 
We report a result on the PD adjustment. In simple terms, conditioned to the climate policy 
shock, there is a shift ∆𝑞 in the probability distribution of the small productivity shocks and 
thus in the default probability of issuer j: 
∆𝑞𝑗(𝑃)= 𝑞𝑗(𝑃) - 𝑞𝑗(𝐵) = ∫ 𝜙(𝜂𝑗)𝑑𝜂𝑗
𝜃𝑗(𝑃)
𝜂𝑖𝑛𝑓
, with 𝜃𝑗(𝑃) = 𝜃𝑗(𝐵) - 𝜉𝑗(𝑃) 
Thus, assuming that the climate policy shock on the fiscal revenues of the firm (and thus of 
the sovereign) is proportional to the shock on the GVA of low-carbon and carbon-intensive 
sectors, i.e., 𝜉𝑗 = 𝜒𝑗𝑢𝑗,𝑠
𝐺𝑉𝐴(P), with elasticity 𝜒𝑗 , then the adjustment ∆𝑞𝑗(𝑃), the PD of j in a 
Climate Policy Shock Scenario: 
• Increases with the GVA shock magnitude |𝑢𝑗,𝑠
𝐺𝑉𝐴(P)| if 𝑢𝑗,𝑠
𝐺𝑉𝐴(P)<0, decreases vice versa; 
• Is proportional to the GVA shocks on CPRS (in the limit of small Climate Policy Shocks). 
The bond spread can be defined then as: 
𝑠𝑗 =𝑦𝑗−𝑦𝑓, with 𝑒
−𝑦𝑗𝑇 = 1 −  𝑞𝑗 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑗  
The Climate Spread Δ𝑠𝑗 is defined as the change in the spread of a bond contract conditional 
upon a Climate Policy Shock Scenario: 
 
For a complete explanation of the pricing of forward-looking climate transition risks in the 
value of corporate and sovereign bonds, see Battiston and Monasterolo (2019). 
 Required input data 
From the perspective of the user, the application of the CLIMAFIN methodology requires the 
following information on the portfolio of investments to be collected and analyzed:  
• Financial securities (listed equities, corporate and sovereign bonds): identifier of the 
financial security, e.g. ISIN code, TICKER and LEI of the issuer; 
• Financial securities (unlisted equities and loans): LEI of the firm, full legal name, 
location of incorporation. Same information for the parent company; 
• The NACE sector of the economic activities of the firm that issue the contract (at 4-
digit level, if possible); 
• The composition of financial actors’ investments in financial securities (i.e., their 
exposure); 
• Information on the characteristics of the financial securities and time series data (e.g., 
duration, maturity, coupon, term, prices, etc.). 
All financial information (except loans) can be collected using financial data providers (e.g., 
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters Eikon, etc.). 
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In addition to the financial input data, the following climate and energy data are needed: 
• Measures of economic shocks associated with climate scenarios and provided by IAMs 
(Kriegler et al., 2013; McCollum et al., 2018); 
• Contributions from fossil fuels and renewable energy sectors to the individual 
countries’ GVA (e.g. Eurostat, IEA); 
• Data on country’s macroeconomic and financial aggregates (e.g., debt/GDP, deficit, 
etc.) provided by national or international statistical offices (e.g., Eurostat, OECD). 
4 Applications to portfolios of financial institutions 
In this section, we present several applications of the CLIMAFIN approach to the risk analysis 
of investment portfolios. 
 Climate risk assessment of insurance companies’ sovereign bond portfolio 
The CLIMAFIN framework was recently applied to a forward-looking climate transition risk 
assessment of sovereign bond portfolios of insurance companies in Europe, as a result of the 
first collaboration between climate economists, climate financial risk modelers and financial 
regulators (Battiston et al., 2019b). The analysis considers forward-looking scenarios 
characterized by a disorderly introduction of climate policies (i.e., carbon pricing) and lack of 
full anticipation and pricing by investors.  
The authors first computed the shocks on market shares and profitability of carbon-intensive 
and low-carbon activities that contribute to the GVA and fiscal revenues of the EU countries, 
which in turn issue the sovereign bonds that are held in the portfolios of European insurers. 
The shocks are calculated with climate economic models that provide climate transition 
trajectories for fossil fuel and renewable energy and electricity sectors, conditioned to 2°C-
aligned climate policy scenarios. After defining the climate risk management strategy under 
uncertainty for a risk averse investor (insurer) that aims to minimize the largest losses in her 
sovereign bonds’ portfolio, the authors price the climate transition scenarios in the PD of the 
individual sovereign bonds and in the bonds’ climate spread. The results (see e.g., Figure 4-3) 
show that the impact of a disorderly transition to the low-carbon economy on the sovereign 
bonds’ portfolios of European insurers, under 2°C-aligned climate policy scenarios, are 
moderate but non-negligible. In particular, shocks on bonds’ value are heterogeneous across 
countries and reflect the progress towards decarbonization of countries’ economies. Most 
negative impacts affect the portfolios of insurance solos exposed to Polish sovereign bonds. 
Two dimensions drive the magnitude of the impact of climate shocks on bonds’ portfolios. 
First, for each sovereign bond, negative shocks (e.g., on primary energy fossil sector) can be 
possibly compensated by positive shocks (e.g., on secondary energy electricity based on 
renewable sources). Second, in a portfolio of sovereign bonds issued by several countries, 
negative aggregate shocks from a less climate-aligned sovereign can be possibly compensated 
by positive shocks from another more climate-aligned sovereign. These two dimensions 
contribute to limit the magnitude of the median value of the portfolio impact in the chart.  
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Figure 4-3 Distribution of impact on sovereign holdings of European insurers 
 
Note: The length of the bars represents the heterogeneity of impacts on insurers 
domiciled in the given country (wider distribution). Y-axis represents negative 
impact (percentage of the original value of government portfolios) of climate policy 
shocks on the value of sovereign bonds (e.g. 100% expresses 0% impact, 97% 
corresponds to drop of 3%). The estimated impact is based on the country of the 
holder (issuing country), across climate policy shock scenarios and under the 
scenario of adverse market conditions. Source: Battiston et al. (2019b) 
This work aims to raise the awareness of climate risks to insurers as well as of regulators and 
financial supervisors, and provide an approach to include climate risks into their risk 
assessment frameworks. This requires moving from the backward-looking nature of traditional 
financial risk assessment to a forward-looking assessment that considers both climate 
uncertainty and financial complexity. 
 Climate risk assessment of sovereign bond portfolio of the Austrian National 
Bank (OeNB) 
Battiston and Monasterolo (2019) assessed the climate risk exposure of OeNB’s portfolio of 
sovereign bonds issued by OECD countries (10 years, zero coupon). They considered forward-
looking climate transition trajectories produced by two climate economic models (used to 
calculate energy and electricity trajectories consistent with the 2°C targets and used by the 
IPCC report, i.e., GCAM and WITCH8 ), conditioned to several mild and tight climate policy 
scenarios characterized by carbon pricing (Kriegler et al., 2013). They then modelled the 
impact of the change in low-carbon and carbon-intensive sectors’ profitability on the GVA and 
fiscal revenues of each individual OECD country. Finally, they priced the shock on the fiscal 
revenues in the PD of the sovereign bond of the issuing country, on the bond price and yield, 
i.e., the Climate Spread. Results show that the level of (mis)alignment of a country’s economy 
with low-carbon transition, under feasible climate transition scenarios, can be priced in the 
sovereign bond and affect the country’s financial risk position. In particular, as Table 4-3 shows, 
the largest negative shocks on the value of individual sovereign bonds are on countries where 
fossil fuel-based primary and secondary energy sources represent a large contribution to GVA 
and national GDP, e.g., Australia and Poland. In contrast, sovereign bonds of countries with 
                                                     
8 The Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) is the IAM developed by the Joint Global Change Research Institute in 
Maryland to explore the dynamics of the coupled human-Earth system and the response of this system to global change 
(http://www.globalchange.umd.edu/gcam/). WITCH is the IAM global dynamic model integrating the interactions between 
the economy, the technological options, and climate change. It is developed at the RFF-CMCC-EIEE European Institute on 
Economics and the Environment in Milan (IT): www.witchmodel.org  
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growing shares of renewable energy sources contributing to GVA, such as Austria, experience 
positive shocks. The largest negative shocks are associated with the 10-year sovereign bonds 
issued by Australia, equal to 17.36% decrease in value (under a tight climate policy scenario 
(StrPol450) characterized by carbon tax introduction) that translates in an increase in the 
Climate Spread. The negative shock on the sovereign bond is due to the negative shock on the 
fiscal revenues of the fossil fuel extraction and carbon-intensive sectors, which represent a 
relevant share of Australian GDP. In contrast, positive shocks on the sovereign bonds’ value 
(and thus a decrease in the Climate Spread) are associated with the bonds of countries that 
are aligning their economies to the climate targets, e.g., Austria (due to the role of hydropower 
in electricity generation). 
Table 4-3 Climate Spread of sovereign bonds 
 
Note: Climate policy shocks on selected OECD sovereign bond and Climate Spread 
conditioned to a tight climate policy scenario (StrPol450). Positive shocks on the 
yield correspond to negative shocks on the value of the sovereign bond. Climate 
Spread: 2,45=245 basis points. GCAM and WITCH IAMs were used to obtain the 
shocks on the energy technology trajectories conditioned to the StrPol450 2°C-
aligned climate policy scenario. The shock on the bond is the shock on the value of 
the bond, while the shock on the bonds’ yield is its Climate Spread. Source: Battiston 
and Monasterolo (2019) 
 Climate risk assessment on energy infrastructure projects of Chinese 
development finance institutions 
Monasterolo et al. (2018) used the CLIMAFIN methodology to assess the climate transition risk 
exposures of two main Chinese policy banks’ (China Development Bank and Export-Import 
Bank of China) portfolios to overseas energy infrastructure projects. They analyzed 199 
overseas energy investment loans (from oil-based primary energy to solar-based electricity 
production) in 63 low-income and mid-income countries in 2000-2018 with a combined value 
of US$228.105 billion. They found that the banks’ exposures to losses induced by climate 
transition risk ranged between 4% and 22% of their portfolios.9 
Figure 4-4 shows the results of the analysis under a stringent 2°C-aligned climate policy 
scenario (i.e., StrPol450, Kriegler et al., 2013) characterized by the introduction of a carbon tax 
and countries' fragmented action. The authors found that negative shocks on project loans’ 
value affect coal power generation in the Chinese and bordering countries' region (i.e., 
CHINA+), and oil and gas power generation in former USSR and transition countries (i.e., the 
Reforming Economies). In contrast, positive shocks are associated with renewable energy 
projects, in hydropower in the African region and nuclear in Pakistan. The scenarios and shocks 
presented in Figure 4-4 are computed using the GCAM IAM and the LIMITS database, while 
the shocks are in USD million.  
                                                     
9 Note that with an average 12-times leverage, even an average shock (10% circa) could lead the banks to financial distress. 
Geo region Models’ region WITCH: bond value shock (%) WITCH: yield (spread) shock GCAM: bond value shock (%) GCAM: yield (spread) shock
AUSTRIA EUROPE 1,3 -0,16 0,13 -0,02
AUSTRALIA REST_WORLD -17,36 2,45 n.a. n.a.
BELGIUM EUROPE 0,84 -0,1 0,03 0
CANADA PAC_OECD -5,21 0,67 -18,29 2,61
POLAND EUROPE -12,85 1,75 -2,49 0,32
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Figure 4-4 Climate financial risk assessment of Chinese overseas energy projects 
 
Note: Projected gains and losses of China Development Bank and Export-Import 
Bank of China’s overseas energy loans portfolio (project based) conditioned to 
stringent 2°C-aligned climate policy scenarios (in million USD). Source: Monasterolo 
et al. (2018) 
 
 Climate Stress-test of the financial system 
In 2017, Battiston et al. (2017) published a Climate Stress-test exercise that provides an 
application of financial valuation in network models to the analysis of equity portfolios of 
banks exposed to climate transition risks. First, the authors assessed investors’ exposure to 
climate transition risk using the CPRS classification. Then, with the climate stress-test, they 
assessed the first and second-round losses of investors’ portfolios conditioned to climate 
transition scenarios, i.e., the indirect losses due to devaluation of counterparties' debt 
obligations on the interbank market, using the DebtRank10. They further calculated the Climate 
VaR, conditioned to different climate transition scenarios provided by IAMs and under low-
carbon or high-carbon investment strategies, of the 20 most exposed banks in the EU and US 
(Figure 4-5).  
The authors found that the exposure of institutional investors to climate transition risk is 
largely heterogenous and amplified by network effects. In particular, the exposures of pension 
and investment funds to CPRS reached 43-45% of equity portfolios, and the potential losses 
could be amplified by the mutual exposures of financial actors (e.g., pension funds and 
investment funds). Roncoroni et al. (2019) further developed the climate stress-test applied 
to Banco de Mexico’s portfolio using the Asset Network Valuation Framework (NEVA) 
approach (Barucca et al., 2019).  
Battiston et al. (2017)’s Climate Stress-test considered micro-level climate transition risks, i.e., 
the exposures of individual banks to individual financial contracts (equity holdings) and 
computed the Climate VaR (VaR 95, i.e., 5%) on largest EU and US banks’ portfolios, assessing 
the impact of a disorderly transition on banks’ capital. They found that banks with a 
“environmentally unsustainable” investment strategy (i.e., those mostly exposed to fossil fuel 
and carbon intensive firms) incur large losses (Figure 4-5 left chart) in comparison to banks 
with a greener investment strategy (Figure 4-5 right chart). Moreover, the losses via first round 
(i.e., due to direct effects, dark colors) are amplified by risk reverberation and contagion of 
                                                     
10 The DebtRank is a reference measure of systemic financial impact developed by Battiston et al. (2012).It is inspired by 
feedback-centrality and allows to determine the systemically important nodes in a network to assess drivers of systemic 
financial risk.  
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intra-financial contracts (i.e., the indirect effects, lighter colors). For instance, with regards to 
the two most exposed banks, Deutsche Bank’s losses on capital are driven by direct effects, 
while Credit Agricole’s losses are driven by indirect effects. This means that the largest banks 
are heterogeneously exposed to climate transition risk and the related losses could be 
amplified by financial interconnectedness, with implications on asset price volatility and 
financial stability (Monasterolo et al., 2017).  
Figure 4-5 Climate Value at Risk (VaR) of EU largest banks conditioned to low-
carbon or high-carbon investment strategy  
 
Note: The Climate VaR (5%) analysis is conducted on the equity holdings of 20 most 
severely affected banks, under scenario of renewable (green, left chart) and fossil 
fuel and carbon intensive (brown, right chart) investment strategies, in USD million. 
Dark (light) color represents first (second) round losses. The analysis is based on the 
financial network model by Battiston et al. (2012) that introduced the DebtRank. 
Source: Battiston et al. (2017) 
5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented CLIMAFIN, a transparent and science-based approach vetted by 
academics and practitioners. CLIMAFIN allows to translate forward-looking climate transition 
scenarios into financial shocks and to provide investors and financial supervisors with 
scenario-adjusted risk metrics and models (i.e., Climate Spread, Climate VaR and Climate 
Stress-testing). 
The innovative approach of CLIMAFIN supports private and public financial institutions in their 
portfolio risk management strategies. It also provides financial supervisors with a methodology, 
independent from the ones developed by the industry, in order to inform the design of 
regulations to foster financial stability in the low-carbon transition. 
Embedding climate risk into financial risk metrics requires to connect areas of knowledge 
which have remained separated so far and developed in parallel by climate scientists, climate 
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economists, financial risk and network experts. Moreover, this interdisciplinary endeavor 
would not be possible without the long-term dedication of academic researchers.   
The CLIMAFIN applications addresses three important elements of climate-financial risk 
assessment. First, the temporal scale of the problem and its uncertainty compel us to move 
from a stress-test approach based on a single type of scenarios to a set of scenarios, to be able 
to compute the Climate VaR conditioned to the uncertainty that characterizes the scenarios. 
Second, the assumptions of the scenarios matter for their use in financial assessment. New 
generation of climate scenarios assumes that countries are on track to deliver on their 2030 
climate pledges, and do not consider the role of finance nor its complexity in achieving the 
scenarios, implying that funds for undertaking even massive investments in energy technology 
(and change the energy technology composition) are always available with no frictions. 
However, in reality, financing (in particular to low-carbon energy investments) is constrained 
and affects the likelihood of the transition scenarios. Third, the information gaps at firm level 
(e.g., the energy technology and emissions profile) mean imperfect information for investors 
about their exposure to climate risks via firms’ contracts (e.g., stocks, bonds, or loans). 
Greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions accounting suffers from limited availability, 
comparability and relevance for climate policy (Monasterolo et al., 2017). In contrast, in the 
definition of the activities that are exposed to transition risk, i.e., the CPRS, CLIMAFIN 
considers not only GHG direct and indirect emissions of activities but also their relevance for 
climate policy implementation, their role in the energy value chain, and firms’ future 
investment plan (e.g. CAPEX). 
 
CLIMAFIN has been applied to several portfolios (e.g., equity holdings of EU and US largest 
banks, sovereign bonds’ portfolios of European insurance firms and central banks, syndicated 
loans of US banks, etc.) and is supporting several central banks and financial regulators’ climate 
financial risk assessment exercises. CLIMAFIN has been recently extended to the analysis of 
the exposure of US banks’ loans to climate physical risks (storms and floods) impacting on 
firms and sectors’ capital intensity, at a granular geographical level, and computing the Value-
at-Risk (95 and 99 percentile by Battiston et al., 2020). 
The result indicates that under several climate scenarios, the potential impact of a disorderly 
transition to a low-carbon economy on financial actors (e.g., pension funds, investment funds 
and insurers, development banks) is considerable. In addition, investors’ exposures to climate 
risks are large and can be amplified by financial complexity, potentially creating new sources 
of risk for economic and financial stability.   
Regarding climate transition risks, current CLIMAFIN’s developments focus on the refinement 
of the disorderly transition scenarios in collaboration with the IAM community, including SSPs 
and Post-Paris Agreement scenarios, and the analysis of the feedbacks of the climate financial 
shocks Battiston et al., 2020. Regarding the climate physical risk scenarios, the CLIMAFIN team 
is working at the refinement of the shocks’ transmission to the individual firms at a granular 
geo-localized level, in collaboration with development finance institutions (e.g., the World 
Bank), using microlevel data. 
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 Environmental Stress-Testing on Banks’ Credit 
Risks  
 
by 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China1 
Abstract 
The benefits of the positive externalities of an unpolluted environment and stable climate are 
enjoyed by all economic actors. Conversely, the costs of the negative externalities of the 
pollution and emissions that damage the environment and cause climate change have 
historically not affected individual firms. However, both positive and negative externalities can 
be internalized by a firm with the introduction of relevant policy- and market-based 
mechanisms. For the first time for a Chinese financial institution, this paper discusses the 
impact of internalizing environmental costs onto a firm’s balance sheet and the consequent 
risks this creates for commercial banks. A relevant theoretical framework, transmission 
mechanisms and analytical methodologies are established to assess the impact of tightening 
environmental protection standards and climate change policies, joint and several liabilities 
that banks are exposed to via their customers’ activities and changes in the bank’s reputational 
standing in the eyes of its shareholders and depositors. Two industries, namely thermal power 
and cement production, are selected for stress testing against a range of high, medium and 
low stress scenarios and the impact on their financial performance and credit ratings is 
assessed as a result. Actionable responses to this analysis are put forward. This bank-led 
approach to research in this focused field (i.e., assessing the impact of environmental factors 
on credit risk of commercial banks) is pioneering in China. 
Keywords: environmental Factors, credit Risk, stress testing, commercial banks 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, the international community has increasingly recognized that commercial 
activities, including pollutant discharges and the exploitation of natural resources, are 
accelerating environmental degradation, testing the planet’s carrying capacity (Bank of 
England, 2015). In response, government, public and non-governmental organizations have 
proposed ever tighter restrictions on companies’ environmental footprints. These restrictions 
in turn have forced businesses to assume more costs associated with environmental 
protection and face growing challenges for managing environmental and social risks. 
Consequently, commercial banks and other lenders have had to reconsider risks on the loans 
they provide to businesses, including risks of default due to rising costs of complying with 
environmental regulations, of being liable for pollution, of third-party claims for damage 
compensations, and of losses of reputation and market shares due to non-compliance.  
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Yin Hong, Deputy Director of Morden Finance Research Institute, email: yinhong@icbc.com.cn; 
Ma Suhong, Head of strategy and development department, ICBC Credit Suisse Asset Management Co.,Ltd.; Le Yu, Yang 
Xing, Lv Zhenyan, Qiu Muyuan, Zhang Jingwen from ICBC. 
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In response to these rising environmental risks, ICBC set up a research group to study how 
environmental factors impact risks faced by commercial banks since 2015. In this chapter, we 
first point out that both positive and negative externalities of a firm’s impact on the 
environment can be converted into endogenous variables in the firm’s financial performance 
by policy, market or legal factors. We then apply stress test approaches to analyze how the 
impact of environmental protection policies on firms’ costs translates to credit risks for 
commercial banks and how significant that impact on credit risks may be. It is noteworthy that 
due to business confidentiality, we have not disclosed the quantitative outcomes of the stress-
test exercises led by ICBC. 
2 Basic framework of ICBC’s environmental stress-testing 
A traditional stress-testing consists of six steps: 1) select the portfolios to be tested; 2) select 
the stress factors and indicators to be applied; 3) select stress-bearing objects and determine 
stress-bearing indicators; 4) build scenarios; 5) construct the transmission model; 6) perform 
the stress-testing and analyze results (see Figure 5-1, Peria et al., 2001; Berge & Lindquist, 
2007). In this section, we set out the detail of our approach to environmental stress-testing 
using this process. 
Figure 5-1 Flow chart of stress-testing 
      
 Stress-bearing objects and indicators 
Stress-bearing objects refer to targets under the stress-testing, while stress-bearing indicators 
represent the performance of stress-bearing objects in specific aspects. The main businesses 
of commercial banks in China relate to deposits and loans, therefore stress-testing should 
target the impact on credit and business indicators of depositors and borrowers. We classify 
the stress-bearing objects of bank credit risk tests into debtors or counterparties, portfolios 
and macro objects. Debtors or counterparties refer to individuals, portfolios can be further 
divided by different standards, such as by product, industry, customer and region, while macro 
objects refer to the banks overall, focusing on the bank’s entire assets and overall risk. 
Based on ICBC’s experience, there are two types of stress-bearing indicators commonly used 
at the portfolio level, namely technical indicators and management indicators. The former 
represents risks of losses, such as probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), expected 
loss, unexpected loss and risk exposure, all closely related to the day-to-day operations of 
financial institutions including commercial banks. Management indicators include capital 
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adequacy ratio (CAR), non-performing loan (NPL) ratio, economic capital, and profit margin, 
which are usually the focus of regulatory authorities and governments (see Table 4-1). 
Table 5-1 Commonly used stress-bearing indicators 
 
Through this environment stress-testing, ICBC developed a bottom-up approach, which 
started with one factor and one industry at the basic-level impact to multiple targets with 
more complex implications. For the first step, major polluting industries -combined discharged 
pollutants account for more than half of the country’s total, such as thermal power generation, 
cement, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, chemical engineering and paper making, were 
selected as the priority for analysis and research. 
We took the bottom-up approach because the different production technology, resource 
consumption and discharge indicators in various industries necessitate different stress-bearing 
capabilities under environmental protection policies. Placing the entire economy under the 
stress-testing initially would have made it difficult to ensure the soundness of the results. 
Industries such as thermal power and cement have not only been the main source of 
manufacturing-related environmental pollution, but also the focus of environmental 
protection policies. Selecting these industries as the pilot industries for environmental stress-
testing also ensures that the analysis and results are inclusive. Further, the selected stress-
bearing indicators are those representing firms’ long-term operating capacities because the 
impact of environmental risks on firms is a long-term variable subject to market conditions. 
The indicators selected according to a more traditional stress-testing might have been 
insufficient to wholly capture the impact of environmental factors and are likely to generate 
biases in formulating policies. 
3 Stress factors under environmental stress-testing 
 Policy standards and enforcement 
Tightened environmental regulations add costs and affect firms’ profitability. Increased 
regulatory standards and enforcement may affect the debt-paying capabilities of those in high-
pollution and high-emissions industries, thereby impacting the credit and solvency of the 
lenders. In recent years, the Chinese government has introduced a slew of environmental 
protection policies aiming to improve environmental standards and strengthen law 
enforcement.  
On Jan 1, 2015, the Environmental Protection Law was formally enacted with the purpose to 
promote ecological awareness and promote a sustainable socioeconomic development, 
establishing the principle of harmony between man and nature and prioritizing protection.  
Technical indicators Management indicators 
PD CAR 
LGD NPL ratio 
Duration Economic capital 
Gap CAR 
EL Profit margin 
Loan loss Industry profitability 
Provision  
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Since 2013, China has steadily implemented regulations to increase protection of air, water 
and soil. A range of guidelines have been introduced, such as pollution control technologies 
on the production of cement, iron and steel, sulfuric acid, and volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs), as well as drawing up ecological protection red lines. 
 Price factors 
Changes in balance sheets and income statements due to price variations have always been 
the focus of stress-testing. In the Chinese economy, price factors impacted by environmental 
protection policies are mainly carbon trading, pollution rights trading and carbon taxes. As 
important economic means to internalize environmental and social costs, the three factors 
have been so widely used in developed countries that mature and practical experiences have 
accumulated. China is also actively pushing for related reform in this respect to facilitate its 
economic transition, efforts that will add costs and test the repayment capacities of firms 
engaged in highly polluting and energy-intensive activities. 
 Impact of natural disasters 
Climate change is posing unprecedented threats to human societies. The increased frequency, 
scale and spread of natural disasters such as droughts and floods have added risks to firms and 
financial institutions and therefore need to be incorporated into the range of stress-testing to 
be performed. 
 Scenario setting 
The next step scenario setting concerns the ranges of stress factors. Common scenarios fall 
into three types: historical, hypothetical, mixed. A historical scenario refers to stressors set 
pursuant to historical data. A hypothetical scenario is subjectively selected by risk managers, 
allowing more flexibility and the ability to simulate hypothetical events. The most common is 
the combination of a historical and a hypothetical scenario, the so-called mixed scenario, 
which contains historical information and has the flexibility to hypothesize. The last type of 
scenario is strongly advocated by regulatory authorities as it can prevent risk managers from 
being too divergent in their scenario analysis and it is also forward-looking. 
In setting scenarios, the first step is considering future trends of environmental protection 
policies and the small-probability events. Traditional stress-testing focuses on the evaluation 
of small-probability events (Goldstein, 2015; Hahn, 2007; Weber et al., 2008). Risks from 
macroeconomic volatilities have generally been accounted for in the financial system through 
robust risk-reduction arrangements and countermeasures. The major difference is that 
commercial banks have not made adequate preparations for environmental risks. Even Basel 
I,II,III (Carney, 2015; CISL & UNEP FI, 2014) , the latest risk management standard for the 
banking industry, failed to explicitly address environmental factors (CISL & UNEP FI, 2014). 
Therefore, environmental policy factors must first be considered in scenario setting. 
 Transmission path 
Modeling how the stressors bring about financial impact is the core of the stress-testing. 
Stress-testing for different risks, such as those related to the market, credit, liquidity and 
operations, adopt different transmission mechanisms. For some credit risk types, the stress 
transmission mechanism is relatively clear and easily described by the adoption of a financial 
model. For a macro stress-testing on credit risks, however, the transmission process might be 
difficult to describe due to the complicated impact of the macroeconomy on many individuals 
at the micro level. In such cases, it is more suitable to describe the transmission mechanism 
through an econometric model. The modelling methods can include a top-down centralized 
model, a subsection model, a structural model and a simplified model. For those more 
ordinary stress-testing, the target assets, stress-bearing objects and indicators are all quite 
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clear. However, for those uncommon stress-testing, the objects under tests may not be clearly 
definable. For environmental stress-testing, one needs to factor in the wide-ranging impact of 
environmental risks on the firms’ balance sheets, cash flows and income statements, and the 
transition mechanism needs to address costs profits and risks.  
4 Stress-testing on impact of environmental factors on bank credit 
risk: thermal power and cement industries 
ICBC selected two industries, thermal power and cement, and included 437 and 80 companies 
respectively, for first-round stress-testing. The main steps were as follows: 
 Identify environmental stress 
The research group first worked out the stress-transmission diagrams for environmental 
factors in the thermal power and cement industries (see Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3). Our 
research found at the end of 2013, 91.6% thermal power plants in China were installed with 
desulfurization facilities while 50% were equipped with denigration. The adoption of dust 
removal facilities had only recently begun, so the proportion of dust-removal-fitted units in 
service stood at 20% only, with much potential for energy saving. In the future, the thermal 
power industry will see more changes responding to environmental protection policies. One 
is the heightened atmospheric pollution emissions limits. The emission limit of nitrogen oxides 
will be tightened to 100mg/m3 from 450mg/m3, stricter than the standards of the US (135 mg/ 
m3) and EU (200mg/m3). The allowed limit for SO2 will be restricted to 100-200mg/m3 from 
400mg/m3 (higher than that of the US (184mg/ m3) and EU (200mg/m3). The standard for 
smoke dust will be reduced to 30-20mg/m3 from 50mg/m3, matching those of the US and EU. 
Another policy is the higher pollutant discharge fees, which raised the standards for major 
polluting firms and regions. After a transition period, firms’ discharge fees are expected to 
increase by as much as three times2. 
                                                     
2 Different regions have different transition periods. E.g., the transition period is one year for Beijing, three years for Hebei 
and five for Shanghai. 
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Figure 5-2 Stress transmission of changes in environmental protection policies - 
thermal power industry 
 
 
Figure 5-3 Stress transmission of changes in environmental protection policies- 
cement industry 
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As for the cement industry, environmental policy changes may be expected in the followings 
areas. The first is the stricter atmospheric pollutant emission limits. Particulate Matters (PM) 
emission limits will be lowered to 30mg/m3（general regions）and 20mg/m3（key regions）,  
40% and 33% lower than the original limits. NOx (nitrogen oxide) emission limits will be 
adjusted to 400mg/m3 (general)and 320 mg/m3 (key) from 800mg/m3, or 50% and 60% 
reductions. The second is that collaborative use of cement kilns will become a new way for 
firms to balance environmental stresses with growth. Overseas cement giants such as Lafarge, 
Holcim and Cemex have a fuel substitution rate above 10%. Due to deficiencies in domestic 
trash treatment, immature cement co-treatment technology and pressure to recover 
investment, the average fuel substitution rate of leading cement firms in China stands at only 
around 4.5% (with an exception of Huaxin Cement’s13%), trailing international peers. The third 
is higher pollutant discharge fees. Fee standards have already been raised significantly in the 
eastern areas, such as Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, while national standards are basically 
observed in the central and western areas. After the end of the transition period, the total 
firm discharge fees are estimated to increase by up to three times pursuant to the new 
pollutant discharge fee standards and the possibility of “fee- to-tax” reform. 
 Build scenarios   
One of the flaws of a traditional stress test is the focus on a single scenario, even as the 
probability of the scenario can be quite low. The scenarios built by the research group included 
many policies and standards formulated or to be issued, making up a relatively higher 
probability. The research group set stress scenarios based on heavy, medium and light levels 
of stress. For the thermal power industry, the research group created heavy, medium and light 
stress scenarios for the energy saving and emissions reduction of thermal power generation 
companies according to the standards released by the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(end of 2014), the State Council (end of 2015), and special limits for eastern regions released 
by the State Council (end of 2020). 
The research team then took into consideration the impact of increasing pollutant discharge 
fees by four, three and two times on firms’ costs. With respect to the cement industry, after 
several rounds of research and expert discussions, the research group set the stress scenarios 
based on two main factors: first,, policy changes concerning pollution control, co-treatment 
and pollutant discharge were selected pursuant to new environmental protection standards 
set in 2013 and new pollutant discharge fee standards in 2014; second, given that ICBC’s most 
cement customers were in the mid and upstream, expert values were selected for the setting 
of environmental protection costs. 
 Conduct stress-testing through financial transmission model  
Due to the lack of historical data in China on the impact of enhanced environmental standards 
on banks’ credit, a bottom-up approach was adopted in the stress-testing to analyse the 
impact of environmental policy changes on the financial standings of firms. 
We estimated new financial statements under the stress scenarios through the relationships 
of the different financial sheets. Next, we calculated the changes in the firms’ credit ratings 
and PDs under the stress scenarios using ICBC’s existing rating model and derived the growth 
of the NPL ratios of related industries based on the relationship between PD and the NPL ratio. 
See Figure 5-4 for specific principles: 
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Figure 5-4 Schematic diagram of financial transmission model 
 
Step 1 Set the function of the impact of changes in environmental protection standards on 
financial indicators of firms： C=f ， where C indicates the change in a firm’s cost and f 
denotes environmental protection standards. For thermal power companies, the annual 
power generated was estimated according to prime operating revenue and on-grid power 
tariffs, while the increase in the amount of prime operating cost was then calculated based on 
the increased cost per kilowatt*hour under the stress scenarios. For cement producers, the 
prime operating costs under the stress scenarios were calculated by prime operating costs and 
the percentage increases. 
Step 2 Calculate main indicators for balance sheet and income statement according to changes 
in prime operating costs and financial statement articulation. 
When applying stress on the financial position of a sample firm, we paid attention primarily to 
two indicators in the income statement: revenue and cost of goods sold (COGS). 
Correspondingly, other accounts in the income statement would also change, thus affecting 
profit and retained earnings in the balance sheet. 
We assumed △ B = percentage of cost change, △ P = percentage of price change, and △ Q = 
percentage of quantity change. After accounting for changes in cost, price and quantity we 
arrived at revenue, COGS and profit from the equations below: 
△ R=(1+ △ P)(1+ △ Q) － 1 
△ COGS=(1+ △ B)(1+ △ Q) － 1 
△ Profit= △ R －△ COGS 
Here △ R= revenue change in percentage, △ COGS= COGS change in percentage, △ Profit= 
profit change in percentage. 
1) Income statement under stress conditions  
The prime operating revenue and income in the income statement were directly 
impacted and adjusted accordingly. 
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2) Balance sheet under stress conditions  
A decrease in net profit in the income statement leads to decrease of the owner’s 
equity in the balance sheet. We adjusted the current assets and liabilities according to 
the cash flow cycle while maintaining other assumptions. 
Similar changes in the income statements can have different impact on the balance sheets of 
different borrowers. We translated the impact into a reduction in retained earnings on the 
balance sheet, with the understanding that no general rules were applicable to all borrowers. 
One limitation of such a simple approach is that it does not account for individual companies’ 
adjustments to their own financing structures responding to the decline in revenue. As well, 
cash flow cycle may deteriorate under stress conditions. However, given that cash flow cycle 
has no significant weighting in the customer credit rating model, we believed that results 
based on this simplified approach were sufficient to deduce a credit rating migration matrix. 
Step 3 Input above financial indicators into the corresponding score sheets. At ICBC, different 
corporate customer credit ratings and evaluation models were applied to thermal power and 
cement companies. The evaluation model consisted of quantitative and qualitative evaluations. 
To be prudent, we assumed that scores on qualitative and quantitative evaluations declined 
by the same proportion. 
From the change in a firm’s evaluation score we obtained the change in its credit rating, which 
through relationship mapping allowed us to estimate the change in PD. Raising the 
environmental protection standards for firms would cause their profits to decline, reducing 
their solvency and causing declining credit standings and rising PDs. 
Step 4 Construct credit rating transition matrices for the industries that the companies were 
in by summarizing changes in credit ratings of firms; further analyze changes in loan quality in 
related industries based on the relationship between the PD and the NPL ratio. 
 Main findings of stress-testing and policy recommendations 
Thermal power firms 
Stricter environmental protection standards will impose great cost pressure on the thermal 
power industry, but the industry will maintain stable given steady economic growth and rising 
demand for electricity as China furthers industrialization. Enhanced environmental protection 
standards will nonetheless have major structural impact on the thermal power industry.  
Policy recommendations 
• Maintain existing AAA customers while continuing to attract high-quality customers 
from the five major power companies.  
• Pay attention to the impact of changes in environmental protection policies on the 
financial cost and credit risk of firms with AA+ ratings and below, especially corporate 
customers that may be degraded to BBB+ or below.  
• Recognize opportunities to grant loans to firms with energy-saving and emission- 
reduction plans.  
• Recognize new upstream and downstream segments resulted from environmental 
technologies, such as solid waste treatment.  
• Strictly prevent thermal power firms violating environmental protection laws and 
regulations from obtaining funding. 
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Cement industry 
The cement industry will by and large enter a slow-growth stage under pressure to reduce 
capacity. Raised environmental protection standards will impose obvious financial pressure.  
Policy recommendations  
• Guard against risks faced by small and medium-sized cement firms as they adapt to 
the green economy.  
• Keep track of possible credit risks from industry capacity reduction.  
• Select companies strong on desulfurization, denitration and dust removal and help 
them expand given growth potential.  
• Monitor mergers, acquisitions and reorganizations in the industry and improve bank’s 
customer quality by seizing appropriate environmental improvement opportunities.  
• Use ICBC’s financial portfolio products to focus on the development of the industrial 
solid waste market and lend more support to cement co-treatment projects.  
• Grant loans to firms well-positioned in the green transformation of the cement 
industry, support companies with the potential to go global. 
 Further development of environmental stress-testing 
In our research, the first problem was data availability and accuracy, so relevant ministries and 
commissions are advised to implement requirement on companies for mandatory disclosures 
of environmental data. Our research group is strengthening cooperation with the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection in a bid to improve the accuracy of estimates for the internalization 
of environmental cost. 
As ICBC sets high standard for high-polluting and high-energy-consuming industries to access 
its business, the customers selected for this stress-testing were mainly large and medium- 
sized companies, which likely produced above-average results. These test results therefore are 
more indicative of ICBC customers and do not reflect the entire industry. The quality of the 
stress-testing would have been much improved if data representing the whole industry had 
been obtained. 
These stress-testing targeted thermal power and cement industries. We plan to cover other 
polluting industries including iron and steel, nonferrous metals, chemical and paper. The 
methods will be enhanced to include prices, regions and climate change, with the goal to yield 
quantitative results. For example, stress-testing concerning the impact of environmental 
factors on the credit risks of commercial banks will be conducted from the perspective of 
pricing (carbon trading), the sustainable rating (ESG) for firms will be explored, and the 
feasibility of incorporating environmental factors into the bank customer credit rating system 
will be considered to help research and develop an “ICBC Green Index”, prioritizing loans to 
and investment in green firms and fields. 
5 Conclusion and recommendations 
Environmental risks have become an important factor impacting the daily operations of 
commercial banks, therefore environmental stress-testing should be incorporated into bank 
credit risk rating systems and processes. This will improve the ability of the banking sector to 
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identify environmental risks and the customers most able to contribute to sustainable 
development, thereby enhancing the ability of the banking system to continuously support 
the green economy, while also becoming resilient to environmental risks itself. In our opinion, 
stress-testing the impact of environmental factors is important for commercial banks for the 
following four reasons: first, stress-testing can help precisely estimate and quantify the impact 
of more extreme environmental factors on a bank’s credit risks, improving the capacity of a 
bank’s environmental risk management processes; second, environmental risk factors can be 
included in the customer credit rating system, enabling environmental risk measurement to 
form a basis for the pricing of credit products; third, stress-testing leads to rational 
arrangement of bank loans and investment portfolios, thus actively promote the adjustment 
of credit and investment structures; fourth, stress-testing could be taken as a reference point 
for banks and regulators in their future considerations of environmental factors and risks. 
ICBC has stayed at the forefront exploring the impact of environmental risks through stress-
testing analysis. The following are the highlights of our stress-testing:  
• The scenarios constructed by ICBC accounted for many complex factors with a series 
of policies and standards formulated or due to be released. 
• A number of aspects of the environmental stress-testing methodology developed by 
ICBC may be innovative in China or globally, such as the transmission mechanism from 
environment protection policies to firm impacts to bank impacts, the formulation of 
scenarios despite the complexity faced and the forecasting methodology based on 
ICBC’s big data.  
• ICBC started the stress test on a single industry and gradually extended to multiple 
industries, an innovative and practical approach to developing the research 
methodology.  
• Both first-round and corresponding feedback effects were accounted for. For example, 
in stress-testing thermal power companies, the impact from changes in the on-grid 
power tariffs was considered; for the cement industry, the study discussed subsequent 
improvement measures that firms could take in response to environmental protection 
policies, including co-treatment operations  
• The approach of expanding coverage from one to many factors and from one to many 
industries created a path for the banking industry to intensify its capabilities on stress-
testing. 
We believe the construction of this market-oriented mechanism can greatly help reduce the 
impact of economic development on the environment. To improve the efficacy of this method, 
we make the following recommendations: 
• The authorities should actively and collaboratively promote research on fiscal policy, 
financial policy and industrial policy and develop a whole set of policy support systems 
for the internalization of environmental costs.  
• Emissions standards should be tightened with strict supervision and implementation, 
additional pollutant discharge taxes should be collected from polluting firms, and 
companies should be encouraged to make green investments and upgrade 
technologies through tax reductions, discounts, government procurement. 
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• Voluntary agreements and tradable permits should be introduced to establish a well-
running carbon trading market.  
• Special re-lending policy for “environmental protection fields “should be formulated, 
along with positive development of green bonds and green insurance, to reduce the 
operating cost of firms through a market-oriented approach supporting green 
investment. 
• Intermediary service system should be actively cultivated, and policies on the open 
and transparent disclosure of environmental information should be enacted.  
• Policy and market signals should both aim to enhance the value of preserving natural 
resources and reduce the value of carbon intensive investments to spur the 
transformations of the industrial structures and companies toward a green economy. 
 
Table 5-2 China major environmental laws & regulations since 2013 
Title Issued by Issued in Main content 
Pollution 
Prevention and 
Control 
Techniques in the 
industries of 
cement steel, 
sulfuric acid, 
volatile organic 
compounds 
(VOCs) 
Ministry of 
Environmental 
Protection 
May 2013 
Cement: Key pollutants to be effectively 
controlled in 2015, with NOx emissions 
kept below 1.5 million tons and 
particulate matter emissions (including 
unorganized emissions) below 2 million 
tons and full control will be in place in 
2020. 
 
Steel: Sintering fume should be fully 
desulfurized. 
Blast furnace gas (BFG) dry dedusting is 
encouraged. Low-sulfur fuel, regenerative 
combustion and low-nitrogen combustion 
technologies are encouraged for steel-
rolling industrial furnaces. 
 
Sulfuric acid: The pickling process shall be 
employed for acid production in iron-
sulfur plants and acid production from 
smelting fume; acidic wastewater and 
cooling water shall be treated separately. 
The water reuse ratio shall not be lower 
than 90%. 
 
Volatile organic compounds (VOCs): VOCs 
prevention and control system will be 
established in key areas in 2015; 
emissions reduction will be basically 
materialized from raw materials to final 
products and from production and 
consumption in 2020. 
 
Circular of the 
State Council on 
State Council 
September 
2013 
Overall air quality to be improve, heavy 
pollution days to be reduced significantly, 
by 2017, the concentration of inhalable 
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Issuing the 
Action Plan for 
Air Pollution 
Prevention 
and Control (G.F. 
[2013] No. 37) 
particulate matters to fall by over 10% 
from 2012 in prefectural or higher-level 
cities. 
 
Air quality to improve notably in the 
Beijing- Tianjin-Hebei region, the Yangtze 
River Delta and the Pearl River Delta. The 
concentration of fine particulate matters 
to fall by 25%, 20% and 15% in the above 
three regions. 
Environmental 
Protection Law 
National 
People’s 
Congress 
April 2014 
Establish a sound system of environment 
and health monitoring, investigation and 
risk assessment, and create a mechanism 
for public monitoring and early warning of 
environmental pollution; define red lines 
for ecological protection in key ecological 
protection zones, ecologically sensitive 
areas and ecologically vulnerable areas to 
maintain strict protection; expand the 
scope of complainants in environment-
related public interest litigations so that 
all social organizations that are registered 
with the civil affairs department of the 
people’s government at or above the level 
of city divided into districts, are 
specialized in environmental protection 
activities in public interests for more than 
five years and maintain good reputation 
are eligible for lodging a lawsuit with the 
people’s court. Firms that discharge 
pollutants illegally and refuse to take 
corrective actions can be fined for 
successive days in the amount of initial 
fine. 
Action Plan for 
Water Pollution 
Prevention and 
Control 
State Council April 2015 
Close down 10 categories of small firms. 
Close down all product projects of small 
paper making, leather making, dyeing, 
dye making, coking, sulfur refining, 
arsenic refining, oil refining, electroplating 
and pesticide firm that will seriously 
contaminate water bodies. 
 
Launch crackdown on 10 key industries. 
Develop pollution crackdown plans for 
paper making, coking, nitrogen fertilizers, 
nonferrous metals, dyeing, agricultural 
and sideline foodstuffs processing, active 
pharmaceutical ingredient (API) 
manufacturing, leather making, pesticide 
and electroplating industries and 
implement cleaner upgrading. Implement 
equivalent or reduction replacement of 
main pollutant emissions from new, 
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alteration and expansion projects in the 
above industries. 
 
In 2020, over 70% of water bodies in 
seven key drainage basins (Yangtze River, 
Yellow River, Pear River, Songhua River, 
Huaihe River, Haihe River and Liaohe 
River) will reach or exceed Class III. 
 
Black-and-malodorous water bodies will 
be controlled within 10% in developed 
areas of cities at the prefectural and 
higher levels. In 2030, over 75% of water 
bodies in seven key drainage basins will 
reach or exceed Class III. Black-and- 
malodorous water bodies in developed 
urban areas will be basically removed. 
About 95% of centralized drinking water 
sources in urban areas will reach or 
exceed Class III. 
 
Technical Guide 
to Delimitation 
of Bio-protection 
Red Line (Trial) 
(H.F. [2014] No. 
10) 
Ministry of 
Environmental 
Protection 
May 2015 
Areas that are very important to water 
conservation are included within the 
bio- protection red line according to 
results of water conservation function 
assessment and classification. Grade 1 
and Grade 1 protected areas of 
important drinking water sources are 
included within the bio-protection red 
line. The specific method shall be as 
set forth in HJ/T338. 
 
Highly sensitive areas are included 
within the bio- protection red line 
according to the results of soil erosion 
sensitivity assessment and classification. 
Zones of key soil erosion prevention and 
protection areas that pose a relatively 
significant risk of soil erosion also shall 
be included within the bio-protection 
red line. 
   
Assess the materiality of biological 
diversity preservation function. 
Soil 
Environmental 
Quality 
Standard for 
Agricultural 
Land (2nd 
Exposure 
Ministry of 
Environmental 
Protection 
August 
2015 
10 soil contaminants (i.e., total 
manganese, total cobalt, total selenium, 
total vanadium, total antimony, total 
thallium, fluoride (water soluble fluorine), 
benzoapyrene, total petroleum 
hydrocarbon and total phthalic acid 
esters) are added to the test options 
according to relevant foreign standards 
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Draft) 
(revision of 
GB15618-
1995) 
and Risk 
Screening 
Guideline 
Values for Soil 
Contamination 
of Development 
Land (2nd 
Exposure Draft) 
(supplement to 
HJ 25.3-2014) 
and China’s National Technical Rules for 
Evaluation of Soil Contamination Status, 
which are applicable to soil contamination 
investigation and evaluation in specified 
areas. 
 
The soil pH level of 6.5 or below under the  
original standard is further divided into 
two levels: pH ≤ 5.5 and 5.5 ＜ pH ≤ 6.5, 
with different limits applied to the two 
levels, so that the three levels (pH ≤ 6.5，
6.5 7.5) under the original standard are 
increased to four levels (pH ≤ 5.5，5.5 ＜ 
pH ≤ 6.5, 6.5< pH ≤ 7.5,pH>7.5). 
 
The limit on lead content of soil in 
agricultural land is lowered to 80 mg/kg. 
The original standard prescribes three 
limit levels according to pH value 
according to the impact of lead on crop 
growth: 250mg/kg (pH<6.5), 300mg/kg 
(pH6.5-7.5) and 350mg/kg (pH>7.5). 
   
The limit on HCH and DDT contents of 
soil is lowered to 0.1 mg/kg from the 
original standard of 0.5mg/kg. 
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 Quantifying the Impact of Physical Risks on 
Probabilities of Bank Loan Defaults 
 
By 
Research Center for Green Finance Development, Tsinghua University1 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we present an analytical framework and the methodologies for measuring the 
impact of climate-related physical risks on the default risks of bank loans. The framework 
consists of the setting of climate scenarios and a suite of catastrophe models and financial 
models. For the case study, we analyzed the impacts of climate change on typhoons’ intensity 
and frequency and on credit risk metrics (e.g. PD and LGD) of mortgage loans in China’s coastal 
cities. The model shows that, under an extreme scenario (RCP8.5 with extreme exacerbation 
effect on typhoons), the expected annual credit loss of mortgage loans could rise nearly three 
fold in 2050 compared with the baseline scenario which assumes no change in typhoons’ 
occurrence pattern. This framework can also be applied to estimate potential climate 
exacerbated impacts of other natural disasters including floods, heatwaves, drought and 
wildfires on financial risk metrics such as default probability and valuation of assets.   
Keywords: climate-related physical risks, typhoon, mortgage loan, default probability, 
quantitative 
1 Introduction  
A growing consensus among the scientific community is that global warming will lead to 
changes in the occurring patterns of future weather and climate events, such as typhoons, 
floods and heat waves. These climate-related physical risks can cause considerable damages, 
many of which unexpected, to the real economy and the financial sector that provides funding 
for economic activities. The losses to the real economy and the associated impact on the 
financial sector can be enormous as estimated by several central banks and research 
institutions (EIU, 2015; PRA Bank of England, 2015; Regelink et al., 2017).  
Against this backdrop, the international financial community has called for attention and 
actions to integrate climate-related physical risks into financial decision making by financial 
institutions. For example, the G20 Green Finance Study Group, the Central Banks and 
Supervisors’ Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS, 2019) and the Taskforce for 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD, 2017) have advised financial regulators and 
institutions to conduct environmental risk analysis (ERA) and disclosing information related to 
climate-risk exposures and the resulting financial risks. To manage these environmental and 
climate risks, the primary step is to quantify these risks. Many literatures, including other 
                                                     
1 The primary authors of this chapter are Dr. SUN Tianyin, Senior Research Fellow, email: sunty@pbcsf.tsinghua.edu.cn, and 
Dr. MA Jun, Director, Research Center for Green Finance Development at Tsinghua University, email: 
maj@pbcsf.tsinghua.edun.cn. The authors would like to thank Dr Gabriela Aznar Siguan, Prof David Bresch and Eberenz 
Samuel from ETH Zurich, ZHU Yun and MENG Tingyi from Tsinghua University and WANG Jiayi and ZHAO Xinran from 
UIBE for their advices and contributions. The authors acknowledge the support of the INSPIRE grant. 
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chapters in this Occasional Paper, have discussed the methodologies for quantifying transition 
risks and their impact on banks’ and institutional investors’ exposures.   
In this chapter, we present an analytical framework and the methodologies for measuring the 
impact of climate-related physical risks on credit risk metrics of bank loans. In a case study 
using this framework, we quantify the increase in the probabilities of default (PD) and Loss-
Given-Default (LGD) of mortgage loans for properties in coastal cities of China, caused by the 
increased intensities and frequencies of typhoons under various climate change scenarios.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the applications of 
the proposed analytical approach; Section 3 presents the general analytical framework, the 
modules within the framework, and several modelling details; Section 4 presents the results 
of a case study that shows the quantitative estimates of the impact of typhoons on the PD and 
LGD of mortgage loans in coastal cities of China; Section 5 discusses the limitations of the 
current methodologies and outlines future work for our research. 
2 Applications 
This climate physical risk analysis framework is mainly developed for financial institutions, 
especially banks, to analyze the financial risks arising from the impact of physical risks under 
various climate scenarios. The framework could be applied to a wide range of hazards 
including typhoons, floods, heat waves, droughts etc., and various sectors, especially those 
vulnerable to natural disasters such as housing, agriculture, energy and transportation. The 
rationale of these risks translating into credit risks and most affected sectors are briefly 
described in the following Table 6-1.   
Quantifying the Impact of Physical Risks on Probabilities of Bank Loan Defaults  
91 
Table 6-1 Examples of physical risks’ impact on credit risks 
Climate-related 
physical risks 
Mechanism for translating into credit risks 
Most exposed 
sectors 
Typhoons/hurricanes 
Higher intensities and frequencies of 
typhoons/hurricanes cause severer 
destruction to properties and assets, and 
consequently reduce their values and lead 
to higher default rates for loans to these 
sectors 
Real estate 
Transportation 
Agriculture 
Power 
Floods 
More frequent floods cause severer 
destruction to properties and assets and 
interrupt business operations, impacting 
financial performance of the firms affected, 
and leading to higher default rates on loans 
to these sectors 
Transportation 
Real estate 
Mining  
Manufacturing 
Droughts 
More severe and frequent droughts reduce 
water supply to sectors heavily relying on 
water and affect production activity and 
revenues. Droughts also push up water 
prices and consequently operational 
expenses while reduce profitability, leading 
to more loan defaults 
Agriculture 
Food and beverage 
Textile and dying  
Steel 
Power 
Mining 
Heat waves 
Increasing frequency, severity and length of 
heatwaves cause more wildfires, reduce 
labor productivity and lower agricultural 
production; heatwaves also raise 
temperatures of cooling water for power 
plants and cause cable outages, 
interrupting power production and 
transmission. These lead to worse financial 
performance of affected firms and higher 
rates of loan defaults.  
Agriculture 
Forestry 
Energy 
Transportation 
All labor-intensive 
sectors 
Sea-level rise 
Rising sea levels cause irreparable 
destruction of properties and assets 
located in coastal areas, leading to higher 
loan default rates  
All sectors 
deploying assets 
and facilities along 
the coastal area  
Source: Compiled by authors  
 
This framework can also be used by local governments to assess the financial and fiscal impact 
of climate physical risks to cities and regions. For example, a coastal city prone to typhoons 
can apply this methodology to quantify the potential financial destruction caused by future 
typhoons (e.g., reduction in property values) and the needed expenditure for repairment. This 
analysis could be used to derive the financial risks facing a local government (e.g., the 
reduction in value of government-owned properties), the future increase in fiscal expenditure 
(for repairment and disaster relief) and the resulting government debt obligations and debt 
risks (assuming that the government will need to borrow to meet its additional expenditure 
needs).  
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3 Analytical framework and methodologies 
In this section we describe the general framework of our analysis and the methodologies used 
in the four modules of the disaster loss and the financial models.  
 Analytical framework  
The general analytical framework consists of two major components: a disaster loss model and 
a group of financial models, as illustrated in Figure 6-1.  
Figure 6-1 General physical risk assessment framework 
 
The disaster loss model is used to estimate the value losses from physical property damages, 
economic losses (e.g., decline in GDP or income), and/or financial losses due to business 
interruptions by natural disasters. The output of the disaster model is then used as an input 
into the financial models to adjust the estimated financial statements of an entity (e.g., a 
company), such as assets, liabilities, revenues, costs and profits/losses. These adjusted 
variables are later used to calculate various financial ratios such as the loan-to-value, return-
on- equity, asset/liability and interest coverage. 
The disaster loss model itself is made up of four major modules. These are the climate 
exacerbation module, the hazard module, the asset exposure module and the vulnerability 
module. The financial models used in the analysis could include the insurance actuarial model, 
the PD and LGD models, and the valuation model for asset management, depending on the 
type of financial business and the underlying assets affected by disasters. The two components 
of the analytic framework are interconnected by several economic and financial variables 
including GDP, household income, revenues, costs, and the loan-to-value ratio (LTV). 
 The modules 
In this subsection we describe the specific modules used in the disaster loss model and the 
financial models.  
3.2.1 Disaster loss model 
The disaster loss model within this framework is largely built on the on-going python package 
CLIMADA developed by a group of researchers at ETH Zurich (Aznar Siguan & Bresch, 2019). 
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The exacerbation module produces the exacerbation effect of climate change on the 
occurrence pattern and intensity of historical disaster events. The hazard module describes a 
hazard’s historical intensity and occurrence probability in a specific region. These two modules 
are together used to predict the profile of future typhoons. The asset exposure module 
describes the geographical distribution of assets being affected to coordinate with the 
geographical locations of a hazard. The vulnerability module combines hazard and asset 
modules translating the intensity of a hazard’s damages to assets. 
Exacerbation module 
The exacerbation module addresses the exacerbated effect of global warming on typhoons’ 
and other natural disasters’ intensities and frequencies. Specifically, it correlates the 
incremental change of intensity and occurrence probability of a hazard and a rise in 
temperature caused by higher carbon concentration in the atmosphere. Depending on the 
ocean basins investigated, many studies show considerable discrepancy of predicted changes 
in typhoons’ speed and frequency derived from climate change (Knutson et al., 2019). For any 
given location, there is a high amount of uncertainty in climate change-exacerbation effect on 
typhoon i.e., the probability distribution of the impact on typhoons’ intensity and frequency 
caused by climate change has fat tails. In our study presented later in this chapter, we use the 
mean, 90th percentile and the 99th percentile of the statistical distribution of exacerbation 
effects from these studies for parameterization, which form respectively our mild, severe and 
extreme scenarios. 
Hazard module 
The hazard module models future hazard profiles under climate scenarios defined by IPCC 
(Allen et al., 2014). For our case study, this is done through combining historical typhoons’ 
tracks obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the 
output of climate exacerbation module. More specifically, the data of typhoon tracks along 
the coast of China are provided in the International Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship 
(IBTrACS) project of the NOAA (NOAA, 2019). The IBTrACS project is a centralized database 
providing historical tropical cyclone track data to aid the understanding of the distribution, 
frequencies, and intensities of tropical cyclones worldwide. The database pools data from all 
the Regional Specialized Meteorological Centers and other international centers and 
individuals, creating a global best track dataset that merges information from multiple centers 
into one product and archive for public use. 
Asset exposure module 
The asset exposure module describes the geographical locations and value distribution of the 
concerned assets/properties potentially exposed to natural disaster events. These are often 
expressed by the latitudes, longitudes and altitudes of the assets/properties and their 
corresponding monetary values at specific sites. Depending on the specific assets being 
investigated, this information can be obtained from data providers or asset owners. 
Vulnerability module  
The vulnerability module addresses the correlation between the magnitude of damages to 
assets and the intensity of a hazard. The data used for determining the correlation are 
empirical studies and expert judgement. This relationship is often depicted by a damage 
function curve, as Figure 6-2 shows. Here the x axis indicates the intensity of the hazard and 
the y axis the magnitude of damage that the assets suffer in a monetary context as a 
percentage of their initial values. In Figure 6-2, the lines of different colors represent the 
damage curves for various assets for the same hazard.  This is because different assets (e.g., 
buildings, power plants and bridges) with different physical structures and qualities 
demonstrate varied responses (i.e., sustaining different levels of damage) while bearing the 
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same level of shocks from the hazards. The damage curve for a specific asset against a hazard 
is determined by several critical points on the curve. For example, the critical points on the 
property damage curve include (1) the threshold intensity point at which the wind speed of 
typhoon starts to cause damages and (2) the full damage intensity point at which the wind 
speed of typhoon causes 100% damage. These critical points determining the damage curve 
are based on empirical studies of historical records (Emanuel, 2011). 
Figure 6-2 Schematic damage function curves of a natural disaster for different 
assets 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Financial models 
As mentioned earlier, many financial models could be used to analyze the impact of disasters 
on financial variables related to insurance, asset management and banking operations, taking 
the output of the “disaster loss model” as inputs.   
In this study, we adopt the Expected Loss (EL) model widely used by banks to estimate credit 
risks. Typically, EL is expressed as the product of three individual risk-measure components, 
namely Probability of Default (PD), Exposure at Default (EAD) and Loss Given Default (LGD) as 
suggested in  BCBS, 2017 and other studies (Hull, 2012):  
∑ 𝐸𝐿𝑖 = ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖 … … … … … … … … … … [1] 
As we assume banks’ future exposure (EAD) (the real estate properties in the coastal areas) is 
unchanged for the purpose of this study, so only impacts of typhoons on PD and LGD need to 
be evaluated to derive future disasters’ impact on EL. The models estimating the PD and LGD 
are integrated to calculate the expected loss fraction of asset 𝑖, expressed as a percentage of 
EAD: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖 = 𝑃𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑖 … … … … … … . … [2]. 
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In a typical PD model for mortgage loans, the dependent variable is the probability of a default 
by a borrower, and the explanatory variables may include household income, mortgage loan 
interest rates, risk-free rates, loan-to-value ratios (LTV), and loan maturity (Tian, 2014; Xu et 
al., 2010). In our case study, we identify the LTV and household income as the two principal 
“directly impacted” variables, which bridge the disaster loss model and the PD model. These 
variables translate increased property losses and declined household income to PD’s 
incremental change (the delta PD). The logic is that the property impairment and household 
income decline due to disasters would increase the LTV and damage the borrower’s repayment 
capacity, which tends to increase the incentive and risk for the borrower to default. In this case, 
we also use per capita GDP growth as a proxy for household income growth, assuming the 
disaster’s impact on GDP is proportional to its impact on household income. 
For a typical LGD model, its explanatory variables could be categorized into contract 
characteristics, borrower characteristics, differences across industry and industry conditions, 
and macroeconomic systematic risk factors (Qi & Yang, 2009). Among these variables, the 
Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is often considered as a key driver of LGD (Calem & LaCour-Little, 
2004; Hou et al., 2019; Leow & Mues, 2012; Lu, 2014). It can bridge the disaster loss model 
and LGD model by translating the property impairment to incremental LGD (the delta LGD). 
The logic behind this is that an increase in LTV implies that the impaired value of collateral is 
less likely to cover the outstanding loans at default.  
Using the PD and LGD estimates produced by the two models above, we can assess the 
expected percentage loss of EAD by equation [2]. In the current case study which is for 
illustrative purposes, we consider only the household income and LTV as the links between 
hazard damage and the PD, and LTV as the link between hazard damage and the LGD. It doesn’t 
mean that other explanatory variables in the PD model and LGD model are completely 
irrelevant, although they are less important from the perspective of climate risk analysis.  
4 Case study: quantifying typhoon impact on EL of mortgage loans  
In the following, we present some methodological details on how to apply the framework to 
estimate the impact of increased intensity and frequency of typhoons on the EL of mortgage 
loans for properties in China’s coastal cities. This application involves the following seven steps:  
Step 1: Select the cities 
In this study, we select 40 Chinese coastal cities in eight provinces frequently exposed to 
typhoons according to geographical locations and historical typhoon landfall records. In the 
period 2004-2016, properties located in these eight provinces suffered 85% of the direct 
economic losses from typhoons according to our own analysis based multiple sources of loss 
data on historical typhoon events2. A full list of these cities is shown in Table 6-2 below.   
                                                     
2  Data sources: China Meteorological Administration, link: www.tcdata.typhoon.gov.cn  China Meteorological 
Administration: Yearbook of Meteorological Disasters (2004-2016); YIN Jie et al: A study on the relationship between 
typhoon intensity grade and disaster loss in China (2013); and other press releases.  
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Table 6-2 40 Chinese coastal cities selected in our case study 
Index Coastal Cities Provinces 
1 Binzhou 
Shandong 
2 Weifang 
3 Weihai 
4 Yantai 
5 Qingdao 
6 Rizhao 
7 Lianyungang 
Jiangsu 
8 Yancheng 
9 Nantong 
10 Suzhou 
11 Shanghai Shanghai 
12 Jiaxing 
Zhejiang 
13 Hangzhou 
14 Shaoxing 
15 Zhoushan 
16 Ningbo 
17 Taizhou 
18 Wenzhou 
19 Ningde 
Fujian 
20 Fuzhou 
21 Putian 
22 Quanzhou 
23 Xiamen 
24 Zhangzhou 
25 Chaozhou 
Guangdong 
26 Shantou 
27 Jieyang 
28 Huizhou 
29 Shenzhen 
30 Dongguan 
31 Guangzhou 
32 Zhongshan 
33 Zhuhai 
34 Jiangmen 
35 Maoming 
36 Zhanjiang 
37 Foshan 
38 Qingyuan 
39 Beihai Guangxi 
40 Haikou Hainan 
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Step 2: Estimate outstanding mortgage loans  
The next step is collecting/estimating data on the mortgage loans of these cities. However, few 
municipalities at the district administrative level reported such data, which would have 
provided the required geographical resolution for our analysis. Therefore, we scaled the 2018 
national mortgage loan data to district municipality level using the share of each district’s GDP 
of the national total, arriving at an estimate of the district’s outstanding mortgage loans. The 
underlying assumption, validated by our study using many samples, is that the ratio of a 
district’s outstanding mortgage loans to the national aggregate is similar to the ratio of the 
district’s GDP to the national GDP.  
Step 3: Identify the locations of properties  
Another important data point we need for the analysis is the geographical locations of the 
district level properties (assets), so that the potential disaster damages could be mapped 
accordingly. We apply an online tool to geocode the center of municipal districts as the 
location of the properties in a specific municipal district. The output includes the latitudes and 
longitudes for the properties in the municipal districts of the 40 cities (see Figure 6-3).  
Figure 6-3 Distribution of properties (and values) along the coast of China 
 
Source: authors’ estimates 
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Step 4: Generate typhoons’ future profiles under various climate scenarios  
The historical track data of the typhoons used in our case study are extracted from the NOAA’s 
IBTRACS database, which to our best knowledge provides the most complete record of 
historical tropical cyclone tracks worldwide. From this database, all the recorded tracks of 
historical typhoons landed on the 40 Chinese coastal cities are selected for our modelling. The 
historical data of typhoon tracks, together with the exacerbation effects induced by global 
warming estimated and summarized by NOAA climate researcher Thomas R. Knutson (Knutson 
et al., 2019), are used in the hazard module, which generates the future typhoon profiles 
under several IPCC’s climate scenarios, as shown by Figure 6-4.  
Figure 6-4 Locations and intensities of typhoons along Chinese coast 
 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
 
Step 5: Develop vulnerability curves for properties in each district  
Our case study takes Emanuel’s vulnerability curve (Emanuel, 2011) as the basis and adjusts 
its parameters, namely the threshold velocity and half damage velocity which determine the 
final shape of the curve, to match the historical records of typhoons’ impact on the selected 
cities in China (Sun, 2019). The historical records of impact are derived from the data of China’s 
provincial and municipal economic losses caused by typhoon, provided by a professional 
research data provider CSMAR3.  The final vulnerability curve of properties against typhoons 
is shown in Figure 6-5. This procedure is also applicable for defining the vulnerability curve of 
GDP of the Chinese coastal cities. The only difference is that the vulnerability curve of GDP is 
                                                     
3 Data used are derived from CSMAR, historical records of economic losses caused by typhoons in China, 2019, link: 
http://www.gtarsc.com  
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calibrated with data sources contained in empirical studies on economic losses due to 
typhoons (Liu, 2017; Ma, 2016; Wang et al., 2019; J.-y. Zhang et al., 2013; Q. Zhang et al., 2009). 
Figure 6-5 Property value loss as a function of winds speed (in %) 
 
Source: authors’ estimates  
 
Step 6: Estimate property value losses (value reduction in collaterals) under two 
climate scenarios 
We use the disaster loss model to estimate the potential annual value losses of properties 
(used as collaterals for mortgage loans) and impact on GDP (taken as proxy to the decline in 
household income), under two IPCC’s climate scenarios and three levels of climate 
exacerbation effects as shown in Table 6-3. The two climate scenarios are represented by two 
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). An RCP is a greenhouse gas concentration 
trajectory adopted by the IPCC in its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) in 2014. The RCPs describe 
possible climate future scenarios depending on the volume of greenhouse gases (GHG) 
emitted in the decades to come. According to IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (IPCC, 
2014), the four RCPs, namely RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0, and RCP8.5, are labelled after a possible 
range of radiative forcing values in the year 2100 (2.6, 4.5, 6.0, and 8.5 W/m2, respectively).  
In our case study, we focus on RCP 6.0 and RCP8.5, the two scenarios that we believe are more 
likely to occur than others based on the observed trend of human mitigation efforts (Berg et 
al., 2018). In addition, three levels of climate exacerbation effects on typhoons are considered 
for each of the two IPCC’s climate scenarios. The first considers the average (i.e., 50th 
percentile of the statistical distribution of) exacerbation effect (“mean case”). The second 
incorporates the 90th percentile exacerbation effects (“severe case”). The third incorporates 
the 99th percentile exacerbation effect (“extreme case”). There are thus six combinations of 
two climate scenarios and three levels of exacerbation effects (see Table 6-3). As a comparison, 
the baseline scenario is one that assumes historical typhoon occurrence pattern remains 
unchanged in the future.  
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Table 6-3 shows that, under the baseline scenario the estimated annual value losses of 
properties (physical loss in the table) in the 40 cities will be around RMB100billion (0.65% of 
total value) in 2030 and 2050. The value losses would surge to RMB210billion (1.36% of total 
value) and 443 billion (2.87% of total value) in 2030 and 2050 respectively under the RCP8.5 
extreme case. As for the impact on GDP, 1% of annual loss is expected under the baseline 
scenario from 2030 and 2050, while under RCP8.5 extreme case the GDP loss would amount 
to 2.2% in 2030 and 5.0% in 2050.  
Table 6-3 Estimated annual value losses of collaterals and GDP in 40 Chinese 
coastal cities due to typhoons 
 
Source: authors’ estimates 
 
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Physical loss 101 101 101 101 101
GDP loss 62 62 62 62 62
Exacerbation Climate
Physical loss 109 110 112 114 116
GDP loss 67 69 70 71 73
Physical loss 113 117 121 125 130
GDP loss 71 74 77 80 83
Physical loss 134 142 150 160 172
GDP loss 80 85 91 98 105
Physical loss 157 179 203 231 261
GDP loss 96 110 126 146 167
Physical loss 163 178 194 217 240
GDP loss 104 114 126 142 159
Physical loss 210 256 308 371 443
GDP loss 137 170 208 255 310
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Physical loss 0.65% 0.65% 0.65% 0.65% 0.65%
GDP loss 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
Exacerbation Climate
Physical loss 0.70% 0.71% 0.72% 0.74% 0.75%
GDP loss 1.09% 1.11% 1.13% 1.15% 1.18%
Physical loss 0.73% 0.76% 0.78% 0.81% 0.84%
GDP loss 1.15% 1.20% 1.24% 1.30% 1.35%
Physical loss 0.87% 0.92% 0.97% 1.04% 1.11%
GDP loss 1.30% 1.38% 1.47% 1.58% 1.71%
Physical loss 1.02% 1.16% 1.31% 1.49% 1.69%
GDP loss 1.55% 1.78% 2.05% 2.36% 2.71%
Physical loss 1.05% 1.15% 1.26% 1.40% 1.56%
GDP loss 1.68% 1.85% 2.04% 2.29% 2.57%
Physical loss 1.36% 1.66% 1.99% 2.40% 2.87%
GDP loss 2.21% 2.75% 3.37% 4.14% 5.02%
Scenarios
Scenarios
Extreme
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
Estimated annual value losses (Billion Yuan)
Mean
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
Severe
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
Baseline
Estimated annual value losses (%)
Extreme
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
Severe
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
Baseline
Mean
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
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Step 7: Estimate changes in PD, LGD, and EL of mortgage loans due to typhoons 
In this step, we estimate the impact of future typhoons on key credit risk metrics, including PD, 
LGD, and EL, of mortgage loans in the 40 Chinese cities under various climate scenarios with 
different exacerbation effects. The key to estimating the change in PD as a result of changes in 
LTV and Payment-to-Income Ratio (PTIR) is identifying the elasticity of change in PD to change 
in LTV, and the elasticity of change in PD to change in PTIR. These coefficients are estimated or 
calibrated based on relevant empirical studies such as (Tian, 2014) and (Fu, 2005). 
𝛥𝑃𝐷 ≈  𝛼 × (
1 − 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
1 − ∆𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
− (1 − 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡))
+ 𝛽 × (
𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝛥ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
) … … … … … … … [5] 
The changes in PD (probability of default in a year) under the six scenarios (2 IPCC scenarios × 
3 exacerbation effects) are estimated and shown in Table 6-4 below. The delta PD (i.e., change 
in PD) shown in Table 6-4 refers to the increase (in percentage points) of the PD of mortgage 
loans in any given year due to the heightened typhoon risks compared with the baseline level 
for the same year. For example, under the “extreme case” (RCP8.5 with extreme exacerbation), 
the PD for 2050 would increase by 0.97ppts (to 1.37%) from the baseline level of 0.4%. The 
estimated results for the increase of LGD are shown in Table 6-5. Compared to the impact on 
PDs, the changes to LGD caused by heightened typhoon risks are significantly smaller, with the 
highest increment of 1.58ppts in 2050 under the extreme case (RCP8.5 with extreme 
exacerbation), from the baseline LGD value of 27%.  
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Table 6-4 Estimated increase in PD under various typhoon scenarios (in ppts) 
 
Source: authors’ estimates 
Note: the unit of all figures in the table, unless otherwise indicated, is percentage 
point.  
Table 6-5 Estimated increase in LGD under various typhoon scenarios (in ppts)4 
 
Source: authors’ estimates 
Note: the unit of all figures in the table, unless otherwise indicated, is percentage 
point.  
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Base PD 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40%
Exacerbation Climate
delta PD from LTV 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
delta PD from Income 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Total delta PD 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
delta PD from LTV 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
delta PD from Income 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09
Total delta PD 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13
delta PD from LTV 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09
delta PD from Income 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09
Total delta PD 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.18
delta PD from LTV 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.21
delta PD from Income 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.21
Total delta PD 0.14 0.20 0.27 0.34 0.43
delta PD from LTV 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.19
delta PD from Income 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.20
Total delta PD 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.32 0.38
delta PD from LTV 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.36 0.46
delta PD from Income 0.15 0.22 0.30 0.39 0.50
Total delta PD 0.30 0.43 0.57 0.76 0.97
Scenarios
Extreme
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
Estimated delta PD induced by future typhoons
Mean
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
Severe
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
Baseline
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Base LGD 27% 27% 27% 27% 27%
Exacerbation Climate
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
delta LGD 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
delta LGD 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
delta LGD 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.32
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
delta LGD 0.25 0.35 0.46 0.59 0.73
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
delta LGD 0.28 0.35 0.43 0.53 0.64
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
delta LGD 0.50 0.71 0.95 1.25 1.58
Scenarios
Extreme
Estimated delta LGD induced by future typhoons
Baseline
Mean
Severe
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After obtaining the estimated changes in PD and LGD under various scenarios, these results 
are used to calculate the percentage change in EL of banks’ mortgage assets at exposure. The 
results are shown in Table 6-6 and Figure 6-6. The expected loss ratio (ratio of EL to exposure) 
under the baseline scenario remains at 0.11% from 2030-2050 assuming no change in climate 
conditions. Under the extreme case (RCP8.5 with extreme exacerbation), the heightened 
typhoon risk could add another 0.28ppts (to 0.39%) to the expected loss ratio in 2050, 
compared with baseline level of 0.11%.  
Table 6-6 Estimated change of EL (Expected Loss) fraction under various scenarios 
(in ppts) 
 
Source: authors’ estimates 
Note: the unit of all figures in the table, unless otherwise indicated, is percentage 
point.  
 
                                                     
4 The base LGD value is derived from Lu (2014). 
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Base EL 0.11% 0.11% 0.11% 0.11% 0.11%
Exacerbation Climate
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
delta % EL 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
delta % EL 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
delta % EL 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
delta % EL 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12
RCP6.0
(≈ Δ1.3℃ in 2050)
delta % EL 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11
RCP8.5
(≈ Δ2.0℃ in 2050)
delta % EL 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.28
Scenarios
Mean
Severe
Extreme
Baseline
Estimated delta fraction of Expected Loss (EL) induced by future typhoons
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Figure 6-6 Development of estimated EL (Expected Loss) fraction under various 
scenarios (2020-2050) 
 
Source: authors’ estimates 
5 Limitations and future research  
This chapter presents a framework for quantifying the impact of climate physical risks (e.g., 
natural disasters) on banks’ credit risk metrics. We illustrate the approach with an application 
of the various modules in a case study, in which we assess the impact of future typhoon 
scenarios on the PD, LGD and EL of mortgage loans in China’s coastal cities. The preliminary 
finding shows that the PD of mortgage loans could rise by several folds due to intensified 
typhoon risks under severe and extreme scenarios.  
The case study presented here is a simplified, illustrative example intending to show the 
mechanics of how different modules work in the framework, and the quantitative results 
should be interpreted with cautions for several reasons. First, there are two channels of 
damages from typhoons, wind and flood surge, while our case study only considered damages 
from heightened wind risk. Second, the impact of typhoons on economic variables such as 
household income in our model is derived from an approximation to historical direct damage 
loss. A more sophisticated economic-disaster model could be constructed to capture possible 
interruptions to broader economic activities and rising unemployment as well as their indirect 
impact on household income.   
The potential applications of this analytical framework are not limited to assessing the impact 
of typhoons on mortgage loan PDs.  It could be used to analyze the impact of many other types 
of environmental and climate risks –e.g., droughts, floods, heatwaves, winter storms, wildfires, 
deforestation and environmental accidents – on financial indicators such as valuations and VAR 
of investment portfolios, in addition to credit risk metrics. The most critical work needed for 
the various applications lies in better understanding sector-specific issues, such as the reliance 
of agriculture firms on water supply and the climate impact on water supply and water prices.   
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Transition on Default Probabilities of Thermal Power 
Companies  
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Research Center for Green Finance Development, Tsinghua University1 
Abstract 
This chapter presents an analytical framework for measuring the impact of key transition 
factors (e.g., demand reduction, development of renewable energy technologies, carbon price 
increases, and funding cost increases) on the credit risks of thermal power companies. We 
apply this framework to the estimation of average probability of default (PD) of representative 
Chinese companies in the thermal power sector under various climate-related transition 
scenarios. We find that under a 2-degree scenario, the average PD of major thermal power 
companies could rise to 10% in 2025 and 23% in 2030, up from about 3% in 2020. We also 
conclude from our case study that compared with demand reduction and carbon price 
increases, price competition from renewables will likely be the most significant driver for the 
growing credit risks of Chinese thermal power companies.  
Keywords: transition risk, thermal power, probability of default, credit risk 
1 Background 
 Climate transition and its financial impact 
The financial risks associated with climate change have attracted considerable attentions and 
sparked extensive discussions recently in the financial sector (Bank of England, 2018; Jun  Ma 
et al., 2017; Jun Ma et al., 2018; NGFS, 2019). These risks include potential financial losses 
from climate-related physical events (e.g., extreme weather events and sea level rises) as well 
as climate-related transition factors, including public policies and technological changes 
facilitating the transition to a low-carbon economy. Climate-related transition risks mainly 
result from human efforts to prevent or mitigate climate change.   
In the climate transition process, actions to mitigate climate change could result in wide-
ranging impacts on companies in industries such as energy, transportation, manufacturing and 
construction. These impacts on the sectors of the real economy could be transmitted to 
financial institutions (FIs) engaged in financial transactions with them, thus lead to financial 
risks and losses. These losses and impacts received by the financial sectors could be enormous 
as estimated by several central banks and research institutions (EIU, 2015; PRA Bank of 
England, 2015; Regelink et al., 2017). From a financial stability perspective, to better anticipate 
                                                     
1 The authors of this chapter are Dr. MA Jun, Director of Research Center for Green Finance Development at Tsinghua 
University, email: maj@pbcsf.tsinghua.edu.cn; Dr. SUN Tianyin, Senior Research Fellow, email: sunty@pbcsf.tsinghua.edu.cn; 
ZHU Yun, Economist, email: zhuyun@pbcsf.tsinghua.edu.cn. The authors would like to thank PENG Weijian from Tsinghua 
University and Dr. QI Yuandong from University of Maryland for their contributions. 
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and mitigate the potential risks and losses resulting from climate transition, the international 
financial community has called for actions to have FIs integrate these risks into financial 
decision-making. The most noticeable efforts are the G20 Green Finance Study Group (G20 
GFSG, 2017), the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS, 2019) and the Taskforce 
for Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD Financial Stability Board, 2016).  
 Recent developments in methodologies 
To effectively manage climate-related transition risks, the key step is to quantify the impacts 
of climate transition on financial risk metrics, such as the probability of default (PD) of loans 
and bonds and the valuation of securities, properties, and infrastructure assets. PD, as a crucial 
risk indicator for banks and bond investors, describes the probability that a borrower will be 
unable to meet its debt obligations.  
Battiston et al. (2017) conducted a stress-test study and assessed the potential losses in banks’ 
equities for major European banks by mapping the assets, which the banks hold and are 
exposed to fossil fuel production sectors and energy-intensive sectors, to the potential 
devaluation impacts under various climate scenarios (Battiston et al., 2017). By accounting 
both a bank’s direct exposure to these sectors and the indirect exposures from holding 
financial products exposed to the aforementioned sectors issued by other institutions, they 
find that for the 20 most-severely affected EU listed banks, 8% to 33% equity losses could be 
expected.    
Commissioned by the UNEP Financial Initiative, Oliver Wyman (OW) developed a transition 
risk analytical approach, having been trial-used, by 16 international banks to analyze their 
transition risks (UNEP FI, 2018). Based on data from a subgroup of these 16 banks, the research 
shows that the PD for bank loans to the energy utility sector under the “2 degrees (2DS) by 
2040” scenario could be 2.3-2.4 times greater than under a baseline scenario (no efforts taken 
to mitigate climate change). The University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership 
(CISL) also developed a transition risk analytical framework for asset management 
(ClimateWise, 2019).  
Researchers of 2 Degrees Investment Initiative(2ii) developed a framework for measuring the 
impact of abrupt late economic decarbonization scenarios. They incorporate disorderly 
transition scenarios that do not strictly follow the conventional “smooth” transition scenarios 
generated by Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) (Hayne et al., 2019). They find that 
probabilities of default of bonds issued by climate-sensitive sectors in 2035 could rise by 2-3 
folds under a “too late, too sudden” transition against to that of business-as-usual scenario. 
 Our approach: incorporating price competition and funding cost increases as 
additional risk drivers  
Most studies in this area attempt to estimate the changes to revenues and costs of the affected 
companies or assets due to demand reduction and carbon price increase during the transition 
of energy sources. These estimated changes are then used to derive changes in valuation of 
securities and/or credit risk metrics. However, these studies have not explicitly considered 
declines in renewable energy prices (which put downward pressure on fossil fuel prices) and 
increases in funding costs (due to credit rating downgraded, changing regulations and banks’ 
internal credit polices). We believe that these factors (price competition and funding cost 
increases) are highly relevant, and possibly more important than carbon price increases, to 
companies’ financials and the resulting increase in credit risks. Failures to consider these 
factors may lead to significant underestimation of the financial risks faced by banks and 
investors.   
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In our analysis presented in this chapter, we explicitly modelled the impact of price 
competition and funding cost increases, in addition to the usual transition drivers such as 
demand reduction and carbon price increases, on financial performance and credit risks of 
Chinese coal-fired power generation (hereafter thermal power) companies under various 
climate-related transition scenarios.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the methodology 
and general framework of our analysis and its modules, Section 3 presents a detailed case 
study on Chinese thermal power companies, and discusses the results, while Section 4 
concludes with comments on policy implications and future work. 
2 Methodology  
 Risk drivers 
In this study, we took a comprehensive approach to analyzing the credit risk impact of climate 
transition on Chinese coal-fired power generation companies (hereafter thermal power 
companies). Our analysis considered five risk drivers in assessing the financial impact on 
thermal power companies and their credit risks during the transition to achieve a 2-degree 
climate outcome: 
First, the impact of climate-related transition on demand for thermal power companies.  
Compared to baseline scenario that assumes no changes in current policies and technologies, 
the 2DS scenario requires a substantial reduction in the consumption of electricity generated 
by coal-fired power plants. This reduced demand will affect future revenues of thermal power 
companies. 
Second, the impact of renewable technology changes on thermal power tariffs. We expect 
that due to technology progress, the cost (per kW) of renewable energies such as solar and 
wind will continue to decline rapidly in the foreseeable future.  This will exert competitive 
downward pressure on thermal power tariffs, thus reducing revenues of thermal power 
companies.  
Third, the impact of carbon prices on the costs of energy firms. China’s national carbon 
emission trading system (EST) is expected to cover all major thermal power companies in 1-2 
years and all major oil & gas companies in the next 2-4 years. According to IEA forecast, under 
the 2-degree scenario, China’s carbon price will have to rise by about 10 times in the 10 years 
through 2030 (IEA, 2019). As a result, these companies will have to pay for carbon emissions 
at a rapidly rising price for a growing proportion of their output.   
Fourth, the impact of financial deterioration on funding costs of the affected companies. 
Due to the declining revenues and rising costs caused by reasons stated above, these 
companies’ financial metrics (such as cash-flow) will deteriorate and thus their credit ratings 
will likely be downgraded by banks and credit-rating agencies. Such rating downgrades will 
result in higher funding costs for the firms.  
Fifth, the impact of a possible increase in risk weight for environmentally unsustainable 
assets on funding costs of the affected companies. As mentioned earlier, the on-going policy 
discussions in China of changing risk weights for bank loans to “environmentally unsustainable” 
and “green” companies may also result in higher borrowing rates for fossil fuel companies. We 
estimate that a 50-percentage-point increase in risk weight (from 100% to 150%) for 
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“environmentally unsustainable companies” could lead to an increase in average lending rate 
of about 50bps for companies in thermal power industry.   
 Framework of climate transition risk analysis  
Our analytical framework for climate transition risk assessment integrates the following drivers 
of energy transition that impact companies in the thermal power industry: changing demand, 
progress in renewable technology, changing carbon price and rising funding cost. We use this 
framework to quantify the impact of energy transition on Chinese thermal power companies 
under the baseline scenario and the 2DS climate scenario. More specifically, we apply this 
analytical approach to estimating the differences in companies’ financials among alternative 
climate mitigation scenarios and the changes in probability of default (PD) of these companies 
receiving financing from banks and the bond market.  
As shown in Figure 7-1, our framework of climate transition risk analysis consists of four steps, 
with three of which referred to as “modules”. These four steps are: setting climate scenarios, 
transition impact evaluation, corporate impact analysis, and financial risk assessment. In the 
following section, we provide a detailed description of these steps and the linkages between 
the modules.  
Figure 7-1 Framework of climate transition risk assessment model 
 
 
2.2.1 Setting climate scenarios 
A climate risk analysis requires first setting the various climate scenarios of future annual 
global emissions targets and the corresponding public policies are set to achieve them. Here 
we consider two climate scenarios: the baseline and the 2-degree scenario. The baseline 
scenario assumes that current climate measures taken in China will remain unchanged, i.e., no 
further mitigation efforts to curb demand, no changes in carbon prices, no further 
development of renewable and energy-savings technologies, and no changes in funding costs 
for thermal power firms. It serves as a benchmark for other scenarios to evaluate the variables 
under study. For the 2-degree scenario, we adopt the IEA ETP’s definition and estimates of 
future demand for coal-fired power generation, changes in carbon prices, and future market 
shares of renewable energies (International Energy Agency, 2017).  
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2.2.2 Transition impact evaluation module 
The transition impact module describes a sector’s potentially changing performance under a 
set climate scenario or pathway compared to that under the baseline scenario. The so-called 
sector performance includes changes in demand, changes in production costs and sales prices 
under given climate scenarios. For example, under IEA ETP’s 2DS scenario, coal-fired power 
generation is estimated to drop nearly 50% from its current volume in 2020-2030. In this study, 
we adopt the modelling output of IEA’s ETP-TIMES supply model to parameterize the demand 
or production changes of coal-fired power generation and renewables (wind and solar power), 
which are further fed as inputs into the analysis in the corporate impact module.    
In addition to the impact of energy-policy changes on demand for fossil fuel energy, climate 
transition may also involve regulatory changes in the financial sector.  In China, Dr. Ma Jun, one 
of the authors of this chapter and a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the People’s 
Bank of China, proposed explicitly that regulators should consider adjusting the risk weights 
to differentiate policies for green and environmentally unsustainable loans, as Chinese bank 
data clearly show that the default probability of green loans has been much lower than that 
of environmentally unsustainable loans.  In 2019, the French bank Natixis announced that it 
had launched an internal approach to raise the analytical risk weights for environmentally 
unsustainable loans and reduce analytical risk weights for green loans based on internal risk 
models.  We believe that other banks may follow suit and some countries’ regulators may also 
adopt such policies. These policies will result in higher funding costs for environmentally 
unsustainable companies (such as fossil fuel companies) while reducing costs for green 
companies.  
In applying the transition impact module to our case study, we considered the impacts of 
demand reduction and carbon price increases, based on the results of the ETP-TIMES model, 
the impact of price competition from renewables, and the impact of funding cost increases, 
partly based on the assumption of a risk weight increase for “environmentally unsustainable 
companies” and partly reflecting the growing credit risk premium charged by banks or bond 
investors. These impacts were then fed into the corporate impact module to quantify the 
changes in the company financials.  
2.2.3 Corporate impact module 
The corporate impact module integrates the impacts of climate scenarios (e.g., impacts on 
demand and funding costs) into company financial analyses, and derive the changes in 
financial indicators, such as revenues, costs, profits, assets, liabilities, and equities and various 
financial ratios of the affected companies. Specifically, it involves modelling the three financial 
statements to reflect the direct financial effects of climate-related transition. These outputs 
will then be used as inputs or explanatory variables in financial risk models such as PD models 
and valuation models to gauge impacts on banks and investors.  
2.2.4 Financial risk module 
The financial risk module could utilize various financial models, such as logit/probit PD models, 
Merton-based default risk model as well as valuation models (e.g., DCF model), and risk 
analysis tools such as VAR model. These models are used to quantify the impacts of the climate 
transition shocks on credit or market risks facing financial assets (e.g., loans, bonds, stocks, 
real estate and infrastructure assets), by integrating the results from the corporate impact 
module. For example, changes in the financial ratios of the affected companies, together with 
the economic impacts estimated by the transition impact evaluation module, can be used as 
inputs in this module to feed the financial risk models such as a PD and/or LGD model. The PD 
model estimates the change in the default risk of a loan or a bond due to factors driven by 
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climate transition.  In our case study, we apply a PD model to estimate the impact of climate 
transition on default rates of thermal power companies in China.  
3 Case study of Chinese thermal power companies  
We apply the above-mentioned transition risk analytical framework to estimating the impact 
of climate-related transition on the PD of loans to three large representative Chinese thermal 
power companies under the 2DS scenario. This is a typical scenario analysis to simulate what 
would happen to thermal power companies and to associated banks once new policies and 
technologies are introduced to mitigate climate change and to achieve 2DS target.  The 
contents below are organized in the following four sections: 1) description of transition 
scenarios; 2) financial impact on the companies; 3) the PD model; and 4) the results. 
 Description of transition scenarios 
In this case study, we consider two climate scenarios: the baseline scenario and the 2DS 
scenario. The baseline scenario considers the current commitments by the government to 
limit emissions and improve energy efficiency, including the NDCs pledged under the Paris 
Agreement, but assumes no additional efforts going forward. The 2DS scenario incorporates 
the further government actions and technological progress necessary to mitigate climate 
change and to meet the 2DS climate target.  
From the perspective of the thermal power sector, we identify the following critical impact 
factors under the 2DS scenario, namely market demand, power tariffs, carbon price, and 
funding costs. The first two factors will affect a company’s revenue, and the last two factors 
will largely impact the costs of the company. Table 7-1 summarizes the assumptions that we 
use for these impact factors under the baseline and 2DS scenario. 
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Table 7-1 Summary of impact factors under various climate scenarios 
 Year      
Impact factors 
2020 2025 2030 Data Sources/Comments 
Demand 
change (%) 
Baseline scenario 0% 4% 2% Five-year cumulative change (in %) in demand for 
coal-fired power generation.  
Source: Gross electricity generation by coal in China, 
IEA ETP 2017. 
2DS scenario 0% 
-
16% 
-30% 
Carbon Price 
(RMB/tonne) 
Baseline scenario 45 45 45 
Mean carbon price in China in 2019 taken from 
www.tanpaifang.com 
2DS scenario 80 294 508 
Forecasts by IEA: IEA WEO 2019 Documentation 
Table 5 (P.18); World Bank (2019): State and Trends 
of Carbon Pricing. P.10 
Power tariff 
(in RMB/KW) 
Baseline scenario 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Tariff of thermal power in Shanxi, China 
Source: Development and Reform Commission of 
Shanxi Province, 2017 
2DS 
scenario 
Elasticity of 
thermal 
power 
tariff to 
change in 
renewable 
power 
tariff 
7% 44% 80% 
The decline in renewable power tariffs (due to 
technology progress) is assumed to exert downward 
pressure on coal-fired power tariffs with an elasticity 
shown in the table.  For example, a 1% drop in 
renewable energy tariff would lead to a 0.07% drop 
in coal fired power tariff from baseline in 2020; and 
a 1% drop in renewable energy tariff would lead to a 
0.8% drop in coal fired power tariff from baseline in 
2030.  Projection of China renewable power tariffs 
for 2020-2030 are provided by Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance.  
Tariff  0.33 0.27 0.20 
Funding cost increase reflecting change in credit risk 
Due to the revenue declines and cost increases 
caused by transition drivers listed above, these 
companies’ financial metrics will deteriorate and 
thus their credit ratings will be downgraded by banks 
and credit rating agencies. Such rating downgrades 
will result in higher funding costs for the firms. 
Funding cost increase due to increase in risk weight for environmentally 
unsustainable assets  
We assume Chinese banks or bank regulators will 
adopt some form of “environmentally 
unsustainable” penalizing policy (e.g., an increase in 
risk weight for environmentally unsustainable assets 
from 100% to 150%), which will lead to an increase 
in average funding cost by 50bps for companies in 
thermal power industry.   
 
Based on the above impact factors, we selected six transition scenarios for our analysis.  The 
main reason for developing these transition scenarios is that changes to these factors may not 
occur simultaneously, as some of them affect each other (e.g., a carbon price increase will 
result in a demand contraction, so demand reduction should not be considered as an 
independent factor if a large carbon price shock is assumed).  A detailed description of each 
scenario is shown in Table 7-2.  
Table 7-2 Six transition scenarios for our case study 
Risk drivers 
Transition  
Scenarios 
Demand change 
Carbon 
Price 
Power Tariff Funding Costs 
NDC 
2DS-
aligned 
Carbon 
price shock 
Renewable 
price shock 
PD 
impact 
on 
interest 
rate 
Rate rise on 
environmentally 
unsustainable 
assets 
Baseline √          
2DS 
Carbon price √   √   √ √ 
Demand drop   √     √ √ 
Impact from 
renewables 
√   
  
√ √ √ 
Carbon + Renewables √  √ √ √ √ 
Demand + Renewables   √   √ √ √ 
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1) Baseline scenario 
This scenario assumes no changes to carbon price, the current trajectory of demand for 
thermal power, renewable technologies, and funding costs in the future.  
2) 2DS sub-scenarios: 
Under the 2DS scenario, we consider five sub-scenarios. All of these sub-scenarios incorporate 
the impact of financial deterioration on funding costs (i.e., an increase in funding cost for a 
year due to the change in estimated PD based on data of the previous year) and the impact of 
a risk weight increase for environmentally unsustainable assets on funding costs. The 
difference among the sub-scenarios is that some of them consider one or two risk factors from 
the three non-financial factors (demand, carbon price, and impact from renewables). There 
are certainly other possible combinations of these factors, but we present only five to illustrate.  
i. Carbon price 
Under this sub-scenario, only the carbon price is assumed to change (based on IEA and World 
Bank projection of carbon prices for China), while thermal power demand and its tariff remain 
the same as in the baseline scenario. 
ii. Demand drop 
Under this sub-scenario, only demand for thermal power is assumed to change (based on IEA 
ETP’s projection under 2DS scenario for China), while the carbon price and power tariff remain 
the same as in the baseline scenario. 
iii. Impact from renewables 
Under this sub-scenario, the thermal power tariff is assumed to decline due to competitive 
pressure from lower prices of renewable energy, while thermal power demand and the carbon 
price remain the same as in the baseline scenario. We assume a gradual increase in price 
elasticity (from about 0.1 in 2020 to 0.8 in 2030) between thermal power tariff and the 
weighted-average renewable energy price (wind and solar), and derive thermal power tariff 
projections based on tariff projections for renewables provided by Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance.  
iv. Carbon + Renewables 
Under this sub-scenario, we assume a carbon price increase along with a power tariff decline 
due to competitive pressure from renewables, but demand for thermal power remains the 
same as in the baseline scenario. 
v. Demand + Renewables  
Under this sub-scenario, we assume a demand drop for thermal power along with a power 
tariff decline due to competitive pressure from renewables, but the carbon price will remain 
the same as in the baseline scenario. 
 Impact on financial performance of thermal power companies 
To reflect the aforementioned factors into the climate risk analysis of the thermal power sector, 
we selected three representative Chinese coal-fired power generation companies for a case 
study. These companies are large publicly listed firms and derive their majority revenues from 
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coal-fired power generation and sales. Table 7-3 summarizes our estimates of these companies’ 
key financial ratios, including asset/liability ratio, return on assets (ROA), total revenue growth, 
current ratio, operating margin and return on capital employed (ROCE), under the baseline 
scenario and the five 2DS sub-scenarios. The results show that, under all 2DS sub-scenarios, 
all financial ratios will worsen over time compared to their initial values (in 2020) and against 
those of the baseline scenario in the same year.  This suggests that every climate risk driver 
will have a negative impact on the financial performance of the thermal power sector in the 
coming decade.  
Table 7-3 Key financial ratios of thermal power companies under various scenarios2 
 
                                                     
2 The impacts of financial deterioration and a possible risk weight increase for “environmentally unsustainable” assets on 
funding costs of the affected companies are implicitly included in all the cases of 2DS scenario.   
2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030
0.84 0.82 0.80 0.74 0.69 0.64 0.73 0.69 0.64
Carbon price 0.84 0.91 1.19 0.74 0.79 1.15 0.73 0.74 0.97
Demand drop 0.84 0.90 1.09 0.74 0.79 1.06 0.73 0.74 0.87
Renewables impact 0.84 0.95 1.28 0.74 0.85 1.36 0.73 0.76 0.99
Carbon + Renewables 0.84 1.04 1.70 0.74 0.98 1.95 0.73 0.84 1.42
Demand + Renewables /
Demand + price
0.84 1.01 1.47 0.74 0.95 1.64 0.73 0.82 1.19
3% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 4% 5% 5%
Carbon price 3% 0% -5% 4% -1% -10% 4% 1% -7%
Demand drop 3% 1% -2% 3% 0% -6% 4% 1% -2%
Renewables impact 3% -1% -5% 3% -4% -13% 4% 0% -6%
Carbon + Renewables 3% -4% -14% 3% -10% -30% 4% -4% -18%
Demand + Renewables /
Demand + price
3% -2% -7% 3% -7% -17% 3% -2% -9%
1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0%
Carbon price 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0%
Demand drop -2% -5% -8% -2% -5% -8% -2% -5% -8%
Renewables impact -1% -5% -7% -1% -5% -7% -1% -5% -7%
Carbon + Renewables -1% -5% -7% -1% -5% -7% -1% -5% -7%
Demand + Renewables /
Demand + price
-3% -10% -15% -3% -10% -15% -3% -10% -15%
0.51 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.61 0.81 0.35 0.65 1.00
Carbon price 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.21
Demand drop 0.50 0.37 0.26 0.46 0.28 0.19 0.34 0.36 0.11
Renewables impact 0.50 0.38 0.28 0.46 0.29 0.21 0.34 0.27 0.12
Carbon + Renewables 0.49 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.29 0.21 0.34 0.17 0.12
Demand + Renewables /
Demand + price
0.49 0.30 0.15 0.44 0.22 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.07
15% 17% 17% 9% 11% 12% 17% 19% 20%
Carbon price 14% 2% -22% 8% -2% -23% 16% 3% -24%
Demand drop 14% 7% -12% 8% -1% -24% 16% 7% -16%
Renewables impact 14% -3% -39% 7% -10% -48% 16% 0% -34%
Carbon + Renewables 13% -21% -105% 7% -26% -106% 15% -20% -109%
Demand + Renewables /
Demand + price
13% -15% -88% 6% -24% -108% 15% -14% -95%
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Carbon price 5% 1% -7% 4% -1% -12% 5% 1% -8%
Demand drop 5% 2% -2% 4% 0% -7% 5% 2% -3%
Renewables impact 5% -1% -8% 4% -4% -16% 5% 0% -7%
Carbon + Renewables 4% -6% -21% 3% -11% -35% 4% -5% -23%
Demand + Renewables /
Demand + price
4% -4% -11% 3% -9% -20% 4% -3% -11%
Key financial ratios
Climate
scenarios
Risk drivers
Thermal power sector
Company A Company B Company C
Debt ratio
        Base
        2DS
Return on assets (ROA)
        Base
        2DS
Total revenue growth
        Base
        2DS
Current ratio
        Base
        2DS
Operating margin
        Base
        2DS
Return on capital
employed
(ROCE)
        Base
        2DS
Chapter 7 
 116 
 Impact on probability of default  
These ratios estimated in the above analysis are then taken as inputs into our PD model for 
estimating the probabilities of default of these companies under various scenarios. Our logistic 
PD model is constructed as follows: 
𝑃(𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡)𝑖 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖  
Where Xi is the bond and firm characteristics affecting bond default probability, including 
variables such as interest coverage ratio, ROA, asset/liability ratio, current ratio and total 
revenue growth, as well as dummies on state ownership and sector characteristics.  These 
explanatory variables above are selected based on the advice from finance experts and 
preliminary model results. The main purpose of this econometric model is to provide numeric 
interpretations of the effect of changing certain factors on the probability of a bond default. 
The model parameters are estimated using five-year data on all Chinese firms that have issued 
bonds in the domestic market.     
Using the same set of variables, we build a machine learning (ML) model where the 
aforementioned logistic regression serves as the base model to make predictions for future 
defaults. Given that the proportion of default observations is low in historical data, to ensure 
the predictive performance of our ML model, we oversample our data before splitting it into 
training and testing sets for model building. By oversampling, we use a bootstrap method to 
draw observations from the minority class (default bonds) with replacement. We keep doing 
this until the minority (default) and majority (non-default) become balanced (equal-sized). We 
utilize recall, which is defined as (true positive)/(true positive + false positive), to measure our 
model’s predictive performance, which turns out to be reasonably good.     
 Results 
PDs under various scenarios 
Figure 7-2 shows the estimated annual PD values averaged from the three Chinese thermal 
power companies under various scenarios. In all 2DS sub-scenarios, these companies’ PDs rise 
sharply from 2020 to 2030, indicating the negative impact of each of the transition risk drivers 
on credit risks facing banks and/or bond investors with exposures to thermal power companies. 
Similarly, the PD estimates in 2025 and 2030 under all 2DS sub-scenarios are significantly 
higher than those under the baseline scenario for the same years.  
Under the 2DS sub-scenario of “carbon + renewables”, which takes into account both the 
carbon price increase and price competition from renewables in addition to funding cost 
increase, the average of estimated annual PD values of the three companies surge from about 
3% in 2020 to 10% in 2025 and 23% in 2030, representing a nearly four-fold increase during 
2020-2025 and more than eight-fold increase during 2020-2030. Under the other 2DS sub-
scenarios, including that considering only price competition (carbon price increase) from 
renewables, the average of estimated PDs still rises sharply from about 3% in 2020 to around 
6% (5%) in 2025 and around 13% (10%) in 2030. The clear conclusion is that regardless of the 
technical assumptions characterizing the 2DS transition, the likelihood of credit default will 
become extremely high and unbearable in 5-10 years for thermal power companies. 
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Figure 7-2 Average PD estimates of Chinese thermal power companies under 
different scenarios 
 
Relative significance of climate risk drivers  
Our quantitative analysis under various 2DS sub-scenarios allows us to compare the relative 
significance of several energy transition factors in driving the deterioration of company 
financials and the rise in credit risks. This analysis may help companies and FIs to identify and 
prepare responses to the main sources of the climate-related risks and help governments and 
regulators to understand the most effective ways to facilitate the energy transition.    
In this section, we focus on quantifying and comparing the magnitude of the credit risk impact 
of each of the following factors: demand contraction (for coal-fired power generation), change 
in carbon price, and price competition from renewable energies. The impacts of these three 
factors can be measured by taking the difference between the PD estimate for 2030 and the 
PD estimate for 2020 in the three 2DS sub-scenarios: 2DS (demand drop), 2DS (carbon price), 
and 2DS (price competition from renewables). Note that in each of these three sub-scenarios 
funding cost increases are built-in assumptions.   
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Figure 7-3 Increase in PD as a result of risk drivers during 2020-30 (in ppts) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Figure 7-3 shows the price competition from renewable energies is the most significant driver 
for the increase in credit risks of thermal power companies. Along with funding cost increases, 
it could raise the PD by as much as 9.9 ppts between 2020 and 2030, while that impact from 
carbon price increase and demand drop may drive 7.5 ppts and 6.0 ppts respective during the 
same period. One implication of this result is that technology progress in the renewables 
sector probably deserves more attention than it currently gets from policy makers who would 
like to see a faster pace of energy transition.  
4 Conclusion  
We presented a framework for analyzing the impact of climate transition on thermal power 
companies and the quantitative results using data on selected Chinese companies. Our model 
takes into account not only the commonly assumed transition factors such as carbon price 
increase and demand contraction for coal-fired power generation, but also three other factors 
that we believe will become increasingly more important risk determinants: 1) price 
competition from renewable energies that will experience a rapid decline in costs, 2) upward 
pressure on funding costs due to the deterioration of company financials, and 3) upward 
pressure on funding costs as banks or/or regulators begin to tighten credit policies against or 
raise risk weights for environmentally unsustainable assets.    
Our findings suggest the estimated PDs for the thermal power companies will rise sharply (by 
three-to-eight fold) in the coming ten years under various transition scenarios. It is a clear 
warning to FIs that exposures to environmentally unsustainable assets such as loans or bonds 
issued by thermal power companies pose significant credit risks for them in the medium- to 
longer term. Actions need to be taken soon to reduce the exposures to such risks or adopt 
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appropriate hedging strategies to offset these risks. For thermal power companies, they must 
immediately move toward green transformation, i.e., shifting their businesses away from coal-
fired power generation and increase investments in green energies. Without embarking on an 
aggressive green transformation, many of them will likely fall into financial distress five years 
from now.  
Although this chapter only presents a case study on thermal power companies, the research 
approach that we developed can be applied to energy companies and carbon-intensive 
companies in many sectors. Our next project is an application to analyze credit risks of Chinese 
oil and gas companies. We will also continue to refine our methodologies by working on more 
granular aspects of the scenario settings, macro-micro feedback mechanisms, as well as 
company-level responses to climate transition shocks. 
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 Natural Capital Credit Risk Assessment  
 
By 
Francisco Ascui and Theodor F. Cojoianu1 
Abstract 
In recent years, the financial sector has become increasingly aware of the implications of its 
impacts and dependencies on natural capital. Typically, these impacts and dependencies are 
indirect or direct exposures for the companies and other entities to which the financial sector 
provides services such as lending, investment and insurance. This implies a need for the 
financial sector to develop new methods and tools for conducting these activities. This chapter 
outlines recent developments in taking natural capital considerations into account in 
commercial bank lending, through the credit risk assessment process. It situates natural capital 
credit risk assessment (NCCRA) within the context of the earlier development of 
environmental credit risk assessment (ECRA) and provides a detailed review of how NCCRA 
can be conducted in practice. It demonstrates that NCCRA is feasible, using a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative inputs. Implementation challenges include the complexity and 
interconnectedness of natural capital processes, data availability and cost, spatial data 
analytical capacity and the need for transformational change, both within lending 
organisations and across the banking sector.  
Keywords: natural capital; risk; credit risk assessment; environmental credit risk; lending 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, the financial sector has become increasingly aware of the implications of its 
impacts and dependencies on natural capital – the stocks of the world’s renewable and non-
renewable natural assets (e.g., natural resources and ecosystems) that yield flows of 
environmental goods and services (e.g., timber, food, flood mitigation) which directly or 
indirectly underpin the global economy and human wellbeing (Ascui & Cojoianu, 2019; 
Bebbington & Gray, 1993; Costanza et al., 1997; Costanza & Daly, 1992; Pearce, 1988; 
Schumacher, 1973). Typically, these impacts and dependencies are indirect, i.e., through 
exposures to the companies and other entities to which the financial sector provides services 
such as lending, investment and insurance. Historically, many of these impacts and 
dependencies, and the risks that flow from them, have been overlooked. Despite its 
importance, natural capital rarely appears on the balance sheets of corporations and has 
usually been ignored in financial decision making. Ignoring the importance of natural capital 
ultimately translates into unpriced material risks for financial institutions that may emerge at 
either local or systemic levels. A corollary of this is that significant opportunities exist for 
                                                     
1 Francisco Ascui is a Senior Lecturer in Business and Climate Change and director of Centre for Business and Climate 
Change at University of Edinburgh; email: francisco.ascui@ed.ac.uk. Theodor F. Cojoianu is an IRC & Marie Curie 
Postdoctoral Research Fellow at University College Dublin, email: theodor.cojoianu@ucd.ie. 
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competitive advantage for those institutions that are better able to assess and manage natural 
capital risks, and for benefits to flow to society from improved management of natural capital. 
In 2012, around 40 international financial institutions signed the Natural Capital Declaration, 
committing to integrating natural capital considerations into their financial products, and their 
accounting and reporting frameworks, by 2020.2 In this chapter, we focus on developments in 
just one financial sector activity: commercial lending. A founding signatory of the Natural 
Capital Declaration, National Australia Bank (NAB) has declared an intention to “manage our 
natural capital with the same diligence that we manage our financial capital” (Henry, 2016). 
However, they acknowledge that this will require a “significant step-change” in credit decision 
making and the development of entirely new credit risk assessment methods, because “[t]o 
date, credit decisions to agribusiness customers have been based on standard banking 
considerations like cash flow, assets, risk analyses and banker-customer relationships” (NAB, 
2018). This echoes broader feedback from across the financial sector that consideration of 
natural capital credit risks has been held back by a lack of natural capital credit risk assessment 
(NCCRA) methods and tools (Cojoianu et al., 2015). However, in the last few years, several new 
guidance documents, methods and tools for natural capital risk assessment have been 
developed. This chapter will review the current state of these. First, however, we place NCCRA 
in the context of earlier work on environmental credit risk assessment (ECRA) in the financial 
sector.  
2 From ECRA to NCCRA 
Environmental credit risk assessment (ECRA) has evolved in the past three decades, although 
the evidence suggests that, aside from consideration of direct risk, it is not yet highly 
sophisticated in practice. A survey of 57 UK banks in the mid-1990s found that although 87% 
included an appraisal of environmental risks as a part of their credit risk assessment 
procedures, “there are no signs in the current research that bankers are particularly interested 
in measuring things like externalities…  [or] essential natural resources on which the enterprise 
is economically dependent” (Thompson & Cowton, 2004, p. 124). A 2002 study of a sample of 
ten European banks found that while all believed that environmental risks could impact bank 
profitability and should be reflected in loan pricing, they lacked any definitive means of 
measuring impact (Coulson, 2002). The report concluded, “[i]n practice, most lenders stop 
short of assigning a value or margin to environmental risk and rely on ‘experience as the best 
guide’” (Coulson, 2002, p. 2). A survey of 50 European banks in the mid-2000s found that they 
generally claimed to take environmental risks into account in the credit rating stage, but “there 
is still a lack of a systematic and quantitative integration of these kinds of risk in all phases of 
the credit risk management process” (Weber et al., 2008, p. 157). In addition, the survey found 
considerable variation in approaches taken by banks, from a single assessment question to 
applying sophisticated risk evaluation tools (in a minority of cases). Furthermore, within the 
vast scope of indirect risks, banks tended to concentrate on just two areas: the impacts of 
mandatory environmental regulations, and changes in buyer or consumer attitudes 
(Thompson & Cowton, 2004; Weber et al., 2008).  
The turn towards ‘natural capital’ thinking in the financial sector since 2012 (Declaration, 2012) 
poses further challenges for ECRA, because it significantly extends the scope from 
environmental impacts to include dependencies. We use the term ‘natural capital credit risk 
assessment’ (NCCRA) to denote this enlarged scope, which primarily involves indirect risk. An 
impact can be defined as “[t]he negative or positive effect of a business activity on natural 
                                                     
2 http://www.naturalcapitalfinancealliance.org/about-the-natural-capital-declaration/ 
Natural Capital Credit Risk Assessment 
123 
capital” while a dependency is “[a] business reliance on or use of natural capital” (Natural 
Capital Coalition, 2016, pp. 16-17). Under this framing, contaminated land can be viewed as a 
typical example of a negative impact on natural capital (potentially affecting the quality of soil, 
water and ecosystems/biodiversity) as a result of pollution discharge as an impact driver, 
which gives rise to a socially mediated business risk (legally-imposed remediation obligations). 
Dependencies are quite different, and often taken for granted: businesses may depend on 
inputs of natural capital in the form of land, water, energy or materials, as well as a vast range 
of ecosystem services, such as climate regulation, pollination, flood protection and waste 
assimilation. Where these inputs and services are priced (either in markets or through 
regulation), they are likely to feature in existing risk assessment metrics; but the problem is 
that many natural capital dependencies are either not priced at all, or not priced at their full 
social costs (Helm, 2014; van den Belt & Blake, 2015). Such dependencies – as well as similarly 
mispriced impacts – may therefore carry a risk of being priced or otherwise affecting the 
business in future, whether directly, indirectly or through the supply chain, thus translating 
into indirect risk for a lender. 
The sectors most likely to be both highly dependent on natural capital, and with high potential 
for impacts on natural capital, are typically primary production industries such as agriculture, 
fisheries and forestry (KPMG, 2014; Natural Capital Coalition, 2016; van den Belt & Blake, 
2015). Unfortunately, these sectors have highly complex and diverse natural capital impacts 
and dependencies, which have received relatively little attention from ESG analysts: a survey 
of 66 financial research providers in 2015 Theodor Florian Cojoianu et al. (2015) found that 
only nine claimed to have any methodological expertise in assessing natural capital risks in 
agriculture and 13 in forestry; furthermore, this expertise was limited to whole-sector analysis, 
rather than the ability to provide more granular assessment of risks at the individual farm level. 
We now turn to considering the new guidance documents, methods and tools that have been 
developed in recent years that are relevant to assisting financial institutions with conducting 
NCCRA. 
 Natural capital risk assessment guides, methods and tools 
The Natural Capital Protocol is a generic decision-support framework for businesses to identify, 
measure, and value their impacts and/or dependencies on natural capital, covering all types 
of natural capital assessment for all types of business, operating in any geography, at any 
organisational level. The framework is a step-by-step guide arranged in four stages, each 
helping to answer a fundamental question: ‘Why’ (framing the purpose of conducting a natural 
capital assessment), ‘What’ (determining the objectives and scope), ‘How’ (measuring and 
valuing impacts and/or dependencies) and ‘What next’ (interpreting results and taking action). 
As a generic framework, its direct relevance for implementing NCCRA in practice is limited. 
However, it serves to establish an important common platform of concepts, terminology and 
a standardised process for businesses to follow in assessing their own impacts and 
dependencies on natural capital, which should in turn make it easier for the financial sector to 
evaluate their indirect exposure.3 
In 2018, the Natural Capital Finance Alliance issued Integrating natural capital in risk 
assessments: A step-by-step guide for banks (Natural Capital Finance Alliance & PwC, 2018). 
                                                     
3 A number of sector-specific supplements to the Protocol have subsequently been produced, including one for the 
financial sector (produced in partnership with the Natural Capital Finance Alliance): Connecting Finance and Natural Capital: 
A Supplement to the Natural Capital Protocol (Natural Capital Coalition, 2018). Again, this is a generic framework, covering 
all financial services (e.g. investment, lending, insurance etc.) provided to all sectors of the economy. Again, it provides an 
important common platform for the financial sector, but it does not provide any specific guidance on how to undertake 
NCCRA. 
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This document provides a guide for banks to undertake rapid assessment of natural capital 
risks across a lending portfolio, and is supplemented with the online tool ENCORE (Exploring 
Natural Capital Opportunities, Risks and Exposure).4 Both the guide and ENCORE focus on 
natural capital dependency risks only. A key rationale for developing the guide and online tool 
was that in the past, environmental risk has tended to be assessed only at the transaction level, 
whereas natural capital dependencies may give rise to systemic risks that only become 
apparent at portfolio level, such as regional concentration risk or process concentration risk 
(Natural Capital Finance Alliance & PwC, 2018). Potential applications of this approach include 
supporting discussions with borrowers about risk management measures, and monitoring 
risks in a given region or market segment. A parallel report by the Natural Capital Finance 
Alliance and PwC (2018) notes that there are at least two broad options for a bank to integrate 
natural capital considerations into their decision-making: either to embed it within their 
organisation-level environmental, social and governance (ESG) management frameworks, or 
to integrate it into their credit risk assessment processes. The guide and ENCORE provide a 
more specific set of resources for banks to understand their exposure to natural capital risks, 
but with an emphasis on portfolio screening rather than individual transaction credit risk 
assessment. 
In 2019, the Natural Capital Finance Alliance launched Natural Capital Credit Risk Assessment 
in Agricultural Lending: An Approach Based on the Natural Capital Protocol (Ascui & Cojoianu, 
2019). This is the first guide to focus specifically on how to conduct NCCRA, based on and 
consistent with the Natural Capital Protocol. It also focusses on a particularly challenging 
sector: agriculture. Having a standardised method for NCCRA in agricultural lending is 
important for two main reasons. The first is that agriculture is a front-line sector in terms of 
both its impacts and dependencies on natural capital. Agriculture is a major driver of global 
land-use change, which is estimated to cause losses of ecosystem services worth US$4.3-20 
trillion/year (Costanza et al., 2014). The FAO (2015) estimates the cost of the combined 
impacts on natural capital of eight major cereal crops and livestock production systems at over 
US$2.3 trillion/year, or 150% of their measured production value. At the same time, 
agriculture is fundamentally dependent on a range of both renewable and non-renewable 
natural capital inputs, from soil and water to nutrients and pollination services. A study by the 
Natural Capital Finance Alliance and UN Environment World Conservation Monitoring Centre 
(2018) found that large-scale agriculture topped the list of all primary industry sectors in terms 
of its exposure to material natural capital dependency risks. 
Secondly, secured lending – particularly at the relatively small scale typical of loans to farmers 
– is an asset class that has been relatively overlooked in the shift towards greater awareness 
of natural capital issues across the finance sector. The most widely applied ESG risk 
management framework for debt is the Equator Principles, which were launched in 2003 and 
as of March 2020 have been adopted by 104 financial institutions from 38 countries, covering 
the majority of project finance debt in developed and emerging markets. 5  However, the 
Equator Principles are targeted at project finance transactions over US$10 million, or project-
related corporate loans over US$100 million, and are therefore not normally applied to the 
smaller-scale lending that is more typical in the agricultural sector. In addition, the Equator 
Principles focus mainly on environmental impacts, not broader risks arising from 
dependencies on natural capital, and they do not provide any specific guidance for credit risk 
assessment (Equator Principles, 2013). 
                                                     
4 https://encore.naturalcapital.finance/ (accessed 3 June 2019) 
5 http://equator-principles.com/members-reporting/ 
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 Natural capital credit risk assessment in practice 
In this section we outline the key steps in carrying out NCCRA, drawing principally on the NCFA 
guide (Ascui & Cojoianu, 2019).  
2.2.1 Stage 1: Frame  
The Frame Stage helps a user establish why they would conduct a natural capital credit risk 
assessment. This involves, first understanding key natural capital concepts and the business 
case for undertaking a NCCRA. The Natural Capital Protocol and finance sector supplement 
provide extensive guidance on this, which we will not replicate here. It is up to each lender to 
clarify their own reasons for undertaking NCCRA. For example, NAB realised that they faced 
commercial risks and opportunities related to natural capital degradation, as the largest lender 
to agribusiness in Australia, and that their credit exposure to agriculture was in fact larger than 
it was to the mining sector. Through surveying 10,000 agribusiness customers over four years, 
they also realised that natural capital was important to their customers, and that perceptions 
of NAB’s level of environmental commitment made a significant difference to customer 
satisfaction with the company (NAB, 2018). 
2.2.2 Stage 2: Scope 
The Scope Stage involves defining what should be included in an assessment. This in turn 
should be informed by defining the objectives and target audience for the assessment. A 
number of technical decisions need to be made about the scope of the assessment: for 
example whether to focus on impacts and/or dependencies, which value perspective to take 
(e.g., that of the lender, the borrower, the community or society in general), and where to set 
spatial and temporal boundaries. The guide also recommends considering whether the scope 
of boundaries should be ‘attributional’ or ‘consequential’ in nature: an attributional analysis 
measures impacts according to a defined scope of responsibility, while a consequential 
analysis measures the total system-wide impacts resulting from a decision or action (Brander 
& Ascui, 2015; Finnveden et al., 2009). The two approaches can yield quite different 
conclusions (see for example Searchinger et al. 2008). 
The last and most important step in the Scope Stage is to conduct a materiality assessment to 
limit the scope of potential risks that need to be considered in an individual assessment. This 
is particularly important for NCCRA in the agricultural sector, as a distinctive and challenging 
feature of the sector is that relevant natural capital impacts and dependencies vary 
considerably across geographies and agricultural sub-sectors (e.g., different crops and 
livestock production systems). For example, a soil condition that is harmful for one crop type 
can be tolerated by another, and even the same crop grown on the same soil under different 
climatic conditions can require different inputs. However, limiting the scope of potential risks 
to those which are most likely to be material is an important step for NCCRA in any sector.6 
For NCCRA in the agriculture sector, the NCFA guide provides a simplified high-level framework 
or categorisation of likely material risk areas for agriculture in general (Table 8-1), for use as a 
                                                     
6 The NCFA guide recommends that a two-stage approach is taken, in which the key potential risks are first scoped at 
sector/region level (e.g. for wheat farming in Australia) to establish a framework within which loan-specific assessments, 
for that sector and region, can then be made. The first stage is similar to scoping for a portfolio-level assessment (Natural 
Capital Finance Alliance & PwC, 2018). The NCFA ENCORE tool provides one option for this. A bank can select a sector 
(one of 11 high-level sectors as defined in the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS)) and, if desired, one of 157 
sub-sectors, in some cases further sub-divided by production processes within the sub-sector; and then obtain a 
materiality assessment for relevant ecosystem services and natural capital stocks that the sector depends on. However, it 
is worth noting that the ENCORE tool only covers natural capital dependency risks, and furthermore, materiality has been 
assessed at a generic, global level rather than at any more specific level. 
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starting point in sector/region scoping. The term ‘risk area’ is used for groups of related risk 
factors, which in turn are grouped under six thematic areas: water; weather and climate; land 
and soil; biodiversity and ecosystems; energy; and air (emissions). These risk areas cover both 
potential impact and dependency risks that have been found to be material through bottom-
up analysis across a number of different agricultural sub-sectors, from large-scale cropping to 
livestock production (Theodor F Cojoianu & Ascui, 2017, 2018).  
Table 8-1 Example key categories for agricultural loan natural capital risk 
assessment 
Thematic area Example 
natural 
capital risk 
areas 
Example impact drivers Example dependencies 
Water 
Water 
availability 
Agricultural activities may have an 
impact on the availability of water 
in the local/regional hydrological 
cycle, particularly for surface and 
sub-surface water. 
All forms of agriculture depend to 
a greater or lesser extent on 
access to water, which may be 
obtained from rainfall, on- or off-
farm surface water, or sub-surface 
water. Availability has a quantity 
dimension (how much water is 
available), a temporal dimension 
(when water is available), and a 
reliability dimension (how likely it 
is to be available when required). 
Too much water can be as 
problematic as too little water. 
Risks may also be associated with 
the reliability of water supply 
infrastructure, e.g. for irrigated 
crops or livestock drinking water. 
Water use 
The absolute quantity of water use, 
particularly when extracted from 
surface flows or sub-surface 
reserves, can be a key impact 
driver. 
The efficiency of use of the 
available water is a separate 
aspect of water dependency, 
often expressed in terms of the 
quantity of water used per unit of 
output.  
Water quality 
Any farming activities which affect 
the quality of a water supply may 
constitute an impact driver. 
Relevant aspects of water quality 
as a dependency will vary 
according to the agricultural 
system (e.g. livestock vs. crops). 
Key water quality indicators which 
are critical for livestock health 
include total dissolved solids, 
calcium, nitrate and nitrite, 
fluoride, chloride, acidity (pH), 
pathogens and parasites, and 
agricultural chemicals such as 
pesticides and herbicides. 
Weather and 
climate 
Temperature 
extremes 
Not generally applicable, although 
certain farming activities can affect 
local micro-climates and/or 
contribute to larger-scale effects, 
e.g. through changing the albedo 
of land surfaces. 
Both livestock and crops may be 
susceptible to heat stress and/or 
low-temperature conditions, 
which can be a function of both 
absolute temperature (and 
humidity) levels, and length of 
exposure. Factors such as wind 
speed, shading/shelter and 
livestock characteristics (e.g. 
breed, coat colour, physical 
activity, condition, and 
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water/feed intake) can also affect 
temperature risks. 
Extreme 
weather 
Not generally applicable, although 
certain farming activities can 
exacerbate or mitigate the effects 
of extreme weather events. 
Agricultural activities may be 
exposed to a range of extreme 
weather related risks, including 
floods, droughts, bushfires and 
storms. 
Land and soil 
Soil quality 
Any farming activities which affect 
soil quality factors, either on- or 
off-farm may constitute an impact 
driver. 
Relevant aspects of soil quality as 
a dependency will vary according 
to agricultural system. Examples 
include soil organic carbon (SOC), 
acidity (pH), salinity, erosion and 
compaction. 
Fertiliser 
Fertiliser use is a driver of 
significant upstream impacts 
(consumption of fossil fuels, 
minerals and energy), on-farm 
impacts (e.g. on soil quality and 
biodiversity) and downstream 
impacts (including greenhouse gas 
emissions and run-off). The on-
farm and downstream impacts can 
be assessed under soil quality, 
water quality and greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Many agricultural activities 
depend on fertiliser as a key 
input, particularly for maintaining 
and/or enhancing soil nutrients 
that support crop growth. 
Waste 
Farming activities may discharge 
various forms of waste to the soil, 
which may affects its condition, 
biodiversity and/or human health. 
Not generally applicable, although 
certain farming activities may 
depend on inputs which are 
considered wastes elsewhere, e.g. 
application of treated effluent as 
a fertiliser. 
Biodiversity and 
ecosystems 
Biodiversity  
Farming activities may have 
impacts on biodiversity through 
land use changes, habitat loss or 
degradation, synthetic chemical 
and fertiliser use, and nutrient run-
off. 
Farms often depend on 
biodiversity for services such as 
pollination or pasture cover and 
composition. 
Weeds, pests 
and diseases 
The way in which the farm is 
managed (e.g. prevention and 
response to outbreaks) can be a 
key driver of off-farm impacts. 
This is an example of a ‘negative 
dependency’ or ‘ecosystem dis-
service’, where aspects of the 
natural environment can have a 
negative impact on a farming 
business. 
Animal 
welfare 
Poor management of animal 
welfare has both a direct impact 
and can result in further impacts, 
such as promoting the spread of 
disease. 
The health and welfare of farmed 
animals is an important factor in 
their growth and development, 
which in turn can be considered 
as a benefit flowing from natural 
capital. It is also important for a 
variety of legal, regulatory, 
reputational and moral reasons. 
Energy Energy use 
The use of energy derived from 
fossil fuels is a driver of resource 
depletion and climate change 
through production of greenhouse 
gases (considered under air 
emissions below). This use may be 
direct (e.g. use of diesel) or indirect 
(e.g. use of electricity or 
upstream/downstream emissions 
associated with any other 
inputs/outputs). 
Agriculture relies directly and 
indirectly on two main sources of 
energy: sunshine and fossil fuels. 
Renewable energy such as wind 
or hydro power is itself indirectly 
reliant on the sun’s energy, but 
also requires manufactured 
capital to enable its conversion 
into useful energy such as 
electricity. Sunshine is not 
considered as a dependency 
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because it is beyond the control 
of any stakeholders. 
Air  
Greenhouse 
gas emissions 
Emissions of different greenhouse 
gases (principally carbon dioxide, 
methane and nitrous oxide) may 
occur as a result of a variety of on-
farm activities, including land 
clearing, energy use, fertiliser and 
other input use, fertiliser 
application and livestock. 
Although plants depend on 
carbon dioxide for their growth, it 
is generally not limited in supply, 
and hence not relevant as a 
dependency, except for crops 
grown in greenhouses. 
Other air 
emissions 
Other air emissions from farming 
may include particulates (dust), 
drift from pesticide/herbicide 
application, etc. 
Generally not applicable, although 
there could be examples of one 
form of agriculture depending on 
emissions from another, e.g. wind 
erosion depositing soil nutrients 
from one location to another. 
Source: Ascui and Cojoianu (2019)  
 
An important concept to clarify in any risk assessment exercise is that of risk itself. Risk can be 
regarded as referring to uncertainty of outcomes that are significantly different to expectations, 
whether in a positive or negative direction (Hardaker, 2000). However, common usage tends 
to focus on the probability of outcomes that are negative or worse than expectations, or 
‘downside risks’. This also fits with credit as a form of financing that is mainly exposed to 
downside risks, in contrast to equity investment which is exposed to both positive and negative 
outcomes. Nevertheless, even in the context of lending, the concept of ‘opportunities’ can be 
employed to consider broader positive outcomes, beyond the improved performance of a 
specific loan, that may eventuate from extending credit to a borrower, such as the possibility 
of accessing a new market or improving the lender’s reputation. The concept of ‘resilience’ 
can also be useful as a way of conceptualising the value of lower risk. 
Materiality is another key concept that can be interpreted in different ways. The NCFA NCCRA 
guide, in line with the financial sector supplement, defines materiality broadly, as “anything 
that has reasonable potential to significantly alter the decisions being taken” (Ascui & Cojoianu, 
2019, p. 11). Each lender will have to determine what it considers to be the threshold for 
‘reasonable potential’ (in the definition of materiality), bearing in mind that the significance 
of a risk is the product of its probability of occurrence and its impact. The most significant risks 
are those which are highly likely to occur and the impact of which is also high (high-
probability/high-impact), whereas low-probability/low-impact risks can often safely be 
accepted (subject to periodic monitoring, in case the probability of occurrence or degree of 
impact should change in future). It is important to be aware of low-probability/high-impact 
risks, as they may be mitigated by suitable preparation, insurance or other forms of portfolio-
level diversification. Likewise, high-probability/low-impact risks should be flagged as 
opportunities for management intervention, and checked to ensure that they do not aggregate 
to higher impacts at portfolio level. 
2.2.3 Stage 3: Measure and Value (Assess) 
The NCFA NCCRA guide proposes the following model for credit risk assessment (Figure 8-1), 
which proposes that the overall risk level for a given risk factor is a product of the current 
(historical) risk level, the likely future trend over the relevant timescale(s), the probability of 
the risk being priced (if relevant) and the borrower’s ability to mitigate the risk. The current 
(historical) risk level for natural capital risks is analogous to a borrower’s financial credit history: 
it provides a strong indication of the borrower’s fundamental vulnerability to expected natural 
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capital risks. In the absence of a method (such as this framework) for assessing natural capital 
risk at the level of the individual transaction, historical natural capital risks may have been 
partially reflected in the lender’s overall risk premium for the sector. However, what is not 
necessarily currently taken into account is what will happen to the risk level over time, in 
physical terms (the future trend) and in economic terms (the probability of the risk being 
priced). Many physical risks translate directly into impacts on farm financial performance (e.g. 
by reducing yields or increasing input prices) and therefore do not require separate 
assessment of the probability of being priced, but some (often regarded as ‘externalities’) 
depend on being priced in some way, for example by government regulation or changes in 
consumer demand. Assessments of the current (historical) situation and future projection 
need to be considered in combination with an assessment of the borrower’s ability to manage 
the given risk (step 2c), in order to evaluate the overall risk (step 3). 
Figure 8-1 Risk assessment model 
 
Source: Adapted from Ascui and Cojoianu (2019) 
The next step is to measure each of these components of risk. First of all, the example risk 
areas shown in Table 8-1 need to be segregated into specific risks. For example, ‘water 
availability’ can mean many different things, each associated with different risks in different 
sectors and geographies. When considering Australian wheat production, which is 
predominantly rain-fed, ‘water availability’ primarily concerns the availability of soil moisture 
derived from rainfall, whereas for Australian horticulture, access to sufficient supplies of 
irrigation water would be the key issue (and in some areas this would imply risks associated 
with dependency on surface water flows, whereas other areas would depend on groundwater 
resources).  
Identifying specific risks and indicators is an art that should be informed by science. From a 
lender’s perspective, credit risk is primarily concerned with the possibility of default or delay 
in repayment by the borrower. Material natural capital related risks are, therefore, those 
outcomes that are significantly negative in terms of the borrower’s future financial 
performance (a secondary consideration would be outcomes that are significantly negative in 
terms of the value of the underlying asset (such as land) offered as security). In the case of 
agriculture, the main determinants of financial performance of a typical farm are input costs, 
yields or productivity, and output prices; therefore, material risks can be identified as those 
factors which could produce a significant variation in any of these (increased input costs, lower 
yields or productivity, or lower output prices). In the case of water availability for Australian 
wheat production, there is a strong correlation between plant water use and grain yield. Lower 
yields could therefore come about either if the average amount of plant available water 
reduces in future, or if available water becomes less reliable. This suggests that suitable risk 
indicators would include a quantity measure and a variability measure. In general, across the 
Step 1: 
Assess current 
situation
Step 2a:
Estimate likely 
future trend
Step 2b:
Estimate probability 
of risk being priced 
(where relevant) 
Step 2c: 
Assess borrower's 
ability to mitigate 
risk
Step 3: 
Evaluate overall risk
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regions of southern Australia, which make up the bulk of Australian wheat production, wheat 
is a winter crop which relies mainly on rainfall received during the growing season (as opposed 
to northern Australia, where winter crops rely mainly on stored soil moisture from summer 
rainfall). Therefore, for most Australian wheat cropping regions, the amount and variability of 
rainfall received during the growing season could be suitable indicators of water availability 
risk (French & Schultz, 1984). Highly detailed historical data is available from the Australian 
Bureau of Meteorology, and climate forecasts can provide an assessment of likely future trends 
in these indicators. Table 8-2 provides an example of potential specific risks, indicators and 
data sources for assessing natural capital credit risks for Australian wheat production. 
Table 8-2 Example risk factors, possible indicators and potential data sources for 
wheat farming in Australia 
Thematic 
area 
Risk area Risk factor Indicator 
Data sources 
(current or 
historical 
situation) 
Data sources 
(future 
projection or 
pricing) 
Risk mitigation 
evidence 
Water 
Water 
availability 
Growing 
season 
rainfall 
Millimetres of 
rainfall during 
growing season 
for the region 
(historical 
average) 
Regional 
rainfall 
datasets 
Regional 
outputs from 
long-term 
climatic 
models 
Farmer’s ability 
to use rainfall 
prediction tools 
and adapt 
accordingly 
Rainfall 
reliability 
Variability index 
for the above 
Water use 
Water use 
efficiency 
Total annual 
millimetres of 
rainfall divided by 
tonnes of wheat 
yield (historical 
averages) 
Regional or 
farm-specific 
rainfall 
datasets 
combined 
with farm-
specific yield 
records 
Extrapolation 
of historical 
trend 
Farmer’s ability 
to improve 
water use 
efficiency 
Water 
quality7 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
Weather 
and climate 
Temperature 
extremes 
Heat stress 
Total annual high 
degree hours 
(historical 
average) 
Regional or 
farm-specific 
temperature 
records 
Regional 
outputs from 
long-term 
climatic 
models 
Farmer’s ability 
to use 
temperature 
prediction tools 
and adapt 
accordingly 
Frost 
damage 
Total annual frost 
days (historical 
average) 
Extreme 
weather 
Floods, 
cyclones, 
hailstorms, 
bushfires, 
drought 
Number of 
significant events 
in last 10 years 
Regional data 
from 
government 
agencies or 
insurers, or 
farm-specific 
records 
Regional 
outputs from 
long-term 
climatic 
models 
Farmer’s ability 
to use extreme 
event 
prediction tools 
and adapt 
accordingly 
                                                     
7 Not considered applicable in this particular example, because wheat farming in Australia is primarily rain-fed and there 
are no significant risks associated with the quality of this water input. Nevertheless, water quality could be a relevant risk 
factor for irrigated wheat farms, and it is highly likely to be relevant for any livestock farming. Agricultural activities may 
also impact on water quality; however, in the case of wheat farming, the main water quality impact risk is of fertiliser run-
off, which is considered separately under ‘Fertiliser use’. 
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Land  
and  
soil 
Soil quality 
Soil acidity 
Percentage of 
crop area with soil 
pH <4.5 
Farm-specific 
soil samples 
Extrapolation 
of historical 
trend 
Farmer’s ability 
to monitor and 
actively 
manage these 
risks 
Soil salinity 
 
Percentage of 
crop area with soil 
salinity >100mM/L 
Soil organic 
carbon 
 
Percentage of 
crop area with soil 
organic carbon 
<1% in top 10cm 
Soil erosion 
Percentage of 
farm with ground 
cover <50% 
Farmer 
observations 
(e.g. photos); 
ground cover 
maps derived 
from satellite 
data 
Fertiliser  
Fertiliser 
use  
Total tonnes of 
fertiliser used 
divided by 
application area 
(historical 
average) 
Farm-specific 
records 
Extrapolation 
of historical 
trend 
Farmer’s ability 
to monitor and 
actively 
manage these 
risks 
Fertiliser cost as % 
of total farm costs 
Farm-specific 
records or 
analyst 
reports 
 
Fertiliser 
application 
Partial Nutrient 
Balance (kg 
nutrient removed 
from soil/kg 
applied) 
Farm-specific 
soil samples 
combined 
with farm-
specific 
application 
records 
Partial Factor 
Productivity (kg 
yield/kg nutrient 
applied) 
Kilogrammes of 
nitrates released 
to surface water 
Farm-specific 
records 
and/or 
environmental 
protection 
agency water 
quality 
monitoring 
data 
Biodiversity  
and  
ecosystems 
Biodiversity  
Extent 
and/or 
quality of 
biodiversity 
% of land set aside 
for 
biodiversity/native 
vegetation 
Farm-specific 
records 
and/or 
satellite data 
Scientific 
assessments 
of likely 
future 
changes in 
ecosystems 
and 
biodiversity; 
or 
extrapolation 
Farmer’s 
awareness of 
biodiversity and 
implementation 
of conservation 
strategies 
Quality of 
biodiversity 
Biodiversity 
maps, e.g. 
Atlas of Living 
Australia 
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of historical 
trend 
Weeds, 
pests and 
diseases 
Rate 
and/or 
severity of 
incidents 
Cost per hectare 
of weeds, pests 
and diseases 
control (historical 
average) 
Farm-specific 
or regional 
records 
Scientific 
assessments 
of likely 
future 
changes in 
weeds, pests 
and diseases 
incidence; or 
extrapolation 
of historical 
trend 
Farmer’s 
capacity and 
equipment to 
respond to 
weeds, pests or 
diseases 
outbreaks 
Animal 
welfare8 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
Energy Energy use 
Energy use 
efficiency 
Total energy used 
divided by tonnes 
of wheat yield 
(historical 
averages) 
Farm-specific 
records 
Extrapolation 
of historical 
trend 
Farmer’s ability 
to monitor 
energy 
consumption 
and implement 
energy 
efficiency 
measures 
Energy cost 
Energy cost as % 
of total farm costs 
Analysts’ 
energy cost 
projections 
Air 
Greenhouse 
gas 
emissions 
Carbon 
intensity 
Total tonnes of 
greenhouse gas 
emissions (in CO2 
equivalent) 
divided by tonnes 
of wheat yield 
(historical 
averages) 
Farm-specific 
records 
Extrapolation 
of historical 
trend 
Farmer’s ability 
to monitor 
greenhouse gas 
emissions and 
implement 
emission 
reduction 
measures Cost of 
carbon 
Greenhouse gas 
emissions cost 
as % of total farm 
costs 
Analysts’ 
carbon price 
projections 
Other air 
emissions 
Other 
emissions 
intensity 
Total tonnes of 
other air 
emissions divided 
by tonnes of 
wheat yield 
Farm-specific 
records 
Extrapolation 
of historical 
trend 
Farmer’s ability 
to monitor 
other air 
emissions and 
implement 
emission 
reduction 
measures 
Source: Ascui & Cojoianu (2019b) 
Having identified suitable risk factors and obtained data on indicators, the next step is to 
evaluate what that information means in terms of risk levels. Given the challenges of natural 
capital data collection and assessing the uncertainty of future conditions, quantitative or 
monetary valuations are unlikely to be feasible in many circumstances. The exceptions might 
be for certain narrowly defined risks (e.g., if a legislation has been passed which will introduce 
a specified cost of carbon for certain on-farm emissions which were previously unregulated, 
                                                     
8 Not considered applicable in this particular example, because it focuses only on the activity of growing wheat. However, 
in Australia, wheat farming is often combined with livestock farming, in which case animal welfare would be a relevant risk 
factor for the latter activity.  
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or a water source is being depleted and there is a probability of reduced revenue or additional 
costs to maintain supply, these risks could be quantified and assigned a monetary value, which 
could in turn be added as a cost in a model of the farm’s financial situation). In many other 
cases, however, a qualitative assessment, based on a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative inputs from the measurement stage, will be feasible in order to assign a risk level 
to each risk factor. Ideally, over time, such qualitative assessments would be validated by back-
testing against quantitative performance data, enabling the development of more robust and 
replicable metrics. 
A variety of techniques can be used to convert information gathered through the 
measurement stage into assessed risk levels. If data are available across a portfolio of loans, 
then one way of assigning risk levels may be on the basis of benchmarking against peers, with 
risk levels assigned to percentiles. For example, water use efficiency could be assigned the 
following risk levels, based on performance relative to peers:  
• High risk = below 40th percentile;  
• Medium risk = between 40th and 60th percentiles;  
• Low risk = above 60th percentile.  
The chosen percentile ranges should be based on evidence of impacts, such as historical 
information showing that the lowest 40% of farms have significantly lower yields than the 
upper 40%.  
Use of percentiles is particularly appropriate when the risk factor has a linear relationship with 
impacts or dependencies. For example, water availability risk, measured as millimetres of 
rainfall during the late growing season, was found to have a linear relationship with wheat 
yields in New South Wales, Australia (CelsiusPro, 2010). However, risks may have a variety of 
relationships. For example, a risk may increase sharply at certain thresholds (a stepped 
relationship, as described in the case of soil acidity below, which falls naturally into low, 
medium and high categories based on soil pH being above, between or below the critical 
thresholds of 5.5 and 4.5), or it may increase exponentially towards some limit (such as total 
crop failure or death of livestock). These relationships are illustrated conceptually in Figure 8-2. 
However, it should be noted that many other relationships are possible. The type of 
relationship and its critical parameters (e.g. threshold levels) may vary by sector/region. They 
may as well as depend on the materiality criteria (what level of impact or dependency is 
considered to be significant). Furthermore, it should be noted that in some cases the critical 
parameters or their relationships may be unknown, or imperfectly understood. 
Figure 8-2 Types of risk relationship 
 
Source: Ascui & Cojoianu (2019b) 
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Example: risk thresholds for soil acidity – wheat farming in Australia 
Soil acidification is a slowly occurring natural process accelerated by agriculture, mainly 
due to excessive use of ammonium-based fertilisers, and partly because the product 
removed (e.g. grains or other crops) is alkaline. Nitrogen in ammonium-based fertilisers is 
readily converted to nitrate and hydrogen ions in the soil. As acidity increases, aluminium 
becomes more soluble, resulting in poor root growth, which in turn restricts access to 
water and nutrients. Acidification can also make nutrients chemically unavailable, and 
negatively affect soil microbial activity.   
It is estimated that more than 70% of surface soils and half of subsurface soils across the 
Australian Wheatbelt are affected by soil acidity, which results in up to A$500m/year in 
lost production (AGRIC, 2015; Wheatbelt NRM, 2013). The optimal pH range for wheat is 
around or above pH 5.5 in the topsoil and 4.8 in the subsurface – key thresholds below 
which aluminium begins to dissolve and starts to affect root growth (Gazey & Andrew, 
2009). One technique to help overcome this risk is to apply lime, which can help increase 
grain yield when soil pH is a constraint.  
Figure 8 3 Key thresholds for soil pH for wheat 
 
Source: Wheatbelt NRM (2013)  
 
While the existence of these biophysical thresholds provides a relatively clear 
identification of risk levels at the level of a specific soil sample site (e.g. High risk = pH<4.5, 
Medium risk = 4.5<pH<5.5 and Low risk = pH>5.5), further steps are required to convert 
data from soil samples to a risk assessment for the farm as a whole. If sampling has been 
done correctly, it should be possible to infer the proportions of the farm’s arable land that 
fall into the above three risk categories. Quantification of the yield penalty and/or cost of 
liming could be used to derive rules for converting these proportions into an overall risk 
assessment.  
 
The risk assessment model in Figure 8-1 proposes that the overall risk is a product of the risk 
level of the current (historical) situation, the expected future trend (including the probability 
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of pricing, where relevant) and the farmer’s ability to mitigate the risk. The question therefore 
arises, how should the latter factors be considered to alter the current risk level? 
One approach is to use expert judgement to evaluate each stage iteratively, on its own merits. 
For example, let us assume that the current risk level for a given risk factor is assessed as being 
medium. Reputable forecasts project that the risk will increase in future, but an expert (either 
the assessor themselves, or a third party) judges that the risk level is still best described as 
medium. Based on the farmer’s demonstrated capability to manage the risk, however, an 
expert (again either the assessor themselves, or a third party) judges that the overall risk is 
best described as low. 
Another alternative, which may be used in the absence of a basis for expert judgement, is to 
construct a risk logic table or algorithm to determine how risk assessments for each stage will 
be combined into an overall risk assessment. An example is given in Table 8-3, in which the 
assessment at each stage moderates the preceding risk level (up, down or keeps it the same). 
Similar tables can be constructed for assessments with more risk levels or stages. Tables such 
as these, or algorithms built on their logic, can help automate the overall risk assessment, but 
care should always be taken to ensure that they do not inhibit better judgement, where it is 
available. In other words, it should always be possible to over-ride the automated process, 
where the assessor has good reason to believe the overall risk should be assessed otherwise. 
 Table 8-3 Example risk logic table 
Current (historical) risk Future projection Risk mitigation Overall risk 
Low Decrease Ineffective Low 
Low Decrease Moderately Effective Low 
Low Decrease Highly Effective Low 
Low Stay the same Ineffective Medium 
Low Stay the same Moderately Effective Low 
Low Stay the same Highly Effective Low 
Low Increase Ineffective High 
Low Increase Moderately Effective Medium 
Low Increase Highly Effective Low 
Medium Decrease Ineffective Medium 
Medium Decrease Moderately Effective Low 
Medium Decrease Highly Effective Low 
Medium Stay the same Ineffective High 
Medium Stay the same Moderately Effective Medium 
Medium Stay the same Highly Effective Low 
Medium Increase Ineffective High 
Medium Increase Moderately Effective High 
Medium Increase Highly Effective Medium 
High Decrease Ineffective High 
High Decrease Moderately Effective Medium 
Source: (Ascui & Cojoianu, 2019b) 
 
2.2.4 Stage 4: Apply 
The Apply Stage provides guidance on how to validate and verify the results of an assessment, 
and the actions a user could take to apply results and integrate them into existing processes. 
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The end result of conducting the risk assessment may be a set of ‘traffic lights’ as illustrated in 
Table 4. This may be sufficient for the assessor to factor into their overall judgement (along 
with other qualitative inputs, such as an assessment of the farmer’s financial management 
ability) in order to make a decision about whether or not to offer credit to the applicant. 
Alternatively, a further step could involve assigning weights (for example based on expert 
judgement) to the different risk factors and risk levels, in order to calculate an overall risk 
assessment automatically. As with combining current, future projection and risk mitigation 
assessments into an overall risk assessment for single risk factors, any automated overall risk 
assessment for the applicant entity as a whole should be treated with caution, and not allowed 
to inhibit better judgement, where it is available.   
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Table 8-4 Example overall risk assessment 
Thematic 
area 
Risk area Risk factor Risk level 
Future 
projection 
Risk 
mitigation 
Overall 
risk 
Water 
Water 
availability 
Growing 
season 
rainfall 
 
Rainfall 
reliability 
Medium Increase 
Highly 
effective 
Medium 
 Water use 
Water use 
efficiency 
Medium 
Stay the 
same 
Highly 
effective 
Low 
 Water quality 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Weather 
and climate 
Temperature 
extremes 
Heat stress 
 
Frost 
damage 
High Increase 
Moderately 
effective 
High 
 
Extreme 
weather 
Floods, 
cyclones, 
hailstorms, 
bushfires, 
drought 
High Increase 
Moderately 
effective 
High 
Soil Soil quality 
Soil acidity 
 
Soil salinity 
 
Soil organic 
carbon 
 
Soil erosion 
Low 
Stay the 
same 
Moderately 
effective 
Low 
 Fertiliser use 
Fertiliser use 
efficiency 
 
Fertiliser 
cost 
 
Fertiliser 
application 
 
Fertiliser 
run-off 
High 
Stay the 
same 
Highly 
effective 
Medium 
Biodiversity 
and 
ecosystems 
Biodiversity 
Extent 
and/or 
quality of 
biodiversity 
Low Increase Ineffective High 
 
Weeds, pests 
and diseases 
Rate and/or 
severity of 
incidents 
High Increase 
Moderately 
effective 
High 
 
Animal 
welfare 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Energy Energy use 
Energy use 
efficiency 
 
Energy cost 
Medium Decrease 
Highly 
effective 
Low 
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Air 
emissions 
Greenhouse 
gas emissions 
Carbon 
intensity 
 
Cost of 
carbon 
Medium Increase 
Moderately 
effective 
High 
 
Other air 
emissions 
Other 
emissions 
intensity 
Low 
Stay the 
same 
Moderately 
effective 
Low 
Source: Ascui & Cojoianu (2019b) 
 
Once a risk assessment framework has been constructed for a given sector/region, it should 
be validated, reviewed and continuously improved. Validation can take many different forms. 
One option could take the form of an expert review. Alternatively, a quantitative validation 
could be based on applying the framework to a set of loans and then comparing the 
performance of those loans with a control sample, over a suitable period of time. It may be 
possible to conduct a hypothetical risk assessment exercise on a set of historical loans (i.e., 
back-testing), in order to avoid the problem of having to wait a long time to see the effect of 
natural capital risk factors on performance. 
3 Conclusion 
Incorporating natural capital considerations into the credit assessment process addresses a 
gap in the ESG landscape around smaller-scale secured lending, and is an important step for 
financial institutions to meet their commitments under the Natural Capital Declaration 
(Declaration, 2012; Mulder et al., 2013). The objective of systematically assessing natural 
capital risks is to improve financial institutions’ overall assessments of credit risks. An 
improved understanding of a borrower’s risk profile should enable improved allocation of 
capital and enhance overall loan performance, thus allowing increased finance to flow towards 
more sustainable activities in future. One of the benefits of a standardised procedure is that it 
reduces the risk of each lender developing different measurement and valuation approaches 
to natural capital risks, thereby obtaining different results. There is a distinct ‘public good’ 
advantage to the standardisation of methods as far as is practicable. It is therefore to be hoped 
that banks will continue to collaborate on further methodological development of the 
framework. 
The NCFA guide and more detailed expositions of natural capital risks in relation to specific 
sectors and geographies (Ascui & Cojoianu, 2017, 2019a; Cojoianu & Ascui, 2018) demonstrate 
that NCCRA is feasible, using a combination of quantitative and qualitative inputs. Many 
challenges to implementing NCCRA in practice remain, however. In the agricultural sector in 
particular, natural capital impacts and dependencies are often difficult to define and measure, 
because they are complex, multi-dimensional and interconnected (and sometimes still poorly 
understood). Identifying suitable risk measures is therefore a matter of balancing complexity 
and comprehensiveness with practicality: a mix of art and science. There is no definitive ‘right’ 
answer to the question of how to measure a particular risk, but studies have shown that there 
are, for nearly all of the identified risks, some options currently available to begin assessment 
(Ascui & Cojoianu, 2017, 2019a; Cojoianu & Ascui, 2018). Only by starting to collect such 
information, and then comparing it with loan performance, will lenders be able to evaluate 
quantitatively the effectiveness of different metrics and measurement options (Katchova & 
Barry, 2005). 
Natural Capital Credit Risk Assessment 
139 
There is of course a trade-off between the cost of obtaining and analysing information, and 
the associated benefit – and at present, neither side of this equation has been adequately 
measured, with respect to sector- and geography-specific NCCRA. This is an important area for 
further research (Weber, 2012; Weber et al., 2010). The benefit should not only consider the 
lender’s improved ability to identify, avoid and/or price natural capital risk due to a reduction 
in information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1978), but also the potential benefits for the borrower that 
could result from understanding risks, and mitigation options or best practices, of which they 
might not previously have been aware. In general, more research is required that explores the 
links between natural capital impacts and dependencies, and borrower financial performance.  
Another challenge is that credit risk assessment is by its very nature a forward-looking process 
that requires judgements to be made about an unknown future. NCCRA therefore differs 
fundamentally from backward-looking natural capital accounting, for example as practiced 
under the UN System of Environmental-Economic Accounting, or SEEA (European Commission 
et al., 2013). Nevertheless, a forward-looking risk assessment can start from an assessment of 
the historical situation, and convergence with frameworks such as SEEA (for example by 
sharing concepts and definitions, thus promoting consistency of data) is certainly desirable.  
Other areas for further research and development include: 
• Developing and refining natural capital risk factors, indicators and thresholds for different 
sectors and regions; 
• Validating the application of the framework against loan performance; 
• Quantifying the impact of risk mitigation on overall risk impact;  
• Developing methods for dealing with interlinked risks;  
• Developing methods for weighting and combining risks into an overall risk assessment – 
as opposed to relying on credit officers’ subjective integration; 
• Developing methods for aggregation at different levels (e.g. diversified operations, 
regions or lending portfolios); and 
• Extending the framework for use in ongoing monitoring and client engagement. 
In order to implement agricultural NCCRA effectively, banks and/or research providers will 
need to start investing in spatial ‘Big Data’ capabilities, for example using Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS), which have not yet been widely adopted in the financial sector 
(Cojoianu et al., 2015). Many existing natural capital datasets are already GIS-based (e.g. 
rainfall and other climatic data, soil maps etc.), and by collecting and collating their own data, 
elicited through the lending application process (Goss & Roberts, 2011), banks may begin to 
benefit from the ability to detect systemic risks (and opportunities) across a portfolio, in a 
bottom-up manner as opposed to the top-down assessment currently offered by tools such as 
ENCORE. Such systemic effects are likely to be relevant because many of the natural capital 
and sustainability issues in agriculture involve long-term, large-scale processes, where 
systemic understanding is still emergent. Ideally some form of data-sharing process – such as 
various initiatives underway in the area of product sustainability claims (Gale et al., 2017) – 
would develop, so that such information would not remain siloed within individual lenders, 
where its potential utility is significantly decreased. Data integration platforms could 
potentially integrate data from multiple external sources (such as meteorological data, soil 
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quality, satellite data) as well as holding borrower data in confidence, which the borrower 
could then elect to release to different lenders or other parties as required. The Natural Capital 
Coalition is working with a variety of partners to address natural capital data issues through 
its Data Information Flow project.9 
Finally, truly valuing natural capital will require radical transformations in awareness and 
culture both within lending organisations and across the banking sector. At present, only a 
handful of the world’s banks have signed up to the Natural Capital Declaration. It is likely that, 
as experienced in the past with environmental risk, banks may be concerned that asking their 
customers too many difficult questions may result in them being competitively disadvantaged 
(Coulson, 2002, 2009). Furthermore, at the level of individual credit assessment officers, 
focussing primarily on financial information is a powerful mind-set which will need to be 
actively transformed to a new framing that is inclusive of natural capital impacts and 
dependencies. There is an urgent need for both critical and empirical social science research 
which addresses the many challenges associated with achieving this transformation, if the goal 
of managing our natural capital with the same diligence that we manage our financial capital 
is to be achieved, in the relatively short time before that natural capital is irrevocably 
depreciated. 
  
                                                     
9 See https://naturalcapitalcoalition.org/projects/data-kit/ 
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 A Model to Integrate Water Stress into 
Corporate Bond Credit Analysis1,2  
 
by 
Henrik Ohlsen and Michael Ridley 
Abstract 
Water stress is perhaps the most tangible aspect of climate change and involved in almost all 
companies’ production processes. Companies that depend on water and operate where water 
withdrawals are high relative to available supply are exposed to water risk. The costs for a firm 
to obtain water needed to sustain its operations may rise abruptly or gradually, impacting its 
profitability, competitiveness and the ability to repay debt. Combining data on the corporate 
water usage per production location with costs based on site-specific water supply and 
demand conditions, our tool for integrating water stress into corporate bond credit- risk 
analysis (Corporate Bonds Water Credit Risk Tool) allows financial analysts to quantify 
corporate water risk, assess the potential impact of water stress on a company’s credit ratios 
and conduct company-specific scenario analysis. Fixed-income analysts and portfolio 
managers can further use his tool to benchmark companies and assets in water- intensive 
industries, such as mining, power and beverage, on exposures to water stress. In a 2015 study, 
we applied the model across 24 companies in three sectors and found: 1) water stress levels 
in many regions are high and increasing; 2) companies will face pressure to internalize costs; 
3) financial ratios of companies in some sectors or regions may be negatively impacted; 4) 
financial institutions face potential risks from companies receiving their funding while having 
production in water-stressed areas. 
Keywords: shadow water price, water stress, additional OPEX, additional CAPEX, physical risk, 
credit risk 
1 Introduction 
 Water Stress and Financial Analyses  
For many companies, the access to enough water for operations is becoming increasingly 
costly, especially in water-stressed regions. On the supply side, the continuous overuse of 
water sources, ecosystem degradation and changing climate patterns with more frequent and 
severe droughts are making water an increasingly scarce resource. On the demand side, 
population growth is contributing to rising demand from households and agriculture, and 
competition for water resources is growing within and between water- dependent economic 
sectors. As a result of these growing supply and demand pressure, water-related capital 
                                                     
1 This chapter was re-written and edited by Henrik Ohlsen, Managing Director of VfU, email: ohlsen@vfu.de and Michael 
Ridley, Director, Senior Responsible Investment Specialist, HSBC GAM, email: michael.a.ridley@hsbc.com.  
2 It is a short version of the 2015 final project report ´Integrating Water Stress into Corporate Bond Credit Analysis´, 
authored by Michael Ridley and David Boland and edited by Liesel van Ast, Simone Dettling, Anders Nordheim, and Henrik 
Ohlsen. The project was commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) 
in 2014 and jointly led by Global Canopy Programme; UN Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI); and 
German Association for Environmental Management and Sustainability in Financial Institutions (VfU). 
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expenditure is rising amongst companies that directly withdraw water in catchments with 
scarce or over-allocated resources. Water tariffs are increasing as utilities attempt to recover 
higher expenditure to secure supplies. Water shortages have prompted authorities in 
economies including the U.S. state of California and the Brazilian state of São Paulo to 
introduce demand management and restrictions, which can limit production. Increasingly 
uncertain water supply and rising water costs affect the financials of companies, e.g., in mining, 
power and beverage industries. Additional capital expenditures to secure water supply (e.g., 
through investment in desalination), higher operating expenditures due to increasing water 
prices, production losses resulting from restricted access to water or the loss of a company’s 
social license to operate as it competes for scarce water resources with the local community, 
can lead to lower-than-expected earnings, restricted growth, and unfavorable financial ratios 
impacting credit analysis.  
2 General Principle of the Water Credit Risk Tool  
This tool incorporates openly available data from the World Resources Institute on water stress 
at any location into a traditional financial model, thereby enabling users to integrate a 
company’s exposure to water stress into credit risk analysis.  
To achieve this purpose, the model uses a shadow price for water as a proxy for exposure to 
potentially increasing costs for water resulting from water stress. Our analysis, as described in 
the next section, found no statistical correlation between urban water tariffs and water 
scarcity. In the absence of market prices that reflect resource constraints, shadow prices 
provide a proxy for the magnitude of exposure to water stress.  
The calculation of these shadow prices is based on a total economic value (TEV) concept – a 
concept taken from environmental economics. Shadow water prices are calculated by 
considering the value of the alternative uses of the water were it not used by the companies 
analyzed (opportunity costs). Where location-specific water use data are unavailable for a 
company, shadow water prices across a company’s assets are weighted by production or assets 
in each location in order to derive a company-weighted shadow water price to reflect its 
overall risk profile. A higher company-specific shadow price indicates higher potential 
exposure to water stress across its operations. By using the shadow price to calculate a 
company’s potential water use costs, water risk is introduced into the company’s financial 
model via operating expenditures. This allows the user to measure the potential impact of 
increasing water costs on key financial ratios used in credit assessments.  
The TEV concept is used to estimate the shadow water price to provide an ‘upper bound’ with 
which the model is able to gauge the magnitude of direct potential exposure for a company, 
and to test the company’s financials against this exposure. The market price of water may not 
reach the shadow price, however the costs of water constraints can be internalized through 
both market and non-market mechanisms, including capital expenditure (capex), physical 
shortages leading to lower production, and asset stranding caused by loss of water rights.  
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 Figure 9-1 Shadow price increases with water stress 
 
 
When the model introduces water as a factor into the credit analysis of companies, the two 
parameters that determine estimates of how a firm’s credit is impacted are the amount of 
water the firm uses and the shadow water prices that the firm faces depending on the 
locations where it produces. These two factors, coupled with the financial strength and 
business risk profile of each company, determine the extent to which firms are impacted by 
water stress in the model.  
To illustrate the efficacy of the model, the full report of the project3 also presents analysis 
undertaken on 24 companies, eight each from mining, power and beverage industries. We 
apply the Excel-based model4 to investigate how these firms’ credit ratios could be impacted 
by water stress, based on the potential costs associated with their water use under current 
and projected water supply conditions.  
The model calculates company credit ratios before and after integrating the shadow price of 
the water used at their production locations. For some firms, using the full value of water use 
accounting for scarcity and population factors could significantly impact their credit ratios, 
which could lead to a rating downgrade and an adjustment in the value of their bonds.  
3 Methodology 
 Estimating shadow water price 
The financial model provided is an open-source Microsoft Excel-based tool. It extends 
traditional credit analysis, which evaluates firms’ business and financial risks, to include water 
stress. Our model calculates five credit ratios for companies, but unlike traditional credit 
analysis tools, the Corporate Bonds Water Credit Risk Tool (CBWCR Tool) can also model firms 
                                                     
3 See the report (GIZ/NCD/VfU, 2016) at http://vfu-mediathek.de/mediathek/entry/2492/#gv-entry-reviews. 
4 See the excel-based model (GIZ/NCD/VfU, 2016) at http://vfu-mediathek.de/mediathek/entry/3527/#gv-entry-reviews.  
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being impacted by TEV associated with the water used for business operations, defined in this 
case as the ‘shadow price’.  
Water prices are a lagging indicator of water risk. Water governance is highly politicized and 
current water tariffs are not a reliable indicator for local supply-demand dynamics. The price 
of municipal water for 355 cities around the world ranged from US$0.0/m3 to US$4.5/ m3 in 
2014, according to a Water Tariff Survey published by Global Water Intelligence (2014). Our 
analysis found no statistical correlation between these urban water tariffs and water scarcity 
levels at the 355 locations, based on data from the World Resources Institute. Current water 
costs are inadequate as indicators of exposures to water risk. The location-specific shadow 
water price provides an appropriate proxy for water stress, as depicted in Figure 9-2.  
Figure 9-2 Estimated shadow prices of water in global cities providing a proxy for 
water stress across geographies 
 
Source：WRI Aqueduct. Shadow water prices from DBRM Associates.  
Our model aims to overcome this by using the TEV concept to capture the full economic value 
of water to reflect supply constraints and demand pressures. The evaluation of alternative 
allocations of water among competing users requires costs and benefits to be expressed in 
monetary terms, using prices and quantities. The TEV concept covers the external benefits 
that water provides to society and ecology, in addition to the private benefits enjoyed by water 
consumers. Since observed prices for water often fail to reflect actual economic values, for 
example, due to government regulations and subsidies, observed market prices need to be 
adjusted to accommodate distortions.5 In some cases, there may be no market price, so the 
value must be estimated.  
The TEV concept6 attempts to capture the benefits that water provides, in addition to the 
private benefits enjoyed directly by water consumers. We estimate the use value of four 
different “services” provided by water, namely water’s value for agriculture, domestic supply, 
human health and environmental services  
Figure 9-3 shows how we capture the total economic value. The four services agricultural 
values, domestic supply values, human health impacts and environmental impacts are the four 
                                                     
5 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, System of Environmental-Economic Accounting for 
Water,2012. 
6 See Appendix A in the full report (Ridley & Boland, 2015). 
Copenhagen
$ 7.38/m³
(TEV: $3.99)
Mumbai
$ 0.22/m³ 
(TEV: $13.58)
Mexico-City
$ 0.95/m³ 
(TEV: $8.66)
Vancouver
$ 2.22/m³
(TEV: $2.01)
Sao Paulo 
$ 1.28/m³
(TEV: $5.33)
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dependent variables in the TEV equation (Table 9-1). The values for domestic supply are 
calculated on a simple assumption that value increases with water scarcity. The two 
independent variables of the TEV are water stress and population.  
Figure 9-3 Components of the shadow Water Price 
 
Source: Ridley, M. and D. Boland (2015) 
 
The model sums these four values to arrive at an overall shadow water price:  
Shadow Water Price = (2W/5) + P(4/5(W + 1)) + PD((2 x 10↑ - 8W↑ 2 + 10↑ - 8W + 10 ↑ - 7)) 
+ P(W/10) x (0.031W ↑2 + 0.015W)7’8 
The population weighting and average value of a DALY are in the model itself and can be 
adjusted by the user as required. 
 
                                                     
7 Abbreviations: W = baseline water stress score, PD = population density, P = population weight, D = value of DALY 
(disease-adjusted life years) 
8 For more details of how this formula is derived, please refer to the full report (Ridley & Boland, 2015). 
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Table 9-1 Explanation of the dependent variables in our TEV calculation 
Dependent 
variables 
Types of 
water use 
Equation 
Independent 
variables impacting 
dependent variable 
Method for calculating 
Agricultural 
value 
Consumptive (2W/5) Baseline water stress 
Meta-analysis based on estimates of 
value of agricultural water use from 
study sites in published research, to 
infer values for agricultural water use 
at new locations (“benefits transfer”). 
To minimise variation across methods 
and significant uncertainty in values 
normalized across years for inflation 
and pricing parity, the research was 
restricted to studies published from 
2000 to 2015. 
Domestic 
supply price 
Non- 
consumptive 
P (4/5(W+1)) 
Baseline water 
stress, population 
The values of domestic supply are 
calculated on an assumption that value 
increases with water scarcity, with 
values ranging from US$0/m3 to 
US$5/m3. Values are based on the 
range of urban prices in the Global 
Water Intelligence 2014 tariff survey 
data 
Human health 
Non- 
consumptive 
PD (2x10-8 
xW2 + 10-8 x 
W+ 10-7) 
Baseline water 
stress, population 
Calculated using life-cycle analysis 
impact factors developed by Pfister et 
al (2009). Includes a value for  
‘disability adjusted life years’ (DALY), 
per m3 of water consumption. 
Environmenta
l impact 
Non- 
consumptive 
P (W/10) x 
(0.031W2 + 
0.015W) 
Baseline water 
stress, population 
Calculated using life cycle analysis 
impact factors developed by Pfister et 
al (2009). 
 
Water stress, the “W” in the equation, is one of the two independent variables in our 
calculation of shadow water price. The second independent variable is population size within 
a 50-kilometer (km) radius. Areas that have high levels of water stress and are densely 
populated will have relatively high shadow water prices, reflecting expectations of increased 
costs to secure supplies and greater competition for resources.  
Using the TEV concept to calculate the US$/m3 shadow water price, indexed to water stress, 
is a systematic approach to integrating water risk into financial analysis (Equarius Risk Analytics, 
2015). 
The model includes the shadow water price to estimate the potential scale of the financial 
impact of water constraints on companies with operations in water-stressed catchments.  
 Integrating shadow prices of water in CBWCR tool 
The CBWCR tool calculates company credit ratios before and after integrating the shadow price 
of the water used at production locations.  
Chapter 9 
 150 
In a 2015 study, we analyzed 24 companies from three different industries – eight each from 
the mining, power and beverage. Each company analyzed in the model is shown on a separate 
sheet in the Excel file. The top half of each Excel sheet is a standard credit analyst’s company 
model. The model contains Profit and Loss, Cash Flow and Balance Sheet information for each 
company for 2013-2017. These three interlinked statements generate five key credit ratios 
used to estimate the credit strength of the company.9 Calculating these adjusted credit ratios, 
on the assumption that the firms were being asked to pay a higher price for water in line with 
the shadow price at their main locations, allowed credit analysts to see by how much the firms’ 
credit ratios might deteriorate over 2013-2017. This allowed analysts to consider whether this 
might lead the rating agencies to downgrade the companies’ credit ratings, or lead to a fall in 
the value of the firms’ bonds. 
What is novel about this model is the inclusion of location-specific information about the firms’ 
operations and water use. This is found in the lower part of each company sheet. The model 
pulls in data on water stress held by the World Resources Institute (WRI) and applies a formula 
to calculate shadow prices at different locations around the world, in the years 2010, 2020, 
2030 and 2040. The tool enables users to calculate the shadow water price at all land-based 
locations for these years. 
With the mining companies, we ascertain the location of all their main mines, while for the 
power industry we identify the location of power generation plants. Based on the longitude 
and latitude of each site, the model identifies the level of water stress at that location using 
WRI data, and then calculates the shadow water price to identify the value of water linked to 
water stress at that specific location. 
The shadow water price at all of a firm’s main locations is then weighted by the amount of 
water each company uses at each location, so that the model calculates a blended or average 
shadow water price for each company. Suppose a mining company uses 60 percent of its water 
at mine A (where the shadow price is US$10.00/m3) and 40 percent of its water at mine B 
(where the shadow price is US$2.00/m3), the company’s blended shadow price would be 
(US$10 x 0.6) + (US$2 x 0.4) = US$6.80.  
Most firms only discloses information about their overall aggregate water use per annum: 
most do not break down water use by location. So, for many companies we use proxies such 
as reserves for mining, installed capacity for power utilities and production data for beverages 
to estimate the blended shadow water prices relevant to the companies’ operations (for 
further details on this see Appendix B of the full report). Users of the tool may wish to use 
alternative production-related proxies to estimate the breakdown of water use by location.  
The blended shadow price for each company is then multiplied by the amount of water that 
the company uses in a year. This calculates each company’s total shadow water costs to reflect 
both its exposure to water-stressed areas and its dependence on access to water resources. 
This shadow water cost appears as a new “water OPEX line” on the company’s Profit and Loss 
account and thus affects the credit ratios. The overall process is sketched out in Figure 9-4. 
                                                     
9 For a full description see Appendix B of the full report (Ridley & Boland, 2015). 
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Figure 9-4 Three sources of data to introduce TEV of water into corporate bond 
credit analysis 
 
 Location-level vs. country-level water price 
The model uses a slightly different methodology for beverage companies, largely because they 
operate so many production sites, bottling plants, distilleries and breweries around the world. 
So rather than accounting for the exact locations of all  these operations, their blended shadow 
water price is calculated at a country level. Analysts assess the proportion of their operations 
in different countries, then assign a country-specific shadow price (as opposed to a locational 
price to the site). This approach reflects the time constraints that analysts are likely to face, 
but the model could be adjusted to create a more granular, site-specific evaluation in countries 
with significant production sites and areas under water stress.  
This shadow price is then weighted according to one of the following criteria, based on a 
hierarchy of information:  
• How much product, in terms of hectolitres, does the company produce per country?  
• If the above information is not available, the weighting is based on the number of 
factories or distilleries or breweries operated per country.  
• If neither piece of information is provided, the weighting is based on the breakdown 
of annual revenues by country.  
This simplified approach enables a high-level benchmarking on exposure to water stress. 
Further sub-national research could then be conducted where a company is identified as at 
risk from water stress. Of the eight beverage companies analyzed, two firms, namely A-Busch 
and Heineken, specify the amount of product they produce by country in terms of hectolitres. 
One firm, namely Nestlé, specifies the number of production sites it operates in each country. 
The remaining five firms break down their sales by country. For further guidance on how to 
use the model, see Appendix B in the full report. 
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4 Case studies 
 Assessment of exposure to water stress  
For the 24 companies in mining, power and beverage industries analyzed in our project, we 
found that there was a large difference in how exposed they might be to water stress. Many 
of the firms operate in regions of water stress. Results of the model’s application do not 
provide a forecast of actual impacts on the financials of specific companies or timings of costs 
being internalized. They provide a proxy to benchmark companies on their exposure to 
localized water stress across their operations worldwide, with risk aggregated at a company 
level so that it can be integrated into credit analysis.  
The model increases the operating expenditure (OPEX) that each firm faces annually, on the 
assumption that the firm must pay to access water at all of its main operating sites, at a cost 
in line with our estimate of the shadow water price at these locations. Given this assumption, 
the firm faces higher OPEX costs every year; this reduces their free cash flows and their key 
credit ratios like Net debt/EBITDA can deteriorate. 
Six of the mining companies analyzed are investment-grade and two are non-investment-grade 
– Fortescue and Vedanta. Six of the power companies are investment-grade, while two, Consol 
Energy and Eskom, are non-investment-grade. All the beverage companies were investment-
grade.10 
                                                     
10Based on data as of June 2015. 
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Table 9-2 Ratings of 24 companies from three industrial sectors, as at 17 July 2015 
Sector Company B'berg Equity (Ticker) HQ  Market  
Moody’s 
(Cap. Billion) 
S&P 
Mining 
Anglo 
American 
AAL_LN Equity London, UK £12.4 Baa2 Neg BBB- 
Mining Barrick Gold ABX_US Equity Toronto, Canada $10.7 Baa2 Neg BBB- 
Mining BHP Billiton BHP_US Equity 
Melbourne, 
Australia 
£67.3 A1 A+ Neg 
Mining 
Fortescue 
Metals 
FMG_AU Equity Perth, Australia AUD 5.3 Ba2 Neg BB Neg 
Mining Glencore GLEN_LN Equity Zug, Switzerland £31.9 NR BBB 
Mining Rio Tinto RIO_LN Equity London, UK £47.4 A3 A- 
Mining Vale VALE_US Equity 
Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil 
$27.4 Baa2 Neg 
BBB 
Neg 
Mining Vedanta VED_LN Equity Mumbai, India £1.3 Ba3 Neg BB- Neg 
Power  Consol Energy CNX_US Equity 
Canonsburg, PA, 
USA 
$4.2 B1 BB 
Power  EdF EDF_FP Equity Paris, France £40.2 A1 Neg A+ Neg 
Power  Eskom 1001Z_SJ Equity South Africa Not listed Ba1 
BB+ 
Neg 
Power  GdF GSZ_FP Equity Paris, France £43.2 A1 Neg A 
Power  RWE RWE_GY Equity 
Dusseldorf, 
Germany 
£12.1 Baa1 Neg 
BBB+ 
Neg 
Power  
Sempra 
Energy 
SRE_US Equity San Diego, USA $25.7 Baa1 BBB+ 
Power  
Southern 
Company 
SO_US Equity Atlanta, GA, USA $39.9 Baa1 A Cwn 
Power  Vattenfall VATT_SS Equity 
Stockholm, 
Sweden 
Not listed A3  A-   
Beverages 
Anheuser-
Busch 
ABI_BB Equity Leuven, Belgium £190.5 A2 Pos A 
Beverages Carlsberg CARLB_DC Equity 
Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
DKK 96.8 Baa2 Neg NR 
Beverages Diageo DGE_LN Equity London, UK £48.7 A3 A- 
Beverages FEMSA  FEMSAUBD_MM Equity 
Monterrey, 
Mexico 
MXN 
512.9 
NR A- 
Beverages Heineken HEIA_NA Equity 
Amsterdam, 
Netherlands 
£42.2 Baa1 BBB+ 
Beverages Nestlé NESN_VX Equity 
Vevey, 
Switzerland 
CHF 232 Aa2 AA 
Beverages Pernod Ricard RI_FP Equity Paris, France £29.2 Baa3 Pos BBB- 
Beverages SAB Miller SAB_LN Equity London, UK £56.8 A3 A- 
 
Source: Company Reports, Bloomberg 
 
When we introduce water as a factor into the credit analysis of companies, the two parameters 
that determine how a firm’s credit is impacted are the amount of water the firm uses, and the 
overall blended shadow water price that applies to the water used across the firm’s sites.  
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Table 9-3 Data on the 24 firms’ water use in 2013 and the changes of blended 
shadow prices between 2010 and 2040 
 
Source: Company Reports, Bloomberg, GIZ/NCD/VfU/DBRM Associates 
 
Table 9-3 sets out the amount of water the firms used in thousand cubic metres, in 2013 
(column 3) and the blended shadow water prices using 2010 and 2040 scarcities for each 
company in 2013 (columns 4 and 5).  
The companies in Table 9-3 are ranked in terms of the sizes of their annual 2013 water 
consumption. This shows a wide range in the amount of water used by the 24 companies, from 
Glencore, which used 969 million cubic meters (m3) in 2013, to Pernod Ricard, which used 2.4 
million m3. Two other companies used 500 million m3 or more in 2013 – Rio Tinto and EDF. 
Fifteen of the 24 firms used more than 100 million m3 of water in 2013. Together, the 24 
companies use more than 5.3 billion cubic meters of water annually, almost as much as the 
annual freshwater withdrawals of a country such as Norway (6.4 billion m3/annum) (Bank, 
2020). 
EDF is one of the top three companies in water consumption. This is significant because the 
model only considers consumptive water use, while many utilities including EDF also use a 
great deal of water in a non-consumptive way. For example, for cooling power plants, where 
water is extracted from rivers or seas, run over power plants and pipes, and then returned to 
water courses. The model only applies shadow prices to consumptive water use, meaning 
water that is not returned to the rivers or seas. None of the beverage firms directly used more 
than 65 million cubic meters in 2013.  
Since the majority of the beverage firms’ water use is through their supply chains, they may 
be indirectly exposed to water stress through the products that they buy (e.g., sugar, fruit, 
barley, packaging) (Water Footprint Network, 2019).  The model only integrates annual direct 
water use by companies themselves, as reported by the companies (Ethical Consumer, 2013). 
Company Sector Water Use 2013 TEV 2010 TEV 2040 %age Change Between 
Thousand Cubic Metres $/m3 $/m3 2010 and 2040 TEVs
Glencore Mining 939,000 4.33 5.41 24.9%
Rio Tinto Mining 731,000 8.67 8.70 0.3%
EdF Power 500,000 4.10 4.38 6.8%
Southern Power 388,269 2.62 2.73 4.2%
Vale Mining 373,800 1.08 1.13 4.6%
BHP Billiton Mining 347,500 6.41 6.44 0.5%
Vedanta Mining 344,849 2.46 3.76 52.8%
Eskom Power 334,275 4.61 5.25 13.9%
RWE Power 314,900 3.55 3.84 8.2%
Anglo American Mining 201,490 1.41 1.89 34.0%
Vattenfall Power 162,000 4.30 4.28 -0.5%
Fortescue Mining 139,420 0.66 0.66 0.0%
GdF Power 132,600 5.80 6.39 10.2%
Sempra Power 120,760 8.81 8.62 -2.2%
Barrick Gold Mining 100,909 4.16 4.55 9.4%
SAB Beverages 62,100 3.24 3.68 13.6%
Nestle Beverages 61,065 4.44 4.82 8.6%
A Busch Beverages 39,447 4.15 4.46 7.5%
Heineken Beverages 27,670 3.42 3.79 10.8%
Consol Power 16,473 3.67 4.03 9.8%
Femsa Beverages 14,950 4.67 5.38 15.2%
Carlsberg Beverages 14,300 4.23 4.58 8.3%
Diageo Beverages 5,581 4.56 4.95 8.6%
Pernod Ricard Beverages 2,406 4.40 4.66 5.9%
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Whereas most of the water used by mining and power companies is directly consumed in 
operations, direct water use may represent just 1 percent of total water use by beverage 
companies. Since beverage companies do not disclose the volumes of water used by their 
suppliers, we have not included this in the analysis. The model excludes indirect water use 
because this would need to use modelled estimates based on industry averages. The analysis 
may therefore underestimate the level of water risk in the beverage industry.  
Company-wide shadow prices calculated for the firms in 2010 range from US$0.66/m3 for 
Fortescue Metals to US$8.81/m3 for Sempra Energy. Thirteen of the companies face weighted 
average shadow prices above US$4.00/m3. The distribution of the 2010 shadow prices within 
the mining industry is wide. Large mining companies such as Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton face 
high estimated shadow prices of US$8.67/m3 and US$6.41/m3 respectively, while the 2010 
shadow price for Anglo American is estimated at US$1.41/m3.  
Beverage companies’ 2010 shadow prices are found in the middle or towards the top of Table 
3. The 2010 shadow price ranges narrowly from US$4.67/m3 for Femsa to US$3.24/ m3 for SAB 
Miller. Given the large number of sites operated by beverage companies, the blended shadow 
prices in this industry are based on average country-level water stress data, which may mask 
variations in site-specific water stress within countries.  
For 22 of the companies analyzed, the blended shadow water price rises between 2010 and 
2040. The shadow prices tend to be higher in 2040 than in 2010, because water stress and 
population are projected over time to rise in many locations. Water stress may be exacerbated 
in some regions as climate change leads to changes in rainfall patterns and more frequent and 
severe droughts. However, water availability is projected to increase in some locations as 
rainfall patterns change over time.  
 Scenario analysis to model current and future risks 
In our study, we model the potential implications of three scenarios for the 24 companies:  
1. Exposure to current water stress: firms pay the 2010 shadow prices in 2014, 2015, 
2016 and 2017; 
2. Exposure to future water stress: firms pay the 2040 shadow prices in 2014, 2015, 2016 
and 2017; 
3. Business as usual (BAU) without water stress: companies do not face the shadow 
prices of water.  
In all three scenarios, we assume all of the companies see their annual revenues grow by 3 
percent per year, and their general annual COGS (cost of goods sold) rise by 2 percent per 
annum. We also assume that water use grows at 2 percent per annum and water prices grow 
at 3 percent per annum.11  
Scenarios 1 and 2 model the impacts of shadow prices of water on the financial ratio 
projections for these firms, compared to Scenario 3. The firms’ Net Debt/EBITDA ratios have 
increased (deteriorated), as they become more leveraged; their EBITDA/Revenue ratios have 
fallen (deteriorated) as their margins shrink.  
                                                     
11 These assumptions are made for all the three scenarios in case business grows as business as usual. 
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Net Debt/EBITDA ratios estimated to be significantly exposed to the internalization of shadow 
prices for water include four mining companies: Barrick Gold, Vedanta, Rio Tinto and Glencore, 
and four power companies namely Eskom, RWE, Sempra and Southern.  
Although credit ratios are important, there is no direct or one-to-one relationship between 
credit ratios and credit ratings. Credit ratios are only one part of the way in which credit 
analysts rate companies. Credit analysis involves financial risk analysis, looking at credit ratios, 
as well as business risk analysis, which involves looking at the competitiveness of an industry 
in which a firm operates. How strong a company’s credit ratios need to be to achieve a 
particular credit rating depends in part on the business risks that it faces; this in turn is largely 
shaped by the industrial sector in which a firm operates.  
How do the mining, power and beverage industries compare on business risks? Mining is 
viewed as moderately high-risk, given the industry’s high cyclicality and the fairly intense level 
of competition. By contrast, utilities tend to be low- risk, due to their industry’s low cyclicality 
and their natural monopoly status. The beverage industry lies between mining and utilities in 
terms of business risk, given its low cyclicality and low competition.  
Because mining firms face greater business risks than both beverage firms and utilities, mining 
firms need to have strong credit ratios to earn the same credit rating as either a beverage firm 
or a utility. In the mining space, companies probably need to have a Net Debt/EBITDA ratio of 
below 4.0x to be rated investment-grade. A mining company would probably need a Net 
Debt/EBITDA ratio of below 2.0x to be rated in the Single A rating category.  
In contrast, it can be assumed that power companies with Net Debt/EBITDA above 5.5x, are 
not likely to be investment-grade, and that utilities with Net Debt/EBITDA above 3.5x are likely 
to be rated below the Single A rating category.  
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Table 9-4 Estimation of the firms  ´net debt/EBITDA in 2017 in three scenarios 
 
Source: GIZ/NCD/VfU Corporate Bonds Water Credit Risk Tool 
 
5 Conclusion 
 Applications   
The CBWCR tool is applicable to both credit analysts and portfolio managers in the bond 
markets on both buy and sell sides.  
Credit analysts can use the tool to cover mining, power and beverage companies or other 
industries heavily dependent on water with outstanding bonds. Analysts can source corporate 
location-specific water data and apply the tool to analyze specific companies, potentially 
extending or adjusting quantitative analysis. Results can be used for selecting companies or 
issues for engagement, or to follow up with further research on the company’s water 
management. 
Other bond professionals in origination and syndication could use the tool to analyze the 
potential impact of water scarcity on the issuers. Rating agencies may use the tool to consider 
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the potential impact of water stress on credit ratings, while credit risk managers can apply it 
to analyzing whole portfolios of bonds.  
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) analysts can use the tool to identify and engage 
firms “at risk” from water stress by encouraging more disclosures and management practices 
on water. The model could provoke research into regulatory frameworks, water policies and 
infrastructure relevant to preparedness for water scarcity.  
Companies themselves could use the tool to consider the potential impact of water stress on 
their own credit ratings. They should be able to source good data on water usage, the location 
of their operations, water prices, and data about capex responses to higher water prices.  
 Limitations and outlook 
There are three basic limitations in the model’s current form. First, it only considers direct 
water usage. Because firms in the mining and power industries are heavy users of water, the 
model works well when analyzing these firms. But in other sector like retail, where direct water 
use levels are low, there is a significant reliance on water usage higher up the supply chain. 
Currently the model does not take this type of indirect water usage into account. 
A second limitation is that the model relies on firm providing information on the geographic 
locations of their main operating sites, and their annual water consumption. This information 
is difficult to find in some industries, such as data centers. Data centers can use significant 
power and water, but information on their location and water use can be difficult to obtain. 
The third shortfall is that it only assumes firms are impacted by having to pay a higher price 
for water over time. However, in some extreme circumstances, firms could be denied access 
to water completely if there was a falling-out with the population around an operating site, or 
if water reserves became unavailable. 
As the investment community becomes more aware of water as an issue of stewardship,12 
there are more areas and aspects in which the methodology discussed in this article can be 
applied and improved.  
                                                     
12 A new investor initiative, named “Valuing Water Finance Task Force”, online at https://www.ceres.org/valuing-water-
finance-task-force, was founded in early 2020 with the goal to engage with corporate leaders on sustainable water 
practices. 
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Disclaimer 
The authors, editors and affiliates will not accept any liability for damage arising from the use 
of the report or Corporate Bonds Water Credit Risk Tool, and make no representation regarding 
the advisability or suitability of specific investment decisions. A decision to invest in any 
company or vehicle should not be made in reliance on any of the statements set forth in this 
article or the original report. The contents of this report do not constitute recommendations 
to buy, sell, or hold such security, nor are they considered to be investment advice. All market 
data included in this report are derived from third parties as at 1 July 2015.  
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 Integration of Climate Change Risk within RAF 
and ESG Assessment in Credit Risk Models  
 
by 
Banca Intesa Sanpaolo1 
Abstract 
With rising awareness of how climate change and related risks affect financial stability, 
financial institutions and firms are integrating climate change risks into their risk appetite 
framework (RAF) and process of decision-making as well. To help build a climate-conscious 
culture, Banca Intesa Sanpaolo as a leading bank group in Italy, has been following the 
guidance by organizations like the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) 
and working on developing approaches to minimize the impact of such risks. These 
approaches are developed through the streams of Management of Intesa Sanpaolo’s direct 
exposure to ESG risks, identification and evaluation of business related ESG risks, and 
evaluation of ESG linked business opportunities.  
Keywords: climate change risk, risk appetite framework, ESG assessment, credit risk model 
1 Environmental risk analysis in Banca Intesa Sanpaolo: recent 
developments 
 Background 
The Paris Agreement on Climate Change, together with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, have laid the foundations for a more sustainable future. Sustainability and 
transition to a low-carbon economy, which are more efficient in terms of resources and 
circularity, are key elements of a specific action plan for ensuring the long-term 
competitiveness of the European Union. 
Governments, firms and financial institutions are facing the catastrophic and unpredictable 
consequences of climate change and resource depletion. In particular, the financial system has 
already undergone several reforms during the past years to integrate the lessons learnt from 
the recent financial crisis, but it is ready to contribute to a greener and more sustainable 
economy. In this context, the European Union is committed to promoting more sustainable 
economic growth, to ensure the stability of the financial system and to promote greater 
transparency with a long-term view of the economy. In January 2018, the High-Level Expert 
Group (HLEG) on Sustainable Finance appointed by the European Commission in 2016 
published a final report with a series of recommendations on key priority actions to develop 
an EU sustainable financial strategy. Some of the priorities highlighted by the HLEG have been 
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Fiorella Salvucci, Head of Credit Risk - Corporate, Sovereign and Financial Institutions portfolio 
at Intesa Sanpaolo, email: fiorella.salvucci@intesasanpaolo.com; Fabio Garzaniti, Head of Internal Model Development Unit 
- Corporate, Sovereign and Financial Institutions portfolios at Intesa Sanpaolo, email: fabio.garzaniti@intesasanpaolo.com; 
Andrey Karpov, Credit Risk Model Developer – Credit Risk Department at Intesa Sanpaolo; Fabio Verachi, Enterprise Risk 
Manager – Enterprise Risk Department at Intesa Sanpaolo.  
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included in the 2018 European Commission’s Action Plan for Financing Sustainable Growth, 
which was launched in March 2018. 
With reference to financial markets, the European Commission aims at improving financial 
stability by integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors into the investment 
decision-making process. The environmental aspects, such as the mitigation of climate change 
and adaptation solutions in response to global warming are specially taken into consideration 
by the EU. In fact, the inclusion of ESG factors in the decision-making process of public and 
private institutions play a fundamental role in European Commission’s Action Plan.2 The EU 
Action Plan for Financing Sustainable Growth aims at: 
1. Redirecting capital flows towards sustainable investments, to achieve sustainable and 
inclusive growth; 
2. Managing financial risks deriving from climate change, resource depletion, 
environmental degradation and social issues; 
3. Promoting transparency and long-term vision in economic and financial activities. 
 ESG factors and governance improvements in the banking sector 
The contribution of the banking sector to sustainable economic growth will depend on the 
ability of banking institutions to adapt their business models to the new needs emerging from 
environmental transformations. Banca Intesa Sanpaolo, in order to assess its ability to 
compete on the market and to develop in balanced conditions its economic-financial assets, 
is trying to integrate the results of the financial statements with an articulated and complex 
series of qualitative information, such as the products and services offered, the markets of 
reference, the sector structure, the degree of competition, the trend in demand, the 
technology used, the corporate governance and the quality of management. 
The Board of Directors (BoD) and top management of Banca Intesa Sanpaolo take 
responsibility for promoting the risk culture and its inclusion in the strategy. Middle 
management is required to supervise the development of an adequate risk culture and create 
mechanisms for implementing the risk appetite. Following these principles, Intesa Sanpaolo is 
developing internal skills and a framework that would allow for the recognition of the ESG risks, 
thus adopting the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure 
(TCFD) as well as other provisions on sustainable finance (ESG, SDGs, EU Action Plan, etc.). The 
new competitive scenario, where the Bank operates, is generating a twofold effect: 
• On the one hand, regulation is becoming more intrusive (e.g., through the possible 
introduction of a capital requirement for the risks associated with climate and other 
environmental factors); 
• On the other hand, for some time now, the regulator has started to directly monitor 
the quality (viability and sustainability) of the banks’ business models (conduct, 
compliance, enterprise risk management models, corporate governance, etc.). 
                                                     
2 As an example, managers’ remuneration or the various incentives to protect stakeholder’s rights are tools aimed at 
guaranteeing the equality among the various interested parts of a company.  
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 The TCFD and its main implications on the Group Risk Appetite Framework 
In June 2017, following the publication of the final report of the TCFD recommendations, some 
gaps emerged that had to be filled in the context of the management of ESG risks. Regarding 
climate risks, the analysis showed that the BoD should define and describe the governance 
and culture of ESG risks. Furthermore, the governance of financial intermediaries should 
define the roles and responsibilities regarding the purpose of its monitoring and evaluation.3 
Intesa Sanpaolo is implementing this kind of guidelines. Indeed, the management 
responsibilities include the definition, approval and implementation of the overall business 
strategy and the related overall risk strategy. The Institution’s key policies, within the 
applicable legal and regulatory framework, include the risk appetite that must consider the 
benefits in the medium term and the solvency.4 
The BoD maintains direct responsibility of this topic. The information related to climate change 
is provided to the BoD at least once a year and it is considered in defining the strategy, risk 
management, business objectives and investment policies. In light of this analysis, Intesa 
Sanpaolo has created a task force focused on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the 
integration of ESG risks in the risk management framework, supporting the Risk Committee 
and the top management in its supervisory functions related to the monitoring of current and 
future overall risk strategy of the Bank. 
The intensification of these discussions requires an improvement in the relationship with other 
internal risk processes, especially with the risk appetite framework (RAF), Internal Capital 
Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP), stress test and strategic planning. In fact, it is well 
known that risk and capital planning are an indispensable and integral component of strategic 
planning and the related documentary outputs merge with the business plan.5 
Following the June 2017 TCFD recommendations, the key activities of the risk management 
department concern: 
• Identification, assessment and measurement of climatic risks (transition risk and 
physical risk) of the Bank; 
• Implementation, development and monitoring of a corporate-level risk governance 
framework, including risk culture, risk appetite and bank risk limits. 
Moreover, the Chief Risk Officer Area, has the new task of identifying, assessing, measuring, 
monitoring and adequately managing all the risks related to climate risk (both transition and 
physical risk), guaranteeing that the identification and evaluation are not based solely on 
qualitative information but also take into account quantitative aspects and results of internal 
models.6 
                                                     
3 The climate risk for finance in Italy, Report of the Working Group 3 of the Italian Observatory on sustainable finance, 4 
March 2019. 
4 This approach is described in the report of the CoSo Framework: Enterprise Risk Management, Applying enterprise risk 
management to environmental, social and governance-related risks in CoSo, February 2018. In addition, the functioning 
of the board in the management of ESG risks is also in line with the CONSOB Report "Non-Financial Information as a driver 
of transformation", published on 25 March 2018. 
5 See M. Baravelli, Sapienza University of Rome, M. Di Antonio, University of Genoa - The new regulatory model: how 
strategic planning changes in banks, Bancaria (2018). 
6 In the credit risk internal rating model, with reference to climate risk, the Bank utilizes a qualitative questionnaire to assess 
the exposure of socio-environmental risks as well as environmental certifications are taken into consideration. 
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Within the Chief Risk Officer Area, the Enterprise Risk Management Head Office Department 
is becoming more and more involved in the ESG risk management process. These recent 
evolutions envisage that ESG risks should be identified, analyzed and managed in an integrated 
and cross-view way, involving all corporate functions, and that risk logics also become part of 
strategic decision-making processes. Although there is a regulatory pressure for improving 
internal governance to oversight these risks, the integration process is slightly slow compared 
to what is expected by regulators, because of the poor data quality and of difficulties in 
modeling the scenarios and adopt changes in the risk models. 
In September 2019, the European Supervisory Authorities (European Banking Authority, EBA; 
European Securities and Markets Authority, ESMA; European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority, EIOPA) stressed in a joint report on “Risks and vulnerabilities in the EU 
financial system” that financial intermediaries should incorporate ESG risks and, in particular, 
climate risks in the risk governance framework.  
As a consequence, the Bank is even more committed to identifying, monitoring and 
incorporating these risks within its RAF. For instance, the calibration of the RAF metrics, the 
risk appetite, risk tolerance and risk capacity calibration activities are mainly addressed by the 
Enterprise Risk Management department which considers the analysis of the evolution of the 
business strategy, the prudential regulation and the stress scenarios, formulate the proposals 
to be submitted to the Board. In this context, particular attention is dedicated to 
methodologies and tools to model the Most Significant Transactions (MST): the priority is to 
evaluate ex ante the impact at least on the main RAF indicators of big tickets and to check, by 
using what if analysis, what risk position the Bank would put in place in case the transaction is 
actually implemented (compared to the RAF thresholds in force). Shortcomings in this sense 
can compromise the ability to critically evaluate the risk/return profile and understand the 
main profits drivers. 
The RAF is approved by the BoD and reviewed, for possible modifications, at least once a year. 
The Enterprise Risk Management function is strongly involved in its formulation as well as in 
the other already mentioned cross-functional processes (ICAAP and stress test). Furthermore, 
recent developments show that EU supervisors aim to review the Capital Requirements 
Regulation and Directive framework through a potential inclusion of ESG risks in the 
Supervisory Review Evaluation Process, including wider considerations on the second pillar 
such as risk management activities and stress tests. 
Regulators are encouraging financial institutions to take ESG factors into consideration in their 
analyses. In fact, the speed at which these changes are taking place (just think of the European 
Commission activism in giving substance to its Action Plan for Sustainable Finance) could 
underestimate the fact that the financial sector cannot yet fully guarantee an effective and 
appropriate climate risk management. These difficulties derive above all from the already 
mentioned lack of hypotheses, models and scenarios capable of generating a large number of 
detailed information to be summarized in significant key performance indicators and/or key 
risk indicators. 
2 Environmental Risk Analysis in a commercial bank: Intesa 
Sanpaolo’s approach 
Intesa Sanpaolo, a leading banking group in Italy in all the market segments, is aware of its 
significant impact on the social and environmental context, thus choosing to act not only on 
the basis of profit, but also with the aim of creating long-term value not only for the Bank’s 
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shareholder, but also for its employees, customers, the community as a whole and last but not 
least, the environment. 
Given both the macroeconomic scenario and the Group’s risk profile, the Intesa Sanpaolo risk 
management framework aims to achieve a complete and consistent overview of risks, by 
continuously improving the assessment and representation of the risk level of the Group’s 
activities and fostering a culture of risk-awareness. Proper risk management and control are 
essential conditions to ensure reliable and sustainable creation of value and protect the 
Group’s financial soundness and reputation. Therefore, with specific reference to the 
management of ESG risks, the Bank’s approach has been developed within the following 
streams: 
• Management of Intesa Sanpaolo’s direct exposure to ESG risks; 
• Identification and evaluation of business related ESG risks; 
• Evaluation of ESG linked business opportunities. 
Intesa Sanpaolo considers environment and, more specifically, climate change as a 
fundamental part of a wider management model of social and environmental strategy. To this 
end the Bank has joined important international initiatives and standards such as the United 
Nations Global Compact, the Principles on Responsible Banking of the United Nations 
Environment Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), the TCFD recommendations and CDP, aimed at 
promoting dialogue among firms, international organizations and society in general and to 
pursue with respect for the environment. Moreover, the Bank has developed and issued 
specific internal policies in this area (Group’s “Rules for the environmental and energy policy”). 
To address more specifically the management of its direct exposure and reduce its direct 
ecological footprint, Intesa Sanpaolo has developed a Climate Change Action Plan, applied 
technological innovations for the modernization of its buildings and introduced more energy-
efficient systems, promoted the purchase of electricity from renewable sources and has 
developed mobility management initiatives that reduce emissions due to commuting and 
business meetings. 
The identification and evaluation of business-related environmental risks at present is 
performed mainly through: 
• Risk clearing activities established within Intesa Sanpaolo’s Risk Management 
Framework aimed at granting a qualitative evaluation of ESG risks related to 
transactions, loans and counterparties belonging to sensitive sectors (e.g. mining, 
power & utilities); 
• The adoption of Equator Principles (EP) guidelines for the assessment of social and 
environmental risks for project finance; 
• Credit risk models that include “social” and “environmental” information in the 
qualitative and quantitative components of the corporate rating model (as discussed 
in the following sections). 
Risk clearing activities have a strong focus on evaluating environmental risks, currently dealing 
with: 
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• MSTs, as defined in the internal Guidelines for the Governance of the Group’s Most 
Significant Transactions; 
• Credit transactions with corporate clients, within the decision-making autonomy of 
the parent company; 
• New partnerships related to financial and non-financial initiatives; 
• Suppliers selections. 
The risk clearing activity includes the evaluation, in line with the EP guidelines, of the technical 
forms of project finance from US$10 million and project-related corporate loans from US$100 
million.  
The risk assessment is performed through a qualitative analysis of the operation and the 
counterparty, taking under considerations relevant items of the reputational dimensions. 
Special attention is given to the evaluation of the counterparty’s ESG risk profiles. The analysis 
is carried out by means of specialized info providers, public data, information gathered by the 
business functions that eventually propose further insights. The methodology (qualitative 
metrics) is tailored on the type of operation (e.g., credit transactions vs suppliers’ selection). 
The risk clearing structure issues an advisory opinion resulting from the risk assessment, which 
assigns to the operation/counterparty a risk class and contributes to the decision-making 
process, empowering the appropriate evaluation of this type of risks. The risk clearing activity 
is supported by the ongoing implementation of self-regulated policies for the assessment and 
management of the social and environmental risks in sensitive sectors. 
In order to strengthen its management of ESG risks and to ensure a constant and precautionary 
monitoring of possible changes to national and European regulations, Intesa Sanpaolo is 
presently involved in a number of international industry working groups on climate change 
issues. Furthermore, international studies show that climate change may also be a business 
opportunity. As an example, in order to achieve the EU’s climate and energy targets for 2030, 
the European Commission’s Action Plan on Sustainable Finance estimates supplementary 
investment of 180 billion euros per year. To this end, Intesa Sanpaolo is active in assisting its 
customers committed to reducing their environmental impact with green products and 
services.  
In light of the above, Intesa Sanpaolo issued its first Green Bond for 500 million euros in 2017 
and among the objectives of the 2018-2021 Business Plan, it included the support to the 
production system with an environmental perspective, with a specific plafond of up to 5 billion 
euros, aimed at companies which adopt a circular economy model. 
Finally, the current framework for the governance of ESG risks and opportunities will be further 
developed in line with Intesa Sanpaolo’s adhesion to TCFD and the ongoing EU regulatory 
developments in the field of sustainable finance and climate change risk. Key enhancements 
to be implemented will therefore include: 
• Consolidation and mapping of ESG risks to properly enrich ESG information available 
on counterparties/transactions and development of a common infrastructure (data 
and tools), thus enabling and supporting reporting, strategic planning and decision-
making processes; 
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• Widening of the scope of the ESG risk clearing activities and strengthening of climate 
change risk evaluation within the decision-making process; 
• Further enhancement of the ESG governance framework (e.g. RAF, roles and 
responsibilities). 
3 ESG assessment in credit risk models 
 
 Internal ratings for the corporate portfolio  
The analysis of ESG risk factors in credit risk models is an important element in the overall risk 
management framework and their relevance is bound to assume an increasing importance in 
the years to come. At the beginning of 2009, with the introduction of the first foundation 
internal ratings-based approach (FIRB) corporate rating models, the evaluation of ESG risk 
factors was incorporated by Intesa Sanpaolo in the “qualitative” component of the PD models. 
Given the absence of readily available ESG data at the time (both at counterparty and 
aggregated level) that could be used to statistically analyze the robustness of correlation with 
credit risk, the ESG risks were incorporated in the rating models through a set of specific 
questions to be answered in the qualitative assessment section. Rating analysts had to fill the 
questionnaire during the rating attribution process, based on expert judgment and specific 
guidelines. The latter were necessary in order to render the answers based on specialist 
evaluation homogeneous across different assessments. 
A practical consequence of this choice was that all the answers provided by the rating analysts 
could be stored in order to accumulate a sufficiently long time series of ESG risk factors 
assessments. Indeed, as mentioned before, one of the major challenges in ESG risks analysis 
is data availability: it could be difficult to observe an actual correlation with the corporate 
defaults in the past and the available data could be insufficient to produce robust conclusions. 
Unexpectedly, it is possible that the most environmentally unsustainable corporates, from the 
environmental point of view, have always been the best payers, given their high profitability.  
Among the other sources of uncertainty was the absence of a clear and uniformly 
acknowledged taxonomy to identify which corporates can be defined “green” and which are 
certainly “environmentally unsustainable”, as well as to the level with respect to which the 
ESG risks should be assessed (e.g., counterparty vs. asset/loan level). Moreover, some ESG 
risks could be more relevant for large corporates with sophisticated business structure 
covering multiple economic sectors and industries. Therefore, the same counterparty could 
be simultaneously considered “green” and “environmentally unsustainable”, depending on 
the branch of business under evaluation. At the same time, the corporate credit risk models 
are usually developed at counterparty level. As a consequence, the statistical analysis based 
on historical perspective could be potentially biased and not representative of the future 
dynamics However, the analysis of default rates behavior for each answer to the relevant 
question could give a first insight on the correlation of the ESG risks with the credit risk of a 
certain counterparty. 
Even though the qualitative questionnaire is considered to be an auxiliary element in the 
overall evaluation of the creditworthiness of corporate obligors (the main sources of credit 
risk assessment is balance sheet and internal/external behavioral information), it is essential 
for a correct and comprehensive analysis of all the characteristics of a certain counterparty 
that cannot be deduced from financial data and other traditionally used information. 
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One of such examples is the exposure to ESG risk factors that could influence in a relevant way 
the capability of a certain obligor to pay his debt in a duly manner: 
• Environmental credit issues:7 (i) transition risks can impact, for example, the utilities, 
carbon-intensive industries and transportation sectors, as they could be affected by 
tightening emissions regulation; (ii) physical risks, such as damage to hydroelectric 
power stations and gas pipelines, as well as oil spills and disruptions from extreme 
weather events, are more common for the sectors dependent on natural resources, 
including land and water, and the industries with a high level of fixed assets (e.g. 
energy generation, materials and buildings, agriculture and forestry enterprises); 
• Social credit issues: demographic and health-related shifts in consumer preferences 
and regulation could affect the performance of the food, beverage and tobacco 
sectors, while the tightening of the healthcare regulation could affect the drug pricing 
in the pharmaceuticals industry; 
• Governance credit issues: risks deriving from lawsuits, tax litigations, social security 
and environmental disputes, incidents of alleged corruption, fraud and other 
violations, management structure stability and general governance issues. 
In order to evaluate the correlation between a given risk factor and the risk of default, a time 
series of historically registered data is needed. When available, a traditional estimation 
approach can be applied to study the discriminatory power of ESG risk factors. This means that 
you should analyze different sets of information collected at a given point in time (T) and 
connect them to the observed default frequency over the next period (usually equal to 12 
months, between T and T+1). The data collected by mean of qualitative questionnaire can be 
used for this purpose. 
An example of the application of the above approach with respect to the answers to the 
question about the exposure of corporate counterparties to social and environmental is shown 
in Table 10-1. Notice, that the answers “b” and “c” (there exists a certain exposure to 
social/environmental risks in terms of harmful substances emission, negative environmental 
impact, job safety issues, respect of human rights etc.) show a higher riskiness, as the default 
rates observed for these answers are higher than the portfolio average. 
 
                                                     
7 For additional reference, see “Implementing the Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures” by TCFD, June 2017. 
 
Integration of Climate Change Risk within RAF and ESG Assessment in Credit Risk Models  
169 
Table 10-1 Question about the exposure to social/environmental risks – Default 
rates distribution 
Question - Exposure to social/environmental risks 
% Population 
distribution 
% Index of 
riskiness8 
a) No exposure 59% 96% 
b) Yes, but the company operates in compliance 
with the regulations by adopting forms of 
protection  
39% 104% 
c) Yes, potential social/environmental risks 2% 132% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
 Environmental certifications and implications on riskiness 
The subsequent corporate rating models releases occurred in 2010 (transition to AIRB 
approach) and in 2014, highlighted a satisfactory predictive ability of the risk drivers aimed at 
assessing ESG risks: all the previous qualitative questions were confirmed in terms of their 
statistical significance, based on the time series of observed default rates. 
Given the ever-rising worldwide awareness of the importance of ESG risks evaluation in 
general and climate change risks analysis in particular, the last change of the corporate rating 
models in April 2017 was accompanied with further enhancement of the above risks 
evaluation. In addition to some new questions added to the qualitative questionnaire, the 
social and environmental information analysis was included for the first time into the 
quantitative section of the model.  
Regarding the new questions, the presence of business interruption or credit payment 
insurance against negative events, that could hinder the obligor’s solvency and the continuity 
of business activity enriches the qualitative questionnaire to be compiled by a rating analyst. 
In particular, the presence of an insurance against catastrophic events (wildfire, earthquakes, 
floods etc.) could be considered as a mitigating factor protecting the obligor against physical 
risks. 
As for the quantitative section, the presence/absence of certain certificates (quality, 
environmental, occupational health, information security etc.) was included as an 
independent risk driver into the regression model, aimed at predicting the default target 
variable. The regression parameters were then estimated on the time series of annual data, 
where at each reference date T the presence of certificates was indicated at counterparty level. 
Table 10-2 shows the default rates distribution observed during the model estimation sample. 
Note that the presence of each type of certification is associated to a lower riskiness. 
                                                     
8 The observed level of risk is expressed in terms of an index number with respect to the 100% base set equal to the average 
portfolio default rate. 
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Table 10-2 Presence of environmental certificates – default rates distribution 
Certification ISO 140009 % Population distribution % Index of riskiness 
No 97% 101% 
Yes 3% 62% 
Total 100% 100% 
   
EMAS10 Distribution % % Index of riskiness 
No 99.7% 100% 
Yes 0.3% 71% 
Total 100% 100% 
   
FSC 11 Distribution % % Index of riskiness 
No 99% 100% 
Yes 1% 64% 
Total 100% 100% 
   
Organic Certification 12 Distribution % % Index of riskiness 
No 98% 101% 
Yes 2% 63% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Finally, it’s worth to underline that in general the possibility to include some risk factors into 
the rating model through a quantitative approach is highly dependent on the availability of 
data and of a representative sample: these are essential for the estimation of the relationship 
of hypothetical risk drivers with a given target variable, as well as for the analysis of the 
correlation intensity in terms of discriminatory power. A qualitative approach can be used 
instead as a data collection instrument, which is fundamental during the transition towards 
the quantitative approach. Moreover, the collected data can be also used for an ex-post 
validation of the judgmentally assigned factor weights, eventually adjusting the initial 
assumptions. 
As for the future developments, the Intesa Sanpaolo Group is going to further reinforce the 
risk management practices on ESG and climate related issues, in line with the European 
Commission’s Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth, as well as with EBA’s initial policy 
recommendations that are currently under development. Using the accumulated historical 
experience, the Group is committed to enhance climate risk awareness and to guarantee 
sound risk management practices on climate related issues in order to reduce the potential 
impact of climate change implications and to protect its reputation, its business and its 
investors. The climate change risk analysis is being incorporated in its risk management 
framework, with particular reference to credit risk and reputational risk, while the climate 
change sensitive exposures monitoring of credit portfolio is being included in the RAF 
                                                     
9 Certification ISO 14001 is a certification of a family of standards related to environmental management that exists to help 
organizations minimize how their operations negatively affect the environment (energy efficiency, efficiency in the use of 
materials and water, correct management of waste, emissions etc.). 
10 EMAS is the EU’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme. It is similar to ISO 14001, but considered by some analysts to be 
more rigorous. 
11 FSC (Forest Stewardship Council): certification concerning the purchase of forest products of which we know the origin 
and good management on an environmental level. It is used by companies in the wood / paper / furniture industry. 
12 Organic certification: specific certifications on cultivation methods (in the case of farms) or the origin of the raw material 
(in the case of food companies). 
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framework, in order to integrate the long-term time horizon dimension and ESG analysis in the 
business relationships with corporates. 
This would also allow to play an important role to raise awareness amongst corporates about 
long-term challenges and incentivize them to increase the shift towards sustainable business 
models. 
In order to guarantee a prudent management of risks and opportunities connected to climate 
change, the introduction of elements connected to climate change within the RFA is being 
analyzed. 
With regard to the credit risk models, a set of new ESG risk drivers (suggested by the ever-
enriching methodological literature and the industry best practices) will be tested in a 
regression analysis framework in order to study their correlation with the default event in 
terms of discriminatory power. Based on statistical evidence, the introduction of a stand-alone 
ESG scorecard within the rating model will be considered. 
4 Conclusion 
As described in this chapter, Intesa Sanpaolo aims at creating a climate-conscious culture to 
minimize the potential impact of climate change. To guarantee a healthy and prudent 
management of risks and opportunities connected to this topic, we are integrating climate 
change risk considerations into the RAF. 
The perimeter definition of the ESG area relevant sectors must also be accompanied by a 
coherent integration of the information set available, especially with regards to counterparties 
subject to evaluation and monitoring. Therefore, a specific analysis aimed at classifying 
corporate counterparties in terms of belonging to some specific sectors should be carried out. 
This assessment of reputational/ESG/climate change risks is particularly useful in order to: 
• Allow monitoring of exposure to these sectors; 
• Integrate the counterparty reputational, ESG and climate change risk estimation 
activities in the cross-functional internal processes. 
These short considerations highlight the importance of these first piloting evaluations, which 
must be followed by other relevant developments, especially in terms of external disclosure 
and in the context of the adoption and application of ESG policies. With this aim, the Bank 
launched an inter-functional working group that is in charge for the design of the reference 
framework and the information/process solution to be implemented. 
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 Quantifying Value Impairment through 
Transition Risk Analysis 
 
By 
Vivid Economics1 
Abstract 
Vivid’s Climate Risk Toolkit uses climate scenario analysis to quantify the transition risks 
associated with different climate policy pathways, in line with TCFD recommendations. These 
estimates can inform financial institutions’ investment decision making and help align strategic 
decisions with the expected state of climate policy. As climate risks become increasingly 
apparent, the use of climate scenario analysis in supporting investors’ decisions will become 
more valuable. By quantifying the impacts associated with climate change transition risk, our 
methodology can guide investment decisions in the coming period of uncertainty.  
Keywords: scenario analysis, transition risk, financial value impairment, TCFD 
recommendations, asset-level modelling, quantitative analysis, climate change 
1 Introduction  
In holding large portfolios, most institutional investors face exposure to climate-related risk 
across sectors, geographies and financial instruments, while at the same time financing the 
development of the real economy. The longer time horizons of their asset and liability 
management, as well as their exposure to equity and debt, further highlight the importance 
of considering climate change in strategic decisions. However, the extent of investors’ 
exposure to climate change can be particularly difficult to assess given the size and 
diversification of their portfolios. 
Vivid’s methodology quantifies the value impairment and risk impacts of different climate 
scenarios on a range of financial assets. The climate risk toolkit can quantify impacts on 
financial assets under different climate scenarios and provides a clear narrative as to the 
drivers of these impacts. This information can inform investors and regulators of the exposure 
of various portfolios and individual assets to the transition risk associated with these climate 
scenarios.  
2 Methodology 
Our climate risk toolkit consists of four key modelling components, as detailed in Figure 11-1: 
1) Scenario pathway The scenario modelling component produces the transition risk 
narrative to be explored and translates this into scenario outputs through modelling.  
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by authors: Josh Cowley, Economist, email: josh.cowley@vivideconomics.com; Jason Eis, 
Executive Director, email: jason.eis@vivideconomics.com; Thomas Nielsen, Engagement Manager, email: 
thomas.nielsen@vivideconomics.com.  
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2) Economic shocks The economic shock modelling component translates outputs from 
the scenario modelling stage into real economic shocks, the impact of which can then 
be quantified in the asset modelling component. Shocks are divided into two types: 
direct and indirect. Direct shocks are those that inflict immediate costs on companies, 
while indirect shocks affect companies streams through secondary channels, such as 
changes in demand for a company’s products. 
3) Asset value streams The asset value streams component quantifies the annual value 
stream impacts of identified shocks on financial assets. It does so by first examining 
financial asset exposure to shocks, for example, through the markets in which 
companies are currently active. The next step is then to model company actions in 
response to shocks, such as implementation of abatement opportunities. Finally, 
competition dynamics such as exit, or costs pass through to consumers is modelled 
by considering relative exposure and action across the market. 
4) Financial impacts This final modelling component consolidates annual impacts from 
the asset-level modelling into valuation impacts. The asset-level modelling is 
consistent across all asset classes, but there are differences in financial modelling 
across asset classes. Financial modelling generally follows a discounted cash flow 
approach with additional elements for some asset classes. 
This chapter describes the four modelling components and is structured accordingly. 
Figure 11-1 The Net-Zero Toolkit consists of four modelling components 
 
Source: Vivid Economics 
 
 Scenario pathways 
Climate scenarios are plausible, distinctive, consistent, challenging and relevant descriptions 
of future outcomes that should enable investors to better understand how investments might 
perform under different climate policy pathways. Thus, scenarios need to present a range of 
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possible outcomes across key risk and opportunity factors, covering a variety of alternative 
plausible future states under a given set of assumptions and constraints.  
To ensure comparability across scenarios, they depend on a consistent set of inputs to convert 
to outputs (Table 11-1). Climate risk scenarios must define inputs such as climate policy 
stringency and timing, and the potential for abatement associated with various low-carbon 
technologies in a consistent way. In addition, parameters which are consistent across scenarios 
such as GDP projections, population growth and current policies will affect scenario outputs.  
Table 11-1 Key inputs required for transition risk scenario modelling 
Inputs Description 
Climate policy stringency Regional carbon budgets over time 
Policy timing Year of climate policy introduction and rate of 
increase in stringency 
Changes in relative technology costs Changes in abatement costs based on feasible 
technological improvements 
Behavioural change parameters Changes in demand for existing goods and ease 
of adoption for key goods such as heating and 
beef 
Baseline economic parameters (constant 
across scenarios) 
GDP, population, current CO2 emissions and 
climate policies 
Source: Vivid Economics  
 
Vivid’s methodology can incorporate a wide range of publicly available scenarios. Any 
publicly available scenario providing the scenario outputs listed in Table 11-2 can be used. For 
example, these include the 1.5°C scenarios underpinning the IPCC’s Special Report on Global 
Warming of 1.5°C hosted by the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA).2 
The scenarios in this database cover some of the key dimensions of uncertainty, including level 
of warming, emissions overshoot, and socioeconomic assumptions through different Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP).  
At the same time, Vivid’s ability to design and incorporate bespoke scenarios can be useful for 
generating valuation impacts that are transparent and aligned with investors’ own views on 
transition risk. Publicly available scenarios may require taking on assumptions that may be 
unclear or at odds with investors’ views of climate action. Bespoke scenario design allows 
control over the underlying assumptions and full alignment between an internal view of 
climate risks and the scenario modelled. For example, Vivid constructed the Forecast Policy 
Scenario (FPS) under the IPR project, which aligned with a disorderly transition of climate 
policy – this is detailed further in Section 0. 
Vivid Economics’ scenario design starts with a set of core factors underpinning each climate 
change scenario, which our scenario modelling then uses to estimate key economic and energy 
                                                     
2 IAMC 1.5°C Scenario Explorer hosted by IIASA (release 2.0)  
https://vivideconomics.sharepoint.com/:p:/s/projects/190703CPP/ESW_9U3EzLVPoiG8VKXlw0QBzt7LoqPcHXE-
P4srZC9oyQ?e=vkgBwh  
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system variables. To describe plausible future pathways, scenarios are consistently based on 
the set of inputs outlined in Table 11-1 that can be translated into the outputs required to 
conduct asset-level analysis. 
Transition risk scenario modelling estimates key economic and energy system variables across 
each scenario, through energy systems modelling. A high-level summary of the scenario 
modelling approach is shown in Figure 11-2 below. Vivid Economics uses integrated 
assessment modelling (IAM) – incorporating both energy and land-use systems – to translate 
the assumptions under each low-carbon transition scenario into key economic variables.  
Figure 11-2  Overview of the scenario modelling process  
 
Source: Vivid Economics 
 
The integrated assessment modelling produces a series of outputs which are used in the 
economic shocks component. The scenario outputs used to assess firm level outcomes in the 
asset value stream methodology are detailed in Table 11-2. 
Table 11-2 Example outputs required from transition risk scenario modelling 
Output Example 
Implicit carbon price pathways Carbon price values implied by climate policy 
action (annual, to 2050) 
Gross power capacity additions and 
total generation and storage 
Deployment of renewable energy by technology 
(annual, to 2050) 
Fossil fuel and other commodities 
demand 
Demand for oil, gas and coal (annual, to 2050) 
Demand for energy and land-related 
end-use technologies 
Capacity additions (new sales) of all major road 
transport vehicles by type (annual, to 2050) 
Source: Vivid Economics  
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 Economic shocks 
The economic shock modelling component translates scenario outputs into shocks on the real 
economy, the impact of which can then be quantified in the asset value streams modelling 
component. Shocks are divided into two types: direct, which affect asset value streams 
through a company’s operations or costs, and indirect, which affect asset value streams 
through changes in demand for a company’s products. 
The primary direct shock to assets from transition risk is implicit carbon pricing. Implicit 
carbon prices – which include carbon taxes, market-based carbon prices or the cost of 
complying with other climate change regulations – represent a significant cost shock for 
emissions intensive companies. Whether prices are imposed through carbon taxes, ETS, clean 
technology subsidies, or other policy mechanisms, they can be summarized by a single carbon 
price signal. This price then assigns a cost to the company’s emissions and to its carbon-
intensive inputs. 
Low carbon transition scenarios also produce indirect shocks through changes in demand for 
a company’s products and resulting changes in commodity prices. Climate policy pricing 
emissions and technology shifts make low carbon products less costly for consumers 
compared to products with high emissions intensities, affecting demand in both types of 
markets. As a result, while demand for fossil fuels, which are emissions intensive in use, is 
expected to decline, demand for clean technology alternatives (like renewables) or green 
commodities (like lithium) is expected to grow. These changes in demand will affect prices for 
products in these markets. 
Vivid’s methodology supplements scenario outputs on demand contractions with modelling 
of commodity price changes, as these will determine which assets different companies 
continue to operate. For example, climate policies such as implicit carbon pricing raise the 
costs associated with consuming a barrel of oil, tonne of coal or cubic metre of natural gas. 
Vivid’s methodology finds the new global price faced by suppliers using the global supply curve 
for each fossil fuel, mineral, manufacturing and downstream sectors, such as vehicle 
production or petroleum refining.  
3 Asset value streams 
The asset-level modelling component calculates the impacts of the economic shocks on 
assets. This component identifies asset exposure to each of the direct and indirect shocks, and 
then assesses what actions companies will take to mitigate exposure. Exposure depends on 
what markets a company is active in, as well as company emissions intensity, while response 
depends on available abatement options. Finally, dynamic competition takes the exposure and 
response modules as inputs and calculates the equilibrium outcome on firms within each 
market. 
 Company exposure 
The exposure of financial assets to market level risks is identified through financial data on 
revenue flows. Asset-level modelling is implemented at the business segment level, based on 
individual markets. Companies in the model can operate in several markets, with exposure 
estimated based on company segmentation. 
Carbon cost exposure is calculated using asset-level emissions data. The direct cost burden 
from transition risk can be quantified for individual assets using scope 1, while scope 2 and 3 
emissions capture indirect cost burdens. Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions from owned 
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or operationally controlled sources, while scope 2 & scope 3 emissions are supply chain 
emissions, including purchased energy and materials.  
In addition, demand-side impacts for transition-sensitive sectors are modelled in additional 
detail. Transition-sensitive sectors are those which are expected to experience significant 
indirect impacts from transition risk. For example, demand destruction in the oil sector 
associated with climate policy, and demand creation for low-carbon markets such as EV 
production is calculated based on scenario modelling outputs.  
 Company action 
The action component models company response to risk exposure that is independent of 
their competitors’ actions. Vivid’s ‘action’ modelling component focuses on company 
responses that are independent of competitors’ actions. Independently of competitors, 
companies can realise effective abatement opportunities to reduce emissions and exposure 
to direct carbon costs.  
The direct carbon pricing impact of transition risk will lead firms to consider which abatement 
options are available to reduce the cost burden. Vivid’s abatement cost database is sufficiently 
granular to differentiate between abatement potential and cost.  
Vivid’s competition modelling component examines the interplay between exposure and 
action in the context of the market. This involves aggregating direct and indirect impacts on 
each company and examining what costs companies can pass through to consumers.  
The combination of cost estimates from transition risk modelling and cost pass-through rates 
is used to estimate secondary changes in market demand and firm-level profit margin changes. 
These results are then used to estimate the final impacts on firm-level profits. Market share 
across firms will adjust, and company revenues, profits and emissions are estimated after such 
adjustments. 
4 Financial impacts 
Cashflow estimates from asset modelling are discounted to net present value (NPV) terms to 
estimate financial valuation impacts as illustrated in Figure 11-3. This fundamental approach 
forms the basis of valuation calculations for each asset class, which ensures comparability 
across results by asset class. There are some additional asset class specific modelling steps 
required for fixed income and real assets. This section outlines the specific approaches for 
equities, fixed income assets, and real estate and infrastructure, while the case study details 
some results from the Inevitable Policy Response (IPR) project which followed this 
methodology. 
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Figure 11-3  Discounted Cash Flow modelling is used to translate annual profit 
impacts into changes in current valuation 
 
Source: Vivid Economics 
 
 Equities 
The net present value (NPV) of firm profits is used to measure value impairment for equities. 
The asset-level modelling produces annual cashflow estimates under each climate scenario. 
These cash flows are then aggregated to the company level and discounted back to net present 
value (NPV) terms. The model uses company-level discount rates if available, or standard 
discount rates otherwise. Value impairment for an equity under each scenario is defined as 
the percentage of change in NPV profits compared to the chosen reference scenario which is 
assumed to be ‘priced in’ to the current valuation of the equity.  
 Corporate debt 
Corporate debt impacts are estimated by translating changes in equity valuations to changes 
in fixed income instrument default risk. Historical data on expected mortality loss rates by 
credit rating through time is combined with changes in credit ratings under each transition 
scenario compared to the reference scenario. Results can be calculated for all publicly listed 
bond instruments currently outstanding (data permitting). 
The corporate debt modelling approach is summarized in Figure 11-4. Changes in future cash 
flows calculated from the value stream modelling are converted into estimates on default risks, 
which are considered through the lens of credit rating changes. The impact on default risk are 
translated into a new security valuation through the standard bond valuation model. 
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Figure 11-4  Corporate debt modelling summary 
 
Source: Vivid Economics 
 
 Real estate and infrastructure 
Value impairment for real estate and infrastructure is assessed using a common methodology. 
This section sets out the approach based on real estate, with key differences for infrastructure 
outlined where relevant. The approach for real assets is also based on a discounted cash flow 
approach, with some conceptual adjustments. The relevant asset-level modelling elements for 
real estate and infrastructure are exposure to direct carbon costs, as well as the owners’ 
response in terms of abatement. Vivid’s modelling is flexible to incorporating more asset-level 
data where available in specific markets or for specific portfolios.  
The competition modelling for real assets determines the share of total costs that can be 
abated or passed through to tenants or consumers. The share of costs from direct transition 
risk impacts that is passed through to tenants is modelled using the cost pass through 
modelling described above. Infrastructure cost pass through rates vary by sector and region, 
depending on the availability of alternative assets. For some large infrastructure assets with 
clearly identifiable sources of demand, changes in demand are estimated based on changes in 
underlying gas demand and increases in pipeline costs. 
The real estate modelling approach is summarized in Figure 11-5. Value impairment for real 
estate under each scenario is defined as the % change in NPV of scenario rental profits 
compared to the reference scenario, which is assumed to be ‘priced in’ to the current valuation. 
The approach for infrastructure is the same, except with cost pass through based on the 
dynamic between infrastructure owners and consumers rather than owners and tenants in 
real estate. 
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Figure 11-5  Real estate modelling summary 
 
Source: Vivid Economics 
 
 Case study – Inevitable Policy Response (IPR) 
The IPR project defined a Forecast Policy Scenario (FPS) which is consistent with a disorderly 
transition.3 The FPS defines a series of policy actions that are likely to occur in the period to 
2050 as the realities of climate change become clear, and pressure on governments from all 
angles increase. The disorderly nature of the scenario means that the macro and sector level 
impacts of policy forecasts take effect around the time of a 2025 ‘ratchet’ on policy stringency. 
While the impact on current value is modest in percentage terms, it implies that $1.6 trillion 
(over half of UK GDP) would be wiped off the MSCI ACWI (Figure 11-6). The total negative 
impact of the FPS is 3.1% of the current index value. Broken out by value stream, demand 
destruction for transition-sensitive sectors such fossil fuels and ICEs reduce index value by 
2.8%. This is offset somewhat by growth in demand for renewables, EVs and other cleantech, 
which increases index value by 1%. The remaining 1.2% reduction is attributed to costs from 
carbon pricing and associated competition impacts. 
                                                     
3 For more information on the design of the IPR scenario, see https://www.unpri.org/inevitable-policy-response/what-is-
the-inevitable-policy-response/4787.article 
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Figure 11-6  A revaluation of the MSCI ACWI in line with the FPS today would 
remove $1.6trn from the index 
 
Source: Vivid Economics; *carbon revenues from the World Bank’s State and Trends 
of Carbon Pricing 2019 
Note: Asset impacts assume an immediate revaluation based on the FPS. 
 
The bottom 10% of companies suffer from carbon costs and experience demand destruction 
under the FPS, while top companies experience demand creation and benefit from a carbon 
cost advantage. Poor performers tend to have high emissions intensity relative to the markets 
they are active in, increasing their direct carbon costs. In addition, many poor performers have 
substantial fossil fuel revenues which are impacted by demand reductions and price impacts 
under the FPS. Conversely, top performers have limited exposure to fossil fuels, and benefit 
from demand creation in markets such as EVs. These companies also gain an advantage under 
carbon costs due to their low emissions intensities, which means the benefits of higher market 
prices outweigh the carbon costs they are exposed to. 
Figure 11-7 Impacts for the top and bottom performers within the index are driven 
by different value streams 
 
Source: Vivid Economics 
 
At a sectoral level, there is significant variation both across groups and within them, 
highlighting the range of potential winners and losers under the FPS (Figure 11-8). Some 
primary sectors such as energy are overwhelmingly negatively affected, with mean company 
valuations in the sector falling 33%. Other sectors face wider variation. For example, electric 
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utilities with the strongest renewables strategy could see valuation double (104 percent), 
while laggards could see valuations fall by two-thirds (-66 percent). 
Figure 11-8 Within-sector variation can be significant, particularly for the most 
impacted sectors in the index 
 
Source: Vivid Economics 
Note: Error bars indicate the 10th and 90th percentiles of companies in each sector. 
Detailed results on the IPR asset impacts are available on the Principles for 
Responsible Investment website. 
5 Limitations & areas for development 
While the Climate risk toolkit can be used to assess risk for a wide range of asset classes and 
at a high level of granularity, there remains some outstanding developments that will improve 
the level of analysis offered in the future. Some limitations of the current approach to scenario 
analysis are outlined below. 
• The baseline scenario selected directly impacts the magnitude of results under the 
policy scenario. Selecting a baseline scenario requires an implicit assumption on the 
current level of policy and technical developments, which directly affects results. 
While our approach offers the choice between a BAU scenario that reflects current 
policy announcements or a scenario which continues historical trends, there is 
currently no widely accepted baseline scenario. 
• The methodology limits interactions between physical and transition risks. The 
climate risk toolkit has developed to be capable of analyzing physical risks alongside 
transition risks since the IPR project. However, there could be further interaction 
between the physical and transition effects in future renditions of the climate risk 
toolkit. 
• A focus on listed equities means some sectors and regions are underrepresented 
in results. Analysis focuses on listed equities and the sectors and regions these 
represent. This means not all risks are captured as many fossil fuel producers are not 
listed, such as Middle Eastern national oil companies. In addition, while Europe and 
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the US are well represented due to a high level of listed equities, there are fewer 
Chinese equities listed for example. This can be overcome if private equity 
information is incorporated for a desired region or sector. 
6 Conclusion 
Climate scenario analysis can inform financial institutions’ investment decisions and help align 
strategic decisions with the expected state of climate policy. As climate risks become 
increasingly apparent, the use of climate scenario analysis in supporting investors’ decisions 
will become ever more valuable. By quantifying the impacts associated with climate change 
transition risk, our methodology can guide investment decisions in the coming period of 
uncertainty.
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 Financial Climate-related Transition Risks: 
Integrated Assessment Across the Finance and 
Investment Universe 
 
By 
Dr. Nicole Röttmer1 
PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft, Germany 
Abstract 
Financial institutions are facing a potentially significant disruption in the real economy, 
reflecting on their balance sheets, business models, and portfolios. Quickly understanding and 
integrating this understanding of potential regulatory, market, and technology dynamics into 
standard operating procedures is key for smoothly managing potential risks and capturing the 
arising opportunities. This chapter outlines a pathway for capturing the key risk and 
opportunity drivers at the right level of detail, and for integrating them across institution types, 
functions and in specific roles.  
Keywords: transition, risk, opportunity, climate excellence, investment, banking, insurance, 
real estate, project finance, risk management, analyst, portfolio management 
1 Purpose and approach  
 Why to leverage scenario analysis?  
The climate transition the world might undergo to limit global warming will test the resilience 
of business models, while at the same time creating significant potential for value. Increasing 
awareness of the potential impact of the transition is fostering regulator, supervisor and 
stakeholder attention, and insufficient action and communication by financial institutions 
might reflect on their license to operate.  
Scenario analysis is a method of choice when historical trends and datasets can no longer be 
used to accurately forecast the future (e.g. in the case of accelerating or disruptive change, as 
in a climate transformation), and effects are likely to play out over the medium to long term. 
Scenario analysis is a powerful tool, enabling users to directly understand the impact of climate 
change on sectors, specific companies, or even entire portfolios. Per scenario, it allows for the 
modelling of a variety of impacts that can be interrelated and interact positively or negatively 
with one another. For example, it not only connects changes in oil demand from the 
automotive industry (resulting from the introduction of more electric vehicles) with impacts 
on oil prices and refinery performance, but also with the impact on demand for renewable 
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Dr. Nicole Röttmer, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft 
GmbH Germany, email: Nicole.Roettmer@pwc.com. 
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power generation and the potential for alternative fuels to boost financial performance in 
other sectors. 
 
Infobox Scenario: "A scenario describes a development path that leads to a specific result. 
[...] It should be noted that scenarios are hypothetical constructs; they are not forecasts or 
predictions, nor are they sensitivity analyses "(TCFD, 2017d). Scenarios describe 
conceivable, inherently consistent future worlds instead of, for example, a change in 
individual parameters such as an interest rate. In simple terms, a scenario is a consistent 
series of "what-if" questions. 
 
Due to these characteristics, scenario analysis can deliver valuable insights to any user 
interested in learning about the potential impact of climate-related risks and opportunities on 
their own performance, from an investor curious about how a portfolio of investments would 
perform under the assumptions of climate change, to an insurance company striving to 
understand the impact of climate-related risks on their policies and their business. Its insights 
inform risk management and link well with upcoming supervisory stress-tests, as 
demonstrated for example by the launch of market-wide insurance climate stress tests in early 
2019 by the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) in the United Kingdom.2  
An example by The CO-Firm and Kepler Cheuvreux illustrates, why this scenario view might 
extend our current understanding of risks and opportunities. Their research shows that under 
the 2°C and 2.7°C climate pathways (scenarios, for the sake of easy understanding) by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) 3 , companies today might be significantly over- or 
undervalued (Figure 12-1).4 Capital markets thus might not fully account for them yet(The CO-
Firm & Kepler Cheuvreux, 2018c, p. 36). 
                                                     
2  Bank of England, Prudential Regulatory Authority (2019) Insurance Stress Test 2019, 18.06.2019. See 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/letter/2019/insurance-stress-test-
2019.pdf?la=en&hash=2F9F25800465DFF2AFA24C5C230D8ADCE6BA5810  
3 The Scenarios that form the basis for the assessment of climate-related risks build on 1) the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) and 2) the IEA World Energy Outlook (WEO). The ETP 2017 2°C Scenario (2DS) 
and the WEO 2016 450 Scenario form the basis for the 2°C scenario. The ETP 2017 Reference Technology Scenario (RTS) 
and the WEO 2018 New Policies Scenario (NPS) – once available – form the basis for the 2.7°C Scenario. 
4 For an analysis of the automotive, steel and electric utility sectors, please refer to publications of the CO-firm. (The CO-
Firm & Kepler Cheuvreux, 2018b, 2018c, 2018). 
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Figure 12-1 Illustrative steel company valuation impact in a 2°C and a 2.7°C 
scenario, assuming an average adaptation (Market) as well as “beating the 
marking” (Beat-the-market) relative to a consensus baseline(The CO-Firm & Kepler 
Cheuvreux, 2018d) 
 
 
Thus, scenario analyses can support existing risk, financing, investment, or underwriting 
processes by answering the following questions: 
• How material are climate-related risks, i.e., to what extent do they affect the financial 
performance of investments, products, companies, sectors and countries? 
• What drives climate-related risks and opportunities, i.e., changing energy prices, 
competitive new technologies, changing demand patterns?  
• What do I need to believe for these risks and opportunities to materialize? I.e., will 
oil heating be prohibited, do synthetic fuels enter the market at reasonable cost, or 
will the renewable build-out take place? 
• How resilient is my portfolio, and potentially the companies’ business lines and 
projects, given the potential to strategically adapt (technology investments, product 
or value chain changes)? 
Such findings can be used by different groups of actors within financial institutions, for a 
variety of purposes. Some examples are to support the selection of financing or investment 
objects, to validate risk parameters and modelling, to adjust portfolio or fund allocation, to 
focus exposure to companies according to their risk, and to support reporting (Röttmer, 2018, 
pp. 269-282). 
 Why think about a fundamental modelling logic for climate transition risks? 
Scenarios allow for capturing interdependent sector dynamics, such as the impact of an 
electrification of cars on electricity demand, housing infrastructure, the oil market, input 
prices for the chemical industry and so on. Only a fundamental analysis allows for capturing 
these effects, as the following example illustrates:  
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There is a widespread belief that the climate transition risks and opportunities can largely be 
described through carbon prices. However, this is not reflecting the fundamental changes in 
the economy that will – in an interdependent manner – influence demand, technology cost 
curves, resource availability, etc. Figure 12-2 provides an example, illustrating the global 
revenue of three large electric utility companies under a under possible 2.0°C climate scenario. 
Despite their comparable size in terms of power generation capacity, the three companies 
have significantly different carbon footprints. The company with the lowest footprint shows 
the lowest revenue growth potential in the scenario and is outperformed by the company with 
the biggest carbon footprint over time.  
Figure 12-2 Global revenue development for power generation of three large 
electric utility companies in a 2.0°C scenario 
 
Source: The CO-Firm and Kepler Cheuvreux (2018b) 
 
Another fundamental belief relates to the assumption that sector dynamics are indicative of 
company dynamics (the same holds true for specific physical assets, such as real estate). 
Research by The CO-Firm (The CO-Firm & Kepler Cheuvreux, 2018c) shows that average 
financial effects on sectors are barely indicative of individual company’s performance. Rather, 
for example, companies within the automotive sector, exhibit significantly different financial 
impacts (positive and negative), based on specific company characteristics and geographic 
footprints. In the automotive sector, for example, regional demand trends (e.g. vehicle fleet 
growth driven by developing markets) and technological diversity (plug-in hybrid, electric or 
conventional vehicles) drive company EBITDA performance: “The main differentiators 
between winners and losers are regional and technological exposure, and diversity, relative to 
the peer group” (The CO-Firm & Kepler Cheuvreux, 2018c), as can be seen in  Figure 12-3 below.    
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Figure 12-3 EBITDA impact on individual companies in an exemplary 2.0°C IEA-
based climate scenario analysis. 
 
Source: The CO-Firm and Kepler Cheuvreux (2018c) 
 
These dynamics require an increasingly thorough understanding of drivers of direct and 
indirect climate-related risks and opportunities as well as the ability to quantify and manage 
their potential financial impact. This can be achieved by treating this type of risk and 
opportunity along the existing mechanisms, from sector outlooks to risk models. 
 Purpose of the fundamental Climate Excellence methodology 
In this context, the purpose of the Climate Excellence methodology and tool is to financially 
assess climate-related transition risks and opportunities. It quantifies the risks and 
opportunities arising from the transition towards a lower carbon economy using scenario 
analysis. It builds on a bottom-up approach, focusing on the drivers of financial performance 
for plants, products, projects and technologies under a changing market, price, technology 
and regulatory environment, thus lending itself to the analysis for the real economy and the 
financial sector. For the financial sector, it can be conducted across a multitude of use cases 
with a defined real asset underlying the financial instrument, such as bank portfolios and 
individual loans, equity portfolios/funds, bonds, real estate, infrastructure and other project 
financing mechanisms, and insurance premium impact calculations.  
Transition risks could alter the risk-return profile of financial assets. Climate Excellence 
leverages different publicly available, scientific and integrated future climate pathways and 
energy system models. It leverages their assumptions on technology, market (demand, price), 
and regulatory changes in a fundamental model, translating them into specific impacts on 
physical assets such as products and technologies, plants, real estate and infrastructure, 
companies, and sectors in their relevant geographies. It derives country-level impacts on that 
basis.   
This approach mirrors the work typically performed by chief economists, sector analysts, and 
financial analysts (e.g. research analysts, equity/ credit analysts or actuaries) and supplements 
it with specific climate-related, financially relevant insights. Given the fundamental approach, 
it can provide all types of metrics for integration into standard modelling approaches (e.g. for 
asset management, discounted cash flow (DCF) or multiples models). Its bottom-up approach 
provides one pathway for integrating climate-related risks (and opportunities) into the 
standard risk categories used by regulators.  
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 Chapter approach  
This chapter illustrates how fundamental scenario analysis can be used as a practical tool for 
analyzing transition risks and opportunities. Using the example of asset management and the 
scenarios provided by the International Energy Agency, this paper presents the methodology 
and demonstrates the application of scenario analysis with a real-life case study.  
Three key characteristics describe the methodology embedded in the Climate Excellence tool:  
- Extending the current financial sector view on risk and opportunity, with a forward-
looking, materiality-based financial assessment of climate-related risks and opportunities: 
- Scenarios describe plausible development paths towards a lower carbon economy 
(without providing any probability), leading to a specific global warming target or 
carbon particle concentration. The methodology is inherently forward-looking due 
to the application of scenarios, and allows for a materiality-based, quantitative 
financial assessment of climate-related risks and opportunities. 
- Comprehensive coverage of scenario impacts, due to fundamental analysis and market-
based assessment:  
- The analysis enables an integrated understanding across scenario-specific climate 
risk drivers, addressing the suggestion of the TCFD (2017b). It thus reflects the full 
potential financial impact from changing demand, competitive environments, input 
prices and new technologies, as well as regulation, and not only single factors. 
- It is based on the underlying, sector-specific market dynamics, enabling the 
integration of climate analyses into existing risk, valuation, credit or underwriting 
processes, as well as internal macroeconomic outlooks and microeconomic views. 
- It allows for a consistent assessment of risks and opportunities across financial 
instruments and underlying assets (e.g. real estate, infrastructure, projects, 
companies, plants or products, countries) 
- Reflective of strategic choices of companies (adaptive capacity), providing a more true 
and fair view on the specific risk position of the real economy counterpart: 
- “Financial modelling of climate risk must consider companies’ ability to anticipate 
transition risks and develop mitigation strategies, as it impacts future asset 
development and companies’ financial performance. Adaptive capacity allows a true 
and fair view of risks and opportunities to be presented. Not considering it might 
lead to the overestimation of climate risks” (The CO-Firm & Kepler Cheuvreux, 2018a, 
p. 33). 
2 Which questions does transition scenario analysis answer for 
financial institutions? 
For financial institutions, there are various use cases for the results and learnings from 
scenario analysis. Three broad distinctions can be made: Use cases by institution, by function 
within an organization, and within functions, such as equity analysis, building on the specific 
methodologies and proxies used.  
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 Questions answered for asset managers/owners, for banks and insurance 
companies 
Different financial institutions’ characteristics require different foci when performing scenario 
analyses, as the TCFD illustrates in their supplemental disclosure guidance for asset owners 
and asset managers, banks, and insurance companies (TCFD, 2017a). 
Scenario analysis provides different financial institutions with a common foundation of 
insights on overall materiality, risk (opportunity) drivers, changing macroeconomic and sector 
environment. These are: 
1. Order of magnitude financial impacts within and across scenarios; 
2. Sector- and scenario- or even geography-specific risk drivers with significant financial 
impacts based on changes to revenues, cost, and capex; 
3. Understanding of the company-, project-, plant- or product-specific characteristics that 
imply vulnerability relative to the risk drivers; 
4. An interpretation of the changes described by the scenario that imply the change in the 
risk profile; 
5. Potentially a range of KPIs for approximating the potential risk position.   
Institutions tend to have different approaches to integrating scenario learnings into their 
operations. 
Asset Manager/Asset Owner 
Key Question: Could climate change have a material impact on my investment analysis?  
While the TCFD distinguishes between asset managers and asset owners, both have the same 
goal: to optimize value (risk return) for their investors and stakeholders. Given their role in the 
financial system, they strive to outperform the market, identify new and attractive financing 
opportunities, and, depending on the institution, potentially guide the energy transition. 
Relevant insights extend across the five points illustrated above, depending on the respective 
audience within the institution. A relevant cross-check consists of extending the frame of the 
analysis to longer timeframes, checking whether any risks (opportunities) occurring after ten 
years might already impact the performance of assets currently invested in. One example is 
the real estate sector, where an intention to sell in 10 years’ time might meet a demand which 
then already incorporates a view to the next 10 years – thus, 20 years would be the appropriate 
timeline for assessing risks. In the risk integration, the focus is on the key risk drivers. 
Banks 
Key question: Could climate change impact my counterparties’ probability of default? 
While banks tend to leverage the same underlying basis and findings of scenario analysis, they 
tend to apply a higher materiality threshold (apart from for distressed entities). Also, when 
integrating the learnings in the standard processes, they tend to leverage the few key risk 
drivers per sector and geography. Standard portfolio indicators are of less relevance currently. 
In risk integration, the focus is on the key risk drivers. 
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Insurance companies 
Key question: How does climate change affect my underwriting and investment activities 
across business lines? 
Scenario analysis allows for a forward-looking integration of climate-related risks into 
investment and underwriting activities, complementing traditional stress testing. On the 
underwriting side, scenario analysis supports a better understanding of climate-related 
impacts on claims and premiums. Insurance premiums, for example, could be affected by 
climate-related transitions risk due to changes in the amount of insurance policies sold. There 
could be different potential implications. A reduction in premium revenues could impact 
overall profitability and, in turn, also impact capital requirements. Scenario analysis provides 
insights into which sectors within the underwriting portfolio across different business lines 
could be most affected. 
  Questions answered by function of a financial institution 
A number of needs by different functions can be addressed by scenario analysis, for example 
within asset management. Some of the objectives of scenario analysis by user group were 
derived from the TCFD‘s supplementary notes for the financial sector (TCFD, 2017a). 
Table 12-1 Objectives of scenario analysis for the asset manager user group5 
User 
groups 
User Questions that can be answered with Scenario Analysis 
Market  
Equity Analyst 
(PRI, 2018)
 
  
● Who could be winners and losers - structurally, including adaptive 
capacity? 
● What are the material impacts of climate change on existing risk 
factors? Have new risk factors been identified? 
Product 
development 
(PRI, 2018, p. 37)
 
● Where do new investment needs arise (and existing needs 
diminish)? 
● How can this be reflected in new products or during the transition 
of existing products? 
Portfolio 
Manager 
● How could climate change affect the relative risk-return profile of 
specific sectors? 
● To what extent can security selection influence the average sector 
risk? 
● Can the sector actively manage its risks and opportunities? 
● What are the material impacts of climate change on existing risk 
factors? Have new risk factors been identified? 
Risk 
controlling 
Risk Manager 
● Would new risk factors or a change in the materiality of risk factors 
imply a need for reflection in general risk management? 
Sustainability 
Department 
CSR Manager 
● Which metrics should be retrieved from the specialist 
departments for the disclosure of climate risks? 
● Qualitative vs. quantitative: Which financial indicators should be 
mapped? 
                                                     
5  Adapted from PwC (2019) in TCFD Think Tank (2019, pp. 14-15). The criteria considered here are followed by 
presentations and discussions in the TCFD Think Tank in Q1 and Q2 2019. For further criteria and parameters see Technical 
Supplement publications of TCFD (2017c, p. 9). 
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 Integration example: Asset owner analyst 
While the second line of defense is regulated in its risk modelling, there is flexibility in 
investment analysis with regard to model used. While some analysts use multiple-based 
models, others build on, for example, discounted cash flow models. Some analysts build 
distinct models per company, reflecting corporate assets and investment plans, while others 
work primarily with financial reporting and derive additional insights qualitatively.  
Once the potential financial materiality of climate-related risks and opportunities and their 
timing has been analyzed and an analyst chooses to integrate these findings, the analyst has 
different pathways for doing so. Using the example of a discounted cash flow model, climate-
related insights might find reflection in the growth potential or risk profile of specific securities. 
If changes in cash flows are to be reflected, the results will depend on whether the analyst is 
interested in the business impacts at a specific point in time or in a trend. Results from the 
analysis of a specific time frame can be used to extend the forecasting horizon of specific cash 
flows. If the analysis shows business impact changes in a trend, the terminal growth rate can 
be adjusted. Also, the specific short-term calculation could integrate climate-related impacts 
on cash flows (the same holds true for capex). 
Similar degrees of freedom exist for the reflection of risk. An illustrative issue tree is shown 
below (Figure 12-4).  
Figure 12-4 How to integrate scenario analysis into company valuations 
 
Source: The CO-Firm and Kepler Cheuvreux (2018a) 
3 Methodology & data 
This chapter outlines the method and data used to assess climate-related risks & opportunities 
with Climate Excellence, using the example of individual companies. Our method for modelling 
is unique in that it: 
• provides forward-looking and financial impacts; 
• builds on fundamental analysis, enabling the assessment of risks from market and 
competitive dynamics, and enabling an easy integration into existing analysis 
practices; 
Do you want to integrate these 
results of scenario analysis into 
financial modelling?
Use the results in multi-criteria or 
other type of analysis
Do you want to reflect changes in 
cash flows or changes in the risk 
profile?
Do you want to be able to reflect the 
business impact of transition risks at 
a specific point in time or are you 
more interested in the trend?
Do you want to understand the 
potential risks in specific scenarios 
or integrate scenario risk into the 
central valuation model?
Extend the forecasting 
horizon or specific cash 
flows (option 1)
Adjust the terminal 
growth rate (option 2)
Calculate the implied risk 
premium and its variance under 
different adaptive capacity 
scenarios (option 3)
Adjust the discount rate to 
reflect the required rate of 
return to take up additional 
transition risk 
(option 4)
No Yes
Growth profile Risk profile
Risk to baseline scenarioTrendPoint in Time Risk within transition scenario
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• includes adaptive capacity, i.e., the capacity of companies to adjust their strategies 
if financially relevant; 
• builds on bottom-up asset-level modelling, allowing integrated insights on a plant, 
technology, company, country and sector level; 
• builds on geographic granularity corresponding to specific sector characteristics; 
The approach has been co-developed with leading financial institutions, inputs/ modelling 
been academically validated and tested with companies over several years.6 
Two approaches are most discussed in modelling climate-related financial impacts: top-down 
and bottom-up modelling. We have chosen the bottom-up approach for the quantitative 
assessment of climate-related financial risks and opportunities, as we have seen that 
corporate characteristics within a sector lead to significantly different financial impacts. 
 Understanding the financial implications of climate scenarios 
We calculate the financial impact (FI) for an individual company i for a given year t>0 under a 
given climate scenario SC as follows. 
Formula 12-1 Financial impact calculation, example: Company 
𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶,𝑖,𝑡>0 = (∑ 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡,𝑗,𝑘 × 𝐵𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶,𝑖,𝑡,𝑗,𝑘
𝑗,𝑘
) × (∑ 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡=0,𝑗,𝑘 × 𝐵𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶,𝑖,𝑡=0,𝑗,𝑘
𝑗,𝑘
)
−1
 
 
Where 
 
𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶,𝑖,𝑡>0 is the financial impact in terms of EBITDA, EBIT or sales 
relative to the start year 
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝑖,𝑡,,𝑗,𝑘 is the company activity breakdown that splits revenue shares 
to the bottom level, summarizing the activity j in a geography 
(e.g. country or region) k 
𝐵𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶,𝑖,𝑡,,𝑗,𝑘 is the financial impact in terms of absolute EBITDA, EBIT or 
sales under the scenario SC for the bottom-level activity j in 
geography k for company i 
 
 
Formula 12-1 shows that the breaking down of an individual company’s economic activity into 
meaningful climate-impact entities (based on industry standard classification systems, such as 
NACE - as used in the EU Taxonomy - or NAICS)7 to which we can map a specific climate-related 
                                                     
6 See, for example: University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL, 2016) and The Energy Transition 
Risks & Opportunities (ET Risk) research consortium seeks to provide research and tools to assess the financial risks and 
opportunities associated with the transition to a low-carbon economy. Please refer to: http://et-risk.eu/, as well as G20 
Green Finance Study Group (2017). 
7 NACE - Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community, NACE is derived from the French 
Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne; NAICS - North American Industry 
Classification System 
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financial impact for this individual activity and in its geography. To do this, in a first step, we 
cluster economic activities by profit drivers (is the key determinant the value chain 
performance, the operations performance, or product differentiation). Then, we break down 
a company segment by key operations from a climate-related view (per geographic region).   
Climate Excellence then uses functional impact relations for mapping climate scenario 
parameters such as demand changes, relative price changes, availability of raw materials, etc. 
to the profit and loss divers along the companies’ structural criteria. This is a materiality-driven 
approach, looking at the extent of climate risks and opportunities relative to the average 
margin and margin volatility. This mapping results in individual cost, margin, and/ or volume 
impacts. The overview illustrates that an understanding of the sector and partially geographic 
market dynamics is key in providing a true and fair view of the impacts.    
 Fundamental market modelling to calculate the financial impact of climate 
scenarios  
In the previous chapter we broke down company economic activities into climate-impact 
homogeneous entities, based on NACE codes. We analyzed their profit drivers, identified the 
relevant transmission mechanisms that illustrate their impact by climate scenarios, and gained 
an understanding of the competitive situation.  
We now assume that we are looking at a sector in which financial performance is driven by 
operations efficiency, and that operations efficiency is linked to the technology, capacity, and 
efficiency status of specific plants owned by the company. This would, for example, be the case 
for sectors such as cement, steel, and utilities. In this case, Figure 12-5 (subsequent numbering 
is consistent with the chart8) illustrates our modelling approach:  
Data on current plant ownership by a company (2) in different geographies is mapped with the 
scenario-based, geographic changes to demand, prices, etc. (1), and, reflecting future 
developments, the potential for companies to technologically improve their assets and pass 
through additional cost (3). Building on the investment plans announced by companies, and 
the improvement potential, the fundamental market model (5) then dynamically models the 
relative competitive position of plants as it changes due to relative geographic demand trends, 
changing input costs, etc.  
The market model allocates scenario-specific relative margin and volume impacts to the 
different plants. This approach is further detailed in the subsequent paragraphs and described 
in detail in the “Investor primer to transition risk analysis” report by The CO-Firm and Kepler 
Cheuvreux (2018a). 
                                                     
8 For more general information on each of the following steps, please refer to publications of The CO-Firm and Kepler 
Cheuvreux (2018a). 
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Figure 12-5 Fundamental market modelling approach to quantify financial impacts 
from climate scenarios 
 
 
1. Derive the key risk drivers to translate a scenario into a narrative. First, develop a holistic 
transition narrative by extending scenario data with consistent transition drivers. This can 
include a) Breaking down country-specific technology pathways by region and country 
based on scenario data; or b) deriving information on regulatory interventions (e.g. 
quotas and subsidies) by region and by scenario based on current and announced 
regulatory regime, climate targets, envisaged technology pathways. 
2. Build an asset-level database with financial information on individual economic activity 
in geographies. The analysis builds on data on corporate assets, such as power generation 
plants (e.g. wind turbines) or steel and cement plants, and technologies, efficiencies, 
production cost of each entity.  
3. Conduct a techno-economic assessment of risk mitigation measures (“adaptive 
capacity”). Financial modeling of climate risk must consider companies’ ability to 
anticipate transition risks and develop mitigation strategies. The potential effectiveness 
of such measures is comprised under adaptive capacity. Analyzing risk mitigation must 
take into account a variety of aspects such as the scenario applied (e.g. 2.0°C), the current 
technology base of a company, e.g. type, location, and age of technologies, investment 
and CAPEX and the risk-return profile of the market. Measures comprise cost pass-
through, technological upgrades and shifts, etc. 
4. Incorporate three assumptions for companies’, i.e., asset development. Three potential 
pathways form part of the analysis: FROZEN freezes the current asset portfolio over time. 
This hypothetical assumption is used to identify the cost of inaction under climate 
scenarios. MAINSTREAM assumes that company changes or adapts its asset portfolio in 
line with the overall market trend under the scenario. BEAT THE MARKET assumes that a 
company takes all financially profitable means to adjust based on its financial prowess, 
anticipating changes, beating the market. 
5. Develop a fundamental market model based on the demand and supply developments to 
derive prices and asset-specific profit in the scenarios. At the example of an asset-centric 
sector, steps 1. to 4. allow for identifying the production costs per asset and company 
under different scenarios over time, forming a merit order. The intersection of the merit-
order with the demand given by the scenario indicates the commodity price. The 
difference between this price and the production costs indicates the financial impact: 
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𝐵𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶,𝑖,𝑡,,𝑗,𝑘 is the financial impact in terms of absolute EBITDA, EBIT or 
sales under the scenario SC for the bottom-level activity j in 
geography k for company i 
6. Derive financial impacts on companies. Aggregating the resulting absolute profit changes 
results in profit impact on company level. 
 Deep dive on data required for climate scenario analysis 
Transition scenarios (1) 
While a climate scenario illustrates the carbon (equivalent) emissions still available to sustain 
a certain global warming level with a specific likelihood, transition scenarios that lend 
themselves to scenario modelling tend to provide insights into potential allocations of carbon 
budgets to, for example industrial sectors, and the choices these sectors need to take to 
achieve such an overarching global warming pathway. Regulation, technology mix, and 
changes in demand and prices can be drivers. Also transition scenarios can build on the impact 
of, for example, choices already taken, i.e., by regulators.  
Figure 12-6 Illustrative relationship between climate scenarios, carbon budget and 
sector 
 
 
Given the fundamental modelling approach, Climate Excellence can operate with a range of 
scenarios. For illustrative purposes, the following case examples build on publications by the 
IEA, and their integrated energy system models.  
Scenarios can provide a set of parameters that describe future world in most cases, covering:  
• Economic activity by sector/ geography 
• Population growth 
• Energy demand 
• Climate policy 
• Fossil fuel generation, renewable share in power generation 
• Carbon capture and storage assumptions, bio-energy shares, syn fuels 
• Oil and gas demand  
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• GHG emissions  
 
Asset-level data (2) 
Chapter 3 illustrated the value of detailed and complete data on corporate assets in 
adequately assessing climate-related risks and opportunities. Similarly, Caldecott et al. point 
out that analysis using asset-level data is typically9: 
• Bottom-Up: Asset-level exposure is aggregated up to the company level rather than 
inferred from company-level reporting; 
• Fundamental: Fundamental asset attributes (e.g., location, technology, and age) 
inform analysis rather than disclosed metrics (for example, carbon intensity), 
enabling more sophisticated and flexible analysis; 
• Comparable: Standardization can ensure accurate company comparisons and avoids 
embedded methodological assumptions; 
• Forward-looking: Asset attributes (such as age) can enhance the analysis of future 
company performance and enable validation of company projections. 
• Efficient: It can significantly reduce reporting burdens and reduce time and money 
spent on assuring voluntary disclosures; 
• Timely: Asset-level data can be updated in real time as events occur (like mergers or 
asset commissioning) rather than according to annual reporting cycles; 
• Transparent: Asset attributes are transparent and are based on real observational 
data, giving stakeholders access to the same data as company executives; 
• Scalable: The marginal costs of data acquisition and analysis decrease with scale of 
the dataset; 
• Science-driven: Asset-level data unlocks scientific approaches to analysis which are 
repeatable and testable; 
• Unbiased: Assessments of environmental factors informed by asset-level data do not 
rely on the (non-expert) opinions of corporate boards. 
• Self-improving: Science and technology-driven risk analysis and data acquisition 
improve continuously with new generations of technology and research. Costs are 
also reduced over time. 
For Climate Excellence, among others, third-party asset level data used comprises more than 
230,000 physical assets in over 50 countries, providing information such as technologies used, 
capacities, production volumes, location, and other sector-specific information. 
                                                     
9 Based on article of Caldecott et al. (2018). 
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Risk mitigation measures (3) 
As an additional step, the analysis covers ~130 general technical measures for improving 
energy and carbon efficiency, as well as commercial measures companies can take to respond 
to changing input costs, in case taking these measures is business case positive.  
4 Impact examples: Climate-related transition risks:  
The following paragraphs illustrate climate-related transition risks for two distinct sectors. This 
assumes that the financial institution has reviewed whether and in which sectors climate-
related risks and opportunities might become financially material in a first step. In a second 
step, in sectors potentially materially affected, the following analyses can be applied.  
The first example is for power generation, illustrating that climate-related impacts on single 
companies can substantially differ from the respective sector average. The second example 
shows that risk and opportunity drivers impact corporations activities differently, despite them 
operating in the same sector.  
 Power generation: Global EBITDA implications and relative company 
performance  
Looking at the sub-sector average for power generation, both climate scenarios exhibit 
positive EBITDA developments relative to today (see Figure 12-7), in the business line power 
generation.  
Relative to a 2.7°C IEA scenario, IEA’s 2.0°C scenario reflects higher CO2 prices, more 
investments in renewable energy sources and power grids, as well as a higher power demand 
in general through electrification (e.g. e-mobility). Thus, globally, the 2.0°C scenario shows 
stronger EBITDA growth until 2030. However, not all power generation companies profit from 
these developments at the same manner. The scatter plot shows a heterogeneous picture with 
some companies outperforming the global average growth trend, while others - under the 
scenario - cannot maintain their current financial performance.  
Performing this type of analysis across sectors can provide material insights for portfolio 
management, as it illustrates the growth implications per (i.e., invested) sector, which might 
differ substantially between sectors. The distribution of growth potential among the 
companies in the sector can provide guidance to analyst security selection within the limits 
set by portfolio management. 
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Figure 12-7 The financial impact of climate risks usually affects individual 
companies heterogeneously, even within the same sector. Both figures show 
MAINSTREAM adaptive capacity 
 
Source: The CO-Firm and Kepler Cheuvreux (2018b) 
A steel example illustrates the risk and opportunity driver analysis.   
 Steel manufacturing: Valuation insights, the cost of inaction, and 
characteristics of successful companies 
The example on power generation showed heterogenous impact on companies, even within 
the same sector. Figure 12-8 illustrates the cumulative discounted cash flows of three steel 
companies along three-time horizons, focusing on their steel segments. An analysis by Kepler 
Cheuvreux and The CO-Firm revealed that all three steel companies would lose relative to a 
consensus baseline with a perpetuity view under both a 2.0°C or 2.7°C climate scenario 
compared to baseline evaluation.10 In particular, steel company B could lose ~ 60% in a 2.7°C 
world, and ~50% in a 2.7°C world, and ~70% in a 2.0°C world, even under the assumption that 
company B invests proactively (in a business case positive manner) and aggressively in those 
technologies and markets with highest EBITDA potential (strategy: “BEAT THE MARKET”). Steel 
company A and C would be significantly less impacted by the climate scenarios. 
This type of analysis illustrates the potential materiality of climate scenarios relative to a 
baseline as it could currently be applied by analysts and illustrates the time horizons in which 
different cash flow assumptions would materialize.  
                                                     
10 With regard to the choice of a baseline for company valuation, the valuation estimates from climate change scenarios 
are compared with a market ‘consensus’ baseline, based on Bloomberg consensus data and the terminal growth rate and 
discount rate applied from Kepler Cheuvreux’ own equity analysts (The CO-Firm & Kepler Cheuvreux, 2018d).  
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Figure 12-8 The discounted cash flow from steel manufacturing would be 
significantly reduced for all three steel companies along a 2.7°C and 2.0°C warming 
pathway11 
 
 
Often, climate-related risks and opportunities are considered a medium- to long-term effect. 
Figure 12-9 illustrates the impact of companies seizing to invest beyond what they have 
planned for the next three to five years (“frozen” strategy). This would already reduce EBITDA 
in the short-term.  
Were the companies to adjust along the scenario-based developments in their respective 
geographic markets and in line with their technological experience, and their financial means 
(generated in the steel segment), company A could generate a positive trend. This is even more 
true if the company proactively “beats the market” (Figure 12-9).  
                                                     
11 With regard to the choice of a baseline for company valuation, the valuation estimates from climate change scenarios 
are compared with a market ‘consensus’ baseline, based on Bloomberg consensus data and the terminal growth rate and 
discount rate applied from Kepler Chevreux’ own equity analysts (The CO-Firm & Kepler Cheuvreux, 2018d).  
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Figure 12-9 EBITDA development of three steel companies with three strategic 
assumptions under a 2.0°C climate scenario12 
 
 
What drives such differences in the financial performance of companies and their ability to 
adapt to climate scenarios? The companies’ current technology portfolios and geographic 
footprints provide explanations. For a better understanding of the results, it is worthwhile to 
note that there are three main technology routes for steel manufacturing: coal-based (Blast 
Oxygen Furnace (BOF)), electricity-based (Electric Arc Furnace (EAF)), and gas-based (Direct 
Reduced Iron (DRI)). All routes have different characteristics regarding raw materials, 
investments and GHG emissions. Figure 12-10 shows the EBITDA breakdown according the 
three technology routes and the geographical footprint for the main regions and countries. 
Company A has a globally and technology diversified portfolio which can level-out climate-
related impacts. Company C has invested in two routes in two regions. Only Company B has 
focused on one route in one country. Company A benefits from its diversified portfolio, which 
levels out climate-related impacts through the different route characteristics and different 
climate impacts among regions. Additionally, it profits from further investment in the electric-
based and gas-based production routes regions, benefiting from the route’s inherent 
characteristics (e.g. North America). Steel company C can also profit from its early investment 
in the gas-based route in the United States. However, steel company B’s portfolio focuses on 
the coal-based production route in one country. The costs for the coal-based route to adapt to 
climate-related impacts are significantly higher compared to the other technologies and 
investment only pays off under high CO2 prices which occur in the 2.0°C only after 2030. Until 
then, the competitive disadvantage of coal-based steel production results in decreasing 
financial performance.  
                                                     
12 With regard to the choice of a baseline for company valuation, the valuation estimates from climate change scenarios 
are compared with a market ‘consensus’ baseline, based on Bloomberg consensus data and the terminal growth rate and 
discount rate applied from Kepler Chevreux’ own equity analysts (The CO-Firm & Kepler Cheuvreux, 2018).  
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Figure 12-10 Today's asset and geographic portfolio and the adaptive strategy 
influence the ability of companies to succeed under 2.0°C climate scenario13 
 
5 How to apply scenario analysis 
Scenario analysis of climate-related financial risks and opportunities can integrate smoothly 
into existing processes and practices. Using the example of investment, climate scenarios can 
be mapped against an investor’s own macroeconomic outlook, in the case of IEA, regarding 
population growth and economic growth. The sector-specific scenario developments can be 
mapped with the institutions’ own sector-specific outlooks, leading to a delta analysis which 
helps to understand where and how risk and opportunity drivers might change or new ones 
might arise, and allows the internal experts to review the order of magnitude impacts based 
on their experience. The same holds true for the company level, building on the companies’ 
structural characteristics (Figure 12-11). 
                                                     
13 With regard to the choice of a baseline for company valuation, the valuation estimates from climate change scenarios 
are compared with a market ‘consensus’ baseline, based on Bloomberg consensus data and the terminal growth rate and 
discount rate applied from Kepler Chevreux’ own equity analysts (The CO-Firm & Kepler Cheuvreux, 2018d).  
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Figure 12-11 Scenario analysis insights lend themselves to easy integration into 
existing financial institution practices (example investment) 
 
Source: PwC (2019) Own elaboration 
For the specific integration into existing valuation approaches, Figure 12-11 provides a first 
methodological overview. Figure 12-12 provides a schematic example for an integration of 
climate-related factors into real estate valuation, based on an income approach. 
Figure 12-12 Illustrative approach on how to integrate climate-related risks in real 
estate evaluation 
 
Source: Valuation of Carbon Performance Project (2019) 
6 Conclusions and outlook 
The purpose of this study is to describe one pathway to analyzing climate-related risks and 
opportunities, based on the Climate Excellence methodology and tool, and using the example 
of asset management and scenarios provided by the International Energy Agency (others can 
be applied in a similar fashion). The paper underlined the insights that can be generated by 
using climate scenario analyses, and showcased different use cases for different financial 
institutions and their functions. The underlying modelling and data needs were explained and 
the application of scenario analysis with a real-life case study was demonstrated.  
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There are a few key conclusions that can be derived from this overview:  
• Focusing exclusively on carbon and carbon regulation might jump too short in 
providing a true and fair view of potential climate-related risks and opportunities.  
• In line with the recommendations by the (TCFD, 2017b), it is valuable to look not only 
into the next couple of years, as investment or product decisions taken today may 
face significantly negative impacts during their lifetime, creating lock-ins or avoidable 
losses 
• Only focusing on sector-centric analysis means losing out on the potential to improve 
portfolios by active securities selection, as company performance within sectors in 
the same scenario tends to vary significantly. 
• At the same time, scenario analysis allows for deriving clear and distinct risk and 
opportunity drivers on a sector-, and – depending on sector characteristics - 
potentially geography-level. They can be mapped to distinct company characteristics. 
This provides ample space for the easy integration of climate-related risk and 
opportunity analyses, all the way to a quantitative integration into valuation, 
probability of default, or premium calculations.  
Voluntary disclosure, such as the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) and the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), as well as regulatory activities connected with the disclosure of 
climate-related risks and opportunities, and supervisory activities indicate that scenario-based 
climate-related disclosure is there to stay. At the same time, scenario analysis still tends to be 
a weaker point in current disclosure related to the TCFD recommendations14 , as are the 
integration into strategy and risk management. These points are closely connected – without 
a clear view on underlying dynamics and risk and opportunity drivers, it is hard to formulate a 
strategy or integrate numbers without their underlying rationale into a risk framework.  
With increasing work on and with climate scenarios and by contrasting specific results with 
one another, and increasing disclosure, it can be expected that the dialogue will increasingly 
center on key scenario assumptions, such as on the key decarbonizing engines of the energy 
system (i.e., carbon capture and storage or usage), and the transmission of these assumptions 
to the financial performance of individual business models, products, customers and suppliers, 
etc. The same holds true for commercial actors’ strategic responses and adaptive capacities. 
These dynamics pave the way for a better understanding of the strategic choices we are facing 
regarding climate change, their economic impacts across assets, companies, sectors, societies, 
a call for meaningful data, and a smarter dialogue between users and preparers.  
                                                     
14 According to the TCFD status report, information related to Strategy c), “describe the resilience of the organization’s 
strategy, taking into consideration different climate-related scenarios, including a 2°C or lower scenario”, had the lowest 
levels of disclosure (TCFD, 2019). 
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By 
Acclimatise and Vivid Economics1 
Abstract  
The Acclimatise-Vivid Economics physical climate risk analytical toolkit offers a joined-up top 
down and bottom up approach to assessing physical risks in financial portfolios. Acclimatise 
draws on extensive experience in interpreting physical climate risk data to provide detailed 
analysis of how climate hazards can impact clients’ holdings. Vivid Economics brings 
understanding of state-of-the-art modelling techniques to shed light on the macroeconomic 
climate impacts facing banks and investors. Here we share an overview of the Acclimatise-
Vivid Economics analytical toolkit, which is a suite of integrated tools and services that can be 
customised to clients’ evolving needs. The analytical toolkit is based on a layered approach, 
which first provides a high-level climate risk assessment at the portfolio level, followed by deep 
dive analyses where material risks are identified. The toolkit provides qualitative risk scores 
for the portfolio-wide heatmapping, and quantitative financial metrics at the second (‘deep 
dive’) stage. 
Keywords: physical climate risk, natural disasters, changes in asset values, financial impacts 
1 Purpose of the analytical toolkit  
Climate change risks have the potential to disrupt financial markets, and are of growing 
importance for the finance sector. The Task Force for Climate-related Financial Disclosures 
(TCFD), and the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) have highlighted the 
financial risks from climate change, and called for the integration of climate risk into asset 
management and investment practices. Having an investment portfolio which is resilient to 
potential future climate scenarios is of vital importance. 
Acclimatise and Vivid Economics have partnered to develop an analytical toolkit for banks and 
investors, to assess physical climate risks and opportunities under future climate scenarios. 
Acclimatise is an advisory and analytics company specialised in physical climate risk 
assessment and climate change adaptation. Vivid Economics is a strategic economics 
consultancy with a focus on climate change analysis, public and private climate change 
strategies, and the quantification of risks and opportunities.  
Our analytical toolkit assesses the impacts of climate change-related physical risks and 
opportunities on a portfolio by combining climate hazard models with sector and asset-level 
vulnerability data, value stream impact models and financial modelling, to assess impact on 
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Richenda Connell, email: r.connell@acclimatise.uk.com, CTO and Co-founder of Acclimatise; 
Robin Hamaker-Taylor, email: r.hamaker-taylor@acclimatise.uk.com, Financial services climate risk consultant at 
Acclimatise; Xianfu Lu, email: xianfu.lu@acclimatise.uk.com, Head of Analytics at Acclimatise; Eis, Jason, email: 
jason.eis@vivideconomics.com, Executive Director of Vivid Economics. 
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key financial metrics. It can serve various business functions within a financial institution 
including strategic portfolio management, informing lending decisions and asset allocation, 
disclosure, and internal or external engagement. It can be delivered with a menu-driven 
interface. 
2 Intended users and application 
Our toolkit has been designed for use by banks and investors to evaluate forward-looking 
physical climate risks based on scenarios. Within banks, the toolkit caters to a variety of 
functions, including: 
• Risk management teams,  
• Credit risk departments, 
• Investment officers, and  
• Lending officers.  
Within the investment community, the target users are asset managers and investors, also 
across a variety of functions, including: 
• Risk management teams, 
• Investment officers, and 
• Stewardship teams. 
The toolkit has broad applicability as it can be used globally, across most sectors. Furthermore, 
it can be applied to most asset classes, and supports analyses for a wide range of acute and 
chronic climate hazards. More detail is provided in Section 3 below.  
3 Fundamental components 
 Overview 
Our toolkit performs both portfolio-wide and asset-level assessment of physical risks and 
opportunities with its phased, layered approach. After secure data collection of asset level 
information, (including location, sector and sub-sector information, and details of the 
underlying physical assets2), the first phase is a high-level portfolio-wide assessment, resulting 
in a heatmap. The second phase involves quantification for a selection of assets. This involves 
‘deep dive’ asset-specific analyses for higher risk areas identified from the Phase 1 heatmap. 
See Figure 14-1 for an overview of the toolkit’s fundamental components. 
                                                     
2 To the extent this information is available. This includes, for example: construction type, number of stories, age of physical 
asset, etc. 
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Figure 13-1 Overview of fundamental components of the Acclimatise-Vivid 
Economics analytical toolkit for physical climate risks 
 
Source: Acclimatise and Vivid Economics 
 
 Coverage  
Our toolkit has global coverage and covers all sectors and sub-sectors which can be vulnerable 
to physical climate risks. See Figure 14-2 for a sample of sectors typically assessed by users of 
the toolkit. 
Figure 13-2 Non-exhaustive sample of economic sectors covered in the Acclimatise-
Vivid Economics toolkit 
 
The toolkit draws on the latest climate science on potential changes in key climate hazards, 
both acute and chronic, from a wide range of global and regional climate model outputs. 
Specifically, the toolkit leveraging:  
•  The full suite of climate models participating in the World Climate Research 
Programme’s (WCRP) fifth phase of the Climate Model Inter-comparison Project, 
known as ‘CMIP5’; and 
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• Some of the regional climate model outputs from WCRP’s Coordinated Regional 
Climate Downscaling Experiment (CORDEX). 
Figure 13-3 provides an overview of the climate science used in the analytical toolkit.  
Figure 13-3 The toolkit employs robust climate science on potential changes to key 
climate hazards 
 
Source: Acclimatise and Vivid Economics 
 
Hazards listed under “chronic” and “acute” hazards are variables that are entirely dependent 
on climatic or hydrometeorological conditions (hence can be quantified by either climate 
models directly or by combining more than one variable directly simulated by climate models). 
The “climate-related” variables/phenomenon are often also dependent on other non-climatic 
parameters (e.g. water stress is dependent on population and economic activities, landslide 
dependent on topography etc.). 
The toolkit covers a range of time periods, from the present day up to 2100, with most financial 
institutions applying it on investment timescales up to mid-century. It provides data for a range 
of climate scenarios, though typically the representative concentration pathway (RCP) 
scenarios 2.6 and 8.5 are used to span a range of future physical risks, roughly corresponding 
to 2oC and 4°C warming by the end of the 21st century.3    
The financial effects of physical climate risks can be quantified with the toolkit for a full range 
of asset classes and risks. It is designed to assess debt, equity, real estate and infrastructure 
investments. See Figure 14-4 for an overview of asset classes covered by the toolkit. 
                                                     
3 Source: IPCC, 2014:  Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer 
(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp. Table 2.1. Available from:  
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf 
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Figure 13-4 The financial effects of climate change can be quantified for a full range 
of asset classes and risks with the analytical toolkit 
 
Source: Acclimatise and Vivid Economics 
4 Detailed methodology 
Our toolkit performs both portfolio-wide and asset-level assessment of physical risks and 
opportunities with its phased, layered approach. This draws on good practice in risk 
management, which suggests that a broad screening of risks should be conducted, before 
determining which areas to focus on for in-depth analysis. The heatmapping approach has 
multiple benefits, in that it:  
• Provides an early indication of where higher risks may lie within the portfolio,  
• Is comprehensive in scope, covering all relevant sectors, sub-sectors and geographies,  
• Is undertaken quickly and efficiently, and 
• Highlights ‘hotspots’ of physical risk in the portfolio, which can then be the focus for 
deep-dive analysis or investor engagement. 
This section reviews the two phases of the analytical toolkit in more detail, highlighting how 
the heatmapping exercise is a first stage that feeds in to the second deep-dive stage. These 
phases are separate, relying on distinct methodologies, as described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. 
 Portfolio-wide physical risk heatmapping 
The first phase identifies key areas of physical risk by screening a portfolio for vulnerability to 
a full range of climate impacts. Inputs for this are covered under Section 5.1 of this chapter, 
but include portfolio composition information on sectors in locations of interest to the client. 
For this phase, spatial data on climate hazards under various scenarios are combined with 
sector vulnerability indicators and applied to the portfolio. This produces a heatmap which 
helps identify priority portfolio segments for deeper analysis.  
This phase assesses the vulnerability of a portfolio – by sector and sub-sector – to climate and 
climate-related hazards. Vulnerability to climate change of each sub-sector is assessed using a 
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suite of eight vulnerability indicators covering the whole value chain, including for example, 
reliance on climate-sensitive supplies, transportation route, market demand, etc.  
Each sub-sector is assigned a vulnerability indicator weighting score within the toolkit, 
according to the relative importance of the indicator to a particular sub-sector. This score 
represents the extent to which that vulnerability indicator will affect the value of any holding 
in that sub-sector when subject to a specific combination of hazards. These vulnerability 
indicators have been developed by Acclimatise over a decade, drawing on a broad base of 
empirical analysis and peer-reviewed literature, as well as Acclimatise’s work with clients in 
those sectors and geographies most prone to climate risk. They capture a wide range of impact 
channels through which climate and climate-related hazards can affect holdings in a sub-sector. 
The indicators are designed to provide comprehensive coverage of potential risk areas, and 
enable financial institutions to have a full picture of the factors that might affect the value of 
their portfolios. 
Within the toolkit, the hazard data and vulnerability indicators are combined to assess physical 
risks facing a financial institution’s sub-sectors by geography. Impacts are assessed across all 
vulnerability indicators that are important to a specific sub-sector, and utilising hazard data 
sets that are relevant to the sub-sector. Sets of relevant climate/weather data (e.g. 
temperature or precipitation), and climate/weather-related events data (e.g. landslide or 
wildfire risk) are linked to each vulnerability indicator. The underlying hazard data are assigned 
scores, to indicate the presence, absence and severity of individual hazards. 
A set of physical risk heatmaps are produced in this phase, per climate scenario and time 
period, providing banks and investors with a picture across the portfolio of which segments 
face higher physical climate risks. The heatmaps can be provided based on sector and sub-
sector categories, asset classes and geographies as specified by the client. The heatmaps are 
typically delivered in Excel so they can be readily disseminated. An illustrative heatmap output, 
showing risk scores by sector, sub-sector and geography is provided in the ‘Input and output 
metrics/data’ section (Section 5). 
 Quantification of physical risk in financial metrics 
The second phase takes portfolio segments identified as at high risk in the heatmapping phase 
and employs data on climate hazards (present-day and future), value stream impact models 
and financial modelling to assess impacts on key financial metrics. The analytical approach is 
summarized in Figure 14-5. It applies data analytics to evaluate value stream impacts at two 
levels: 
• Economy and sector-level effects of physical climate change, deploying a 
Computation General Equilibrium (CGE) model to estimate the effects of slow-onset 
climate change for a large number of countries and sectors. This models the wider 
demand shifts caused by physical climate change, and the interdependencies 
between sectors.  
• Company-specific value chain analysis of physical climate risk, applying climate 
hazard data to quantify impacts on the physical assets and supply chains of 
companies in the sector.  
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Figure 13-5 Overview of analytical approach to quantifying the financial effects of 
physical climate risk 
 
Source: Acclimatise and Vivid Economics 
 
Economy and sector-level modelling 
We deploy a computational general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the interactions 
between economic sectors and between countries/regions. It provides an understanding not 
just of ‘first-order’ climate change impacts but also how climate change shocks feed through 
the entire economic system, sector by sector. Compared to other similar models, it provides a 
higher level of geographic and sector disaggregation, and hence a more nuanced view of 
climate change effects than models which are limited to a handful of regions and sectors.  
Detailed climate change impact functions are used to model the relationships between 
temperature increases and economic outcomes at sector- and country-levels. Impact functions 
provide a means to translate between physical and economic impacts, providing information 
on the magnitude of economic impact for any given temperature rise. These impact functions 
draw on the latest academic research and cover a range of effects, including impacts of 
increased temperatures on labor productivity, reductions in availability of land caused by sea 
level rise and changes in the demand for specific sectors. These risks are quantified and used 
as an input into financial asset modelling. 
Modelling impacts on value chains 
We model physical climate risks to value chains for key impact channels: changes in facility-
level production, physical asset damage, business interruption and supply chain disruption. 
These risks are quantified and used as an input into financial asset modelling. 
• Facility-level production: Changes in climatic variables can have a direct impact on the 
productive capacity of assets. We maintain an in-house database of sensitivity functions, which 
describe the relationships between climatic factors and production, based on latest academic 
literature and empirical evidence. Combining sensitivity functions, asset locations and climate 
models generate estimates of changes in production at the facility level between present day 
and under future climate change scenarios. 
• Facility-level extreme weather damages: We maintain a database of damage functions which 
describe the relationships between hazard intensity and physical damage to assets for many 
major asset classes. Combining these with archetypal asset and hazard intensity data for asset 
locations provides estimates of facility-level losses. 
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• Facility-level business and supply chain interruptions: We maintain a model of business 
downtime caused by extreme climate events. The model combines empirical data on business 
interruptions caused by extreme weather events with hazard maps, to evaluate associated 
production losses.  In parallel, data on sector supply chains are combined with data on extreme 
events at key supply locations for the sector, to estimate potential supply chain disruption and 
associated lost production across the sector. 
Financial modelling 
Discounted cash flow models are used to estimate the combined effects of the above value 
stream impacts on valuations of financial assets. For each financial entity, we aggregate the 
cash flow impacts of changes in sector size with facility-level impacts on productivity, damages, 
and business and supply chain interruptions. These cash flows are discounted over time using 
a company-specific discount rate in order to estimate valuation impacts. The same approach 
is used for corporate bonds, factoring in the impacts of cash flow changes on probability of 
default.  
5 Input and output metrics/data 
 Inputs 
Databases integrated into the toolkit include: 
• Acute and chronic climate and climate-related hazard data, for present-day and future 
time periods under climate change scenarios,  
• Country economic data, covering a range of social accounting matrices, 
• Input-output data and international trade data, 
• Data on listed companies, including financial metrics, geographic and product 
segmentation, and  
• Sectoral databases.  
Other databases can be integrated into the toolkit depending on client requirements. 
Clients provide portfolio data in a matrix of sub-sector and geography for the first phase of 
analysis (portfolio-wide heatmapping). Sub-sector descriptions are mapped onto standard 
industry classifications. For the second phase (quantified deep dives), core financial 
information for counterparties is required, if they are not listed companies or if data are not 
publicly available.  
 Outputs 
The toolkit provides qualitative risk scores at the first stage: portfolio-wide heatmapping, and 
quantitative financial metrics at the second stage: ‘deep dive’ analysis. Providing qualitative 
metrics is a strength of the toolkit, as the heatmapping can be used to facilitate internal 
dialogue around the climate ‘hot spots’ across a portfolio and help raise awareness. The 
qualitative risk score gives clear direction and focus for the quantitative assessment, so that 
data- and resource-intensive quantitative analysis is only performed where warranted. 
The first phase produces a heatmap output, as shown in Figure 13-6. Outputs can be displayed 
aggregated by asset type, portfolio sub-sectors and geographies. Vulnerability to all hazards 
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are shown in outputs, though it is possible to show a more detailed breakdown of which 
hazards in particular are driving the aggregated risk score. 
Figure 13-6 Illustrative physical risk heatmap output 
 
 Source: Acclimatise and Vivid Economics 
The toolkit can also present results as a multi-hazard risk score overlaid with asset value, 
drawing visual attention to vulnerable assets, as shown in Figure 13-7. 
Figure 13-7 Illustrative risk scores for a portfolio of hotels and resorts covering 
multiple climate hazards (coastal flooding, river flooding, cyclone risk, extreme 
heat, water stress) 
 
Source: Acclimatise 
 
For the quantified ‘deep dive’ analysis, the toolkit provides outputs expressed in financial 
metrics, including cash flow changes, value corrections (as shown in Figure 13-8) and changes 
in probability of default. Each of these value stream impact channels in this figure is discussed 
in Section 4.2. For example, ‘production’ is related to impacts on the productivity and outputs 
(e.g. crop yields may drop as a result of drought, electricity output would decline for a 
powerplant under hotter weather as the generation efficiency decreases).   
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Figure 13-8 Illustrative example of change in asset value, decomposed into value 
stream impact channels 
 
Source: Acclimatise and Vivid Economics 
6 Limitations of the current approach, outlook/future development 
A key feature of the toolkit is its layered approach, which first provides a high-level climate risk 
assessment at the portfolio level, followed by deep dive analyses where material risks are 
identified. The toolkit provides qualitative risk scores for the portfolio-wide heatmapping, and 
quantitative financial metrics at the second (‘deep dive’) stage. Providing qualitative metrics 
may be seen by some as a weakness. However, the tool developers perceive this to be a 
strength, as the heatmapping can be used to facilitate internal dialogue around the climate 
‘hot spots’ across a portfolio and help raise awareness. The qualitative risk score gives clear 
direction and focus for the quantitative assessment, so that data- and resource-intensive 
quantitative analysis is only performed where warranted.  
The heatmapping analytics are based on the most recent best-in-class and peer-reviewed 
climate-related data. Many of the climate variables are reliant on the Coupled Modelled 
Intercomparison Project (CMIP) for climate projections data. Phase 5 of Coupled Modelled 
Intercomparison Project, ‘CMIP5’ is currently the most recent iteration for which climate 
model output data are fully available, and these data are included in the current version of our 
heatmapping analytics. The next generation, CMIP6, is being carried out by the scientific 
community. CMIP6 data are expected to be made available in 2021, when Acclimatise will 
integrate them into our analytics.  
For other impact data sets (which may continue to use CMIP5 as their data inputs for the near 
future), commercial and research organizations release data periodically, which we horizon-
scan for suitability for use in the heatmapping. Our internal refresh plan includes an annual 
review of new/updated datasets that we consider will benefit the heatmapping and 
notification to clients of the timescales for adding the new datasets. After each such data 
refresh, the heatmapping analytics are presented as an updated version to the market. 
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 Understanding and Mitigating Risks from a 
Global Low Carbon Transition: A Micro-Based Approach 
to Assessing Climate Transition Risk  
by 
Climate Policy Initiative Energy Finance1 
Abstract 
Climate transition risk is an increasingly important object of concern for central bankers and 
policymakers with financial stability mandates. However, managing the financial stability 
implications of climate transition risk cannot be done using traditional macroeconomic 
modelling tools alone. Micro-level, bottom-up modelling is required for effective identification 
of the drivers, timing and magnitude of climate transition risk. An analysis of the potential 
impact of climate transition risk on financial stability also requires a mapping of risk 
transmission channels, including the extent to which risk mitigation activity by companies and 
financial institutions can pass risk to public balance sheets. CPI Energy Finance has developed 
an analytical approach which assesses these issues and calculates climate transition value-at-
risk metrics for physical fossil fuel and industrial assets, companies and tax revenues. This 
chapter explains the analytical approach by reference to our recent case study in South Africa, 
which showed that climate transition risk, if not well managed, could pose a threat to South 
Africa’s sovereign credit rating. While the chapter focuses on the application of this analysis 
by those with financial stability mandates, the modelling also has important applications in 
risk management activities of development financial institutions, fossil fuel and industrial 
companies and financial institutions.  
Keywords: climate transition risk, financial stability, value-at-risk metrics, contingent liabilities, 
South Africa, sovereign credit rating, modelling, bottom up 
1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the approach that Climate Policy Initiative Energy Finance (CPI EF) 
developed to measure the exposure of countries and their financial systems to low carbon 
“transition risk” or “climate transition risk”. Climate transition risk, which arises from the 
structural changes to the global economy that will be required in a low carbon transition, could 
result in lower-than-expected corporate profits, financial asset values and tax revenues. The 
material magnitude of these changes and the systemic importance of the industries that they 
will affect mean that if not effectively managed, transition risk could cause economic shocks 
with potential losses falling on workers, investors in the equity and debt of companies and 
ultimately, public balance sheets. There is a growing consensus that climate-related financial 
risk, of which transition risk for most countries is probably the most important part in the short 
term, could pose a material threat to global financial stability (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2020). 
                                                     
1  The chapter is written by Matthew Huxham, Principal, Climate Policy Initiative Energy Finance, email: 
Matthew.Huxham@cpilondon.org; David Nelson, Executive Director, Climate Policy Initiative Energy Finance, email: 
David.Nelson@cpisf.org. 
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The growth of interest in climate-related financial risk has prompted the development of a 
wide variety of new tools, indicators and scorecards designed to help investors identify 
transition risk. However, there are fewer tools or analyses that translate transition risk into 
changes in valuation of equity and debt securities and even fewer that show the impact of the 
low carbon transition on both investors and government debt levels. CPI EF’s transition risk 
methodology aims to fill that gap. 
CPI EF’s approach draws on detailed asset-level,2 bottom-up (micro-level) analysis, which we 
argue is necessary to augment “top-down” macroeconomic models if central bankers, financial 
supervisors and policymakers are to gain an understanding of the drivers, timing, magnitude 
and distribution and transition risk. In this chapter, we describe our analytical approach, which 
developed over several years3 and then provide an illustration of the methodology taken from 
our recent case study of South Africa (Huxham et al., 2019). The case study was commissioned 
and supported by Agence Française de Développement (AFD). 
The chapter deals with the following topics:  
• How we define climate transition risk and why new analytical tools are required to 
support a comprehensive analysis of this risk;  
• The aims of CPI EF’s alternative approach and how our insights contribute to a wide 
range of risk mitigation actions from actors including central bankers, financial 
supervisors, policymakers with economic, industrial and labor-related remits, 
companies, and investors in public and private debt and equity securities; 
• How to construct such an analysis – including, data, scenarios and models; 
• An illustration of this methodology in the context of South Africa; and 
• How we are working to improve the analysis through future case studies. 
2 Hypothesis: transition risk is different and so requires new 
analytical tools 
An effective analysis of the macroeconomic consequences of transition risk (e.g. impacts on 
sovereign credit ratings and the value of currencies) needs to start with an analysis of its 
microeconomic foundations. The risks arising from transition to a low carbon economy – 
whether driven by policy, taxation, technology, consumer behavior or a combination – will first 
affect the value of specific physical assets (such as oil fields or coal mines)4 and companies 
                                                     
2 The term “asset-level” refers principally to physical assets. CPI EF’s analysis of transition risk starts from the valuation of 
individual coal mines, oil wells, industrial facilities etc. The analysis also includes an assessment of the impact of transition 
risk on company valuations and solvency, but it does not assess the change in value of individual securities (e.g. different 
classes of shares, senior vs. subordinated debt). 
3 Relevant papers showing the development of this line of thinking include: Moving to a low carbon economy: the impacts 
of policy pathways on fossil fuel asset values developed for the inaugural New Climate Economy report in 2014 
(https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/moving-to-a-low-carbon-economy/) and Government assets: risks and 
opportunities in a changing climate policy landscape (2016) prepared for the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development in 2016 (https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/government-assets-risks-opportunities-changing-
climate-policy-landscape/). 
4 The value of physical assets will change because of drivers affecting the amount (or cost) of supply, demand or both. 
Different transition drivers will have different effects – while carbon taxes may increase the cost (and therefore demand for) 
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before spreading across economies. Central bankers, financial supervisors and policymakers 
with a financial stability remit need to understand the drivers, timing, magnitude and 
distribution of transition risk starting at the level of physical assets and companies in order to 
mount an effectively and timely response at the level of the economy or the financial system.  
Economy-wide general equilibrium models, which tend to have limited intra-sectoral 
granularity, are not always well suited to this task. For example, the impact of the global low 
carbon transition on the value of oil resources and the companies extracting them will depend 
on the relative cost position of the assets and competitive forces. For example, two oil fields 
producing products of a similar chemical composition could experience very different 
outcomes from a transition, depending on their position on the cost curve. A relatively 
expensive asset might become too expensive to produce and lose all its value, while an 
inexpensive asset may lose no production but suffer from lower prices and a loss of margin. 
Therefore, to gain an understanding of the impact of a low carbon transition on the oil industry 
in a country which earns a significant proportion of tax revenues from oil, policymakers need 
to understand factors ranging from the position of different resources on global or regional 
cost curves; the financial structure and health of the companies extracting the oil; the extent 
to which local municipal finances rely on oil royalties etc. 
While general equilibrium models might have the computational power to assess the impact 
of national or even sectoral carbon prices on variables like interest rates and unemployment, 
by averaging within or across sectors, they are unlikely to identify the context-specific factors 
identified above, which can be the main drivers of transition risk.  
If policymakers and regulators do not add “microeconomic” analysis into their toolkits, they 
may fail to identify the complex drivers of transition risk which are likely to crystallize in a non-
linear fashion (e.g. gradual, sharp, or indeed, gradual then sharp). These drivers are likely to 
be both international and therefore out of a country’s control (e.g. falls in demand for imports 
of seaborne thermal coal) and domestic (e.g. mandated coal phase-out dates). 
“Microeconomic” analysis of the sort proposed by CPI EF can help policymakers understand 
the impact of different combinations of transition drivers. It can also help to identify the areas 
where the risk is concentrated today and to predict the risk mitigation activity of private sector 
actors (e.g. companies and financial institutions). Understanding risk concentrations can help 
policymakers design targeted responses which are sensitive both to macroeconomic and 
political economy considerations.  
The methodology and the case study presented in the rest of this chapter shows how CPI EF 
does this microeconomic analysis, starting from an assessment of climate transition “value-at-
risk” for individual mines, oil wells and industrial facilities. We then combine individual asset-
level impacts to understand the impact of transition risk on companies and their investors, 
then the impact on public finances.  
3 Intended users of this methodology 
CPI EF’s granular approach to transition risk measurement means that the results can inform 
the decision-making of actors far beyond the central banks and financial supervisors within 
the NGFS. Potential applications could range from financial sector stress tests, corporate and 
financial institution risk management and planning for a “just transition” for workers and 
communities in areas dependent on businesses likely to decline in a low carbon transition. This 
                                                     
carbon-intensive products (for example, coal-fired power generation), technological innovation may reduce the cost of 
low-carbon alternatives (for examples, solar photovoltaic power generation).   
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detailed modelling can also help public and private sectors alike in understanding the 
implication of a potential tightening of global climate mitigation commitments in the run up 
to COP26.  
However, we expect that our analytical approach will be of most interest for those 
with responsibility for maintaining financial stability.  
 Public institutions with responsibility for financial stability mandates 
Financial stability mandates are often split between central banks, financial supervisory 
authorities (where separated from central banks) and governments.5 Policymakers tasked with 
maintaining financial stability tend to have economy-wide remit and tend to have 
responsibility for assessing emerging new risks, of which climate transition risk is one.   
We think the following categories of decision makers would benefit the most from our 
methodology: 
1. Monetary policymakers, who often have a primary objective to maintain price stability, 
may seek to use CPI EF’s analysis to incorporate another material source of risk into 
their forecasting, particularly insofar as it impacts the external trade balance (which 
could affect the valuation of the currency), where transition risk (e.g. falling demand 
for seaborne thermal coal) is largely outside of the control of the country. The analysis 
can also help policymakers to understand the extent to which external shocks could 
affect consumer prices directly (e.g. changes in the prices of imported goods).  
2. Financial supervisory authorities will be able to use the analysis to provide guidance 
to financial institutions on incorporating transition risk into everyday risk management 
practice and disclosure as well as enabling institutions to respond to any transition risk 
stress tests designed by the supervisory body and enabling the supervisory body to 
assess the quality of stress test responses. CPI EF’s analysis could be used to help 
design transition risk scenarios taking both external and domestic sources of transition 
risk. It will also help financial supervisors assess the broader effects which could result 
from risk mitigation actions by supervisee firms (e.g. divestment could protect 
individual firms, but pass transition risk onto less scrupulous parties).  
3. Finance ministries seeking to calibrate public debt levels, the sovereign credit rating 
and borrowing costs will – in combination with their existing general equilibrium 
models – be able to use such analysis to stress-test the public finances to account for 
the impact of an acceleration of international climate policy.  
4. Policymakers with an interest in levels of investment in the economy (both 
macroeconomic policymakers interested in the quality of GDP growth and fiscal 
policymakers designing incentives for new investments) will be able to use CPI EF’s 
analysis to assess the resilience of planned new investments to climate transition risk. 
The channels through which transition risk might affect a country’s economy (or financial 
system) are likely to be idiosyncratic and dependent on factors such as whether a given country 
is a net exporter or importer of fossil fuels and the importance to a given country of the 
                                                     
5 Mandates can vary significantly between central bank institutions, as described in Dikau, S and Volz, U, Central Bank 
Mandates, Sustainability Objectives and the Promotion of Green Finance explores the range of variations between central 
bank mandates: https://www.soas.ac.uk/economics/research/workingpapers/file139494.pdf 
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financial services industry.6 To use this tool, countries would thus need to complete a detailed 
initial analysis, which would identify current drivers and concentrations of transition risk. 
However, it would also need to be updated regularly to account for changes in global and 
domestic climate policy, technological change and changes in the structure of commodity, 
energy and industrial markets. 
 National and multilateral development financial institutions 
The international policy and development community will also likely be interested in the 
results from this analysis when scaled up and made publicly available.  
Without preventative action, information asymmetry in relation to transition risk could allow 
effective risk mitigation by internationally diversified corporates and financial institutions at 
the expense of increasing concentrations of risk in resource-exporting countries and within 
vulnerable parts of those countries. For example, we found that, in South Africa, the recent 
trend of large internationally diversified coal mining companies to divest coal mines (rather 
than paying to close them down) has pushed transition risk onto smaller, less diversified 
companies, often backed by investment by state-owned financial institutions.  
International financial organizations, national and multilateral development banks (MDBs), 
and development finance institutions (DFIs) will be important actors in supporting transition 
planning in developing countries. For these institutions, analysis of the sort proposed in this 
paper could be used both internally – in their own investment and portfolio management 
processes – and through technical assistance to institutions in their areas of operation. 
National development banks, MDBs and DFIs could also be key conduits in developing new 
types of transition financing in developing countries. Processes to develop and finance 
transition plans for workers and communities, increasingly involving international 
collaboration, would benefit from a detailed analysis of where (down to the physical location), 
when and under what scenarios certain mines, oil fields or other industrial assets might 
become economically unviable. 
 Private sector and other users of this analysis 
CPI EF’s transition risk analysis – in particular, the underlying models which estimate the value 
of physical assets and companies in different climate mitigation scenarios – will also have a 
wide range of applications in the private sector. Private lenders, such as sovereign bond 
investors, as well as credit rating agencies, are increasingly likely to incorporate detailed 
information on country transition risk exposure and management strategies into investment 
decisions as they face increasing pressure to demonstrate alignment with international climate 
goals. Credit rating agencies, which have hitherto been reluctant to make fundamental 
changes to their rating methodologies to account for climate-related financial risk, could use 
transition risk analysis of the sort proposed in this chapter to adjust the credit metrics that 
they use to rate sovereigns today. Examples could include using the additional information 
                                                     
6 In many advanced industrial economies (for example, the UK), where the share of the economy from commodity 
extraction and manufacturing has fallen, the size of the financial services industry has risen significantly. London is an 
important hub for the global financial services industry. London-based banks will face some risk from the UK’s planned 
low carbon transition, however, the institutions based in London have significant exposure outside of the UK in jurisdictions 
with less progressive and less transparent policy processes than in the UK. Any assessment of the solvency of London-
based firms in the context of transition risk therefore should arguably include an assessment of transition risk in countries 
where those firms have major exposures. By contrast, transition risk in other countries may be a less material consideration 
for financial supervisory authorities in countries with financial sectors that are smaller in the context of their host 
economies/more domestically focused.  
Chapter 14 
 222 
provided by this modelling to adjust projected indicators such as public debt to GDP and public 
sector contingent liabilities. 
Similarly, companies committed to implementing the recommendations of the Taskforce for 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) are starting to consider the implications of 
transition risk for their existing portfolios but may not yet have incorporated a view on how 
changes in country risk in their operational jurisdictions might affect their earnings.  
Financial institutions also are facing increasing pressure to make their portfolios “Paris-
compliant” and are searching for more analytically rigorous ways to reduce transition risk 
(whether arising from structural changes in commodity markets or in changing country risk 
profiles) than divestment, negative screening, scoring, tilting or exclusion. These approaches 
often fail to link climate-related financial risk to changes in physical asset or company valuation. 
CPI EF’s analysis has changes in valuation at its heart and therefore allowed corporates and 
financial institutions to develop more tailored transition risk strategies. 
4 Methodology 
This section explains the steps involved in the CPI EF transition risk methodology, which has 
been developed through a series of studies including for the 2014 New Climate Economy 
project, a conceptual study for the EBRD and our detailed study in South Africa. We assess 
transition risk by calculating the difference in value between a baseline scenario (which we 
typically call “business as usual” or “BAU”) and one where the world decarbonizes in order to 
keep average global temperature rises well below two degrees above pre-industrial levels 
(2DS). 
The approach includes four main steps: 
• Setting the scope for the analysis, including timeframe, sectors and scenarios; 
• Calculation of the climate transition value-at-risk, starting with physical assets; 
• Assessing the distribution of climate transition value-at-risk, including how this can be 
affected by the risk mitigation action of companies and financial institutions; 
• Design of policy, regulatory and other strategic responses for mitigating external 
transition risks and reallocating risks around the economy. 
 Scope 
The first step in the analytical process is to decide on the sectors that the study will cover. The 
breadth of the study will in part be defined by the time or budget available but should cover 
at least the sectors likely to be affected most materially by the transition. This should, at a 
minimum, include: 
• Exports and imports of resources and products, for which demand is very likely to fall 
in a 2DS scenario, for example, thermal coal and crude oil; 
• Sources of domestic greenhouse gas emissions, which may need either to make 
investments to remain viable in a 2DS scenario (for example, in fuel switching or in 
carbon capture) or where output will need to be curtailed (for example, electricity 
generation, oil production, steel and cement production). 
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More ambitious studies could also include assessments of the transition risk exposure for 
products where the technological path to decarbonization remains unclear. For example, 
platinum, which would benefit if the decarbonization of transport involved a large role for 
hydrogen fuel cells but would otherwise see weakening prospects as demand for the metal 
falls as the market share of diesel engines declines. 
Having chosen the scope, we proceed to choose the timeframe for the analysis. Too short a 
timeframe (e.g. <10 years) and the analysis would miss important sources of risk. Countries 
might also continue to invest in long-life infrastructure that might face stranding in 20-30 years’ 
time. On the other hand, very long-term projections are often seen as irrelevant given the 
level of uncertainty involved. As an increasing number of countries are now seeking to develop 
deep decarbonization pathways to 2050, we would suggest conducting an exercise with 
projections at least until 2040. 
Once the scope and timeframe are decided, we design the scenarios and models required to 
calculate transition risk. We expect that an analysis may include several global and domestic 
scenarios (as well as combinations of the two) to reflect the inherent uncertainty about the 
transition.7 
 Calculating climate transition value-at-risk 
CPI EF’s analysis calculates the value of physical assets and companies as the net present value 
of future cash flows. Climate transition risk is the difference between the value of assets 
(physical or financial) in a baseline (or BAU) scenario and in the chosen low carbon scenario 
and is expressed as a monetary value. 
4.2.1 Using models to calculate value-at-risk 
We estimate these valuations using proprietary models8 of the markets that the assets under 
analysis operate in. These markets can either be global, regional or domestic. We tend to build 
detailed models only of the sectors where our initial analysis indicates are likely to have the 
most significant transition risk downside.  
These models include cost data about physical assets; 9  point-to-point shipping or other 
logistics costs;10  and projections of future demand.11  These can have different structures, 
depending on the commodity or other product (for example, crude oil trades on a global 
market with relatively few benchmarks, such as Brent. On the other hand, there are many 
prices for seaborne thermal coal, depending on its chemical characteristics and its shipping 
route). Where appropriate, the models will account for constraints, such as long-term 
                                                     
7 More details on our approach to model design for the South Africa work can be found here: https://medium.com/climate-
policy-initiative-energy-finance/counting-the-cost-of-climate-transition-risk-an-energy-finance-approach-
b7355d94f27c 
8 The models referred to in this example can be built in Excel if they are simple, but where the calculation requires multiple 
scenarios or variables, we have built models using programming languages, such as Python. 
9 Typical information required about physical assets, such as coal mines or oil fields, include: lifting or extraction cost (where 
possible, with labour, electricity, fuel costs split out); capital expenditure costs (such as maintenance or expansion) and 
information about the resource, including the quality or grade of products produced and the life of the resource. We have 
obtained information about physical asset costs from third party sources, including Wood Mackenzie and Rystad Energy 
10 Typical information required about logistics arrangements include information on costs of transport of the product to a 
domestic customer or to port and the nature (terms, length, counterparty) of the logistics contracts. Where a miner has a 
long-term fixed-price logistics contract, it provides the miner with a clearer “route to market” when demand falls, but it 
also limits the ability of the miner to pass on transition risk to the infrastructure provider. 
11 It is simplest to undertake this analysis using 3rd party projections of future demand. However, in carrying out this analysis 
in relation to sectors where the decarbonisation pathway is not yet understood (e.g. steel), it is important to know the 
drivers underlying 3rd party demand projections. This will allow the user of the model to update demand projections (and 
hence model outputs) as circumstances change.  
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contracted liquefied natural gas sales (which therefore are not available to spot pricing 
mechanisms). However, the models typically use some form of optimization function, 
designed to simulate the most economically optimal set of trade flows, which then allows us 
to derive prices and volumes for each export and import node. 
We use these models to derive the price and sales volume that would be achieved by individual 
mines, oil fields or industrial facilities, in different climate mitigation scenarios. As the models 
already contain cost information and project sales prices and volumes, we can estimate 
profitability by asset in different scenarios. 
4.2.2 Scenarios 
The scenarios used in CPI EF’s transition risk modelling are designed to simulate how the 
supply of and demand for fossil fuels and other assets under review might change in a low 
carbon world. The International Energy Agency (IEA) produces some of the most widely used 
fossil fuel demand scenarios, although they do not provide country-level detail for most 
countries. However, the inherent uncertainty around decarbonization pathways means that 
an effective analysis of transition risk quickly needs to go beyond static scenarios (see Section 
6.1 for more information on inherent uncertainty around scenarios). 
At a minimum, the transition risk analysis proposed in this chapter requires both global and 
domestic scenarios. The approach addresses risks resulting from “climate action” outside of 
the country (“external risks”) separately from those that are the result of domestic policy. This 
is not only because external risks are subject to different dynamics. We have often found that 
governments underestimate the magnitude of external risks and may not have a detailed 
understanding of their drivers, especially if they are driven by policy decision in other countries 
(e.g. the actions of the Indian and Chinese governments have a significant influence on the 
profits realized by thermal coal exporters such as South Africa and Colombia). 
 Assessing the distribution of climate transition value-at-risk 
After calculating climate transition value-at-risk at the level of physical assets, our analysis 
assesses the likely distribution of that risk within the economy under study. This is an 
important step, because it identifies risk concentrations and sources of potential vulnerability 
– for example, where we project that significant risk would be borne by financially weaker 
parties, such as workers, municipalities or small companies. 
The level of detailed analysis on the distribution of risks will depend on the requirements of 
the users of the analysis but will likely include companies and their investors; national and 
local government; workers and consumers. Local political economy considerations might 
influence the level of analysis (for example, in South Africa, we assessed the exposure of Black 
Economic Empowerment companies specifically). 
We assess the distribution of risk this in three steps: a) mapping “explicit” exposure to 
transition risk; b) accounting for likely “implicit” risk transfers and c) assessing potential 
contingent liabilities after implicit transfers have been accounted for. To do this part of the 
analysis, we build financial statement projection models for companies likely to be most at risk 
from the transition. These models can be at different levels of detail depending on the 
materiality of the companies but need to be sufficiently detailed to allow us to assess the 
impact of transition risk (and efforts to mitigate transition risk) on a given company’s earnings 
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and other key credit risk indicators, including net debt, cash flow generation and access to 
liquidity.12 
4.3.1 Explicit risk 
How transition risk is allocated between companies and their investors will be a function of 
ownership and capital structure. Contracts (for example, take-or-pay contracts for 
infrastructure) influence the split of risks between companies. Regulation (for examples, 
royalties and production sharing arrangements) can alter the share of risk exposure between 
companies and governments. We term risk allocation within a company according to the 
ownership, capital structures, contracts and regulation existing today as “explicit risk”. The first 
step of our analysis in any country – whether of external or domestic risks – is to assess 
“explicit” risk allocation. 
Information on ownership and capital structures is usually found in financial statements. For 
publicly listed companies, this information is usually freely available for download from 
company websites. In the case of privately held companies, we typically source the 
information from the local registry of company financial information (e.g., Companies House 
in the UK). 
4.3.2 Implicit risk transfers 
The analysis of explicit risk allocation does not account for the likely responses of companies 
and governments as they seek to mitigate transition risk. Companies facing transition risk 
might seek to protect their shareholders by cutting costs (for example, by making workers 
redundant or by renegotiating infrastructure contracts) or passing it on to consumers via 
higher prices (although this is not always possible in practice, especially in markets with 
regulated consumer pricing). Governments might seek to protect jobs by reducing taxes.  
Our modelling incorporates an understanding of likely company and government risk 
mitigation strategies. These “implicit” risk transfers will likely shift more transition risk onto 
financially weaker parties than is explicitly the case. Mapping implicit risk transfers is the 
second step of our analysis. 
4.3.3 Contingent liabilities and sovereign debt 
Companies may still face overwhelming transition risk exposure even after implicit risk 
transfers. This could cause them to default on loans, resulting in losses for loan guarantors 
(which in many developing countries often includes the state) and loan providers. Financial 
distress and bankruptcies can also result in significant additional costs for the public purse, 
including those relating to “bailouts”; closure and remediation liabilities for mines; 
unemployment and retraining costs. 
Similarly, if transition risk results in higher-than-expected public debt, it could result in a 
downgrade to the sovereign credit rating with a wide range of consequences for the economy, 
particularly if it leads to a downgrade below investment grade. Integration of the results of 
this “micro” analysis with “macro” models would help to estimate the additional costs of these 
impacts.    
                                                     
12  Where appropriate, we also build financial models for financial institutions where we have identified a particular 
concentration risk relating to project, companies, regions and countries exposed to the transition. 
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4.3.4 Other factors 
In addition to the insight from the quantitative analysis, we would also seek to review potential 
qualitative factors, which will also be drivers of the transition but do not so easily submit 
themselves to quantitative analysis. These might include: 
• Increasing political pressure on countries who are party to the Paris Agreement to 
increase the ambition of their domestic climate plans (for example, which might force 
fossil fuelled power plants to close earlier than expected); and 
• Decreasing international (public and private) appetite to provide finance to coal 
companies and projects, which might put pressure on coal mining industries and make 
coal-fired power relatively uncompetitive against “cleaner” alternatives. 
 Outputs – using transition risk analysis to develop risk mitigation strategies 
Once an analysis of a country’s exposure to transition risk has been performed, users of this 
information, including policymakers, central bankers and financial regulators can then use it 
to design the appropriate response. Other parties who are exposed to transition risk may also 
find it useful, but policymakers will have the widest possible range of options and so will likely 
be interested in the broader picture, as illustrated in Figure 14-1.  
Figure 14-1 Transfers of transition risk between parts of the South African economy 
 
Source: CPI EF. Figures show transition risk in billions of US dollars 
This chart is an extract of one of the key findings from CPI EF’s South Africa study, illustrating 
both the “explicit” distribution of transition risk between parts of the South African economy 
according to today’s ownership, contracts, regulation and policy and the likely risk transfers 
between parts of the economy that could result from the strategic actions taken by companies 
and financial institutions to mitigate transition risk and from companies falling into financial 
distress. The analysis found that the South African public balance was likely to bear more than 
half of the transition risk in coal, oil and related infrastructure sectors even though coal mining 
is substantially privately owned. 
 Other responses  
Our analytical approach also indicates benefits from other responses, which might include: 
1. Avoiding new investments that would add to transition risk (i.e., those that might be 
viable in a BAU scenario but lose value in a 2DS scenario). Governments and financial 
supervisors have a range of options for discouraging these investments, ranging from 
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the direct (e.g. where sectors are publicly owned) to the more indirect (e.g. by 
reducing fiscal incentives; reducing/removing the availability of other forms of state 
support such as loan guarantees and power purchase agreements; or increasing 
capital charges for investments exposed to transition risk); 
2. Switching investment to sectors likely to benefit from a transition and in so doing, 
diversifying transition risk; 
3. Using information about the timing, drivers and distribution of transition risk to plan 
for a “just transition” for affected workers and communities; 
4. Capturing external benefits from the transition (e.g. lower than expected oil prices) or 
carbon tax revenues to help to compensate parties at risk from a transition or 
proactively incentivizing investors to shift capital towards sectors that are likely to 
benefit from the transition and where the country has a competitive advantage; 
5. Making the sovereign balance sheet or financial institutions more resilient to 
unmitigated transition risk by reducing, encouraging or mandating the reduction of 
leverage in advance of potential transition impacts; and 
6. Engaging with the international climate and development finance community for 
targeted transition risk mitigation support (e.g. financing to pay for the shut-down of 
highly emitting plants, where no cheaper alternative is expected in the short-term). 
5 South Africa case study  
This section presents some of the highlights from our South Africa case study as an example 
of how to apply the methodology outlined in the previous section. 13  The study was 
commissioned and supported by AFD. The analysis also benefited from feedback and debate 
at meetings of the Advisory Finance Group to the World Bank, which included current and 
former government ministers, including former finance minister of South Africa and chief 
executives of public finance institutions, including AFD and the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa (DBSA). 
Below, we outline the objectives of the sponsors of the study; key findings; our 
recommendations for policymakers; and lessons learned, which have been incorporated into 
planning for our next analyses in different countries.  
 Objectives 
The AFD had three main objectives when commissioning this study. Firstly, they hoped to use 
the results to support their engagement in the policy debate on the low carbon transition in 
South Africa. They also hoped to develop strategic insights that would be relevant for their 
partners and clients in South Africa (including financial institutions, municipalities and utilities) 
as to how to measure climate transition risk. AFD also hoped that the study would make a 
contribution to the international debate on the most appropriate methodologies for analyzing 
climate-related financial risk.  
                                                     
13 The full paper Understanding the impact of a low carbon transition on South Africa (2019) is available for free download 
from https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/understanding-the-impact-of-a-low-carbon-transition-on-south-
africa/. 
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Similar considerations also motivated the DBSA to engage seriously with the team at executive 
level. DBSA occupies a crucial position as a state-owned enterprise with a key role in financing 
infrastructure (such as the utility Eskom and port and freight rail operator Transnet) and 
municipalities, all of whom will face significant transition risk as identified in the report. DBSA 
has since decided to develop a new energy investment framework, which would guide them 
in making future investment decisions both in South Africa and its wider region of operation 
and explicitly account for considerations around transition risk and the just transition as well 
as more traditional development indicators, such as energy access. 
 Scope, data and scenarios 
We restricted the scope to sectors where we could use or devise what we thought were 
defensible low carbon scenarios including coal exports and oil imports, as well as related 
infrastructure, including rail lines, ports, pipelines, oil refineries and synthetic fuel production 
facilities which use gas and coal as feedstock.  
By contrast, our analysis of other sectors, including mining of platinum group metals, 
manganese, iron ore and the automotive assembly industry, was more qualitative, either 
because the outcome for an industry might either be net positive or negative (platinum, which 
is used in both diesel engines and hydrogen fuel cells), dependent on intra-technology 
competition (manganese, which is used in some energy storage technologies) or net negative 
but beyond the scope of our period of analysis (i.e., beyond 2035).  
Our primary 3rd party sources of data were Wood Mackenzie’s global coal cost curve and 
Rystad Energy’s UCube database as well as company-specific information from company 
websites and 3rd party research. We used adjusted versions of the IEA’s 2017 New Policies 
Scenario and Sustainable Development Scenario as the principal drivers of our global scenarios. 
We used current South African domestic policy as the baseline scenario for the domestic 
analysis. 
 Key findings 
Our analysis produced 5 top-level findings: 
1. South Africa faces material transition risk arising in coal mining, power, refining, ports, 
freight rail and pipeline sectors. We estimate the risk in these sectors at more than 
$124 billion (or more than 1 trillion rand) in 2018 present value terms.14 This figure 
represents around one third of South Africa’s 2018 GDP. An impact of this magnitude 
would likely trigger further losses to South African corporates, financial institutions 
and public finances by causing South Africa to lose its investment grade credit rating. 
2. Much of the risk and potential impact (approximately 75%) is due to factors, policies 
and events beyond the control of the South African government, while nearly 50% of 
the risk is due to changes in policy and market expectations – mainly outside of South 
Africa – that have already occurred over the last five years. In other words, South 
Africa and its companies and investors face considerable risk to the extent that they 
have not fully updated their business and investment plans to reflect international 
events of the last five years. 
                                                     
14 In the South Africa study, we calculated transition risk as the difference in the present value of two sets of projected net 
cash flows over the period 2018 and 2035 between BAU and 2DS scenarios. The BAU scenario included a sharp increase 
in coal exports over the period, as was expected in 2013, a scenario that was still driving investment cases for some new 
infrastructure investments last year. 
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3. The public balance sheet faces only 16% of the explicit risk, but after risk transfers and 
contingent liabilities, the government would face more than half of the potential risk 
of $124bn. 
4. The current South African system of incentives for capital investment still favors 
existing industries that are exposed to transition risk. We identified $25 billion in 
planned infrastructure investment decisions that would add to South Africa’s 
transition risk exposure, above and beyond the $124bn already identified, including 
coal power plants, coal mines, port and rail infrastructure. 
5. South Africa still has the chance to mitigate much of this risk, provided that it plans in 
advance to develop the fiscal, financial and policy tools required to shift transition risk 
away from parties without the capacity to bear it. 
 Further insight  
Our analysis also produced other, more detailed insights, including: 
5.4.1 Most of the risk lies in export coal and related infrastructure 
The largest share of risk (around 75% of the $124bn total) arises from factors beyond the 
control of South Africa, most notably the significant decline in demand for thermal coal traded 
on the seaborne market that would occur in a 2DS scenario. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 
14-2, prospects for the seaborne coal market appear already to have fallen significantly over 
the last five years, driven by a range of factors, not all of them related to climate policy. These 
factors include technological change (falls in the cost of wind and solar power generation and 
lithium ion batteries), new energy market regulation (incentives for higher penetrations of 
renewables and new power market designs which value energy system flexibility) and 
geopolitics – all factors beyond the control of South Africa or its government. 
Figure 14-2 More than half the value of South African coal exports was lost between 
2013 and 2017 measured as million tonnes (mt) and net present value (NPV) 
 
Sources: International Energy Agency, CPI EF 
We found that, between 2013 and 2017, the future prospects for South African coal exporters 
fell dramatically due to the slowing growth of coal fired power generation capacity countries 
that buy South African coal. When factored into some forecasts, the coal export business for 
the period of our study would be worth 65% less (Figure 14-2) than it had been in 2013. But 
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investment decisions in South Africa, including in new mines and the extension of freight rail 
capacity, did not reflect this level of lost value. This means that investments are occurring that 
would be stranded in a BAU scenario, not just in a 2DS scenario.  
A further $30bn could be at risk under a 2DS. Much of this risk is concentrated in the mid-
2020s, when our scenarios show a sharp decline in seaborne traded volumes as major coal 
buyers such as India and China ramp up domestic renewables capacity at the same time as 
trying to protect their domestic coal mining industries. 
Lower demand and lower prices for thermal coal would reduce profits for coal mining 
companies as well as lower royalties and tax receipts. However, the effect of lower-than-
expected profits will be much broader. As well as providing shareholders with a return on their 
investments, profits are also required to pay back the sunk capital investment in mines and 
the rail and port infrastructure that is needed to get the coal to the market. If a global low-
carbon transition prompts a fall in coal export revenues, not only might miner profits and 
government taxes be wiped out, there may not be sufficient cash to pay back original 
investments in mining and infrastructure. Our analysis showed that while state-owned freight 
rail operator Transnet would be protected against the effect of falling profits in the early 2020s 
via the “take-or-pay” terms of its contracts with miners, its coal freight line might flip from a 
major generator of group profits to a loss-making asset by the end of the 2020s. Declining 
earnings at Transnet, one of the few South African state-owned enterprises which has retained 
an investment grade rating in recent years, could increasingly restrict the company’s access to 
debt capital markets without government guarantees, meaning additional contingent 
liabilities for the public finances. 
5.4.2 Deep domestic decarbonization could add additional costs, which South 
Africa’s weakened public finances may increasingly struggle to bear 
At the same time as South Africa faces increasing economic pressure from declines in 
traditional sources of exports, international pressure to accelerate its own domestic low 
carbon transition is likely to accelerate. This pressure could manifest itself through 
international climate negotiations (with countries facing pressure to improve their “ambition” 
by the end of 2020) or through the decisions of domestic and international financial 
institutions to restrict financing to carbon-intensive businesses.15 
We did not attempt to specify an alternative decarbonization path for the country nor how 
much of the global decarbonization effort “should” be borne by South Africa. Instead we 
considered the potential costs and benefits to the country of accelerating decarbonization in 
the two most highly emitting sectors, electricity generation and synthetic fuel production from 
coal at Secunda (a facility which is among the largest single site sources of CO2 in the world). 
Our analysis showed that while accelerated decarbonization in the electricity sector could 
have minimal cost or even save money, replacing cheap fuel production from Secunda would 
be much more expensive. Figure 14-3 shows the results of our analysis, which considered the 
incremental cost of three options for mitigating emissions at Secunda, including retrofitting 
carbon capture technology and closing the refinery and replacing it with a new oil-based 
refinery. The most expensive option – closing the refinery and replacing the production with 
imports – could cost nearly $30 billion more in present value terms than continuing with the 
existing method of producing fuel from coal.  
                                                     
15 The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis counts over 100 “globally significant financial institutions” that 
have announced their divestment from coal mining and/or coal-fired power plants and lists the pledges at 
https://ieefa.org/finance-exiting-coal/ 
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Figure 14-3 The cost as net present value (NPV) to South Africa of closing Secunda 
early 
 
Sources: CPI EF estimates and analysis 
Whether the country can afford an accelerated transition or even today’s climate mitigation 
and adaptation investments will depend on how it reacts to external transition risk. If the 
country does not prepare adequately, it may find itself very constrained in the ability to spend 
on climate mitigation and adaptation activities. This, in turn, could mean it becomes 
increasingly reliant on international climate finance to support climate policy action.  
5.4.3 A variety of transmission channels could shift risk from investors to the public 
balance sheet 
How risk is distributed through the South African economy is as important as the absolute 
level of the risk. We found that while the public balance sheet would explicitly face only 16% 
of the downside risk (with investors facing the rest), there are several channels through which 
business strategy, policy and financial distress will further distribute the share initially borne 
by investors back to the public balance sheet. After these risk transfers, the South African 
government would bear more than half of the total risk. 
Until recently, more than half of South African coal export volumes was controlled by 
investment grade, internationally diversified “majors”, such as Anglo American, Glencore and 
South32. Our models showed that if today’s ownership of coal mines persisted, those parties 
would bear more than a third of the explicit transition risk (as illustrated in Figure 4) and, 
because of their financial strength, would likely be able to do so without experiencing financial 
distress. 
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Figure 14-4 The explicit distribution of South Africa’s external transition risk 
 
Sources: International Energy Agency, CPI EF. The blue section of each bars shows 
the amount of value lost between 2013 and 2017 resulting from changes in the 
baselines or BAU scenarios as at 2013 and 2017. 
NB: The second block of bars (including South 32 etc.) is a breakdown of the 
“International Majors” bar above. The third block is a breakdown of “Other private 
companies” while the Transnet bar corresponds to the “State owned enterprises” 
bar at the top. 
 
We identified Sasol as the South African company with the most significant transition risk 
exposure relative to its size. The company (whose two largest shareholders are South African 
public institutions) could lose value equating to more than a quarter of today’s market 
capitalization through falling profitability of its Secunda plant in the event of lower-than 
expected oil prices.  
However, the allocation of risk in South Africa may change once various parties react to the 
risk of loss to the value of their assets. Sasol is considering options to convert some of Secunda 
to run on natural gas, which will reduce the sensitivity of its profits to rises and falls in the oil 
price. In coal, where the risk is not yet priced into listed securities, companies that are alert to 
transition risk may seek to sell them to those who are not yet considering this risk. Recent 
sales such as that by South32 (to Seriti Resources) might be partly prompted by this. 
For companies remaining in the South African coal market, we would expect them to seek to 
recover some of the shortfall in export revenues by increased sales to domestic customers 
such as Eskom, although in practice this is likely to be limited as near-bankrupt Eskom has no 
financial capacity to bear further input cost increases without increasing electricity prices to 
consumers, many of whom are already unable to afford tariffs which in some cases have risen 
by 300% over the last 10 years. Instead, workers and key counterparties such as Transnet may 
be forced to bear this risk, with investors bearing the remainder. Some mine owners may 
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decide to close assets before the end of their economic lives. Mine closures will hit 
communities and workers through job losses, reduced economic activity and the loss of 
funding from companies for social infrastructure. Municipalities where assets are located may 
suffer the greatest impact (most of the value at risk lies in just two – Emalahleni and Steve 
Tshwete), but the spread of transition risk will be broader. Lower national taxes will reduce 
national government transfers to municipalities, curtailing their ability to provide services and 
to pay their obligations.  
As with municipalities, many companies (especially some of the highly leveraged Black 
Empowerment Enterprises) will not have strong enough balance sheets and may appeal for 
government assistance. National government could find itself faced by sharply increased costs 
due to either bailouts or decommissioning costs following bankruptcy.  
Government may find itself obliged or expected to absorb the impact of the transition in other 
ways. Government may support workers who lose their jobs or provide funding for 
unemployment benefits and retraining, or to provide finance and assistance to struggling 
municipalities to attract new job-creating investment. However, its capacity to provide this 
support could be constrained by lower tax revenues and an increase in non-performing loans 
and an erosion of capital bases at state-owned financial institutions such as the DBSA and the 
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (IDC). 
5.4.4 Government still has a range of options for mitigating transition risk, but will 
face political challenges   
Despite this analysis, which shows that most of the transition risk that South Africa faces 
derived from outside of the country, the debate around the energy transition in South Africa 
continues to revolve around the operational and financial crisis at utility Eskom. On the other 
hand, if the government (as well as state-owned enterprises and state-owned financial 
institutions) starts to incorporate an understanding of external and domestic transition risk 
into planning, it still has a variety of options to mitigate the risks identified in our study 
(summarized in Table 14-1). Many of these findings will apply to a variety of other countries, 
although the specifics and impact of the actions will vary depending on the circumstances of 
a country.  
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Table 14-1 CPI EF recommendations to the South African for mitigating transition 
risk in the country 
 
 
We recommended that, where it has control over timing (for example through fiscal incentives, 
direct procurement or access to finance from the DBSA and IDC), the country should delay 
major new capital investments until it is satisfied that they will remain economically viable in 
a 2DS scenario. We identified more than $25 billion of new investments that our modelling 
suggested might be viable in a BAU scenario but not in a 2DS scenario, including new mines, 
coal power plants, infrastructure and an oil refinery (as summarized in Table 14-2). 
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Table 14-2 Pending infrastructure investments that could destroy value in a 2DS 
scenario 
 
 
During a sustained period of weak economic growth, it may prove challenging politically for 
government to pull back support from new investments, especially if they attract capital into 
the country. If this sum was instead invested in industries or assets that are more resilient to 
transition risk, or benefit from a low carbon transition, it could spur a more sustainable source 
of jobs and economic growth. 
Beyond the very short-term, the phasing of government action to mitigate transition risk will 
also be critical, especially given the country’s weakened public finances. Closing power plants 
and fuel production assets too fast and the cost of generating or procuring replacement power 
and fuel could limit the government’s ability to spend on social programs and have a 
significantly negative impact on the workers (our analysis shows job losses of 25,000-35,000 
between now and 2035) and their communities. Act too slowly and the political barriers to 
future accelerated climate action will only rise. For example, if the government sought to 
introduce an accelerated ramp down of the coal mining industry in the mid-2020s in response 
to falling export demand, it would be challenging to ensure a process where all key 
stakeholders were able to provide input (including trade unions and local government) and 
the pressure for bailouts from coal companies falling into financial distress would become 
difficult to resist. 
By contrast, a transition plan designed well in advance of the decline in export coal markets 
would enable state-owned financial institutions such as the DBSA to develop new sources of 
transition funding instruments, which could draw in international climate finance to support 
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South Africa’s low carbon transition. A roadmap, which specified the least-cost means of 
supplying each power plant’s coal demand (and for what period) would also help the financial 
sector avoid stranded assets while also providing a justification for continuing some of its coal 
funding to keep the lights on for a specific period. 
A government-wide acceptance of coal’s finite future might open up options for South Africa 
to be proactive in harnessing the potential benefits of the global low-carbon transition. This 
could include reallocating investment incentives within mining from coal to minerals that 
might benefit from a low-carbon transition (including manganese and vanadium) and planning 
to make the most of benefits of lower oil prices that our report identified.  
Lower oil prices could dampen the effect of falling coal exports on the balance of payments. A 
more proactive policy could use the benefit of lower oil prices to offset risks from other sectors 
(see Figure 14-5 for an example). For example, national government might choose to increase 
taxes on oil products, diluting the benefit to consumers but reducing its own risk. Additional 
fuel tax revenues could be redistributed to parties struggling to bear the negative effects of 
the transition and/or retained to offset any pressure on the sovereign credit rating. 
Figure 14-5 Using micro-level analysis to design targeted mitigation policy – using 
the benefits of a lower oil price 
 
Source: CPI EF. Figures show transition risk in billions of US dollars 
 
 Lessons learned our South Africa case study 
We have explained some of the key findings from our work in South Africa, which illustrates 
the methodology set out earlier in this chapter. More detail can be found in the full report. 
Although the focus was on South Africa, we believe that versions of the above approach can 
be valuable to a wide variety of policymakers in countries with different characteristics. 
However, having access to the relevant data is an important prerequisite to a meaningful 
analysis. In South Africa, we benefited from the fact that most of the companies with exposed 
assets had publicly listed securities. Public institutions in South Africa are also subject to 
rigorous reporting requirements. The extensive disclosure from both sources provided a solid 
basis for drawing conclusions. In jurisdictions where assets are to a greater extent owned by 
private entities, or where there are weaker auditing and disclosure standards, analysis of this 
type will inevitably involve more educated guess work than in the South Africa example. 
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6 Limitations of the current approach 
Transition risk analysis using macroeconomic modelling tools only would not generate the 
level of insight as we have described here. Macroeconomic modelling provides policymakers, 
central bankers and regulators with only a partial understanding of transition risk. However, at 
the same time, CPI EF’s analysis on its own will not be sufficient to inform policymakers’ 
decisions as it does not provide a full picture of the second and third order effects such as 
impacts on inflation or economy-wide employment levels. We continue to work with partners 
to develop approaches to integrate the insights from both “micro” and “macro” analyses.   
Similarly, the nature of CPI EF’s analysis necessarily points to policy responses that are most 
effective in targeted channels. Recent literature has proposed a wider range of potential 
central bank interventions including exclusion of fossil-related assets from central bank 
collateral frameworks and asset purchases; accounting for transition risks in setting 
microprudential capital requirements; introducing macroprudential capital buffers for coal 
exposure and including stranded asset risk in stress tests. An approach which combines CPI 
EF’s analysis with macroeconomic modelling would open up a wider range of potential risk 
mitigation solutions. 
 Inherent uncertainty 
Beyond the limitations discussed above and the need for more work on integrating the insights 
from micro- and macro-level modelling, CPI EF is currently working to understand many other 
inherent uncertainties about transition risk. As the global low carbon transition progresses, 
countries are likely to face transition risk to assets in sectors where there is no current 
emissions pricing or obvious transmission mechanism for that risk. Emissions relating to land 
use and deforestation are a clear example of a sector responsible for material emissions but 
with no current method for pricing those emissions. We think that applying a hypothetical 
carbon price is unlikely to provide a meaningful estimate of transition risk as it will not account 
for the multiple different dynamics that may affect land use emissions, including shifts in 
demand for agricultural products; technological and policy changes that improve the 
productivity of land use and new synthetic food production techniques. CPI EF is working to 
develop a conceptual framework for understanding the potential drivers of transition risk in 
land use. 
Finally, the question of scenario-generation is a key methodological area for further research. 
Given the inherent uncertainty about the development timeframe of different low carbon 
technologies and their cost, there will be multiple potential pathways to 2DS. Our analysis 
currently uses static scenarios, but in practice, probabilistic scenarios will be required which 
account for a variety of potential transmission pathways. These will be critical not just for 
increasingly useful transition risk analysis, but much more broadly across policymaking, 
strategic and investment decisions. 
 Other climate-related financial risks  
Our analysis focused only on climate transition risk. However, countries and regions also face 
significant physical climate risk that would have material effects on economies and financial 
systems if not monitored and managed effectively. While we expect the majority of physical 
risk on a global basis to crystallise later than transition risk, physical risk shocks, such as 
Hurricane Idai, can negatively affect the capacity of countries to be proactive in managing 
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transition risk. 16  Physical risk also interacts in important ways with the issues we have 
addressed in this work: 
• Rising temperatures will affect the number of hours per day that South African mine 
workers are able to work; in water-stressed regions, the cost of water may rise 
significantly (either because of scarcity or because of the investment in expensive 
technologies such as desalination), further affecting the operating costs of all 
businesses including those exposed to transition risk.  
• Some global warming may already be “locked in” as a result of historic greenhouse gas 
emissions. However, the incremental amount of warming (and hence, physical 
damage) resulting from future emissions may be higher or lower depending on the 
speed of global climate mitigation action. All else being equal, lower expected levels 
of physical damage may mean lower required spending on climate adaptation. 
However, the benefits of lower adaptation costs are likely to be in the longer term. 
Further work is needed to provide policymakers with a broader picture of climate-
related financial risks. 
7 Conclusion 
Over the past decade, we have seen how the need for action on climate change has become 
more broadly accepted by governments, corporates and investors. But how urgently global 
action can be implemented over the coming decade is difficult to determine. 
At COP26 parties to the Paris agreement will, in theory, be required to submit revised 
Nationally Determined Contributions which raise “ambition” for climate mitigation action. As 
pressure for more aggressive climate mitigation continues to grow, particularly in light of the 
IPCC’s special report on 1.5C warming, we can only anticipate further demand for detailed 
analytical work such as that set out earlier in this chapter.  
We believe that financial shocks triggered by climate transition risk are not inevitable but will 
be much more likely to pose risk to financial stability if they are not managed in an effective 
way. We think that the analytical approach outlined in this chapter will help regulators and 
policymakers do this.  
If climate-related financial risks are managed more effectively, economies can become more 
resilient, companies can continue to grow, new industries can emerge that are aligned with a 
low carbon economy, and the transition of workers from carbon intensive industries can be 
managed more smoothly.  
  
  
                                                     
16 Other shocks to economic capacity or the strength of financial systems, such the crisis precipitated by the COVID-19 
pandemic, also sap the capacity of governments to undertake climate mitigation action where it requires up-front 
investment or fiscal support. 
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 A Macroeconomic Approach to Assessing 
Economy-Wide Transition Risks: The Case of South Africa  
 
By 
Agence Française de Développement (AFD)1 
Abstract  
Using a simple macroeconomic approach, this chapter highlights the interconnected nature of 
the production network and shows why this is relevant when assessing transition risks. We 
consider two simplified transition shocks on the coal and automotive exports of South Africa, 
analyze how these propagate in the economy due to reduced demand of these sectors, and 
assess the indirect loss of production, gross operating surplus and employment ensuing the 
original shocks. We then use financial data and a simple econometric model to quantify the 
evolution of financial fragility within all sectors, and determine which sectors are the most 
exposed and most sensitive to transition risks emerging out of our two scenarios. 
Keywords: macroeconomics, input-output, transition risks, financial fragility, production 
network, sectorial interconnection 
1 Introduction 
Given the ambition of the Paris Agreement to maintain global warming below 2C, a low-carbon 
transition will have to take place, impacting most, if not all, sectors of the economy and 
creating dynamics similar to Schumpeter’s creative destruction. To study ways in which 
decarbonisation is prone to hamper the economic and financial system, the notion of stranded 
assets and transition risks has emerged in the literature, demonstrating possible roots for 
financial instability (Carney, 2015; Rozenberg et al., 2018). Campiglio et al. (2017), among 
others, argue that stranded assets could generate broader macroeconomic negative 
consequences through financial repercussions. For financial regulators, central banks, finance 
ministries, and other financial institutions it is thus of the utmost importance to understand 
to what extent their portfolio and the financial system in general is exposed to these risks. 
As a financial institution exposed to these risks, and more importantly as a development bank 
keen to contribute to the acceleration of smooth low carbon transitions,2 AFD is engaged in 
research programs and studies in this field. AFD is working on a macroeconomic modelling 
effort called GEMMES 3  (Generalized Multisecorial and Monetary Macrodynamics for the 
Ecological Shift), currently developed in several countries and of high relevance for transition 
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Antoine Godin (corresponding author), head of the GEMMES macro-modelling team Agence 
Francaise de Developpement and research associate at Centre d’Economie de l’Université de Paris Nord, email: 
godina@afd.fr; Paul Hadji-Lazaro, Ph.D. student at Université Sorbonne Paris Nord, and Laurent Bergadaa, Research Officer, 
Agence Française de Développement. 
2 As financial institutions and corporates analyze transition risks they are more likely to hedge themselves against these 
risks by greening their portfolios. This is also true at a sovereign and sub-sovereign level. In addition, transition risk analyses 
allow to identify potential “losers” of the transition (companies, sectors, municipalities, communities) and to provide support 
to them in order to maximize social and financial stability, and lessen resistance to policies favorable to the transition. 
3 https://www.afd.fr/en/page-programme-de-recherche/gemmes-new-modelling-tool-incorporates-energy-transition  
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risk analysis. AFD has also partnered with Climate Policy Initiative to develop microeconomic 
analyses of transition risks, the first of which was done on South Africa. The work presented 
in this chapter is a variation of the macroeconomic approach using simple modelling of the 
production structure on the economy. 
All these studies show that it is useful to perceive the low carbon transition as a transformation 
of the production structure whereby carbon-intensive activities will disappear and be replaced 
by low-carbon-intensive activities, and where all sectors in the economy will be impacted, in 
one way or the other. The reason behind this is that our economies comprise highly 
interconnected and specialized production processes where the production of one sector is 
used by other sectors to produce their own goods and services. These value chains require to 
look at more sectors than the usual suspects (carbon-intensive sectors) when trying to asses 
transition risks. 
When assessing transition risks, whether at the level of a single company, financial institution, 
or of a financial system, analysts will typically define a scenario associated with a low carbon 
transition (such as a new carbon tax, or reduced demand for carbon intensive products) and 
apply that scenario through the use of models to the object of analysis. As the Climate Policy 
Institute (CPI) study of low carbon transition risks in South Africa shows quite clearly, looking 
at the direct impact of a particular low carbon shock or scenario is not enough to have a sense 
of the overall consequences of such a scenario (Huxham et al., 2019). It is also crucial to assess 
how the initial impact is spread throughout the whole economy, by looking at commercial, 
financial and capitalistic relationships. This can be done effectively from a microeconomic 
approach by building heuristic models and analyzing contracts where appropriate, as CPI have 
done. However, this approach lacks the macroeconomic dimension and thus underestimates 
economy-wide 2nd round effects. On the other hand, the complete dynamic macroeconomic 
transition risk stress tests, such as those being developed by a number of NGFS members, 
could be seen by some central banks or finance ministries wanting to start with a bird’s eye 
view of the issue, as highly technical, labor and data intensive. 
We present in this paper what could be considered as a simplified macroeconomic approach 
to the issue of transition risk analysis. Using a static Input-Output model of the South African 
economy, we assess the impact on various economic sectors’ output of a theoretical negative 
shock on South Africa’s coal and automotive exports. We then use jobs and financial data to 
look at the total impact on employment, and to identify the sectors most at risk of representing 
a burden to financial system through increased default probabilities. 
Although we mainly intend to provide an illustration of an interesting and readily usable 
methodological approach to transition risks, the choice of South Africa as a case study is 
pertinent. The country is particularly exposed to transition risks, in particular through its 
export sector. We were also able to build on the work done by CPI in this regard, by using the 
low-carbon scenario on coal that was developed. Last but not least, South Africa’s statistical 
office, Statistics South Africa, provides detailed Input-Output (IO) tables as well as financial 
data at the sectorial level, allowing for a connection between impacts at the production level 
and impacts at the financial level.  
Carley et al. (2018) develop a conceptual framework where they decompose vulnerability as 
the combination of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity, in the context of the energy 
transition. The higher the exposure and the sensitivity and the lower the adaptive capacity, 
the more vulnerable is a sector. We apply this framework to our results and highlight how 
certain sectors are exposed and sensitive to financial risks emerging out of simplified transition 
scenarios (under the form of two exports shocks to the coal or automotive sectors). More 
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precisely, we indicate how indirectly affected sectors see a loss of production and employment 
as well as a worsening of two financial fragility indicators: the net debt to EBITDA ratio and the 
Z-score. We further quantify the magnitude of these worsening and highlight that the 
transport, and electricity, gas and water (and auxiliary financial services4 to a lesser extent) 
sectors are particularly exposed to the coal shock, while the metal ores, basic iron and steel, 
glass, auxiliary financial services and again the electricity, gas and water sectors are exposed 
to the automotive shock. 
The data sources and technicalities to assess the impact of a specific transition shock are 
described in Section 2. Section 3 illustrates the methodology with a case study of transition 
shocks and stranding implications in South Africa. Section 4 concludes. 
2 Methodological overview 
 Transition shock 
The low-carbon transition can generate shocks to the production and consumption structure 
by many ways. For example, firms may decide to stop using a specific technology because of a 
carbon tax or due to more stringent regulation. In some cases, this might affect downstream 
firms using these goods because the new technology has changed the characteristics of the 
produced goods. This is what we call a supply shock. A demand shock on the other hand would 
take place where specific policies, technological change or consumer behavior change induce 
a change in consumption behavior, either in the final demand, i.e.,  households’ consumption 
patterns, or in intermediate consumption, i.e., firms’ decision on their usage of inputs. A 
reduction in demand for a specific sector will also propagate into the rest of the economy, as 
the firms in that sector are very likely to produce their goods and services using goods and 
services produced in other sectors. A demand shock can have a domestic origin, i.e., firms and 
households within the country changing their behaviors, or a foreign origin.  
In a liberal market economy, the vast majority of transition shocks will materialize in the form 
of demand shocks. It should also be stated that these shocks will materialize in various ways, 
will not be limited to a single event (hence the use of scenarios) and will come in the form of 
both negative and positive impacts. In this study, we have aimed mainly at exposing a 
particular methodology, and have chosen to concentrate on a specific type of shock, that is an 
external negative demand shocks taking the form of a marked reduction in the exports 
(specifically: coal and automotive). 
This choice of a simplified external shock impacting negatively only one sector is made for 
illustrative purposes only. The methodology can accommodate shocks of any nature: domestic 
or external, demand loss or demand increase, and one or many impacted sectors.  
 Input-Output model 
An IO table is a matrix, see Table 15-1, representing all the transactions of goods and services 
taking place in the economy, specifying the buying (columns) and selling sectors (rows). The 
transactions are grouped into two categories: intermediate consumption and final demand. 
The top left quadrant in Table 15-1 represents intermediate consumption taking place 
between two productive sectors in the production process (e.g. corn supplied by farmers and 
used by restaurants to produce meals). The top right quadrant of Table 15-1 represents final 
                                                     
4 The Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation sector combines activities such as administration of financial markets, 
security dealing activities or activities auxiliary to insurance and pension funds. They are considered as auxiliary because 
these activities do not involve taking the ownership of the financial assets and liabilities being transacted. 
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demand taking the form of consumption, government expenditures, investment in capita, 
investment in inventories and exports. An IO table can also contain information regarding the 
domestic/imported nature of the goods and services being sold, as shown in Table 15-1. Finally, 
the IO table also displays the value added (defined as the difference between sales from a 
sector and its intermediary consumption) distribution between taxes, wages and gross 
operating surplus, this is the bottom part of Table 15-1. 
Table 15-1 Structure of an Input-Output table with detailed imports 
 
Such a table can highlight the interconnectedness of the productive sectors of an economy. It 
indicates how a sector relies on the production of other sectors to produce the goods and 
services it sells. An IO table can be used for numerous applications. A common one is its use 
in a demand-pull model of impact analysis. A demand-pull model is a very simple model based 
on matrix algebra (mostly an inversion). Its purpose is to quantify the effect on all sectors of 
the economy of a specific change (a shock) in demand occurring in one or many sector(s). As 
we will see, because IO tables relate every transaction of intermediate goods in a symmetric 
and consistent manner, they allow grasping the systemic impact of such an exogenous shock. 
Intuitively, the demand-pull model computes how the initial shock first hits the shocked sector 
and then propagates in the economy as sectors (including the shocked sector) producing 
intermediary goods used by the shocked sector reduce their production, and as sectors 
producing the intermediary goods used to produce these intermediary goods also reduce their 
production, and so on. We can thus distinguish between the direct effects (the loss of 
production directly due to the shock) and indirect effects (all the rounds of loss of production 
following the shock). It is important to note that the shocked sector can have both direct and 
indirect effects as it often uses its own production to produce its goods and services. 
 Employment and financial impacts 
Once the IO model has shown the final impact of the exogenous shock through multiple 
iterations, we then combine the results (mainly: impact on output for each sector of the IO 
table) with employment and financial data to determine the loss in terms of jobs, or in terms 
of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). For this, we 
mobilize two concepts: the labor intensity on the one hand and the EBITDA elasticity on the 
other.  
Labor intensity relates the quantity of jobs, measured in full time equivalent, needed to 
produce one unit of goods and services. Once we know these labor intensities, it is then easy 
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to compute the total loss of jobs in the economy due to a demand shock by computing direct 
and indirect job losses across all the affected sectors.  
While the relationship between production and labor is relatively straightforward, it is less so 
for EBITDA. There are indeed non-linearities between output and EBITDA due to the presence 
of fixed costs or non-production costs such as interests’ payments, marketing costs etc. This is 
why we posit an elasticity of transformation between output and EBITDA at the sectorial level. 
We estimate this elasticity via a log-log econometric regression, using 2006-2018 time series 
from the financial dataset. The combination of the demand-pull model and this simple 
econometric model allows us to compute the loss of EBITDA in all sectors of the economy due 
to a shock in demand. 
We then use two different financial fragility indicators, namely the Net-Debt to EBITDA ratio 
and a version of Altman’s Z-score, at an aggregated sectoral level, to identify those sectors that 
are most likely to represent a challenge from a macroeconomic perspective, as well as for the 
financial system, or to individual financial institutions depending on their exposure to these 
sectors. 
 Assumptions and limitations 
The IO model and the further development we have described here rely on strong assumptions 
that could be framed as follows: 
• The scenario is a one-time event, and firms do not adapt to the shock by changing 
their production processes (the technical coefficients of the IO matrix are static and 
there is no substitution between inputs). 
• Producers face constant returns to scale (a change in the output level will induce a 
change in the same proportion in the needed inputs for a unitary production). 
• Labor and capital are unlimited and available at fixed price (a change in the demand 
for productive factors will not induce a change in their cost). 
• We assume a linear relationship between labor and output and a non-linear 
relationship (in the form of an elasticity) between output and EBITDA. 
 Data sources 
We use a 50 sectors IO table published in 2014 by Statistics South Africa. We construct 
employment data combining the 2014 Quarterly Labor Force Survey and the 2014 Quarterly 
Employment Statistics. We decomposed the mining sector into two Gold and Non-Gold sectors, 
using the 2015 report on the Mining Industry (StatSA, 2015). 
We use the Annual Financial Statistics for 2014, published by Statistics South Africa. The 
financial dataset does not cover four IO sectors: Agriculture, Financial intermediation, 
Insurance and pensions, and Education. Their financial data are arbitrarily set to null. 
3 Transition shocks and stranding implications in South Africa 
In this chapter, we model transition dynamics as exports shocks. The main shock we simulate 
concerns the coal sector. With 9.9 billion tons of proven coal reserves at the end of 2017, South 
Africa has 1.0% of the world’s proven reserves and ranks 12th as such. The coal industry 
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represented 1.52% in the GDP in 2014 (the year of our IO table). Over the period 2001-2017, 
around 28% of extracted tons of coal were exported, with South Africa being the 6th largest 
exporter in 2017. To quantify the shock we study, we follow scenarios by Huxham et al. (2019), 
who model a decrease of around 70% in South African exports value until 2025 under a 
scenario which would limit the rise in global temperature to 2°C (compared to the pre-
industrial period). We model this shock as a single exogenous event, rather than as a times 
series. 
In order to compare and contrast the transition risks emerging from a loss in coal exports, we 
also simulate an export loss in the motor vehicles sector. South Africa is indeed well inserted 
within the global value chain of the motor industry (Barnes and Morris 2008), and it is 
reasonable to assume that a global transition to a low carbon economy will lead to a reduction 
in demand for internal combustion engine vehicles. For illustrative purposes only, we use a 
shock of the same magnitude than in the coal sector (approx. 44bn Rand) to compare the 
results.  
 The propagation of an external transition shock 
Figure 15-1 represents the propagation of the coal shock. Each node is a sector and each vertex 
represent the fact that the upstream sectors demands less goods and services produced in the 
downstream sector. We kept only the most impacted sector, following the methodology 
described in Cahen-Fourot et al. (2019, 2020). 
Figure 15-1 Network of output stranding due to a unitary loss in final demand in the 
coal and lignite sector 
 
Source: StatSA, 2017 and authors’ computation 
 
Figure 2-1 illustrates that there can be many different paths of different length by which a 
specific sector is impacted by the loss of final demand in the shocked sector, even if that sector 
seems quite far in the industrial network from the originating sector. 
We can indeed observe different supply chains, such as the trade industry chain relying on 
telecommunication, real estate activities, and computer activities. Each sector in the chain 
produces output used by sectors higher in the chain as intermediary inputs for their own 
production. These chains are thus propagation cascades where the loss of production in 
sectors high in the chain leads to loss of production for sector lower in the chain.  
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 From stranded output to stranded jobs and stranded profits 
Once we determine the quantity of output loss in each sector, it is possible to pursue the 
analysis and compute the quantity of profits, taxes or wages being lost. Importantly, this will 
depend on the nature of the production process in each sector, as different sectors have 
different levels of capital or labor intensity. These characteristics lead to different distributions 
of the added value between labor income (wages) and capital income (profits). The overall 
quantity of lost profits or lost wages in the economy thus depends on which sectors are 
impacted and on their added value distribution among the different factors.  
Figure 15-2 shows the total relative losses in output, employment and gross operating surplus 
(GOS) in the case of a reduction of export demand in the coal and lignite sector, while Delving 
deeper on the sectoral impacts of a loss of motor vehicles exports, we can see that while the 
indirect impacts are more than 100% the direct impacts on output being stranded, the direct 
impacts corresponds to only 25% (resp. 5%) of the total impact for employment (resp. GOS). 
Sectors indirectly impacted, such as trade, other services or transports, even see a larger 
decrease in GOS than the directly impacted motor vehicles sector. 
Figure 15-3 shows the same indicators for the motor vehicles shock. Each stacked element of 
the bar plot corresponds to the loss of output, employment or GOS in a specific sector. The 
bar plots have been normalized to one, for ease of reading but the aggregate loss is indicated 
under each bar plot, as a percentage of total output, employment or GOS in the South African 
economy. The direct effect, i.e., the loss due to the original shock, has been highlighted in blue. 
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Figure 15-2 Sectorial stranding components, i.e., output, employment and GOS, due 
to a loss in demand in the coal sector 
 
Source: StatSA (20175, 2019b6, 2019c7) and authors’ computation 
 
We observe that, in the case of the coal export loss, the original shock (highlighted in blue) 
corresponds to 2/3 of the total impact in terms of total nominal output. This means that for 
every two Rands of lost output in the coal export sector, there will be another Rand of lost 
output distributed in the rest of the economy due to the lost purchases of goods and services 
of the coal sector to the rest of the economy, and to the knock-on effects. The sectors most 
impacted are transport and trade. The relative impacts change drastically when looking at the 
two other impacted variables. Coal and lignite being capital intensive, one sees that the 
indirect loss of GOS amounts to only 25% of the total loss8. On the other hand, as the coal 
sector is relatively less intensive in labor, the direct loss of employment represents roughly 1/3 
of the total loss in employment. This means that for every job at risk in the coal export sector, 
there are actually two other jobs at risk in the rest of the economy. Naturally we find the same 
impacted sectors when looking at jobs and when looking at output (with transport and trade 
playing a key role), driven by the structure of the supply chain, as highlighted in Figure 1. 
However, the relative sectorial losses differ, reflecting varying sectorial capital or labor intensity. 
This indicates that both the structure and the sectorial characteristics of the economy are 
important when trying to evaluate an external transition shock. 
The results are strikingly different in the case of a shock to the motor vehicles industry, as 
shown in Figure 3. We first see that while the original shock to the two sectors are identical in 
                                                     
5 StatSA (2017). Input-output tables for South Africa. Accessed: 2020-01-08. 
6 StatSA (2019b). Quarterly employment statistics. Accessed: 2020-01-08. 
7 StatSA (2019c). Quarterly labour force survey. Accessed: 2020-01-08. 
8 All things being equal, a capital intensive company usually have a higher ratio of GOS to Value added. 
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magnitude (again - for illustrative purposes), they lead to different total stranding impacts in 
output (0.93% of domestic output in the case of coal vs. 1.33% in the case of motor vehicles), 
employment (0.42% vs. 0.79%) and GOS (1.57% vs. 0.65%). This illustrates again that the 
structure of the economy is not neutral in driving how different shocks spread through the 
economy and affect different indicators. The total impact on a specific indicator is the sum of 
sectorial impacts, which are themselves a multiplier of the original shock. The sectorial 
multiplier depends on the strength of the connection between the initial sector and the sector 
under scrutiny and on the nature of each sector: more or less labor intensive for employment, 
more or less capital intensive for GOS. The fact that the automotive sector is more integrated 
in the production structure of the South African economy explains why it generates a larger 
total loss of production than the coal sector. The economic characteristics of the directly and 
indirectly impacted sectors explains why the loss in coal exports leads to a larger impact on 
GOS and a smaller impact on employment. 
Delving deeper on the sectoral impacts of a loss of motor vehicles exports, we can see that 
while the indirect impacts are more than 100% the direct impacts on output being stranded, 
the direct impacts corresponds to only 25% (resp. 5%) of the total impact for employment 
(resp. GOS). Sectors indirectly impacted, such as trade, other services9 or transports, even see 
a larger decrease in GOS than the directly impacted motor vehicles sector. 
                                                     
9 Other services correspond to a combination of services supplied to the household sectors, as well as any 
service provider that does not enter in the otherwise classified service sectors. The diffuse nature of the sector 
explains why it is strongly connected to the industry. 
 
A Macroeconomic Approach to Assessing Economy-Wide Transition Risks  
249 
Figure 15-3 Sectorial stranding components, i.e., output, employment and GOS, due 
to a loss in demand in the motor vehicles sector  
 
Source: StatSA (201710, 2019b11, 2019c12) and authors' computation 
 
 Financial implications 
As interesting the outcome of the stranding analysis in terms of employment or GOS is, it fails 
to assess the impact of the export shock on financial stability. In order to do so, we combine 
the demand-pull model of output stranding with two financial fragility indicators: the net debt 
to EBITDA ratio and a version of Altman’s Z-score.  
We use the non-linear relationship described in the methodology section to determine the 
loss of EBITDA due to the two exports shocks. Figure 4 shows the results we obtained. The size 
of the bubbles represent the total amount of debt (both short-term and long-term) per sector, 
while their color represents the shock: red for coal and blue for automotive. Their position on 
the x-axis indicates their initial financial fragility, using the net debt to EBITDA ratio, while their 
position on the y-axis indicates the increase in fragility following each shock. To facilitate 
reading, we do not display extreme case such as Furniture and Electronic valves sectors which 
have very high net debt to EBITDA ratio (above 20) and a relatively large increase fragility 
(around 2%) for either shock. The same is true for the Basic Iron and steel and leather and 
luggage sectors displaying a very high increase in their net debt to EBITDA (around 10%) in the 
case of the automotive shock, although having a low initial ratio (less than 2).  
In the case of the coal shock (red bubbles), we observe that, on top of the the unseen 
electronic valves and furniture, the electricity, gas and water and transport (and auxiliary 
                                                     
10 StatSA (2017). Input-output tables for South Africa. Accessed: 2020-01-08. 
11 StatSA (2019b). Quarterly employment statistics. Accessed: 2020-01-08. 
12 StatSA (2019c). Quarterly labour force survey. Accessed: 2020-01-08. 
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financial services to a lesser extent) sectors combine a relatively higher net debt to EBITDA 
ratio and higher variation in the same ratio. In the case of the motor vehicles shock (blue 
bubbles), we see, on top of the electronic valves and furniture, electricity, gas and water and 
coal and lignite (and spinning and textiles, glass, nuclear fuel, metal ores 
Figure 15-4 Stranding EBITDA, financial fragility, and liability sizes 
 
Source: StatSA (2017, 2019a) and authors’ computation 
 
We complement the previous results with an analysis of the evolution of the Z’’-score following 
the two exports shocks. The lower the score, the more likely the company is to face bankruptcy 
with a value of zero being equated to a default (D) rated bond. Figure 15-5 plots the same 
bubble representing total sectorial liabilities where their position on the x-axis represents the 
initial sectorial Z-score and their position on the y-axis represents the evolution of that 
indicator for the two shocks(red for coal and blue for automotive). In order to avoid clogging 
the figure, we only show sectors having a Z-score below six. While we find some of the 
previously mentioned sectors standing out again (Basic iron and steel, glass, metal ores, 
electricity, gas and water, transport), the others however display a relatively high Z-score. 
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Figure 15-5 Z-scores and variation in Z-score 
 
Source: StatSA (2017, 2019a) and authors' computation 
4 Discussion and conclusion 
Using the South African coal export sector as a case study, we have illustrated how using a 
simple static Input-Output model can yield interesting insights on the importance of indirect 
effects of exogenous low carbon shocks, both on loss of output and job losses. The approach 
can also combined with financial statistical data to help identify those sectors that are most 
likely to contribute to potential financial instability.  
Our main results highlight that while carbon intensive sectors are more likely to be directly 
affected by transition risks, other less carbon intensive sectors might indirectly be impacted 
through the network of supply and use of intermediate inputs. This is highlighted through the 
use of a static Input-Output model of the economy. In a sense, this approach illustrates the 
importance of looking at scope 3 carbon footprints when analyzing transition risks. Indeed, 
the often-used approach of using scope 1 carbon footprints for transition risk mapping misses 
how value chains are a vector of carbon relationships and carbon-related risk. The Input-
Output models can be considered a way to address the near impossibility of mobilizing scope 
3 carbon footprints at scale. 
With regards to financial vulnerability in the face of climate related risks, it is useful to 
distinguish between exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. We thus use these concepts 
to discuss our results. In the case of the coal export loss, we thus observe that sectors such as 
transport, and electricity, gas and water (and auxiliary financial to a lesser extent) are 
combining exposure (due to their position in the cascade of production loss) and sensitivity 
(due to their relative financial fragility). In order to determine financial vulnerability, one would 
need to determine the adaptive capacity of each sector, which is beyond the scope of this 
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exercise. We nonetheless can assume that the adaptive capacity of the utilities sector is quite 
high, given its strategic position in an economy and its public nature. This however could imply 
a transfer of fragility to the public sector, which would have to recapitalize the sector. 
In the case of the cars export loss, we first observe that the South African economy is more 
exposed in general to production loss. This is because of the stronger integration of the 
automotive in the production network. We thus find more sectors combining exposure and 
sensitivity: metal ores, basic iron and steel, glass, auxiliary financial services and again the 
electricity, gas and water.  
From a case study point of view, the approach developed here shows that scenario building is 
a contextual exercise, which needs to be thought both in terms of reduction in Green House 
Gas emissions and in terms of the production structure of the economy at hand. Concentrating 
only on carbon intensive sector would be an error as financial vulnerabilities might develop in 
other sectors as well. Of course, the case study developed here only considers negative shocks 
while the transition to a low carbon economy is also a source of opportunities. This does not 
change the nature of our results: grasping the systemic impacts of a transition to a low carbon 
economy is fundamental.  
The advantage of this approach is its ease of implementation, only requiring a few matrix 
calculus operations, its relative frugality in terms of data (we combined an IO table with 
sectorial employment and financial data) implying that it can easily be implemented in data-
poor countries. The main limitations of the approach are the fact that input-output data are 
sometimes outdated and of irregular quality 13 , the static economy assumption, and the 
absence of an economy-wide multi-sector low-carbon transition scenario.  
While the proposed approach allows us to capture direct and indirect effects of transition 
shocks, highlighting the systemic nature of the low carbon economy, the analysis done here 
should not be considered as approaching a full macroeconomic model and there are many 
ways in which it could be improved to strengthen the results. 
                                                     
13 In the case of South Africa, we had to use input-output data from 2014. And although we have no reason to doubt the 
quality of the data, this is however not always the case. 
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 Environmental Stress Testing for Equity 
Portfolios  
 
By 
Yao Wang and Yi-Chen Shi1 
Abstract  
China has come under greater environmental and resource pressure at a time when 
increasingly severe global warming brings climate risks into focus. Assessing the impact of 
climate risks on financial performance, this research conducts climate stress testing on equity 
portfolios. First, it employs the asset-pricing model to analyze whether the investment 
portfolio of an asset management company is impacted by climatic factors through sensitivity 
analysis. It then simulates changes of share values in the asset portfolio under several climate 
stress scenarios. Lastly, it calculates the possible maximum value at risk (VaR) of the equity 
portfolio under an extreme climatic risk scenario. The empirical results show that carbon risk 
constitutes a significant impact on the returns and market values of the stocks making up the CSI 
300 Index, and an extreme carbon risk event can cause the market value of the index portfolio to 
drop as much as 10%.  Further, this research finds that carbon risk can have a positive effect on the 
returns of green stocks and a significant negative impact on brown stocks. 
Keywords: environmental stress testing, climate risk, equity portfolio, VaR, scenario and 
sensitivity analysis, carbon asset pricing 
1 Introduction 
The G20 Green Finance Synthesis Report 2016 points out that a major barrier to the 
development of green finance is the absence of environmental risk analysis tools and capacity. 
Therefore, stakeholders should develop and promote environmental risk analysis tools and 
apply them to the financial industry. In April 2019, the NGFS released A call for action Climate 
change as a source of financial risk, and pointed to the need to integrate climate-related risks 
into financial-stability monitoring and regulation. 
The academic community has studied environmental stress testing of the financial sectors, 
mostly focused on banks (Batten et al., 2016; Battiston et al., 2017; Monasterolo et al., 2017; 
Zhang et al., 2016), but little on the asset management industry. Amongst them, Alessi et al., 
2019 performed a carbon stress test on the actual equity holdings of various institutional 
sectors and presented a tool to assess a portfolio’s exposure to climate risks. They found that 
even in a benign scenario, losses could be reduced by 30% by halving the exposure to carbon-
intensive sectors. 
In China, seven ministry-level bodies, including the People’s Bank of China (PBC), jointly 
launched the Guidelines for Establishing Green Finance System on August 31, 2016. Article 10 
                                                     
1 Prof. Yao Wang is the Director General of International Institute of Green Finance (IIGF) at Central University of Finance 
and Economics (CUFE), email: yaowang2013@163.com. Dr. Yi-Chen Shi is a Deputy Director General, chair professor and 
head of Green Finance Innovation Laboratory of IIGF, ycshih_cufe@163.com. 
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and Article 18 of the guidelines explicitly specify financial institutions’ implementation of 
environmental-risk stress testing. The document encourages banks and other financial 
institutions to assess loans and asset risk exposures in the areas with high environmental risks, 
as well as perform quantitative analysis of potential credit risks and market risks from 
exposures under different scenarios. Furthermore, the Guidelines require institutional 
investors to enhance the ability to assess environmental risks and carbon emissions involved 
in their assets and demand institutional investors (particularly insurance companies) to 
conduct stress tests on the impact of environmental and climate factors.  
Based on this, environmental stress testing for the financial sectors has been studied since 
2016 in China. For instance, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) analyzed the 
impact of climate change on the credit risks of commercial banks and conducted 
environmental cost stress tests on thermal power and cement industries (Zhang et al., 2016). 
The International Institute of Green Finance, CUFE (IIGF), launched the first research 
conducting environmental stress tests for asset-management companies in China. In its report, 
the IIGF describes the methodology and tests on the impact of climate and environmental risks 
on stock returns and market values (Wang & Shi, 2017). This paper introduces the findings 
published by IIGF in 2017 and discusses their potential applications. 
IIGF’s research does not limit the methodology to only employing the normal discounted cash 
flow (DCF) to explore how risk factors affect a company’s operating profit. Instead, based on 
the characteristics of the asset management companies, this research uses asset-pricing to 
measure market risks and includes environmental factors in the model, thereby reflecting the 
risk factor with market prices and influences on the unexpected return of the asset. At the 
same time, this research employs the VaR model to derive quantitative environmental risks, 
namely VaR monetization. On this basis, it provides a decision-making basis for industry and 
companies and provides a quantitative reference for the government to establish policies on 
environmental information disclosure and environmental stress-testing. 
This research combines sensitivity and scenario analyses to explore the impacts of climate risk 
on firms’ financial performance. Previous researches on environmental stress testing mostly 
adopted scenario analysis methods with few sensitivity analyses performed. This is because 
the DCF method only needs to assume discount cash flows under certain future scenarios, 
while the sensitivity analysis incorporates historical data. Few researchers have taken this 
approach, let alone combining sensitivity analysis and scenario analysis. 
The implementation of environmental stress testing helps prompt financial institutions to 
recognize the significance of environmental and climatic risks and further push their corporate 
customers to disclose environmental information. Research and development of related 
methods will also gradually refine the methodology for the environmental stress testing of the 
financial industry, creating a set of public environmental stress testing models for the industry.   
2 Research methodology for climate Stress Testing of Equity 
Portfolios 
 Climate stress testing architecture 
The first step of a climate stress test is to identify concrete climate risks, including physical and 
transition risks. After identifying the climate risks, we can perform scenario analysis and 
sensitivity analysis pertaining to bonds, equities, real estate and other assets held by an asset 
management company based on these predefined risks. Since carbon pricing is an important 
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tool to mitigate climate change with market mechanisms, and carbon price can reflect some 
of the climate risks, we add it to our model as a climate risk factor. This approach is based on 
an efficient carbon-emissions market. 
Figure 16-1 Climate stress testing architecture for equity portfolios 
 
 
 Sensitivity analysis and scenario analysis   
This research methodology changes from the previous empirical approach of using mainly 
scenario analysis by combining scenario and sensitivity analyses. The sensitivity analysis aims 
to build the model based on historical data, thus informing us of the adjustment of the 
discount rate and the probability of scenario occurrence for the scenario analysis. 
2.2.1 Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis uses data to identify the relationship between the climate risk and the 
return, meaning the extent to which the rise of the climate risk by one unit affects the return. 
For example, the percentage decrease in return on an asset as the carbon price rises by 1% 
will be the value of the carbon risk coefficient.  
For stocks, we can use a series of models to find their corresponding values of the risk 
coefficient and measure their liquidity risk and market risk in terms of liquidity indicator and 
investment income respectively. Specifically, we add the climate risk factors into the CAPM 
model to get the Beta of climate risk, using the following: 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖𝑚(𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝑅 
where 𝐸(𝑟𝑖) is the expected return of investment, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝛽𝑖𝑚 is the beta of 
investment, 𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓 represents market risk premium, 𝑅𝐶𝑅 is climate risk, and 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑅 is the 
beta of climate risk. 
The analysis concept for bonds only differs by having the values of risk coefficient computed 
with the models (KMV model and Creditportfolio view model) measure the interest rate risk 
and credit risk of bonds, and these risk indicators and the market risk indicators for stocks 
jointly constitute the investment income risk of the asset management company. (see Figure 
16-2) 
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2.2.2 Scenario analysis 
A scenario analysis simulates the possible losses under hypothetical scenarios. For example, we 
can set carbon prices high, medium and low to calculate the subsequent investment loss, then 
obtain the maximum VaR of the investment income and further measure the impact of the 
environmental risk on the investment portfolio.  
Figure 16-2 Analysis methodology for climate stress testing for equity portfolio 
 
 
 Asset pricing models and VaR  
Another innovation of this methodology is that prior stress tests generally used the DCF 
method, exploring how risk factors affected the unexpected operating profit of a company. 
This research instead uses the asset pricing model to measure the market risk based on the 
conditions of the asset management companies. We seek to reflect the risk factor with the 
market price and influence the unexpected return of the asset. Also, this research employs the 
VaR model to estimate quantitative environmental risk known as VaR monetization. Our 
study’s goal is to provide a decision-making basis for the asset managers.  
2.3.1 Asset-pricing models integrating environmental risk factors 
This research uses the asset-pricing model to measure the expected returns of individual 
stocks and integrate climate risk factors into the model. We first use the model to identify the 
impact of climate factors on the portfolio of an asset management company, then we simulate 
value changes of the portfolio’s components under future environment, climate and other 
environmental stress scenarios. Finally, we quantitatively measure the impact of these risks on 
the ROI of the portfolio.  
2.3.2 VaR model  
After computing the expected return and standard deviation of the investment portfolio, we 
use the VaR model to calculate the VaR of the portfolio and discuss the maximum VaR of the 
portfolio under extreme scenarios with the probability of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   
 Transmission from carbon price changes to market risks 
For example, if carbon standard gets stricter, carbon prices will rise, forcing an enterprise to 
pay more for the right of carbon emissions, which reduces its profit as it faces higher carbon 
risks. The bigger the carbon risk factor, the higher the carbon price, the higher the risk 
premium on the emission right, which may result in declining share prices and returns. In this 
research, we calculate returns and carbon risk factors of individual stocks, work out the 
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average return, standard deviation and carbon risk factor of the investment portfolio as well 
as the loss in the value of the portfolio due to the risks of rising carbon prices.  
Figure 16-3  Analysis flow for carbon price risk 
 
 
3 Empirical analysis of climate stress testing of equity portfolio – CSI 
300 Index  
This research simulates the climate risk of the equity portfolio resulting from the investment 
in the stocks making up the CSI 300 Index, which consists of the 300 largest and most liquid A-
share stocks and gauges the overall performance of China A-share market. This research 
conducts climate stress testing over the carbon-price risks of listed companies given the 
availability of data, limiting the scope to the sample shares within the CSI 300 Index. It uses 
data on monthly returns from the Wind database, and data on carbon prices from seven local 
carbon trade pilots in China.  
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Table 16-1 Descriptive statistics of carbon price risk of CSI 300 Index in August 2013 
to June 2016 
 Carbon price Rate of Change Carbon risk factor 
Average value 33.18 0.0529 -0.002 
Median 29.62 -0.0040 -0.0059 
Standard deviation 16.98 0.3978 0.0535 
Minimum 9.33 -0.7099 -0.1403 
Maximum 78.46 1.3675 0.4243 
Number 35 34 281 
    
 
Table 16-2 The impact of rising carbon prices on CSI 300 
Change of average return of CSI 
300 index 
Carbon price 
doubled, 5% 
VaR, loss in 
market value 
of CSI 300 (100 
million yuan) 
and 
percentage in 
total market 
capitalization 
Carbon price 
tripled, 5% 
VaR, loss in 
market value 
of CSI 300 (100 
million yuan) 
and 
percentage in 
total market 
capitalization 
Carbon price 
quadrupled, 
5% VaR, loss in 
market value 
of CSI 300 (100 
million yuan) 
and percentage 
in total market 
capitalization 
change 
in 
average 
return 
when 
carbon 
price 
doubled 
change in 
average 
return 
when 
carbon 
price 
tripled 
change in 
average 
return 
when 
carbon 
price 
quadrupled 
-0.88% -1.76% -2.53% 
26381
（10.8%） 
28540
（16.0%） 
30700
（24.8%） 
 
Table 16-3 Impact of a 10-fold rise in carbon price on CSI 300  
A 10-fold 
rise in 
carbon price 
and 20% 
VaR, loss in 
market 
value of CSI 
300 (100 
million 
yuan) 
A 10-fold 
rise in 
carbon price 
and 30% 
VaR, loss in 
market 
value of CSI 
300 (100 
million 
yuan) 
A 10-fold 
rise in 
carbon price 
and 40% 
VaR, loss in 
market 
value of CSI 
300 (100 
million 
yuan) 
A 10-fold 
rise in the 
carbon price 
and 20% 
VaR, 
Percentage 
decline in 
CSI 300 
A 10-fold 
rise in the 
carbon price 
and 30% 
VaR, 
Percentage 
decline in 
CSI 300 
A 10-fold 
rise in the 
carbon price 
and 40% 
VaR, 
Percentage 
decline in 
CSI 300 
31228 25467 20544 12.70% 10.35% 8.35% 
 
Using the Fama-MacBeth regression methodology, the research produced empirical results 
(see Table 16-2) showing that an increase in carbon price will reduce the investment return on 
CSI 300 index. If the carbon price doubles, triples and quadruples, the return falls 0.9%, 1.8% 
and 2.5%, respectively. In compliance with the Basel Agreement, we opt for the extreme risk 
scenario of 5% value at risk (VaR). If carbon price doubles, the market value of the CSI 300 
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index declines by 2.6 trillion yuan (about 10.8% of the current total market value 25 trillion 
yuan). If carbon price triples and quadruples, the market value of the CSI 300 index may drop 
by 2.9 trillion yuan and 3.1 trillion yuan, respectively. However, even a fourfold rise in carbon 
price may not be enough to meet the Paris Agreement. According to the World Bank, a price 
at USD 80-120 (approximately 560-850 Yuan) a tonne in 2030 is needed to meet the Paris 
Agreement targets. Based on this prediction, if the carbon price rises from 20 yuan to 200 yuan 
(approximately USD28), the market value of CSI 300 index has a 40% chance of dropping 8.4%, 
a 30% chance of losing 10.4%, and a 20% chance of falling 12.7%. In short, the carbon price 
risk can deliver a significant shock on the returns and market values of the CSI 300 Index 
components. 
Furthermore, we compare the impact of carbon price risk on green and carbon-intensive 
(brown) sectors. Based on the industry classification standard set by China’s securities 
regulator (2012 edition), we take the companies in the industries of health, agriculture, 
ecological protection and environmental management, and water production and distribution 
as green stocks, and select the companies in air transport industry, and electricity and heat 
production and distribution as brown stocks. All portfolios are constructed with equal 
weightings. As shown in Table 16-4, an increase in carbon price will reduce the investment 
return on brown assets, while increasing the return on green assets. Also, under the scenario 
of 5% VaR, the decline in the market value of green assets is much smaller than that of brown 
assets. The empirical results indicate that carbon risk mainly influences the carbon-intensive 
sectors.    
Table 16-4 The impact of rising carbon prices on green and brown assets 
Type Industry 
Average return change carbon 
price rises 
once, VaR 
at 5% (100 
million 
RMB) 
carbon 
price rises 
twice, VaR 
at 5% (100 
million 
RMB) 
carbon 
price rises 
three 
times, VaR 
at 5% (100 
million 
RMB) 
carbon 
price 
rises 
once 
carbon 
price 
rises 
twice 
carbon 
price 
rises 
three 
times 
Green 
assets 
Health 0.02 0.04 0.06 
13 
(3.52%) 
6 
(1.57%) 
1 
(0.38%) 
Agriculture 0.15 0.29 0.44 
3 
(1.45%) 
29  
(13.06%) 
61 
(27.57%) 
Ecological 
protection and 
environmental 
management 
0.00 0.01 0.01 
47  
(13.98%) 
49  
(14.62%) 
51 
(15.26%) 
water 
production and 
distribution 
0.01 0.02 0.03 32 (17.05%) 30 (16.08%) 
28 
(15.11%) 
Brown 
assets 
Electricity and 
heat 
production and 
supply 
-0.02 -0.04 -0.06 
89  
(23.08%) 
108 
(28.14%) 
128 
(33.20%) 
Air transport -0.05 -0.10 -0.15 
133 
(21.81%) 
169 
(27.77%) 
206 
(33.73%) 
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4 Conclusion 
This research has built a carbon risk model to explore the relationship between investment 
returns and carbon risk factors. It measures the maximum VaR of the investment portfolio and 
prices the carbon risks based on the market pricing mechanism. The empirical results show 
that:  
Carbon risk does deliver a significant impact on the returns and market values of the CSI 300 
Index components, causing the portfolio to lose as much as 10% of its market value under an 
extreme scenario. Further, this research finds that carbon risk can have a positive effect on the 
returns of green stocks and a significant negative impact on brown stocks.  
Our research reveals that the market price mechanism can genuinely internalize climate cost. 
This is because climate risk factors will affect returns on assets, boosting returns on green 
stocks while reducing those on brown stocks.  
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 Climate Change “Physical Risk” Assessment 
on Investment Portfolios 
By 
Carbone41 
Abstract 
The CRIS methodology was created in 2017 to provide climate-related risk metrics at the asset 
and portfolio levels. It enables asset managers and lenders to better report and manage 
climate-related risks, and more effectively engage with stakeholders. It is based on a 
comprehensive, robust and transparent assessment framework covering acute and chronic 
climate hazards, for different climate scenarios and future time horizons. The method was 
developed to be applied to listed equities and bonds, including green bonds, sovereign bonds, 
and real assets (infrastructure, real estate and natural resources). Anticipating data availability 
constraints, CRIS applies a pragmatic tier-based approach in conducting individual analyses. 
The challenges ahead are the lack of asset-specific data and the reliability of damage functions. 
Keywords: climate risk, physical risks, TCFD, risk assessment, risk metrics, mainstreaming 
climate risks, portfolio assessment 
1 Purpose of the study/methodology 
CRIS – Climate Risk Impact Screening2 - is an innovative method developed to assess the 
exposure of investment portfolios to physical risks3 posed by climate change. The method 
was developed by Carbone 44 in 2017 with the support of major financial actors (i.e., AFD, 
Caisse des Depots et Consignation, FRR, Mirova-Natixis, CCR, ERAFP, BNP, CDG Capital and EDF) 
and with the help and advice from a scientific council gathering financial and scientific experts.  
CRIS provides risk metrics at the asset and portfolio levels. It enables asset managers and 
lenders to report, manage risk and engage with stakeholders. It is based on a comprehensive, 
robust and transparent assessment framework covering acute and chronic hazards, for 
different climate scenarios and future time horizons. The method was developed so as to be 
applied to listed equities and bonds, including green bonds, sovereign bonds, and real assets 
(infrastructure, real estate and natural resources). Figure 17-1 shows the Exposure Map of 
mineral deposits to droughts around the world; this preliminary CRIS analysis aims at 
screening a portfolio to climate hazards only based on asset location. A complete CRIS analysis 
also includes vulnerability information on each asset to create asset-specific risk scoring (see 
following sections). For listed companies, CRIS can be applied to a large universe, based on 
                                                     
1  This chapter is written by Violaine Lepousez, Manager and Climate Risk Expert at Carbone 4, email: 
violaine.lepousez@carbone4.com.   
2 See crisforfinance.com for more information. 
3 Physical risk relates to risks coming from the impacts of a changing climate (increased heat waves or storms for instance), 
as opposed to transition risk that relates to risks coming from the increased needs and pressure to reduce the impacts of 
our economy to climate change (see TCFD). 
4 Carbone 4 is a French leading independent consulting firm specialized in low carbon strategy and climate change 
adaptation. Created 12 years ago, Carbone 4 develops methods, tools and data and support economic actors to help them 
integrate climate into their decisions. 
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public financial data. For sovereigns, all countries have already been assessed. For real assets, 
CRIS can be applied to several specific portfolios. 
 
Figure 17-1  Exposure of mineral deposits to climate change physical risks, run with 
CRIS exposure datasets (multi hazard on left, droughts on right; both based on 
future increases in climate hazards’ intensity and frequency due to climate change)  
 
Source: Carbone4 
 
CRIS scorings on physical risks at the portfolio level allow users to understand how much of 
their portfolio is at high risk due to climate change, for three IPCC scenarios. CRIS scorings can 
be incorporated into risk management systems to enhance long-term return at the portfolio 
and asset level. Best-in-class and benchmark analysis makes it possible to identify the riskiest 
assets across a portfolio. More detailed information enhances dialogue with the underlying 
assets’ owners. 
CRIS risk metrics are useful to various financial actors:  
- to (re)insurance companies to appreciate the risks on their market (sovereign 
analysis) or on their clients (companies or buildings) for instance; 
- to commercial banks to appreciate the risks on their clients and markets, integrate 
the risks on their analytics and to feed their sustainability risk ratings; 
- to asset owners and managers to measure and manage the risks on their portfolio 
and assets and to engage with the underlying components. 
Figure 17-2 shows a real estate portfolio’s credit risks to heat waves. This information was 
created for several hazards and for several regions. It was used by a bank to understand the 
risks on its current portfolio. Next steps will be to create a tool to assess this risk at an earlier 
stage in their risk assessment procedures. 
Assets risk scores 
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Figure 17-2  Exposure of a real estate portfolio’s credit risks to heat waves, faced 
with current climate and with 2050 BAU high emission scenario’s climate  
 
Source: Carbone4 
2 Methodology 
The climate-related risk of an asset, such as a corporate stock or bond, infrastructure project, 
or sovereign bond, can be studied with varying degrees of detail and at various scales. An 
extensive literature and market review revealed in 2017 a lack of comprehensive methodology 
to assess the physical risk exposure of large, multi-asset portfolios spanning the entire globe. 
Most studies carried out by asset owners and managers have centered on a few individual 
assets at the project evaluation or pre-investment stages (i.e., for project finance), or have 
focused on a specific sector, specific geographic region, or on a handful of extreme climate 
events. However, there is a clear need to measure the risk level of entire portfolios, both to 
guide investment strategy and to meet reporting requirements. The high number of assets 
requires an efficient and comprehensive approach to risk analysis, all while maintaining a high 
level of accuracy regarding asset-specific characteristics and location.  
CRIS responded to the need for global coverage, all with a bottom-up, asset-by-asset approach. 
Its main objective is to enable users to assess the exposure of multi-asset portfolios to all main 
physical climate change hazards in all geographical regions. CRIS offers a multi-hazard risk 
screening, based on a multi-scenario climate projections analysis and a value-chain sectoral 
vulnerability assessment. 
CRIS methodological framework is based on the IPCC definition of physical risk: i.e., the 
combination of climate hazard, exposure and vulnerability (see Figure 17-3). CRIS quantifies 
climate exposure and provides risks metrics. 
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Figure 17-3  CRIS simplified methodological framework for physical risk assessment  
 
Source: Carbone 4 
 
CRIS’s bottom-up approach combines the analysis of geographical exposure and sectoral and 
sovereign vulnerability to seven climate hazards (both acute and chronic), see Figure 17-4. 
Nine indirect climate hazards are also factored in (such as water scarcity, coastal erosion 
wildfires, etc.). Climate data is derived from climate models used by IPCC, for three IPCC 
scenarios and three time horizons. CRIS databases cover all countries, with a 25km average 
resolution (up to 8km in France), and all sectors. 
 
CRIS main methodological framework for climate physical risk assessment
© 2019 Carbone 4
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Figure 17-4  CRIS comprehensive scope of analysis  
 
Source: Carbone4 
 
Climate vulnerability is based on sectoral vulnerability literature covering 15 factors across 
value chains, and sovereign vulnerability on 24 thematic indicators covering both 
environmental and socio-economic issues. These vulnerability profiles gather maximum loss 
damage intensity for each sector and each hazard. The vulnerability profiles are then 
consolidated for each hazard, before being aggregated to climate hazards and exposure. 
• For companies and infrastructure, 15 factors of vulnerability (such as needs for cold 
chain, outdoor workers, etc.) that cover impacts on the entire value chain were used 
to assess vulnerability on CAPEX, OPEX and sales. 
• For real assets, 12 technical blocks (such as roof, AC, etc.) that cover materiality, 
equipment, and comfort were used to assess risks on buildings. 
• For governments, 24 socio-economical and geophysical indicators were assessed to 
cover all impacts (such as freshwater withdrawal/resources, %GDP Agriculture, etc.). 
CRIS classifications are compatible with classic reporting ones: ICB, GICS and NAICS. To date, 
CRIS sectoral/asset classification are:  
• For companies: a 60-type classification covering all sectors (industries, farming, 
financial, utilities etc.); 
• For real estate: a 20-type classification covering residential and tertiary buildings; 
Acute hazards 
Chronic hazards 
Direct climate hazards Indirect climate hazards 
Changes in the intensity 
or frequency of storms 
Changes in drought 
extremes Wildfire risks 
Water scarcity risks 
Changes in rainfall 
patterns 
Flood risks (river & groundwater flood) 
Increase in average 
temperature 
Biodiversity migration and loss risks 
Air quality risks 
Changes in the intensity 
or frequency of 
heatwaves 
Urban heat island risks 
Sea level rise 
Coastal erosion risks 
Landslide and mass movement risks 
Changes in rainfall 
extremes 
Coastal flood risks 
© 2019 Carbone 4
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• For infrastructure: a 60-type classification covering all sectors (energy, transportation, 
water, telecom, farming, etc.). 
Exposure is based on asset-level data or financial business data for each of the issuer. It 
captures the sectoral and geographical breakdown of markets and operations. For instance, 
for a listed equity, for sectoral breakdown, CRIS always uses revenue as the major proxy. For 
geographical breakdown, it depends on the sector and data availability. For capital intensive 
sectors, ideally, « tangible assets » or PPE are used to capture geographical 
breakdown. For low capital-intensive sector, revenue is used to capture both sectoral and 
geographical breakdown.  
When creating the risk metrics, CRIS’s model is based on geometric functions used to over-
weight high risk profiles and capture non-linear risk profiles. For instance, CRIS overall multi-
hazard risk score is based on hazard-specific risk score. This aggregation step is based on the 
inversed geometric mean with a weighting system that gives more weight to acute hazard 
compared to chronic ones (Other information can be detailed on request). 
In terms of climate projections, CRIS covers 7 direct climate hazards and 9 indirect hazards. 
The dataset captures future changes in climate compared to the current reference period. For 
each hazard, a selection of climate models was used (from CMIP3 or CMIP5) to create a median 
signal and information on uncertainty. For sea level rise and storm hazard, aggregated 
projections from IPCC were used. CRIS is based on multi-model ensemble, and multiple IPCC 
scenarios experiences. Most studies include: 
• climate scenarios from the IPCC: RCP4.5 and RCP8.5. These scenarios cover 
respectively optimistic and business-as-usual visions of the evolution of GHG 
emissions worldwide. 
• For each of these scenarios, several climate models (3 to 10) are used to capture 
uncertainty and minimize the dispersion of values related to the models. 
Climate data are available for several future time horizons. Most studies include: 
• 1 historic reference period; 
• future time horizons: 2035, 2050 and 2100. 
Climate signal captures the future anomalies compared to the historical reference period 
(+2°C in 2035 for instance), see Figure 17-5 for mean temperature maps. CRIS thus captures 
the risks coming from a changing climate, and not the absolute weather-related risks. 
For acute hazards such as heat waves, climate scores are created based on 2 climate 
indicators: one that describes the intensity (e.g. max temperature), and another one that 
describes the frequency (e.g. number of hots days). 
CRIS methodology can be applied to assess physical risks for all countries. Climate projections 
are at a resolution of 25x25km to 100x100km, depending on the region and/or the hazard 
studied (up to 8km in France). Environmental aggravating factors (such as flood prone areas) 
are site-specific for real assets. 
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Figure 17-5 Example of hazard exposure scores for the reference period and 2 future 
time horizons, used in CRIS assessments run at infra-national spatial resolution  
 
Source: Carbone4 
3 Input and output metrics/data 
For one particular asset with very few specific information available, risk depends mostly on 
its location and on its sectoral activity. Climate risk is a function of location-specific climate 
hazards and industry-specific vulnerability. It is a combination of climate projections for 
specific geographic locations (such as higher temperatures, more intense heat waves, etc.) and 
an issuer's sector-based vulnerability.  
Therefore, CRIS combines for each issuer (i.e., company, infrastructure etc.), see Figure 17-6: 
1. Descriptive financial data on the issuer's activity that are issuer-specific, to capture 
the geographic and sectoral breakdown of its activities (fixed assets or revenues 
depending on the sectoral capital intensity);  
2. Scientific data on climate hazards and sectoral and sovereign vulnerability, that are 
respectively location-specific and sectoral specific, to assess the climate evolutions 
and the gross vulnerability of each sector to each hazard. 
These scientific databases have been built usinga rigorous and transparent approach. For 
instance, climate data was extracted and statistically processed from multi-model ensemble 
and scenarios used by IPCC for each hazard. Median signal and uncertainties coming from the 
models are captured, for each scenario and time horizon. Original data are sourced and all 
processing steps are described. 
 
§ 207 countries covered
§ The hazard rating is 
based on relative 
changes of one climate 
variable: Mean of 
annual temperatures
Key characteristics
Projected changes in 2046-2065 relative to 
1961-1990 under the medium scenario
Future
Projected changes in 2080-2100 relative to 
1961-1990 under the high-emission scenario
Future
Historical mean temperature (historical averages 
1961-1990)  
Past
In the past: 0 is reached for -16°C in Greeland, 99 is reached for +29°C in UAE
In the future: 1 is reached for +0,76°C in Tonga, 99 is reached for +6,42°C in Canada
0                                                     99
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Figure 17-6  CRIS functioning principles  
 
Source: Carbone4 
 
CRIS combines thematic proprietary or public databases (climate, sector vulnerability, 
environmental of other related issues) with asset-level information to calculate risk metrics. 
Furthermore, CRIS methodology follows a bottom-up approach. Anticipating data availability 
constraints, CRIS applies a pragmatic tier-based approach in conducting individual analyses: 
the most precise and relevant data are used where available, with progressively less precise 
data, even averages, being used if necessary. In this way, CRIS is operational even in the 
absence of the most precise data, and easily accommodates updated and higher quality data 
as they are published. 
For instance, at the company level, for each climate hazard, risk is a combination of the risks 
of each country-sector coupling composing its business, weighted by the breakdown of its 
activity in each of these couples. The indicator used to understand the geographic breakdown 
depends on the capital intensity of the sector (CAPEX to revenue ratio): fixed assets for high 
capital intensity sectors, and revenue for low capital intensity sectors. 
For real assets, more detailed asset-specific information is used as the location is known.  
CRIS provides various output indicators that may be used for reporting, risk management or 
engagement. For instance, at the portfolio level, aggregated indicators such as global multi-
hazard scores are useful for reporting or risk management, whereas hazard-specific scores are 
more useful for engagement. A non-exhaustive list of useful indicators would be: 
- At the portfolio level: Global, hazard specific physical risk scoring for various IPCC 
scenarios; Sectoral and global best and worst in class; Sectoral averages, part of the 
portfolio exposed to high risk, distribution of scorings across portfolio, exposure to 
vulnerable sectors, benchmark comparison. 
- At the issuer level: Global, hazard specific physical risk scoring for various IPCC 
scenarios; Hazard-specific scoring for each business unit (sector/country based); 
Benchmark comparison; Qualitative comments and recommendations on adaptation. 
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Figure 17-7  ENGIE’s physical risk assessment to climate change, based on public 
financial information and CRIS model 
 
Source: Carbone4 
4 Case study  
 N°1: corporate portfolio’s analysis 
For corporates, CRIS was applied to 1 765 companies - covering most of the MSCI World’s 
constituents, see Figure 17-8). Results show a strong inter-sector and intra-sector disparity 
in risk levels, allowing for an active management of the risks (stock-picking, benchmarking, 
etc.). Sectors most at risk are on average chemicals & pharmaceutical, food & beverages, 
utilities, industrial and mining & materials. Strong disparity appears in the utility sector as it 
comprises companies from very different countries (more diverse than in other sectors). The 
Notes de risque par aléa pour la société (horizon moyen-terme et scénario d’émissions moyen)
Les notes pour chaque aléa sont construites sur une échelle de 0 à 99 pour tous les scénarios, tous les horizons de temps et tous les pays. 
Moyen-terme
(2050)
Long-terme
(2100)
Notes de risque agrégées pour différents horizons de temps et scénarios (échelle 0-99)
Température
Vagues de 
chaleur
Sécheresse
Régime de 
précipitations
Précipitations 
intenses
Hausse du 
niveau marin
Tempêtes
30  41  33  26  39  51  29  
35
4237
4738
52
La note de risque d’ENGIE est 
de 37/100 en 2050
42 Moyenne sectorielle 
34 Meilleure note du secteur
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Description des principaux risques pour les aléas climatiques les plus importants (horizon moyen-terme 
et scénario d’émissions moyen)
Les activités d’Engie sont très sensibles à l’élévation du niveau de la mer et présentent un
risque au vu des géographies d’implantation. Les activités de production d’électricité sont
sensibles du fait de leur dépendance aux infrastructures portuaires pour l’approvisionnement
en ressources fossiles. De plus les actifs sont difficilement relocalisables. Par conséquent, Engie
est exposé à une dépréciation possible de certains actifs, à une augmentation des frais de
maintenance et des frais d’assurance et à des baisses de production possibles. Parmi les
opérations principales d’Engie, ce sont les activités de production au Qatar et aux Emirats
Arabes Unis qui seraient exposées (note de 57 et 58). Parmi toutes ses business units, les
opérations à Singapour présentent le niveau de risque le plus élevé (88).
Hausse du niveau marin
Les opérations de services 
intégrés de production et 
distribution d’électricité à 
Singapour sont très 
exposées(88).
Point d’attention
Risque faible Risque modéré Risque moyen Risque fort Risque très fort
Les activités d’Engie sont très sensibles à l’augmentation de l’intensité et de la fréquence des
vagues de chaleur, du fait de la forte sensibilité de la demande d’électricité à la chaleur et
du besoin en refroidissement de ces opérations pour maintenir un bon niveau de production.
Des baisses de production sont donc possibles (mais opportunités de demande croissante,
non étudiée ici).
Ses activités au Qatar sont les plus exposées (notes de 74).
Les opérations de services 
intégrés de production et 
distribution d’électricité 
au Qatar sont très 
exposées (74).
Point d’attention
 51  
 41 
88
74
Vagues de chaleur
ENGIE 37/100
Secteur majoritaire: Production d’électricité conventionnelle                                                 Note de risque en 2050
Scénario
optimiste
Scénario 
moyen 
Scénario 
tendanciel
Commentaire général
Engie présente un profil de risque modéré (note agrégée de 37), et inférieur à la moyenne du
secteur. Les aléas les plus importants pour le groupe sont, dans l’ordre décroissant de risque,
la hausse du niveau marin, les vagues de chaleur et les précipitations intenses. Ces aléas
peuvent causer des dommages importants sur les actifs et avoir des implications fortes sur les
coûts de maintenance et de réparation. Des ruptures dans le niveau de production sont à
prévoir. L’étude n’étudie pas les opportunités liées à la demande croissante en électricité.
Les notes de risque associées à ces aléas sont très variées au sein des nombreuses
géographies d’intervention du groupe : le Qatar, les Emirats Arabes Unis et Singapour
apparaissent comme des géographiques particulièrement exposées.
Chapter 17 
 272 
company most at risk is an electric utility (several power plant) based in Asia, very much 
exposed and potentially vulnerable to storms, sea level rise and floods. 
Figure 17-8  Physical risk assessment of a global portfolio of listed companies, based 
on CRIS model  
 
Source: Carbone4 
 
 N°2: sovereign portfolio’s analysis 
For sovereign analysis, CRIS was applied to all countries in 2018. Detailed results are thus 
available. For instance, Figure 17-9 is the report for Vietnam that comprises synthetic risk 
metrics but also detailed information on the vulnerability and exposure of the country to 
physical risks coming from climate change. The results displayed were run with the optimistic 
climate scenario and with a focus on 2050 time horizon. The country is particularly at risk to 
heavy rainfall and sea level rise. Indeed, the country is very vulnerable to floods because most 
of its population and GDP is located in flood prone areas and areas prone to landslides because 
of mountainous context. Vietnam is also vulnerable to other hazards (droughts, change in 
rainfall patterns), but risks are lower because climate trends are less dramatic.  
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Distribution of the levels of future 
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Multi-criteria CRIS risk scores according to the 
high-emissions scenario to 2100. 
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Figure 17-9  Vietnam climate risk profiles based on CRIS model  
 
Source: Carbone 4 
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5 Limitations, outlook and future development  
CRIS’ objective to provide a comprehensive assessment of physical risks at the asset level and 
at the portfolio level has been achieved. CRIS risk metrics encompass risks coming from a large 
panel of hazards and are available for all sectors and geographies. However, CRIS do not 
provide a quantified estimation of future financial risks in monetary terms (except exposure), 
which is one of the major challenges in this research field. We know rigorous damage functions 
does not exist for all sectors, geographies, and hazards; therefore we only provide quantified 
estimations of future financial risks only for some sectors and some impacts (for instance, 
energy or agriculture), or through detailed asset-specific assessments. To enrich damage 
modeling on portfolios, more details on past damages should be requested or consolidated at 
the sector level (for each hazard) with the help of (re)insurance actors. 
Another gap is the lack of robust asset-specific data at the company level (listed or not). 
Spatially specific information on the value chain is key in this assessment as it determines the 
climate exposure of the supply chain, production facility and markets. This is particularly true 
for some vulnerable sectors. More detailed disclosure should be requested to enrich these 
assessments. 
The main challenge today is to demystify the damage functions and climate impact modelling 
and to explain that most black boxes providing financial estimation of future physical risks on 
large portfolios of universe also cause higher levels of uncertainty. The appetite for financial 
output indicators should not impede the level of scientific rigor needed in the risk assessment, 
nor the use of other risk metrics that already enable mainstreaming climate physical risk in 
risk analysis, management and reporting. 
Carbone 4 has been developing other specific methods for infrastructures and real assets that 
provides more accurate risk metrics based on more specific damage functions and asset-
specific information. More information on the 2InfraChallenge can be found from the 
following link: http://www.carbone4.com/2-infrachallenge/. 
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  Scenario Analysis for Systemic Climate Risk  
 
By 
Ortec Finance1 
Abstract 
This chapter by Ortec Finance focuses on climate scenario analysis from a top-down, systemic 
risk perspective. It describes how transition and physical climate risks have macroeconomic 
consequences (i.e., networked effects) based on indicators such as GDP growth, interest rates, 
inflation, investment and international trade flows and other considerations. These climate-
adjusted macro-economic risk drivers in turn affect risk-return expectations across all asset 
classes, regions and sectors. Insights gained from climate scenario analysis allow financial 
institutions (pension funds, asset managers, banks and insurance companies) to make better 
informed strategic investment decisions, including Asset Liability Management (ALM) and 
Strategic Asset Allocation (SAA) approaches with the aim to achieving more climate resilient 
investment portfolios and loan books. 
Keywords: climate, scenario-analysis, systemic risk, asset-liability management, strategic asset 
allocation 
1 Introduction 
This chapter is written by Ortec Finance, an independent provider of technology and solutions 
for risk and return management headquartered in The Netherlands. Ortec Finance is 
innovating the modelling of systemic climate-related risks and opportunities for use in, inter 
alia, strategic asset allocation and asset-liability management. The chapter focusses on 
explaining key concepts around climate change as a systemic risk and climate change informed 
scenario analysis for investors. This chapter also presents a case study in the form of a 
representative diversified investment portfolio analyzed through the systemic climate risk 
lens using the ClimateMAPS methodology. The chapter concludes with a discussion on what 
practical steps investors can take in order to act on the outcomes of the analysis and options 
for further modelling sophistication.  
2 Climate-informed scenario analysis in the context of SAA & ALM 
 Why scenario analysis? 
Scenario analysis is an important tool for managing uncertainty in both business and financial 
modelling, as well as in the climate science world. In general, “a scenario is a possible evolution 
of the future consistent with a clear set of assumptions” (Bunn and Solo, 1993).  Scenario 
                                                     
1 The authors of this chapter are Willemijn Verdegaal and Lisa Eichler, both of whom are Co-Heads of Climate & ESG 
Solutions at Ortec Finance. Emails: Willemijn.Verdegaal@ortec-finance.com; Lisa.Eichler@ortec-finance.com. 
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analysis is a powerful method for assessing uncertainty. It supports investors in making 
informed decision today about how they can best reach their objectives in an uncertain future.   
Figure 18-1 below is a stylized illustration of scenario modelling. It shows historical global 
equity development (blue line to the left of the orange scenario fan), the expected mean (blue 
line that is in the center of the orange scenario fan), the ‘fan’ of potential scenario’s according 
to their likelihood of manifesting (fan consisting of shades of orange) and what actually 
happened during the modelled period (green line in the orange fan).  
Figure 18-1 What is scenario thinking? 
 
Source: Ortec Finance 
In financial modelling relevant for strategic asset allocation (SAA) and asset liability 
management (ALM) analysis, scenario thinking is typically used to simulate the balance sheet 
across different scenarios as shown in Figure 18-2. In different potential financial worlds, 
different asset mixes might either under- or over-perform. For example: in a high growth 
scenario a larger allocation to equity relative to fixed income will be beneficial, whereas in a 
highly volatile period the opposite is likely the case. As an investor you do not know what lies 
ahead of you, so you do not know whether the coming period will be one of high growth or 
high volatility. And when you know, you will probably be too late. Scenario analysis can help 
determine which asset mix is most suitable or robust across a range of potential futures.   
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Figure 18-2 Scenario modelling applied to balance sheet simulations for SAA/ALM 
analysis 
 
Source: Ortec Finance 
 
 Thinking critically about assumptions  
As explained in the previous section, scenario modelling requires the development of one or 
more scenarios based on a consistent set of well-motivated assumptions. These assumptions 
determine how key variables or ‘risk drivers’ develop across possible futures.  In the case of 
financial scenario sets the key risk drivers are GDP, inflation and interest rates. They are the 
building blocks of the financial scenario sets and drive the changes in risk-return profiles of 
asset classes across the different scenarios.  
So if assumptions drive the development of key risk drivers (GDP, inflation and interest rates), 
and risk drivers determine the investment performance of the portfolio in a given scenario – 
then what are these assumptions based on? This is the key question.  
Traditionally, assumptions on how GDP, interest rates and inflation develop, and how they 
influence financial performance, are based on historical relationships and historical averages. 
It is a ‘backward-looking’ methodology. For many applications this is an effective and 
appropriate methodology, but not when it comes to modelling the potential impacts of climate 
change. By definition historical data only includes information on past events. As there have 
not been significant periods of climate change in the period on which there is economic and 
financial data available, it is barely reflected in the historical data. Therefore, climate risk is not 
captured by most traditional assumption building methodologies.  
Considering how material both physical and transitional climate-related financial risks are, the 
fact that they are not captured by traditional methodologies used for SAA/ALM processes is 
highly problematic. Investors are taking crucial decisions about portfolio construction based 
on methodologies that do not capture climate-related financial risks. This becomes even more 
problematic in the realization that climate-related financial risk is a systemic risk that 
influences all sectors, geographies and asset classes. The next paragraph considers climate as 
a systemic risk in more detail. 
Chapter 18 
 278 
 Climate change as a systemic risk 
Figure 18-3 sets out the concept of systemic risk in the context of climate change.  
Figure 18-3 Climate change as a systemic risk 
Source: Ortec Finance 
 
Climate change can affect macro-economic variables (the risk drivers) such as economic 
growth, interest rates and inflation. Therefore, climate change impacts may significantly 
influence the resulting performance of asset classes and industry sectors. Take, for example, 
the impact of average temperature rise on the productivity of labor and land. It is well 
established in the literature2 that when temperatures rise above a certain point, productivity 
declines. The relationship is non-linear and so productivity rapidly declines in the face of rising 
temperatures. This has knock-on effects across the economy. Another example is the potential 
collapse of certain high-carbon sectors. This event impacts all other sectors it is networked 
with, even if they are not particularly high carbon. Retail, banking, real-estate and even 
government budgets and expenditures can be impacted. Via these routes of contagion, 
climate-related risks (and opportunities) spread through the economy. Figure 18-4 and Figure 
18-5 illustrate this principle. Figure 18-4 illustrates how a policy intervention (in this case a 
carbon tax) works its way through the real economy. Figure 18-5 shows how policies aligning 
the world economy with Paris climate goals can impact particular countries economies – in 
this example Canada – very differently vis-à-vis the global average.  
                                                     
2 See for instance Burke & Tanutama (2019). 
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Figure 18-4 Modelling the impact of a carbon tax  
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics, stylized example from the E3ME model 
 
Figure 18-5 Impact on output per sector of Canada vs. the global average in a Paris 
aligned pathway  
 
Source: Ortec Finance, based on outputs from E3ME 
Note: Results are merely for illustrative purposes and should not be used to inform 
investment decision making. 
 
The above examples illustrate the systemic nature of climate risk. These risks (and 
opportunities) are associated with each potential global warming pathway – ranging from an 
ambitious transition to no further action. Therefore, the assessment of climate change as a 
systemic risk driver in strategic investment decision-making is an increasingly necessary 
activity. 
 Bottom-up versus top-down approaches 
In order to understand how systemic climate risks are captured in various scenario-analysis 
methodologies it is useful to distinguish between the two main approaches currently used by 
investors in the market: bottom-up and top-down.  
Chapter 18 
 280 
• Bottom-up approaches: these approaches look at company level data such as carbon 
foot printing, emission intensity, costs associated with reducing a company’s carbon 
footprint, management quality, etc. The risks per company are added up in order to 
have an understanding of the total amount of risk in – for example an equity portfolio. 
Advantages of this approach is that it allows for a very granular, company level view. 
The draw-back is that it does not capture networked effects. It is highly questionable 
if adding up the risks of all the individual companies equals the total level of risk. Due 
to networked effects the total level of risk is likely to be many order of magnitudes 
higher.  
• Top-down approaches: these approaches use macro-economic models to 
understand how the economy functions as a whole. Variables like consumer 
spending, government spending, taxation, international trade, and production are 
considered. These approaches build up from the sector and region levels and are fit-
for-purpose in capturing systemic risks (the networked effects) and therefore the 
total level of risk. The drawback is that they are restricted in the level of granularity 
they can achieve as they cannot look beyond the country and sector level of 
granularity. 
Top-down approaches are required to capture climate as a systemic risk. Top-down approaches 
allow for better informed forward-looking assumptions about how GDP, inflation, and interest 
rates may develop in climate-informed scenarios, and how this in turn affects portfolio 
performance across all asset classes, countries and sectors. Therefore, using a top-down 
approach is crucial when performing climate-informed SAA/ALM analysis.  
 Integrating climate risk consistently throughout the investment process 
Unquestionably, the investment process goes beyond SAA/ALM. Ideally, therefore, when 
integrating climate-related financial risks, these risks should be integrated consistently 
throughout the entire investment process: from the strategic to the implementation (holding 
selection) level. For example: if the asset owner optimizes the asset allocation for a 2°C 
warming pathway (increasing exposures to sectors and regions likely to be least affected by 
systemic climate risk and even stand to benefit from it) then the asset manager should select 
companies that are more likely to perform well under this Paris-aligned pathway as well. Too 
often asset managers seem to not take the systemic nature of climate-related risks and 
opportunities sufficiently into account. For example, a certain low-carbon technology 
company may seem to perform well in a 2°C warming pathway – however if that company is 
likely to face severe macro-economic headwinds because the rest of the economy it operates 
in is exposed to negative impacts, then the company is not likely to do well in that pathway 
(networked effects), then perhaps the asset manager should be cautious to invest.  
In order to design this consistent climate-informed portfolio it is important that asset owners 
and asset managers cooperate closely in order to achieve this consistency. Also, in such a 
setting, top-down and bottom-up data may play a complementary role.  
The section below describes the process of designing a consistent climate-informed portfolio 
and highlights the respective roles of asset owners, asset managers as well as top-down and 
bottom-up datasets.  
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Figure 18-6 Towards a fully consistent climate resilient investment strategy 
Source: Ortec Finance 
 
 What investors should be asking themselves 
When integrating climate-related risks and opportunities into SAA/ALM, investors may want 
to ask themselves the following questions: 
• Does my organization recognize climate as systemic risk? 
• Are the datasets that I am using to measure climate risk able to capture the 
networked impacts of both physical (including extreme weather events) and 
transition climate-related risks and opportunities or are they assuming companies 
operate in isolation? 
• Are the assumptions used in the scenario methodology for ALM/SAA climate-
informed or are they only based on historical, backward-looking information? 
• Are my projected return estimates reasonable under different global warming 
pathways? 
• What risks and opportunities are relevant for me on which time horizon? 
• How will climate-related risks impact my funding or solvency ratios? 
• Is the management of climate-related financial risks implemented consistent across 
the different steps of the investment process: from asset allocation, to manager 
selection and portfolio implementation? 
In conclusion of the first section of this chapter we would like to reiterate the importance of 
investors challenging whether key assumptions used for modelling risk and return projections 
remain valid under different global warming pathways. A scenario approach considering 
different plausible climate futures may be more appropriate than taking a traditional climate 
uninformed approach. Taking this climate informed approach is increasingly being recognized 
by central banks and regulators as part of the fiduciary duty of institutional investors.3 
                                                      
3 UN PRI, “Embedding ESG issues into strategic asset allocation frameworks: Discussion paper”, September 2019 
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Taking an approach that is ‘systemically climate risk-informed’ can therefore contribute to 
taking better investment decisions for allocations to asset classes, regions, and sectors; and 
consequently, can construct a more climate resilient investment portfolio given a certain 
global warming pathway. If the systemic climate risk-informed approach is implemented both 
at the strategic and implementation level then the entire investment strategy is consistently 
addressing climate-related risks at every level of decision-making. 
3 Case study: Applying a systemic climate risk-informed approach to 
SAA & ALM 
Applying a systemic-climate risk informed approach to a diversified institutional investment 
portfolio enables a comprehensive analysis of total portfolio performance and attribution by 
asset classes per country and per sector. In this section of the chapter, we provide a high-level 
overview of the modelling methodology used by Ortec Finance in order to achieve a systemic-
climate risk informed approach (ClimateMAPS). We then provide indicative quantified results 
for an illustrative portfolio. The chapter concludes with pointing out current model limitations 
and areas in which the model can be further developed.  
 Methodology 
The climate risk integration logic applied by Ortec Finance in order to ‘tie together’ climate 
science, macro-econometric modelling, and financial modelling can be explained as follows: 
 
Figure 18-7 ClimateMAPS – climate risk integration logic 
 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimateMAPS 
 
The climate change impact per global warming pathway and the policy and technological 
changes necessary to reach the different temperature targets are based on robust climate 
science. These assumptions inform the macro-econometric model of Cambridge Econometrics, 
which considers worldwide macro-economic interactions. The Cambridge Econometrics E3ME 
model is a non-equilibrium global macro econometric model with linkages between the 
economy, energy sector, and environment. It can fully assess both short and long-term impacts 
and is not limited by many of the restrictive assumptions common to Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models. The model facilitates the integrated treatment of the world’s 
economies, energy systems, emissions and material demands. This enables it to capture two-
way linkages and feedbacks between these components.  
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The outputs from the macro econometric model are deltas (differences) in annual growth rates 
per country, from a macro-economic baseline outlook that does not use the climate specific 
inputs, i.e., that is climate-uninformed.  
These “climate-adjusted GDP shocks” per country/sector and per year are then put into the 
Ortec Finance stochastic financial model. This model translates the impacts of the climate-
adjusted GDP shocks onto a wide range of financial and economic variables (including interest 
rate, inflation, impacts on different asset classes) via stylized facts based on historic data and 
economic rationale.  
The resulting systemic climate risk-aware scenarios set delivers quantified climate-adjusted 
consistent global economic and financial outlooks up to 2060 differentiated per country/sector 
and per global warming pathway, which then can be used for climate-informed portfolio 
analysis. It should be noted that the pathway assumption narratives extend to the end of the 
century as this aligns with climate science time horizons. Financial modelling is not extended 
beyond 2060 as, under the Failed Transition pathway, changes might become so dramatic that 
stability of the entire financial system is at risk. This is uncharted territory and would render 
quantified modelling results very uncertain. 
We consider two broad options for the future: either the world continues on the current path 
or we transition to a low-carbon economy. To represent these two alternative pathways, Ortec 
Finance has developed economic scenario sets to reflect these two variants: the Paris 
Transition pathway and the Failed Transition pathway. These two pathways inform the 
underlying transition and physical climate risk parameters. Furthermore, the Paris Transition 
pathway is then broken down into two possible market reactions: orderly versus disorderly. In 
the latter case, the transition risks are supplemented by a confidence shock representing an 
aggressive market correction of carbon-intensive and related assets. 
Each main pathway is built on key policy and technological assumptions across countries and 
sectors to represent transition risks and opportunities, which are summarized in Figure 18-8. 
Physical risks are composed of, on the one hand, gradual physical risks, such as sea level rise 
and temperature effects on worker and agricultural productivity. On the other hand, physical 
risk also derives from increasing frequency and loss impacts of extreme weather events, such 
as floods, storms, wildfires, that are attributable to climate change. 
A continuation of current policies and technological trends will lead to increasing global CO2 
emissions (Failed Transition pathway) and in turn continuously increasing average global 
temperature reaching up to 4°C by the end of this century. However, in a pathway that limits 
warming to below 2°C, CO2 emissions peak in 2020 and decrease sharply to reach net zero 
before 2066 (in both Paris pathways). 
Chapter 18 
 284 
Figure 18-8 Key assumptions per global warming pathway 
 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimateMAPS 
 
Pricing-in the future impact of transition and physical risks 
The main driver of differences in investment returns in the coming decade between the 
different pathways is a potential price correction (“pricing-in”) in financial markets, particularly 
equity markets. That is, at a certain point in time, financial markets will realize what the longer-
term impacts will be of the transition to a low-carbon world and what the impact will be of 
gradual physical risks (such as reduced agricultural productivity) and extreme weather events 
(whether the transition succeeds or not). By translating this impact to changes in future 
expected output, earnings and dividend growth, the modelling estimates the expected price 
correction on financial markets. This price correction differs per climate pathway and per 
country and sector. Therefore, the overall impact on investment return will depend on the 
composition of the investment portfolio. 
In the Paris Orderly Transition pathway, we assume that pricing-in will take place in the coming 
five years, i.e., 2020 - 2024. In the Paris Disorderly Transition pathway, we assume that pricing-
in starts later, in 2024, and that the full price correction materializes within one year. This large 
price correction leads to negative market sentiment, and consequently to a sentiment shock 
in 2025, followed by (positive) price corrections in consecutive years to compensate for the 
overshooting in previous years. Market volatility is high in this 2024 - 2026 period.  
In the Failed Transition pathway, in the second half of this decade investors will start to realize 
that the transition to a low-carbon economy will fail. Therefore, they will price in the resulting 
impact of increasing physical risks and extreme weather events on expected future output, 
earnings and dividend growth in the period 2025 - 2029. We assume that this first pricing-in 
shock reflects only the impact of physical risks and extreme weather events on growth 
prospects up to 2050. However, in the Failed Transition pathway, physical risks will increase 
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significantly in the second half of this century. At some point in the future, financial markets 
will start to also price in these very substantial post-2050 physical risks. We assume that this 
second pricing-in shock occurs in 2035 - 2039. 
Modelling climate-related extreme weather event frequency & associated losses 
While most climate scenario models are already well advanced in the modelling of transition 
risks and opportunities, the modelling of physical risks is still rather underdeveloped. In 
particular, most academic climate models currently do not capture the effects of climate-
related extreme weather events and how these would influence climate scenarios. To 
overcome the current lack of inclusion in scientific models, we apply the PALgamma model, 
which forecasts the increase in frequency as well as the financial impact of climate-related 
extreme weather risk and, uniquely, identifies the extent to which urbanization and climate 
change contribute to risk, year by year and across over 120 countries worldwide. 
Figure 18-9 PALgamma (climate change-related) Extreme Weather Risk & Impact 
Model 
 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimatePREDICT 
 
This quantification of year-on-year and region-by-region exposure to risk from extreme 
weather attributable to climate change is integrated in the systemic climate risk scenarios, but 
when disaggregated into the individual climate risk drivers, insights help inform other aspects 
of improved investment decision-making such as assessing climate related physical risks of real 
assets, real estate and mortgage portfolios, or enhance insurance companies’ in-house P&C 
catastrophe models. 
 Case study portfolio description 
The case study in this chapter provides an illustrative example - based on a UK diversified 
investment portfolio – of the type of forward-looking, quantified analysis that can be done by 
using a systemic-climate risk informed approach. The scope covered provides a perspective of 
climate-related risk (and opportunities) for institutional investors under the three different 
global warming temperature pathways: Paris Orderly Transition, Paris Disorderly Transition 
and Failed Transition pathways compared to a climate-uninformed baseline.  
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Due to the nature of climate risks, the time horizon is longer than typical periods utilized by 
pension funds. The analysis covers forecasts up to 40 years ahead and results are expressed 
relative to the baseline (climate-uninformed) pathway. It should be noted that all climate-
adjusted economies used in this case study are built on the December 2019 market situation.4  
The example pension scheme that we use in our case study has been chosen to be fairly typical 
of the current situation of DB schemes in the UK. It has a relatively high initial allocation to 
growth assets which results in higher exposure to climate risks than a more mature scheme 
with a low allocation to growth assets. The liabilities and investments modelled give a starting 
funding ratio of 75% on the Long-Term Funding Objective. To help to eliminate the deficit, a 
recovery plan has been agreed such that company contributions are paid annually over the 
first 10 years. 
We assume that the pension fund invests according to a fixed, static asset allocation with the 
following characteristics: 
Table 18-1 UK pension scheme asset allocation table 
 
 
 Insights: Impacts on financial risk drivers 
The physical and transition risks and opportunities narratives that are informed by the climate 
and macro-econometric modelling influence the behavior of key financial risk drivers such as 
growth and inflation.  
Impacts on GDP growth 
The figures below illustrate the dynamics of the growth risk driver for three countries: The US, 
Canada and Europe. 
                                                     
4  Ortec Finance, December 2019 Quarterly Outlook (https://www.ortecfinance.com/en/insights/whitepaper-and-
report/quarterly-outlook) 
Asset Class Duration (Years) Weight
Fixed Income 22 50%
UK GILTS 31 12.5%
UK Index-Linked GILTS 40 12.5%
UK Corporate Credits (Investment Grade) 9 25%
Equity 40%
Equity World (USD) 35%
Equity Emerging Markets (USD) 2.5%
Equity UK 2.5%
Property 5%
UK Retail 2.5%
UK Offices 2.5%
High Yield 4 5%
US Corporate Credits (High Yield) 4 5%
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Figure 18-10 Cumulative real GDP growth across all climate-informed pathways 
(percentage difference to climate-uninformed baseline pathway in the level of GDP) 
 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimateMAPS 
Note: Results are merely for illustrative purposes and should not be used to inform 
investment decision making. 
 
There is considerable variation in the impacts across geographic regions. These differences are 
mainly caused by the level of transition risks over the short term and physical risks over the 
longer term. Higher temperatures exacerbate damage intensity and the frequency of natural 
disasters.  
Impact on interest rates 
Transition and physical risk impact economic variables and asset prices. An example is given in 
Figure 18-11 with the changes in interest rates across four different regions under the Paris 
Disorderly Transition pathway.  
Figure 18-11 Paris Disorderly Transition-adjusted interest rate growth (annual 
difference to climate-uninformed baseline pathway) 
 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimateMAPS 
Note: Results are merely for illustrative purposes and should not be used to inform 
investment decision making. 
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The impact of ‘pricing-in’ across equity sectors and regions 
Different sectors and regions will be impacted differently by a transition towards a low-carbon 
economy and by materializing physical risks and extreme weather events. In a successful 
transition, the low-carbon energy sector will probably benefit, whereas fossil fuel producers 
and other carbon-intensive sectors will suffer losses. Likewise, countries with economies that 
are highly dependent on fossil fuel extraction and exploration will suffer, whereas net 
importers of fossil fuels will be hit less. Finally, how severely economies will be impacted by 
physical risks and extreme weather events depends on their geographical location. These 
differences in sensitivities to transition risk and opportunities, and physical risks and extreme 
weather events, are also visible in the size and direction of the pricing-in shocks. These 
differences can also be seen in Figure 18-12 and Figure 18-13. In these figures, you can see 
that the low carbon electricity sector will benefit greatly in a successful transition to a low-
carbon economy, where other (i.e., brown) utilities will be hit severely. When the transition 
fails, India is expected to suffer significantly from increasing physical risks (lower labor and 
agricultural productivity due to increasing temperatures), where countries closer to the North 
Pole, like Canada, are much less sensitive to increasing temperatures. On the other hand, the 
Canadian economy is hit severely in a transition pathway, as the Canadian economy is heavily 
dependent on tar sand, and this sector will be entirely wiped out when we transition to a low-
carbon world. 
Figure 18-12 Global equity pricing-in shocks for a selection of sectors (expressed as 
a difference to climate-uninformed baseline) 
 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimateMAPS 
Note: Results are merely for illustrative purposes and should not be used to inform 
investment decision making. 
 
Scenario Analysis for Systemic Climate Risk      
289 
Figure 18-13 Equity pricing-in shocks for a selection of regions (expressed as a 
difference to climate-uninformed baseline) 
  
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimateMAPS 
Note: Results are merely for illustrative purposes and should not be used to inform 
investment decision making. 
 
 Portfolio performance results 
This section provides model results on the performance of the case study portfolio (as 
described in section 3.2 above). The illustrative analysis focuses on risk-return impact on total 
fund level, impact attribution across asset classes and regions, as well as insights of 
contributing financial impacts to the underlying climate risk factors. 
Risk-return impact at the total fund level 
The results on a total fund level for the hypothetical portfolio are summarized in the table 
below. The table highlights results separately for each of the analyzed global warming 
pathways by time horizon. The results are shown at the ‘total portfolio’ level of aggregation.  
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Table 18-2 Quantified Cumulative Return Impact for Total Fund Value, shown as 
climate pathways relative to climate-uninformed baseline 
 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimateMAPS 
Note: Case study results are merely for illustrative purposes and should not be used 
to inform investment decision making. 
 
Figure 18-14 shows the mean annual investment return and the 5% Value-at-Risk for two time 
periods. Figure 18-15 shows the result in an ALM context, focusing on the mean and 5% VaR 
of the funding ratio in year 10 and year 20 respectively. A key insight from this stage of the 
analysis is that the climate-uninformed baseline overestimates the expected returns and 
underestimates the risks. Furthermore, an orderly transition pathway to meet the Paris 
agreement has positive implications on the fund performance compared to a disorderly or 
failed transition. The more disorderly the transition, the more value is destroyed in the short 
term. In the longer term, even a disorderly transition shows lower negative impacts in terms 
of risk-return than a Failed Transition pathway.  
Figure 18-14 SAA insights: from climate-uninformed to climate risk-aware thinking 
about risk-return measures  
 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimateMAPS 
Note: Case study results are merely for illustrative purposes and should not be used 
to inform investment decision making. 
 
Median Median Median Median Median Median
Paris orderly transition 
pathway
-3% 0% -1% -2% -3% -8%
Paris disorderly transition 
pathway
-4% -4% -1% -2% -3% -12%
Failed transition pathway 0% -5% -13% -3% -7% -25%
2020-2024 2025-2029
Cumulative return relative to climate-uninformed baseline
Quantified Return Impact for Total Fund Value
Investment portfolio 2030-2039 2040-2049 2020-20592050-2059
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Figure 18-15 ALM context: from climate-uninformed to climate risk-aware thinking 
about funding ratios 
 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimateMAPS 
Note: Case study results are merely for illustrative purposes and should not be used 
to inform investment decision making. 
 
Impact attribution across asset classes and regions 
For the three climate informed pathways, Table 18-3 below shows the cumulative return 
impact relative to the climate-uninformed baseline of the assets that the example pension 
fund is invested in. It can be seen that, in this example, especially equities and real estate are 
significantly impacted by transition and physical risks, leading to substantially lower returns 
than in the climate-uninformed baseline. In the Failed Transition pathway, over a 40-year 
horizon, the cumulative return on equity is around 50% lower than in the climate-uninformed 
baseline. This lower return is purely due to the increasing and devastating impact of gradual 
physical risks and extreme weather events caused by increasing temperatures.   
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Table 18-3 Cumulative return differences to baseline for several asset classes 
 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimateMAPS 
Note: Results are merely for illustrative purposes and should not be used to inform 
investment decision making. Conditional formatting is applied per column per 
period to highlight the differences per (sub) asset class. Returns are calculated using 
the geometric mean methodology.  
 
Cumulative measures
Paris orderly  transition pathway
(ratio to climate-uninformed baseline)
Fixed Income
   FI Government Bonds
      Index-Linked Gilts UK 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% -1% -6% -6%
      Gilts UK 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% -1%
   Credits
      Credits GB 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% -2% -2%
Equity
   Equity Developed Markets -6% -6% -1% -2% -2% -2% -14% -16%
   Equity Emerging Markets -8% -8% -1% -1% -3% -3% -19% -19%
   Equity United Kingdom -6% -6% -1% -1% -2% -2% -16% -16%
Property
   Direct Real Estate UK -6% -6% -1% -1% -3% -3% -17% -17%
      Direct Real Estate Residential UK -4% -4% -1% -1% -2% -2% -13% -13%
      Direct Real Estate Offices UK -6% -7% -1% -1% -3% -3% -18% -18%
High Yield
   Corporate Credits HY US 0% 0% 2% 2% 0% 0% -1% -1%
5
% 
V
a
Median 5% VaR 
2025-2029 2030-20392020-2024
2
0
2020-2059
Median 5% VaR Median 5% VaR Median 5% VaR 
Cumulative measures
Paris disorderly  transition pathway
(ratio to climate-uninformed baseline)
Fixed Income
   FI Government Bonds
      Index-Linked Gilts UK -1% -1% 1% 1% -1% -1% -6% -6%
      Gilts UK 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% -1%
   Credits
      Credits GB -1% -1% 2% 2% 0% 0% -1% -1%
Equity
   Equity Developed Markets -7% -9% -12% -17% -2% -3% -25% -31%
   Equity Emerging Markets -9% -9% -13% -16% -3% -3% -30% -30%
   Equity United Kingdom -8% -17% -10% -29% -2% -2% -26% -35%
Property
   Direct Real Estate UK -7% -7% -7% -7% -4% -3% -24% -24%
      Direct Real Estate Residential UK -5% -5% -4% -3% -2% -2% -16% -17%
      Direct Real Estate Offices UK -8% -9% -7% -6% -4% -4% -25% -26%
High Yield
   Corporate Credits HY US -3% -4% 8% 7% 0% 0% 2% 1%
Median 5% VaR Median 5% VaR 
2030-2039 2020-20592020-2024 2025-2029
Median 5% VaR Median 5% VaR 
Cumulative measures
Failed transition pathway 
(ratio to climate-uninformed baseline)
Fixed Income
   FI Government Bonds
      Index-Linked Gilts UK 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% -1% -10% -10%
      Gilts UK 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% -1%
   Credits
      Credits GB 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% -2% -2%
Equity
   Equity Developed Markets 0% 0% -10% -10% -28% -28% -48% -48%
   Equity Emerging Markets -1% -1% -14% -14% -32% -32% -56% -56%
   Equity United Kingdom -1% -1% -9% -9% -18% -18% -40% -40%
Property
   Direct Real Estate UK -2% -2% -10% -11% -15% -16% -41% -41%
      Direct Real Estate Residential UK -1% -1% -6% -6% -23% -23% -42% -42%
      Direct Real Estate Offices UK -2% -2% -11% -12% -16% -16% -43% -43%
High Yield
   Corporate Credits HY US 0% 0% 1% 1% 6% 6% 16% 15%
Median
2030-20392020-2024 2025-2029
5% VaR Median 5% VaR Median 5% VaR 
2020-2059
Median 5% VaR 
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Depending on the level of granularity of the fund hierarchy, a deeper assessment of climate 
risks is possible. Within emerging markets equities, for example, one can assess which 
countries are the most impacted by climate factors in the region. 
Contributing financial impacts to the underlying climate risk factors 
Asset owners are also interested in gaining a better understanding about the underlying 
drivers for the differences in return with the climate-uninformed baseline. In Figure 18-16, for 
global equities, we can see that in the Failed Transition pathway, the underperformance is 
largely driven by the second pricing-in shock that is expected in the late 2030s. This pricing-in 
shock takes into account the expected negative impact of the increasing physical risks beyond 
2050. Furthermore, in case of a Paris Disorderly Transition pathway to a low-carbon economy, 
the expected sentiment shock is actually larger than the impact of transition and physical risks 
in the real economy. On a global level, the real world transition impact is actually very small. 
That is, risks and opportunities level out more or less. 
Figure 18-16 Cumulative return differences to baseline for several asset classes 
 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimateMAPS 
Note: The vertical axis shows the annualized difference in return between the 
climate uninformed baseline and the climate-informed pathway. 
The following textbox provides a zoom-in to the potential future impacts of extreme weather 
events and how these may affect the portfolio’s exposure to assets located in London. These 
zoomed-in insights aim to illustrate and underline the importance to take into account not 
only gradual physical risks, such as the effects of sea level rise, but to also consider the 
consequences of more frequent and more severe extreme weather events and how much of 
them can be attributed to climate change. 
  
Chapter 18 
 294 
Box 1: Zoom-in to explore extreme weather related risks on portfolio exposure to London 
To illustrate the application of the 
PALgamma model, let’s consider 
Meteorological or storm events. The 
diagram below shows, year by year, the 
prediction of the number of MET events 
and the likely trend in event frequency 
under four climate scenarios ranging 
from the counterfactual (no climate 
change) to a Failed Transition where the 
climate sensitivity to each ton of CO2 
emitted is boosted by earth’s feedback 
systems. As shown in the figure, the event 
frequency of storm events globally 
increases sharply from just under 500 events annually today to twice that number by 2050 
and beyond if the world fails to transition (orange lines). 
With over 1800 individually calibrated cities in its database, Climate PREDICT is used to 
assess the specific risk profiles of individual cities e.g. the unmitigated flood losses of 
London when considering the 
rationale for a 2nd Thames Barrier. As 
can be seen in this figure, when 
zooming into a specific city’s climate-
related extreme weather risk 
exposure for one specific type of peril, 
flooding in this case, the amount of 
losses attributable to different global 
warming pathways is seen to start 
diverging as early as the late 
2020s/early 2030s, and by 2060 
climate-attributable losses from flood 
events experience in London may be 
twice as high if the worlds fails to 
transition as compared to a Paris 
transition pathway. 
 
These types of quantified 
insights on climate-
related extreme weather 
frequency and loss 
modelling is of interest to 
risk managers, in 
particular when adding 
dimensions of trends and 
spreads. To this end, the 
PAL model identifies the 
growing extent by which 
climate change is amplifying extreme weather losses under a range of climate scenarios. 
This figure illustrates how – on a global level – total extreme weather losses under a Failed 
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Transition pathway can be split into expected trends under a climate-uninformed baseline 
(i.e., expected losses per type of peril) and a proportion that is attributable to the specific 
climate scenario (in this case a Failed Transition) the world would find itself in. Under this 
scenario, whilst the frequency of extreme weather events is expected to almost triple 
between now and 2100, overall direct losses are expected to increase almost fivefold (in 
2015 US$ terms). 
Source: Ortec Finance. ClimatePREDICT 
 
 From insight to action 
Central banks, pension funds, insurers and banks increasingly use scenario analysis to better 
understand and analyze their potential exposure to climate-related risks (and opportunities). 
Climate-informed decision making has become a fundamental consideration for institutional 
investors as part of their fiduciary duties, to support in strategic investment decisions, for 
better holistic risk management and in developing more resilience in their portfolios.  
This chapter has illustrated one possible approach to carry out such forward-looking climate 
scenario analysis: a top-down model to explore the financial impacts of three plausible climate 
pathways on the performance and funding position of an example UK diversified portfolio. It 
is important to note that the scenarios illustrated are not intended to be extreme. The climate 
impacts for the example portfolio under “worst case” scenarios could be much larger than 
those illustrated. 
However, as the case study results in this chapter have shown, these impacts alone are quite 
dramatic particularly under a Failed Transition pathway: 
• GDP: drops 60% for the UK by 2100 with similar impacts globally. Indeed in the longer 
term the physical damage caused by climate change is expected to outweigh the 
economy’s ability to grow resulting in real GDP declining from the 2060’s and future 
generations being worse off than their parents. 
• Financial market impact will also be significant with permanent declines in median 
cumulative returns of 50% relative to a climate-uninformed baseline by 2050 and an 
accelerating downward trend thereafter. 
There are also significant short-term risks for financial markets especially from a disorderly 
transition: In the Paris Disorderly Transition pathway, equity markets fall by almost 50% within 
the next 5 years relative to the climate-uninformed baseline, although then recover about half 
of those losses by 2035. A smoother Paris Orderly Transition pathway, on the other hand, 
would reduce the severity of these impacts. With equity markets declining by ca. 20% over the 
next five years relative to the climate-uninformed baseline and recovering about half by 2035. 
In the longer term, from 2035 to 2060 both Paris Transition Aligned pathways slightly 
underperform the climate-uninformed baseline pathway due to lower GDP growth 
expectations from physical risks and the repayment of transition investment. This lower GDP 
also leads to lower long-term interest rates by 2060 but this decline in yields is roughly half 
that than the Failed Transition pathway.  
These modelling insights represent significant market risks and therefore have significant 
implications for financial planning within financial intuitions over both short and longer-term 
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horizons. The implications for markets and GDP are relevant for turning ‘insights into action’ 
not only by financial institutions but also by regulators and policymakers. 
Once implemented, the results of a top-down climate scenario analysis, such as the one 
provided in this chapter’s case study, can be ‘turned into action’ via several routes. Most 
directly, the quantified insights can support financial institutions in: 
• Enabling climate-risk integrated modelling of macro-economic outlooks and macro-
economic risk drivers used by financial institutions; 
• Identifying and quantifying impact of systemic climate risk (networked effects) on a 
portfolio; 
• Increasing resilience of a portfolio’s top-down risk budget under different global 
warming pathways via sector-, region-, or asset class re-allocation. 
Furthermore, top-down, systemic climate risk insights enable more informed decision-making 
throughout other aspects of the investment process: 
• Better informed portfolio management via risk-return insights per asset class, sector, 
and region across different possible global warming pathways that should be used in 
conjunction with bottom-up climate risk analysis on the individual securities level; 
• Climate scenario analysis helps prepare for and fulfil climate-related disclosure and 
regulatory requirements (e.g., TCFD);  
• Delivers complementary information to enable effective engagement (regulatory & 
corporate). 
4 Limitations and outlook  
Given that the future is uncertain, the random variation in future economic variables and 
investment returns over the short-term may result in experience that is significantly different 
to the expected long‑term average experience. This is true of all stochastic financial models 
but is particularly important here because there is material uncertainty in all aspects of climate 
scenario modelling. The use of judgment is required at all stages in both the formulation and 
application of climate scenario models.  
The modelling is intended to illustrate possible plausible impacts. Rather than focusing on the 
absolute results under each scenario, we encourage readers to focus on the relative results of 
the climate-aware scenarios compared with the climate-uninformed baseline. 
The scenarios we have modelled do not cover the full range of possibilities. For example, our 
Paris Disorderly Transition pathway assumes a late realization only on the part of the financial 
markets of the physical and transition risks of climate change. Other possible drivers of 
disorder include a late realization of the risks by policy makers leading to abrupt policy action, 
unexpected technological breakthroughs, or a sudden shift in consumer sentiment. These 
would all result in disorderly impacts that would differ in impact and timing from what we 
have modelled. Moreover, the actual outcome is likely to be different from any of our scenarios. 
However, the scenarios do give some idea of the types of impacts that may be seen, and of 
their potential relative significance. 
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The model we have used relies on Cambridge Econometrics’ macro-econometric model E3ME 
to integrate transition and physical risk drivers and calculate their impact on macro-economic 
outputs. E3ME considers only CO2 emissions from the energy sector and does not model land 
use and emissions from land use change. In order to capture the effects of other greenhouse 
gas emissions, the model uses a climate sensitivity coefficient that implicitly includes these 
other emissions. Another assumption in E3ME is that natural resources are unlimited, i.e., only 
the demand side is modelled, not supply.  
The modelling translates the impacts of climate-adjusted GDP shocks onto a wide range of 
financial and economic variables. To do this, GDP is the only translation mechanism from the 
macro econometric model to the stochastic financial scenario model. Other potential 
translation mechanisms (such as carbon-price impact on inflation and interest rates) are out 
of scope and follow purely from the estimated relationships with GDP in the financial model. 
The results of the modelling are highly dependent on the assumptions used to translate the 
GDP shocks onto the other variables.  
There is particular uncertainty about how climate change might affect interest rates and 
inflation since there has not yet been much research in this area, and the evidence that is 
available is mixed. Historically, inflation and interest rates have generally been lower when 
economic growth is low. In this model, inflation and interest rates fall broadly together in the 
central case which means that the real interest rate, which is the most important driver of 
pension scheme liabilities, does not change that much. However, plausible narratives can be 
constructed in which interest rates fall but inflation is stable or even rises.  
Existing research on how climate change affects financial market volatility is limited and 
inconclusive. Volatility might increase as the physical and transition impacts of climate change 
unfold, particularly if this happens in an unpredictable manner. Due to the inconclusiveness of 
the research, the modelling does not make any allowance for this, except in the Paris 
Disorderly Transition pathway during the period 2024-2026 while pricing in of climate-related 
risks takes place.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the modelling does not consider broader environmental 
tipping points and knock-on effects, such as climate change related migration and conflicts. 
Nor does it consider the potential for food or other resource shortages which may lead to both 
lower GDP and higher inflation. In the aggregate, it is quite likely that the modelling is biased 
to under-estimate the potential impacts of climate related risks, especially for the Failed 
Transition pathway. 
Finally, the modelling is based on market conditions at 31 December 2019 and makes no 
allowance for subsequent events, notably the Covid-19 pandemic. 
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 Factoring Transition Risk into Regulatory 
Stress-Tests for “Late & Sudden” Transition  
 
By 
2°Investing Initiative1,2 
Abstract 
A debate has recently emerged as to whether climate risks may be material for financial 
stability. This is driven by a solid body of evidence that climate risks may strand assets across 
key sectors that are prominently represented in financial markets. As a result, financial 
supervisory authorities are starting to explore how these risks can be integrated into existing 
stress-testing frameworks. This study proposes a methodology that financial supervisors could 
follow to build “late & sudden” transition scenarios that could be used to input into either 
traditional or climate-specific stress-tests of regulated entities. It also proses that supervisors 
run multiple simulations of these scenarios across regulated entities to inform on system and 
idiosyncratic ‘impact tolerance’ and enable the setting of minimum recovery standards. An 
illustrative application of the process is shown, focusing on listed equity and corporate bonds 
tied to climate sensitive sectors (fossil fuels, power, steel, cement, automotive and aviation).  
Keywords: climate stress-test, climate transition risks, scenario analysis 
1 Introduction 
In order for global temperatures to stay below 1.5° above the pre-industrial era by the end of 
the century, estimates suggest that $2.4 trillion would have to be invested annually until 2035 
for the transition of the industrial, energy, agricultural, residential and transport sectors (IPCC, 
2018). Similarly, a significant amount of capital will need to be moved out of current high-
carbon investments in a range of sectors, including fossil-fuel mining, utilities, certain types of 
high-carbon manufacturing, and transport infrastructure. These necessary shifts in global 
financing flows will give rise to a new set of financial risks associated with the transition to a 
low-carbon economy. Failing to anticipate these so called “energy transition” risks might lead 
to large-scale mispricing of carbon-intensive assets (Delis et al., 2018), inevitably followed by 
sudden repricing when the market finally realizes the depth of the transition to come. 
In the speech that he gave to the European Commission on 21st March 2019, Mark Carney, the 
then Governor of the Bank of England, highlighted the need for financial supervisors to 
conduct climate stress-tests to assess the resilience of their regulated entities to such risks, 
and specifically to consider the eventuality of a “Climate Minsky moment”, i.e., a sudden 
materialization of climate risks. Similarly, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
recommended exploring how transition risks could be integrated into mainstream banking 
stress-testing frameworks, and described in its scientific advisory board’s report “Too late, too 
                                                     
1  This chapter is written by Michael Hayne, Senior Analyst at the 2° Investing Initiative, email: michael@2degrees-
investing.org; Soline Ralite, Analyst at the 2° Investing Initiative; Jakob Thomä, Managing Director of the 2° Investing 
Initiative, email: jakob@2degrees-investing.org; Daan Koopman, Data Scientist at 2° Investing Initiative.  
2 This report was supported by the International Climate Initiative (IKI) through project grant18_I_351_Global_A_Paris and 
financial markets. 
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sudden?” how a “late & sudden” transition scenario could impact overall financial stability 
(ESRB, 2016).  
The aim of this chapter is to outline why current stress tests do not capture the nature of true 
“late & sudden” economic decarbonization and calls for a new approach. It then provides 
financial supervisors with a methodology that could help build a range of late & sudden 
transition scenarios to input into either traditional or climate-specific stress-tests of regulated 
entities. The methodology specifically focuses on equity and corporate bonds tied to climate 
sensitive sectors (fossil fuels, power, steel, cement, automotive and aviation). Section 1 of this 
chapter describes the scope of traditional regulatory stress-tests and reviews past climate 
stress-testing initiatives. Section 2 provides discussion on why current stress test may not be 
appropriate and why there is a need for abrupt late & sudden transition scenarios. Section 3 
details the methodology that financial regulators could follow to estimate the impact of a late 
& sudden scenario on equity & bonds in climate-sensitive sectors to provide ‘impact tolerance’ 
indicators for markets, portfolios or firms. Finally, Section 4 presents illustrative results 
obtained by applying this methodology. 
2 Background 
 The scope of traditional regulatory stress-tests 
According to Bank of England, “Stress testing involves putting a severe amount of pressure on 
an object or system, to test how resilient it is under extreme conditions. When applied to 
banks, stress testing involves analyzing how these institutions would cope with hypothetical 
adverse scenarios, such as severe recessions or financial crises” (Bank of England, 2016). 
Stress-tests are conducted internally by financial institutions as part of their risk management 
strategy, by regulators as part of the macroprudential policy framework, or by outside actors 
providing external analysis. 
Stress-tests usually consist of three main parts: (i) a qualitative description of several 
disruptive economic scenarios and how they could propagate to the financial sector, (ii) a list 
of macroeconomic and sectoral parameters, as well as the values that they would take under 
each above-mentioned scenario, and (iii) impact indicators reflecting how each scenario 
impacts the financial sector. The time horizon of the scenarios is usually three years, and the 
scenario parameters and impact indicators displayed are often limited to a dozen. Table 19-1 
displays the main characteristics of the stress-test conducted yearly by the Fed reserve in the 
United States, and by the ESRB in Europe. 
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Table 19-1 Main characteristics of US & EU regulatory stress-tests 
 Fed reserve stress-test (USA) ESRB stress-test (EU) 
Risk scenarios 
considered 
• Severe global recession 
accompanied by a global 
aversion for long-term fixed 
income assets, leading to a 
broad-based and deep 
correction in asset prices 
• Weakening economic 
activities across all sectors, 
accompanied by rapid 
declines in long-term rates 
and flattening yield curves 
• Abrupt and sizeable repricing of 
risk premia in global financial 
markets – triggered e.g. by a policy 
expectation shock 
• Adverse feedback loop between 
weak bank profitability and low 
nominal growth 
• Public and private debt 
sustainability concerns; 
• Liquidity risks in the non-bank 
financial sector 
Time horizon 3 years 3 years 
Macroeconomic 
& sectoral 
indicators 
displayed 
GDP growth rate, unemployment 
rate, National House Price Index 
GDP growth rate, unemployment, 
HICP, Real estate prices 
Impact indicators 
displayed 
Value of the Dow Jones Stock 
Market Index, U.S. BBB corporate 
yield, Projected 
loan/revenues/net income losses 
& capital ratios for participating 
institutions 
Stock prices, Long-term rates, 
Exchange rates, Foreign demand & 
commodity prices, SWAP rates, Credit 
spread indices 
Sources: Authors, based on ESRB (2018) & FED reserve (2018) 
 
 A growing interest from regulators for climate stress-testing 
There is a growing debate as to whether climate risks may be material for financial stability. 
The claim is driven by a solid body of evidence that climate risks may create value destruction 
for key industrial sectors that are prominently represented in financial markets (e.g. energy, 
utilities). Indeed, according to Moody’s analysis, $9 trillion of their rated debt may be at 
immediate or elevated risk of downgrade in response to environmental risks (Thomä & Dupré, 
2017). Around $15-20 trillion of market capitalization in stock markets is tied up with 
companies that are covered in the decarbonization scenarios of the International Energy 
Agency (Thomä & Dupré, 2017).  
As a result, financial supervisory authorities are starting to explore how climate risks – and 
especially transition risks – can be integrated into existing stress-testing frameworks. 
Associated recommendations around integrating such risks have been put forward by the 
UNEP Inquiry (Dupré et al., 2015), as well as a number of leading think tanks3. The European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) also recommended exploring how transition risks could be 
integrated into mainstream banking stress-testing frameworks (ESRB, 2016). Research 
initiatives along these lines have been launched by the financial supervisory authorities in 
Sweden, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and France (Chenet et al., 2015). We detail 
hereafter some of the most notable initiatives. 
                                                     
3 See for example the report from Bruegel, Schoenmaker & van Tilburg (2016). 
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In 2017, Battiston et al., assessed the exposure of European financial institutions to fossil fuel 
production sectors and energy intensive sectors and analyzed the losses that these institutions 
would bear assuming an arbitrary 100% shock in the market capitalization of the fossil fuel 
sector. They concluded that such a shock to the equity value of the fossil fuel sector wouldn’t 
threaten European financial stability, although specific banks could be significantly impacted.   
In the same year, the Dutch Central Bank assessed the potential impact of floods on credit 
losses and quantified the exposure of Dutch financial institutions to transition risks (Regelink 
et al., 2017). This report was followed by another, more in-depth analysis of transition risks 
and their impact on financial institutions’ expected losses (Vermeulen et al., 2018). This latter 
analysis was conducted using a Computable General Equilibrium model (CGE), whose 
production functions were modified to reflect the consequences of several transition 
scenarios, and the macroeconomic impact was then distributed across sectors based on their 
relative emission intensities.  
In 2018, the California Insurance Commissioner’s Office conducted, in partnership with the 2° 
Investing Initiative (2°II), a climate scenario analysis of insurance companies operating in 
California, aiming at quantifying the current and future exposure of these institutions to 
transitions risks, and physical risks on the asset-side of their balance sheets. However, the 
impact of these risks, were they to materialize, wasn’t quantified. The Bank of England also 
included the impact of climate change and of a delayed transition in its UK insurers stress tests 
in 2019, partly based on the methodology presented in this study. Finally, building on 
Battiston’s (2017) paper, Battiston & Monasterolo, published in 2019 a stress-testing 
methodology aiming at pricing transition risks in today’s value of equity and corporate bonds 
in the energy & power sector, as well as in sovereign bonds’ value.  
 The choice of the transition scenario  
Many uncertainties remain as to the form that a low-carbon transition would take. The ESRB 
scientific advisory board’s report “Too late, too sudden?” (ESRB, 2016) identified two types of 
scenario outcomes, a “gradual”, smooth ambitious scenario and a late & sudden one. This 
concept has been further developed by the UN PRI in 2018 operating under the premise of an 
“Inevitable Policy Response” (PRI, 2018). In addition to the two more ambitious scenarios, 
transition outcomes could also involve a “do nothing” approach or a limited climate transition 
ambition but are of little interest to assess the materiality of transition risks. 
Considering that the purpose of a stress-testing exercise is to assess the impact of a worst-case 
scenario on the financial system, a late & sudden scenario is more suited than one that 
describes a smooth transition. Such a late & sudden scenario assumes that limited climate 
action is taken for several years but is then followed by ambitious action to stay below the 2°C 
threshold by the end of the century. This approach also includes a “sentiment” shock at the 
moment climate action is taken, leading to a sudden repricing of financial assets. 
However, these types of scenarios are yet to be fully explored by macroeconomic or energy-
economy models, and little information is available to quantify their economic implications. A 
project aiming at bridging this gap and commissioned by the PRI is currently underway (PRI, 
2019), however this project focuses on establishing alternative baseline scenarios and not 
‘stress-tests’-type results representing tail risks. 
 The choice of methodological approaches 
Before estimating the impact of the energy transition on the value of tradable financial assets, 
the first step is to understand how the profits of companies issuing these securities would be 
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affected by an energy transition, and in particular by a “too late, too sudden” transition. 
Generally speaking, this can either in top down or bottom up fashion as per Table 19-2. 
Table 19-2 Main approaches used by studies to estimate the impact of transition 
risks on share prices 
 
Source: CISL (2015), Vermeulen et al. (2018), Ecofys (2018) 
3 The case for of a standardized framework for climate stress testing 
and abrupt late & sudden scenarios 
As highlighted above, methodologies already exist to quantify the exposure of financial 
institutions’ portfolios to climate risks, and first steps have been taken to assess the potential 
losses that these institutions would incur, were these risks to materialize. The purpose of this 
chapter is to propose ‘upgrades’ on two fronts. The first is on how climate stress tests are 
designed and the coordination between the designers and financial supervisors. The second 
is on the need for abrupt late and sudden scenarios, as current stress tests scenarios do not 
capture the potential effects between macroeconomic indicators, firm specific microeconomic 
indicators and financial asset evaluation.   
To address how stress tests are created, a guiding framework is required to enable cross 
comparison of scenarios and stress test results. The need for a unified framework arises from 
the lack of capacity across supervisors to develop consistent scenarios using consistent and 
disclosed inputs as well as methodologies. For example, the information on the activity in the 
real economy (e.g., the future production and capital expenditure plans of non-financial 
companies), the relationships of macroeconomic and sectorial indicators (currently based on 
historical relationships, e.g. oil price and GDP), as well as the relationship between economic 
and financial indicators (e.g., GDP and non-financial firms’ individual revenues) should all be 
considered. 
Trying to predict how the markets might behave in an abrupt late & sudden low-carbon 
transition is a daunting task given the lack of precedence and knowledge of the relationship 
between economic and financial indicators under such circumstances. An approach to address 
this uncertainty could be by evolving the current research question of “which institutions or 
markets fail in specific scenarios” to, “how many different scenarios does a financial institution 
or market show significant stability to solvency concerns”. For this to be possible there needs 
to be a common framework for creating scenarios. This would both help mitigate the error 
and uncertainty that arises from the speculative nature of how the markets might behave in 
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abrupt late & sudden low-carbon transition, give an estimation of resilience of financial 
markets, as well as reduce transaction cost of conducting such assessments. 
Abrupt late & sudden scenarios 
Current scenarios and the assessments that apply them do not capture the anticipated nature 
of an abrupt late & sudden decarbonization of global economies on several fronts. Explicitly 
current assessments do not cover one or more of the follow attributes:  
• The change in sectorial production from non-financial firms (or value) would be non-linear, 
and the magnitude will accumulate with inaction. 
• There will be strong differentiation in the evaluation of financial assets issued by different 
non-financial firms in sectors undergoing the transition. 
• The change in sectorial production and/or revenues would not be cyclic. 
• The change in demand would likely be too sudden to allow market forces act to induce 
cost minimized deployment of future supply and it is uncertain how this would be 
reflected in terms of market sentiment. 
Current scenarios that apply a linear shock to a sector or demand from a specific technology 
fail to capture the true dynamic of an absolute carbon budget that is being continually 
exhausted and the action that would be required to reduce greenhouse gas concentration. An 
‘inevitable policy response’ would trigger a tipping point in sectoral and/or technological 
demand, which will manifest itself some point in the future. Consequently, the required 
magnitude of change accumulates over time as the carbon budget is consumed, and thus 
greater action is required sooner. As the dependent variable in stress tests is the evaluation of 
financial assets, which is always a function of future cash flows, when the tipping point occurs 
will also impact the results independent of the magnitude of shock. Consequently, the time in 
which the policy response is enacted will have a strong impact on the size of the required 
response, and testing should be carried out across both size of the shock and when it occurs. 
The future capacity for non-financial companies to meet demand and estimations of their 
future production is available at market intelligence agencies, who track capacity and 
production at the asset level (Weber at al., 2017). These databases track the purchases of land, 
permits, and supply chains to be the first to identify corporate activity and sell that to 
respective industries constituents, as market intelligence. Such data has already been used 
extensively by financial institutions and supervisory authorities to track the alignment of 
capital expenditure plans with climate change mitigation commitments (Thomä et al., 2017). 
This forward-looking information can be used in conjunction with demand-side production 
shocks and discounted cashflow modelling to estimate the impact of these shocks on the 
financial asset prices of each non-financial firm in a bottom-up fashion. The benefits of this 
approach are threefold. It incorporates granular firm specific data at the physical asset level, 
it is informed by future expectations and not just past performance, and lastly the 
methodology of formulating/accounting of these expectations is in a consistent manor across 
each firm in each sector. In theory this should in turn provide more accurate assessment of 
non-financial firm solvency and be able to be translated into asset prices and inform financial 
firms solvency. 
The nature of decarbonization of some sectors will not manifest in a cyclical nature as there 
will be no rebounding for some sectors or some technologies. Traditional stress tests have a 
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time horizon of three years, assuming cyclicality would imply that companies in transitioning 
sectors generally have an adaptive capacity to rebound within this time horizon. This does not 
seem likely for non-financial firms that operate solely in fossil-fuel extraction and production 
for example. An outcome of a stress test should be the degree in which these companies can 
remain solvent indefinitely given that there is no rebound in sectoral value. 
The change in the evaluation of equity and bonds (the sentiment shock) will not be the direct 
evaluation of the demand side change currently theorized and represented by traditional 
integrated assessment models, such as those created by the IEA and members of the 
Integrated Assessment Modelling Consortium. This is because without any early warning 
system, the tipping point would likely be too sudden to allow market forces act to induce cost 
minimized deployment of future supply. This especially true within the time frame of 
traditional stress tests of three years. 
4 A framework for climate stress testing and developing late & 
sudden scenarios 
To the authors’ knowledge, there are currently no energy-economy models assessing the 
consequences of a truly “late & sudden” scenario on sectoral value-added. The following 
section outlines an illustrative framework and methodology to build these scenarios using a 
bottom up approach. First it outlines the framework below in point form, it then illustrates our 
first attempt in completing such an exercise. Finally, it shows illustrative results of the 
application of such a framework on two theoretical equity and bonds portfolios whose sectoral 
investments are aligned with the IEA’s NPS scenario.   
In this chapter we have only run one scenario, but the key message of the chapter is that many 
can be run, and that solvency over different scenarios will provide useful insight into market 
stability and resilience. In addition, although we focus on changes in aggregated sectoral and 
technological profits for selected indices in this study, a bottom-up approach also allows total 
market-level analysis, firm-level analysis as well portfolio level analysis. Consequently, it can 
inform on both idiosyncratic and systemic sensitivities to late and abrupt decarbonization.  
The application framework consisting of the following elements: 
• Identification of relevant financial indicators that that drive relationship between 
industrial GHG emissions and firm profits 
• Identification of the appropriate granularity of the above indicators and sourcing the 
corresponding business as usual data for each 
• The formulation of a wide range of plausible abrupt late & sudden scenarios 
• Identification of an appropriate evaluation methodology to suit each financial asset class 
• Benchmarking each firm/portfolio or market BAU evaluation against the range of 
scenarios developed through step iii 
 Inputs and Indicators under a business as usual scenario 
The first steps in building the model is to define the relevant data inputs and indicators that 
drive financial asset evaluation and identify the appropriate granularity and consistent sources 
for this data under a business-as-usual scenario. The independent variables calculating the net 
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profit, in simplified terms, are production, prices, and the fixed and variable costs. Table 19-3 
below illustrates how transition risks, and particularly those stemming from a “too late, too 
sudden” transition, would impact carbon-intensive industries’ profits across the entire “profit 
value chain”, and details the indicators needed to quantify each of these impacts. 
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Table 19-3 Impact of transition on sectoral profits & indicators needed to quantify 
the impact 
 How could transition risks impact sectoral profits? 
Net profits = (Production volume * Prices) – Costs of Goods Sold 
– OPex – (Taxes + Interests) 
Indicators needed to 
quantify the impact 
  Increased cost of emitting CO2: Under a transition scenario, 
the implementation of a carbon tax will cut the margin of 
carbon intensive industries proportionally to their 
emissions. Under a “too late, too sudden” scenario, carbon 
prices would need to be higher than under a “smooth” 
transition scenario, in order to foster a quick decrease in 
emissions.  
- Production 
- Carbon intensity of 
production 
- Carbon tax 
 
Increased cost of production inputs: During a low carbon 
transition, carbon intensive goods will increase in prices due 
to pass-through of direct emissions costs. Industries using 
such carbon intensive goods as production inputs will thus 
be impacted. 
- Prices of 
production inputs 
 
 
Additional depreciation costs and R&D expenditures: 
Under a transition scenario, significant capital expenditures 
in low-carbon technologies will increase companies’ annual 
depreciation costs (included in Operating Expenses). R&D 
expenditures will also likely increase in the short-term as 
deployment of new technologies will have to be expedited 
to meet the unanticipated demand. 
- CAPEX 
- R&D expenditures 
- All other OPEX  
  Changes in revenues: Companies’ revenues will be affected 
through a change in prices and consumer demand: As they 
become increasingly costly to produce, prices of carbon 
intensive goods will likely increase, and consumers will, in 
turn, decrease their demand for such goods. A delayed 
transition, as it would increase the costs bared by carbon-
intensive industries, would likely deepen this effect.  
- Production 
- Prices 
 
A range of initiatives have already sought to quantify the sectoral impacts of a “smooth” 
energy transition, and provide some indicators allowing to quantify its impact on the profits’ 
determinants detailed in Table 19-3. Two relevant initiatives in this regard are the EU H2020-
funded ET Risk project and UNEP FI’s working group on transition risks (UNEP FI & Mercer, 
2018). To the knowledge of the authors, no research has however yet been conducted to 
understand the impact on sectoral profits of a delayed transition scenario, although initiatives 
looking at this issue are under way (notably led by UN Principles for Responsible Investment 
as part of their “Inevitable Policy Response” work) (PRI, 2019). 
Building on this formulation, Table 19-4 below details the indicators and their data sources 
that were used to build the “too late, too sudden” scenarios used here.  
1 
2 
3 
4 
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Table 19-4 Sectors included in the analysis and indicators used for profits 
calculation 
Sector 
Target 
companies 
Geography 
Indicators used 
for profits 
calculation 
Source of the data 
for the BaU & 
smooth transition 
scenarios 
Oil Upstream oil  
Europe, North 
America, South 
& Central 
America, 
Middle East, 
Africa, Asia 
Pacific, Eurasia 
Production, 
Prices 
-Production data 
taken from Asset 
Resolution4, IEA 
WEO2018 SDS & 
NPS 
- Prices data taken 
from ETP2017 
B2DS & RTS 
Coal Coal mining  
Natural gas 
Upstream 
natural gas 
Power 
Power 
generators 
(Coal, Gas, Solar, 
Wind) 
Europe, USA, 
Latin America 
Production, 
Prices, 
Levelized Cost 
of Electricity, 
Subsidies  
- Production data 
taken from Asset 
Resolution, 
WEO2018 SDS & 
NPS 
- Electricity prices, 
LCOE & Subsidies 
taken from ET Risk 
Steel 
Crude steel 
producers 
Brazil, USA, 
Mexico, France, 
Germany, Italy 
Production, 
Prices, Carbon 
prices, Carbon 
intensity 
Production data 
taken from Asset 
Resolution, Prices, 
carbon prices & 
carbon intensity 
taken from ET Risk 
Cement 
Cement 
producers 
Automotive  Car producers 
World average 
 
Production, Net 
margin by 
powertrain type 
Production data 
taken from Asset 
Resolution, 
Production data & 
net margin 
derived from 
ETP2017 & BNEF 
Aviation  
Airlines 
(international) 
Demand, Fuel 
efficiency, Fuel 
prices 
Fleet data taken 
from Asset 
Resolution, 
Demand taken 
from ETP2017 
B2DS & RTS, fuel 
prices & fuel 
efficiency taken 
from ET Risk  
 
                                                     
4 Asset resolution is a market intelligence data aggregator, that links real economy production data form various high 
carbon sectors to financial securities (https://asset-resolution.com/). 
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 Estimating prices and production under an abrupt transition 
Once the baseline values for each of the indicators are defined, the next step is to develop a 
framework for producing late and sudden scenarios expressed in the terms of the required 
identified indicators listed above in Table 19-2.  
There many different approaches to estimating future production profiles as well as a 
plenitude of different outcomes from these models. For instance, the are dozens of integrated 
assessment models used to inform on the probability of global warming, in part by estimating 
future production profiles, and thousands of outcomes. Thus, it is anything but certain what 
the exact production profiles representing global markets undergoing a climate Minsky 
moment may look like and how they should be formulated. However, for measuring the 
tolerance of financial markets to these different outcomes, the exact method for producing 
the production profiles may not need to be so sophisticated. Here we present two simple 
approaches to estimating the future production profiles representing global markets 
undergoing a climate Minsky moment. 
The first method defines the year in which a production shock occurs, and the duration of this 
shock. After which the production trajectory resumes the profile of current IAM estimations 
of future demand. The intent of this style of approach, would be purely understanding how 
financial asset prices may react under modification of parameters independent on what the 
consequences may be for emissions, as well as the impact of those emissions on future 
demand. 
The second approach attempts to use a global carbon budget accounting approach that 
approximates keeping GHG emissions within roughly within 450 ppm, albeit in a very 
simplified manner (further detailed in Annex A). The intent of this approach is to simulate the 
outcome of a policy response that manages to maintain a likely probability of limiting global 
warming to within 2 degrees by the turn of the century, i.e., stylizing an attempt to meet the 
Paris Agreement, assuming the policy action occurs somewhere between 2025-2035. 
Using the first model to understand a market, firm or portfolios’ sensitivity to a climate Minsky 
moment in general, requires that the production profiles for each region and technology to be 
iterated over the parameter for size of the shock, when the shock occurs, and its duration. The 
evaluation of the impact of this production/demand side shock then informs financial asset 
pricing through DCF modeling and bond default probability and pricing models. Similarly, for 
the second model, the year of the shock and the assumed ‘climate lag’, the residence time for 
emitted CO2 in the atmosphere, would be iterated over suitable range of values. The results 
could be representing in simple matrices that illustrate the tolerance of a market, firm or 
portfolio to the combinations of shock magnitude and climate Minsky year for each technology 
or sector.  
Although both approaches described above represents a valuable first step in the 
development of “too late, too sudden” transition scenarios, there are several caveats to bear 
in mind. First, the approaches overlook possible interactions between sectors (in reality, 
emissions may decrease less than needed in an industry and more than needed in another) – 
although it takes into account risk propagation across industries (e.g., an increase in oil prices 
impacts airlines expenses). Second, in the absence of alternative solutions, it features a very 
simplistic price dynamic. Finally, in the absence of alternative solutions, it neglects changes in 
net margins for some sectors. In both methods however, all other indicators within Table 3 
could be also be varied to help understand if the uncertainty in their estimations flow through 
to impact evaluation at the market, portfolio, or firm level. 
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 Estimating equity value under a “too late, too sudden” transition scenario  
As explained above, the energy transition will impact companies’ revenues and expenses, with 
the amplitude of the effect varying depending on the sector they operate in, which market 
they operate in, and when the shock occurs. These changes in the companies’ profits will 
subsequently impact their market value, as the demand for shares issued by weakened 
companies will decrease. We rely on standard evaluation approaches to capture these changes. 
To estimate changes in share prices under a “too late, too sudden” scenario, we rely on 
Gordon’s formulation of future dividends’ flows (Gordon, 1959). The equity market price 𝑉𝐸 
at time 𝑡0 is given by: 
𝑉
𝐸,𝑡0=
𝐷1
𝑟−𝑔
 with 𝐷1 being the expected dividends for the next year, r being the cost risk of capital 
for the company, and g being the dividend’s growth rate.  
Assuming dividends for a given year are proportional to the net profits of the company for this 
year, and explicitly modeling the future evolution of profits, we derive the following formula:  
𝑉
𝐸,𝑡0=𝛼 ∑
𝑃𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
𝑡𝑏
𝑡=𝑡0
∗(1+𝑥)
 
With Pt being the profits made by the company in year t (modelled as explained in Section 2.1), 
tb the date until which we explicitly model cash-flows, x the percentage of modelled value in 
the terminal value, and α the proportionality coefficient between net profits and dividends.  
In simple words, the value of equity for a given company is assumed to equate the Net Present 
Value of its future cash-flows. The difference between VE,t0 under the BAU and the “too late, 
too sudden” scenarios is the equity value put at risk by the transition.  
 Estimating corporate bonds’ value under a “too late, too sudden” transition 
scenario  
The most influential factors that affect a bond's market value are its yield, prevailing interest 
rates (as they affect the discount rate of the bond’s cash flows) and the bond's probability of 
default. For simplicity, we don’t hypothesis how a “late & sudden” transition would affect 
inflation and thus long-term interest rates. Therefore, in our application we focus on default-
risk as the sole driver of bond value changes under a transition scenario. Discount rates are 
kept constant across all scenarios.  
1) Estimating the probability of default under a transition scenario 
There are many methods used calculate in credit risk, each require different assumptions and 
data, and ultimately have various forecasting accuracies (Tanthanongsakkun et al., 2009).  
Commercial credit rating typically employs derivates of the Merton distance-to-default model 
(e.g. Moody’s KVM and Bloomberg’s credit risks models). Nonetheless it is clear that bonds’ 
probabilities of default are heavily correlated with the main financial ratios of their issuers 
(Tang & Yan, 2010). 
For sake of computational convenience, we employ Zmijewski’s bankruptcy model to calculate 
the change in probability of default at time t under a business as usual scenario and then over 
the range of “late & too sudden” scenarios. We then apply this change in default probability 
to commercially published default probabilities at the security level. This helps to calibrate the 
results based on exogenous risks not captured within our framework and is assumed to 
compensate for some of our simplifications.  
(1) 
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To apply Zmijewski’s model we assume that a change of a 𝑥%  in net income translates into 
an 𝑥% change in NI/TA. In addition, we simplify to assume that both the total liabilities and 
current assets are assumed constant over time, and thus in accordance to Zmijewski, the bond 
defaulting at a certain time 𝑡 can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝐷𝑡 = φ(−4.336 − 4.513
𝑁𝐼𝑡
𝑇𝐴
+ 5.679
𝑇𝐿
𝑇𝐴
+ 0.004
𝐶𝐴
𝐶𝐿
)   (2) 
Where PD is the 1-year probability of default, φ the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function, NI/TA net income over total assets, TL/TA total liabilities over total assets, and CA/CL 
current assets over current liabilities. 
Taking the limitations of Zmijewski’s model into account, the changes in NI/TA over time are 
used to calculate the changes in PD over time: 
∆𝑃𝐷𝑡 = 𝑃𝐷𝑡 − 𝑃𝐷𝑡−1      (3) 
The probability of default for each bond in the market or index is then the product of ∆𝑃𝐷𝑡 
and the bonds current probability of default in time t. 
2) Estimating the value of a bond under a transition scenario 
The value of a bond is then given by probability weighted discounted cash flow represented 
by: 
𝑉𝑗 = ∑ 𝑋𝑡𝑃𝐷𝑡(∏ (1 − 𝑃𝐷𝑘))
𝑡−1
𝑘=0
𝑇
𝑡=1     (4) 
With Vj being the value of bond j, T being the maturity date of the bond, X represent the net 
present value of a bond’s cash flow (defined below), and PDt being the probability of default 
computed in Section 2.4.1. 
Where the net present value of the bonds future cash flows is given by:  
𝑋𝑇 = ∑
𝐶𝑗𝐹𝑗
(1+𝑟𝑗)𝑡
+
𝐹𝑗
(1+𝑟𝑗)𝑇
𝑇
𝑡=1      (5) 
Where Fj is the face value of the bond j, Cj is the coupon rate of the bond j, R is the recovery 
rate in case of default, rj is the discount rate for the cash flows. 
For a bond expected to mature in T time periods, with coupons paid every period, the present 
value of its cash flow stream, assuming no default, can be written as: 
𝑉𝑗 = ∑
𝐶𝑗𝐹𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝑡
(∏ (1 − 𝑃𝐷𝑘)) + 𝑅𝑗𝐹𝑗 ∑
𝑃𝐷𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
(∏ (1 − 𝑃𝐷𝑘)) +
𝐹𝑗
(1+𝑟)𝑇
𝑡−1
𝑘=0
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑡
𝑘=1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ∏ (1 −
𝑇
𝑘=1
𝑃𝐷𝑘)      (6) 
In the example displayed in Section 3 below, we set Rj = 38%5, Fj = 1000, Cj = 5%, r = 5%.  
5 Illustrative results 
In this section, we display some results obtained using the GHG concentration driven stylized 
late & sudden scenarios developed in Annex A. Changes in the mean equity value of companies 
in key sectors under a “late & sudden” transition scenario, assuming a sudden repricing due 
                                                     
5 Historical recovery rate of senior bonds (Moody’s, 2017) 
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to a market sentiment shock when the transition starts, are displayed in Table 19-4 (World 
average). As for corporate bonds, Table 19-5 illustrates the increase in the mean 1-year 
probability of default of bonds tied to sensitive sectors, 1 year and 10 years after the beginning 
of a “late & sudden” transition (World average). Table 19-6 displays the change in the value of 
an illustrative bond with a face value of 1000$, a 5% coupon rate, and a 38% recovery rate, 
depending on the sector it is tied to, and depending on its remaining time to maturity after 
the “late & sudden” transition starts (in 2025).  
We set 𝑟 = 5% ; 𝑡0 = 2025 (i.e., we assume a sudden repricing of equity in 2025, date at 
which the TLTS transition starts, due to a market sentiment shock), 𝑡𝑏 = 2040, 𝑥 = 10% and 
α = 1 for all scenarios.  
Table 19-5 Mean change in equity value compared to a BAU scenario under a “too 
late, too sudden” transition scenario for key sectors, assuming a sudden repricing in 
2025 (%) 
 Change in equity value (%) 
Upstream Oil -53.3% 
Coal mining -57.0% 
Upstream gas -30.8% 
Coal electricity -80.1% 
Gas electricity -20.3% 
Solar PV 19.2% 
Wind electricity 12.8% 
Nuclear 19.9% 
Crude steel -52.0% 
Cement -27.0% 
Automotive -9.5% 
Aviation -21.0% 
 
As expected, upstream fossil fuel industrials and fossil-based power producers, in particular 
coal electricity producers, are the most strongly hit by the transition, while listed renewable 
energy producers enjoy a significant revaluation of their shares.  
It is worth noting that these results are sectoral averages, and thus do not consider the 
adaptive capacities of individual companies that the proposed model can and should produce. 
This aggregated impact on sectoral equity value might hide significant disparities between 
companies of a given sector. As, in the context of regulatory stress-testing, changes in the value 
of entire asset classes are of more interest than changes in individual asset values, this isn’t 
much of a concern. Our flexible bottom-up approach to estimating changes in sectoral profits, 
detailed in Section 2.1, could however be adapted to uncover these disparities. Global 
production trends taken from the IEA could be broken down to company level using a fair-
share approach, while indicators related to energy efficiency and operating margin could be 
estimated on a case-by-case basis, based on the CAPEX and R&D expenditures already 
engaged by the company. Such an approach would enable the assessment of the 
consequences of the transition on companies with mixed revenue streams (e.g. revenues from 
carbon intensive and renewable power production at the same time) (Röttmer et al., 2018). 
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Table 19-6 Mean 1-yr probabilities of default of bonds issued by climate-sensitive 
sectors under a “too late, too sudden” transition scenario (%) 
 2018 (Baseline6) 2026 2035 
Steel 0.03 0.03 0.06 
Cement 0.02 0.02 0.05 
Oil 0.01 0.03 0.06 
Coal 0.03 0.04 0.09 
Gas 0.02 0.02 0.05 
Coal power 
0.027 
0.04 0.09 
Gas power 0.02 0.04 
Nuclear 0.02 0.00 
Solar PV 0.02 0.00 
Wind 0.01 0.00 
Airlines 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Automotive 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 
Table 19-7 Mean change in bond values compared to baseline under a “too late, too 
sudden” transition scenario, depending on their remaining time to maturity, and 
assuming a sudden repricing in 2025 (%) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Steel -0.2% -0.7% -1.2% -1.9% -2.6% -3.3% -4.1% -4.9% -5.7% -6.5% 
Cement -0.2% -0.5% -1.0% -1.5% -2.2% -2.9% -3.8% -4.7% -5.6% -6.6% 
Oil -1.4% -2.9% -4.6% -6.4% -8.3% -10.0% -11.7% -13.3% -14.8% -16.2% 
Coal -0.8% -1.9% -3.2% -4.6% -6.2% -7.7% -9.2% -10.6% -12.0% -13.1% 
Gas -0.5% -1.1% -1.9% -2.9% -3.9% -5.0% -6.1% -7.2% -8.2% -9.3% 
Coal power -1.1% -2.5% -4.2% -6.2% -8.4% -10.2% -12.1% -13.8% -15.5% -17.1% 
Gas power -0.4% -0.8% -1.2% -1.6% -2.1% -2.8% -3.5% -4.2% -5.0% -5.7% 
Nuclear 0.1% 0.3% 0.6% 0.9% 1.4% 1.8% 2.4% 3.0% 3.7% 4.4% 
Solar PV 0.4% 1.1% 2.2% 3.5% 4.6% 5.6% 6.6% 7.6% 8.5% 9.3% 
Wind 0.3% 0.9% 1.7% 2.8% 4.0% 5.1% 6.1% 7.0% 7.9% 8.8% 
Airlines -0.2% -0.6% -1.2% -1.9% -2.6% -3.4% -4.2% -5.1% -5.9% -6.7% 
Automotive -0.2% -0.5% -0.8% -1.1% -1.3% -1.5% -1.8% -2.1% -2.4% -2.7% 
 
As illustrated by Table 19-6 and Table 19-7, the bond value that is put at risk by a “late & sudden” 
transition increases as a function of the time to maturity of the bonds, driven by a rise in their 
1-year probability of default as the transition progresses. As highlighted above for equity, Coal 
& Oil producers, as well as Coal power producers are the most strongly affected by a late & 
sudden transition.  
                                                     
6 Bloomberg data, Q4 2018. 
7 Mean 1yr probability of default of power producers worldwide in Q4 2018 (Source: Bloomberg) 
Chapter 19 
 314 
6 Caveats 
Although the approach developed above represents a valuable first step in the development 
of a “too late, too sudden” transition scenario that could be used by financial supervisors as 
an input into climate stress-tests of regulated entities, there are several caveats to bear in 
mind.  
First, the methodology that we developed in Section 2.2 to estimate the impact of a late & 
sudden transition on sectoral profits suffers some limitations – as detailed in Section 2.2.: it 
overlooks some possible interactions between sectors, it considers a simplistic price dynamic, 
and it neglects changes in net margins for some sectors. The approach developed in this study 
fills a gap – the absence of a proper late & sudden transition ‘stress-test’ scenario including 
the indicators needed to estimate the changes in sectoral profits, but it shouldn’t be 
considered sufficient. A proper “late & sudden” scenario developed by the energy-economy 
modelling community, granular both at geography and sectoral levels, would to take climate 
stress-testing a step further. The Inevitable Policy Response project, led by the PRI, will likely 
fill this gap. Multiple scenarios covering different potential outcomes and tools that enable 
easy assessment of both markets and portfolios should be developed further. 
Second, the methodology that we developed to assess the changes in bond and equity value 
for companies in carbon-intensive sectors doesn’t consider potential mixed revenue streams, 
they apply to theoretical companies with all their revenues coming from only one carbon-
intensive sector. When applying the equity and bond shocks estimated above to investment 
portfolios, a solution would thus be to compute an average shock for each company in the 
portfolio, weighed by the share of their revenues coming from each carbon-intensive sector. 
Alternatively, as mentioned pg. 12, our methodology could also be applied at company-level 
and directly factor mixed revenue streams into future profits calculations.  
Third, this study doesn’t cover sovereign bonds. This is because contrary to Battiston et al. 
(2017), we do not consider that a correlation between short-term GDP changes and sovereign 
interest rates is clearly established in the literature, either in developed or emerging 
economies (Poghosyan, 2014; Min, 1999). let alone did we find a value to use for the sensitivity 
factor. Fiscal indicators, in turn, are designated by the literature as key drivers of sovereign 
bonds’ interest rates, but the methodology developed in this study doesn’t yet allow us to 
quantify the changes in a country’s indebtedness under a late & sudden transition scenario. A 
next step would thus be to investigate the relationships between profits of carbon-intensive 
sectors and fiscal revenues and understand how shocks to the value-added of these sectors 
would impact a country’s dept-to-GDP ratio.  
7 Conclusion 
To respond to the growing demand for supervisors to be able to answer questions on the 
materiality of transitions risks posed to financial markets in a late and sudden decarbonization 
of economies, this study first highlights the inadequacy of current approaches. The shortfalls 
of applying traditional stress testing for assessing systemic risk, to assessing risk associated 
with sudden economic decarbonization, lie in the lack of use of available information on the 
future capital expenditure plans of non-financial companies, the inadequacy of the time 
horizon of traditional tests leading to implicit assumptions about the rebounding of sectoral 
value, and the lack of abrupt late & sudden scenarios to test against.  
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To combat this, the study proposes that risk assessment should be carried out via sensitivity 
analysis producing ‘impact tolerance’ indicators. Assessing a range of possible futures could 
mitigate uncertainty around how market sentiment may respond to an inevitable policy 
response. Given that this sort of test does not exist, nor the scenarios, we demonstrate how 
this could be done by: (1) building “late & sudden” transition scenarios including all the 
indicators needed to estimate future changes in profits of carbon-intensive sectors, that can 
also be calibrated to reflect the current climate trajectory of any investment portfolio, (2) 
demonstrating how a to price the risks associated with a late & sudden transition into equity 
and corporate bonds’ value, and (3) and finally by empirically demonstrating the need, by 
estimating and showing the risk associated with a late & sudden transition might have a 
significant impact on equity and bond value of companies in carbon-intensive sectors, fossil 
fuels extraction and coal-based power production being the most threatened activities.   
Combining the methodology developed above with an analysis of the exposure of financial 
institutions to carbon intensive sectors would allow financial supervisors to assess the 
potential impact of a “late & sudden” transition on financial stability. Such a combination of 
top-down stress-tests and exposure analysis through asset-level data has been pioneered in 
the Bank of England’s 2019 insurance stress-test, which was informed in part by the results 
presented above. This methodology will also be applied by the 2°Investing Initiative in their 
partnership with the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority (EIOPA) in 2019.  
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ANNEX A: Detailed methodology for GHG concentration driven stylized 
late & sudden production curves  
This annex outlines the assumptions used to derive an approximated production curves used 
to illustrate the general methodology of stress testing late & sudden scenarios. 
Production & efficiency: 
• For each sector, the additional emissions occurring before the start of the transition under 
a delayed action scenario compared to a smooth transition scenario (date at which the 
transition starts) need to be offset if the Minsky moment is intended to capture a market 
sentiment of actualize the Paris Agreement (i.e., limiting global warming by 2 degrees or 
less by the turn of the century). Thus, the timing of the Minsky moment is a key 
independent variable, and markets and portfolio should be tested across a range of time 
horizons. In our simulation, we chose to model production out to by 2040, and assumed a 
climate lag of 60 years (the temperature of 2100 is determined by the GHG emitted 60 
years before).  
• How these emissions are offset is dependent on the sector. Generally speaking offsetting 
can be achieved through either reducing production, increasing efficiency, or offsetting by 
carbon removal activities will impact the relationship between production and profit. 
Which route emission reduction take is based on the function of each sector the global 
economy. For example, cement being an essential material to build the infrastructures 
needed for the 10 billion humans expected by 2050, assuming a major drop in production 
would seem unlikely (as illustrative in IAM e.g. the IEA in ETP 2017), a surge in energy 
efficiency due to sudden R&D efforts seems more realistic (or the development of a 
substitution product, but we didn’t consider this possibility in the study).   
• The offsetting can either be done at economy level, i.e., considering the emissions 
occurring in each sector before 2025 in the IEA New Policy Scenario (or any other global 
Business as Usual scenario of this kind) or done at the portfolio level, using tools such as 
the Paris Agreement Capital Transition Assessment (PACTA) Transition Monitor.8 The tool 
quantifies the current exposure of investment portfolios to “climate-relevant” sectors and 
technologies (Fossil fuels – Oil, coal, natural gas; Power – Coal, gas, renewables; and 
Automotive – Electric vehicles, hybrid vehicles, ICE vehicles) and provides a forward-
looking assessment of its alignment with 2°C scenarios (based on the production and 
investment plans of the companies financed by the portfolio). The emissions occurring 
before the start of the transition, which must be offset afterwards, will thus reflect the 
production that is currently funded by the portfolio, and its expected evolutions in the 
next 5 years. That way, the shocks applied to the portfolio are calibrated to its current 
trajectory.  
• The results displayed in this study are based on the “global market” approach (i.e., the 
production in each sector before the start of the transition follows the NPS scenario).    
Figure 19-1 below illustrate these principles for the coal mining sector:  
                                                     
8 See https://www.transitionmonitor.com/ for more details.  
Factoring Transition Risk into Regulatory Stress-Tests for “Late & Sudden” Transition    
317 
Figure 19-1 Illustrative trajectory of the coal production financed under a delayed 
transition scenario starting in 2025 
 
 
Prices and profit margins: 
• Fossil fuel prices under a delayed transition scenario evolve proportionally to demand; 
prices for other sectors slowly reach the levels of a “smooth” transition once the “late & 
sudden” transition starts.  
• No impact on gross or operating margins is assumed for building material industries (Steel 
& Cement), as the authors didn’t find any reasonable way to estimate this under a delayed 
transition scenario. The impact that a delayed transition would have on profits for these 
sectors might thus be underestimated.    
• In line with literature,9 carbon prices are assumed to be 1.5 times higher in 2040 under a 
“too late, too sudden” scenario compared to a “smooth” transition scenario, to foster 
quicker energy efficiency improvements once the late & sudden transition has started.    
Although the approach developed above represents a valuable first step in the development 
of “too late, too sudden” transition scenarios, there are several caveats to bear in mind. First, 
the approach overlooks possible interactions between sectors (in reality, emissions may 
decrease less than needed in an industry and more than needed in another) – although it takes 
into account risk propagation across industries (e.g. an increase in oil prices impacts airlines 
expenses). Second, in the absence of alternative solutions, it features a very simplistic price 
dynamic. Finally, in the absence of alternative solutions, it neglects changes in net margins for 
some sectors.   
                                                     
9 See Advance_2020_Med2C (“smooth” transition scenario) and Advance_2030_Med2C (slightly delayed transition scenario) 
(https://data.ene.iiasa.ac.at/iamc-1.5c-explorer/)  
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  ClimateWise Physical Risk Framework 
 
by 
Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership1 
Abstract 
Physical risks – such as rising temperatures, flooding, drought, sea level rise and water scarcity 
– are already being felt globally, and the associated financial losses (both insured and 
uninsured) have significantly increased in recent years. The ClimateWise Insurance Advisory 
Council has developed the ClimateWise Physical risk framework (CISL, 2019), which 
demonstrates how the risk analysis tools of the insurance industry can inform other parts of 
the financial sector and demonstrate the role of adaptation in mitigating these risks. The 
framework offers real estate investors and lenders a means of understanding the potential 
physical risks of climate change on their portfolios. 
Physical risk exposure is likely to vary geographically both within and between portfolios but 
the impacts are significant across the board. For example, a 4°C warming scenario could see 
average annual losses caused by floods to UK mortgages more than double. While insurance 
will play an important role in managing the impact of climate change, the increase in risk could, 
in the most severe cases, make premiums unaffordable. 
Keywords: climate change, physical risk, infrastructure, scenario analysis, catastrophe 
modelling, risk management, insurance industry, financial sector 
1 Introduction 
The changing climate poses new risks and challenges to investors and lenders. While much 
attention has focused on transition risks – the risks posed by rapid decarbonization of the 
world economy – at present, political agreements to cut emissions have not been matched by 
equivalent action on the ground. Instead, the world is currently on track to see substantial 
climate change throughout the 21st century. The definition of physical risks applied here 
follows CISL (2016), where physical risks arise from the impact of climatic (i.e., extremes of 
weather) or geologic (i.e., seismic) events or widespread changes in ecosystem equilibria, such 
as soil quality or marine ecology, and can be event-driven (‘acute’) or longer-term in nature 
(‘chronic’). 
Climate change will influence the likelihood and intensity of extreme weather events, which 
threaten the interests of investors and lenders in real estate and infrastructure assets in 
particular. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that climate change 
                                                     
1 The authors of the chapter are Dr Bronwyn Claire and Dr Nina Seega from the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability 
Leadership. The Chapter is based on a report authored by the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership. The authors 
would like to thank Kajetan Czyz and Rachel Austin of CISL, Vivid Economics, Sayers and Partners, ETH Zurich, as well as 
the ClimateWise Insurance Advisory Council and the Advisory Panel which was established for the project. All queries are 
to be directed to climatewise@cisl.cam.ac.uk. 
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will result, for example, in increased frequency and intensity of heatwaves; more heavy 
precipitation events, leading to a greater risk of flooding at the regional scale; and an increased 
frequency and intensity of extreme high sea levels, such as those caused by storm surges (IPCC, 
2018)2. The large year-to-year natural climate variability means that, even with further climate 
change, such events will not take place every year, even in more extreme scenarios. However, 
early signs of these risks materializing can be seen in more frequent heatwaves in most regions, 
a global increase in the frequency and intensity of heavy rainfall events and an increased risk 
of drought (IPCC, 2018). These changes pose particular threats to both infrastructure assets – 
for which global investment needs may exceed US$90 trillion by 2030 – and residential and 
commercial building stock – which is expected to grow by 13 percent between 2017 and 2026 
(Navigant Research, 2018). For financial institutions lending against real estate and 
infrastructure assets, increases in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events 
might increase the likelihood of defaults due to the increased financial losses borrowers face. 
For investors in real estate and infrastructure assets, such changes might lead to asset 
devaluation and reduced yields.  
Insurance will likely play an important role in helping investors and lenders manage these 
increased risks, but insurance should not be used as a reason to ignore them. Insurance can 
play a key role in helping to manage physical risks, especially of the most extreme events. But 
growing physical risks will also influence the future affordability and availability of insurance 
protection. In their first-ever report on climate change, the UK’s Bank of England (2015, p. 37) 
noted that “increasing levels of physical risks could present challenges, both to market-based 
risk transfer mechanisms and to the underlying assumptions behind general insurance 
business models”. As such, investors and lenders need to be directly empowered to 
understand how these risks might influence them. 
2 Overview of the ClimateWise transition risk framework 
 ClimateWise 
This unique framework was developed through the ClimateWise Insurance Advisory Council 
and builds on existing work on physical climate change risks to the financial sector. 
ClimateWise is a global network of leading insurers, reinsurers, brokers and industry service 
providers who share a commitment to reduce the impact of climate change on the insurance 
industry and society. In 2016, the ClimateWise Insurance Advisory Council was established to 
lead research into ways the insurance industry can support the transition to a low carbon 
economy. The Council is formed of a group of C-suite executives from across the ClimateWise 
membership. The development of the ClimateWise Transition risk framework was guided by 
an Advisory panel of representatives of policy and the market. 
 Background of the ClimateWise Physical risk framework 
The purpose of the ClimateWise Physical risk framework is to show how investors and lenders 
can make use of insurance industry catastrophe modelling tools and metrics to improve their 
management of the physical risks of climate change, especially by encouraging adaptation 
measures in targeted areas (CISL, 2019). The ClimateWise Physical risk framework shows how 
investors and lenders can use catastrophe modelling tools and associated metrics, refined by 
the insurance industry over decades, to better assess, manage, report, and reduce their 
exposure to physical risks, particularly those from extreme weather events. Catastrophe 
models have long been used by the insurance industry to assess and price extreme weather 
event risk, and hence help them and their clients manage these risks. Recently, the Geneva 
                                                     
2 (IPCC) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2018). Global Warming of 1.5°C. 
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Association (2018), a leading international insurance think tank, recommended that climate 
science projections should be used within natural catastrophe models to provide more 
forward-looking forecasts. The framework shows how, in practice, outputs from climate 
models and climate scientists can be used in combination with natural catastrophe models to 
assess risk under future climate scenarios. Used in this way, the insurance industry’s 
catastrophe models are powerful tools that can be used by investors and lenders within their 
scenario analysis to help quantify the physical risks of climate change, while recognizing the 
inherent uncertainty surrounding the future incidence of climate events. 
The framework outlines a four-step process that investors and lenders can follow to use these 
tools, as set out in Figure 20-1: 
• First, investors and lenders need to collect data on the physical assets (‘exposure’) they 
are concerned about. As a minimum, this should include their geographic locations 
and some information on asset class, such as whether they are residential or non-
residential property. The more detailed that property-level information can be – in 
terms of construction type and year, roof type, number of floors, occupancy and 
square footage – the more robust the associated results will be. 
• Second, they need to decide which natural catastrophe model(s) to use for their 
analysis. Several factors will play into this choice. A critical one will be whether the 
modelling will be undertaken in-house or sub-contracted to a commercial model 
vendor. The former would require use of an open source model. This may allow for 
more bespoke analysis to be undertaken and provide greater understanding of what 
drives any results, but these models may not have received as much investment and 
will also require reasonable technical skills to be confident that the work is being 
undertaken accurately. The advantages and disadvantages are reversed for vendor 
models. For models supplied by vendors, the extent and transparency of model 
documentation is another important factor, since this will enable investors and lenders 
to understand and review the assumptions that have been made in the modelling. 
• The third stage involves choosing the climate scenarios to model and defining how 
those climate scenarios might influence the probability and severity of extreme 
weather events. In order to account for uncertainty about the extent of global action 
on reducing emissions, scenarios chosen should cover a wide range of plausible 
futures. The scope of potential ranges in temperature increases, typically expressed in 
terms of temperature increases by 2100 above a preindustrial baseline, might range 
from 1.5°C, the temperature target ‘aimed for’ in the Paris Agreement, to 4°C or more, 
which broadly reflects the temperature increases that would be expected given the 
current trajectory of emissions. The relationship between these temperature changes 
and the severity and frequency of disaster events within a region should incorporate 
the latest peer-reviewed developments in climate science and acknowledge/account 
for the uncertainty around these relationships. Some models already include effects 
of climate change on the frequency and intensity of the perils within their models. 
Otherwise, collaborations with academics or specialist climate change impact 
modelers may need to be sought out in consultation with the model developer. As 
climate models continue to develop, for example in their geographic fidelity, these 
developments can be incorporated into this stage of the analysis.  
• The final stage is model execution and interpretation of the associated results. 
Catastrophe models can provide a wide range of different results of interest. Two of 
the most common outputs are Average Annual Loss (AAL) – the average losses from 
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property damage experienced by a portfolio per year – and annual probability of 
occurrence – the probability that, over the period of one year, a given asset 
experiences an event of a given magnitude. Any results should be compared against a 
‘present day’ climate scenario baseline and, where possible, these baseline results 
should be compared with and scrutinized against historical loss data. Forward-looking 
results should also be benchmarked against those from comparable studies, where 
available. When there is confidence that these results are robust, investors and 
lenders then have the option to convert the changes in expected losses into potential 
changes in asset values. They can also use the natural catastrophe model(s) to analyze 
how adaptation measures might reduce losses and asset value impacts. 
Figure 20-1 Key steps for investors and lenders to follow in modelling the physical 
risks of climate change 
 
Source: CISL (2019) 
3 Applying catastrophe models to infrastructure  
Catastrophe models estimate risks from extreme weather events. Catastrophe models are 
sophisticated computer models used to estimate the risk of physical damage and the financial 
costs of such damage (‘losses’) to a geographically specified portfolio of physical assets, 
typically buildings, caused by extreme weather events including tropical cyclones 
(hurricanes/typhoons), earthquakes, hail, winter wind storms, floods, and wild fires. Typically, 
the key output of a natural catastrophe model will be the distribution of possible losses, 
expressed in financial terms, to the portfolio. 
Catastrophe models vary in detail but typically share the same key hazard, vulnerability and 
financial modules that are applied to a set of physical assets, referred to as exposures. As 
shown in Figure 20-2, these components work in combination to estimate the risk of financial 
losses to a portfolio of exposures. Where information is available, most models can also 
incorporate attributes about building type (modifiers) in relation to the exposures, and details 
on insurance arrangements for the purposes of calculating financial losses. 
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Figure 20-2 Model of the effects of climate change and adaptation measures on a 
given set of assets (exposures) 
 
Source: Based on Figure 8 of CISL (2019) 
 
The minimum data required by investors and lenders for input into catastrophe modelling is a 
set of physical assets (‘exposures’), their geographic locations and some information on asset 
class, such as whether they are residential or non-residential property. Modern natural 
catastrophe models run at a high spatial resolution and benefit from precise location data for 
each of the exposures. Flood models typically have a spatial resolution of between 2 and 50 
meters, reflecting the geographic specificity of flood events; other perils might be modelled at 
lower resolutions. Most models require exposure location data to be provided in co-ordinate 
(latitude and longitude) form. Where co-ordinate data is not already available, ‘geocoder’ 
software can be used to convert a street-level address to co-ordinates. By looking up the 
address in a database, the geocoder converts the address ‘10 Downing Street, London, United 
Kingdom’ to the co-ordinates 51.5034, 0.1276. Some natural catastrophe models have a 
geocoder built in; where they do not, there are several commercial services available. Since 
addresses are sometimes incomplete or ambiguous, it is often necessary to undertake a 
manual check of the plausibility of geocoder outputs. At minimum, this might involve checking 
that all co-ordinates returned by the geocoder are within the expected country/area. A more 
thorough review would ‘reverse geocode’ the co-ordinates returned by the geocoder back to 
addresses and make sure these match the original addresses provided. 
The hazard element of a catastrophe model assesses the physical extent and intensity of 
physical perils – for example, hurricane or flood events. In order to provide a comprehensive 
view of future risk, a natural catastrophe model needs to model possible future extreme 
weather events. One method for generating this is to take a catalogue of historical events, and 
make small, plausible modifications to each historical event’s location or intensity to reflect 
what might happen in the future. At this stage, understanding of the impact of climate change 
on physical perils can be used to make modifications to the possible future extreme weather, 
for example, by incorporating any expected increases in intensity. 
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Climate models can be used to predict how climate change will influence the likelihood and 
severity of extreme weather events, although modelling some perils still represents a 
challenge. Drawing on evidence from the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, Table 20-1 shows 
how the scientific understanding of the physical relationship between climate change and 
perils varies. In general, extreme events related to temperature, such as extreme cold or heat, 
are better understood than complex meteorological phenomena such as storms and cyclones. 
Table 20-1 The impact of climate change is better understood for some perils than 
for others. 
 
Likelihood of further 
changes by late 21st 
century 
Region 
Warmer and/or more 
frequent hot days and nights 
over most land areas 
Virtually certain (99–100%) Over most land areas 
Increase in precipitation Very likely (90–100%) 
Arctic, Northern Europe, 
North America and 
Southern Hemisphere 
Increases in intensity and/or 
duration of drought 
Likely (66–100%) On a global scale 
Increase in intense tropical 
cyclone activity 
More likely than not (50–
100%) 
In the western North Pacific 
(affecting e.g. China, Hong 
Kong, Macau, Japan, Korea, 
Philippines, Taiwan and 
Vietnam) and North 
Atlantic Ocean basins 
(affecting for example the 
Atlantic coast of the United 
States and Central America)  
Increased incidence and/or 
magnitude of extreme high 
sea level 
Very likely (90–100%) Global 
Small increases in winter 
wind speed extremes 
(European winter wind 
storms) 
Likelihood not provided 
“Medium confidence” in 
change 
Central and Northern 
Europe 
Source: IPCC (2013) 
 
The vulnerability element estimates the physical damage caused by an extreme weather event. 
This normally uses damage curves, which relate the intensity of a hazard at a particular 
location to damage caused to assets at that location. For example, a damage curve for flood 
events describes the damage which would occur to assets at various flood depths. Damage is 
normally expressed in terms of a damage ratio, with a damage ratio of 100 percent indicating 
total destruction of an asset. Damage curves are generated either using observed data from 
historical events, or using analytic or experimental estimates. In the latter case, detailed 
characteristics such as building age, structural characteristics, and building occupancy can be 
used to select an appropriate damage curve for a given exposure. Uncertainty around damage 
curves is a major source of uncertainty in natural catastrophe models. 
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The vulnerability element can be used to model impacts of adaptation. Many adaptation 
measures involve physical changes to real estate assets so as to reduce the damage done to 
assets by hazards of given intensities. This, in turn, reduces expected financial losses. Inside 
natural catastrophe models, the effects of this type of adaptation measure can be modelled 
by selecting a damage curve with a lower damage ratio at given intensities. A comparison of 
losses with a ‘baseline’ and ‘adaptation’ damage curve provides an estimate of the effect of 
adaptation. 
The financial element transforms physical damage to economic loss. By combining distribution 
of damage ratios with input data on replacement costs and any possible insurance contracts, 
the financial implications of the physical damage done by the event can be calculated. In many 
modelling approaches, this process is then repeated many thousands of times to help 
understand different scenarios of future losses. 
Although natural catastrophe models vary in their implementations, they typically produce a 
common set of outputs, including the following: 
• Average Annual Loss (AAL): This expresses the average losses from property damage 
experienced by a portfolio per year. If insurance is available and priced commensurate 
with risk, the AAL provides a lower-bound estimate of the premium required to insure 
against the risk. For illustration, Table 20-2 shows the calculation of AAL over a ten-
year period for two scenarios. In both scenarios, total losses over ten years amount to 
£620 million, yielding an AAL of £62 million. However, the AAL metric provides no 
indication of whether losses are expected to be concentrated in a small number of 
years (as per Scenario 2) or spread more evenly through time (as per Scenario 1). 
• Annual probability of occurrence: This measures the probability that, over the period 
of one year, a given asset (exposure) experiences an event of a given magnitude. For 
example, an asset might be at a 1 percent chance of flooding at a depth of one meter 
or more in any given year. 
• Annual exceedance probability curve: This shows the probability that any given 
threshold of losses will be exceeded in any given year. For example, the hypothetical 
exceedance probability curve in Figure 20-3 shows there is a 1 percent chance of the 
portfolio experiencing a loss of £100 million or higher in any given year. AAL can be 
derived from an exceedance probability curve. 
• Return periods: These are ways of describing the magnitude of an event. A flood with 
a 100-year return period has a 1 percent chance of being exceeded by a higher-
magnitude event in any year. Such a flood is expected to occur approximately, but not 
exactly, every 100 years. Table 20-3 shows the relationship between return period and 
probability of exceedance at some frequently used values. 
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Table 20-2 Comparison of two scenarios where in both scenarios, the Average 
Annual Loss is £62 million but the pattern of losses in the two scenarios is very 
different 
Year 
Scenario 1 loss 
(£ million) 
Scenario 2 loss 
(£ million) 
2001 7 0 
2002 0 0 
2003 194 620 
2004 125 0 
2005 9 0 
2006 21 0 
2007 0 0 
2008 14 0 
2009 250 0 
2010 0 0 
Source: CISL (2019) 
 
Table 20-3 Probability losses and return periods 
Probability losses are 
exceeded 
Approximate return 
period 
0.5% 200 
1% 100 
1.3% 75 
2% 50 
5% 20 
10% 10 
20% 5 
Source: CISL (2019) 
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Figure 20-3 Annual exceedance probability 
   
Source: CISL (2019) 
4 Illustrative results  
The following provides an illustrative analysis of 12 real estate asset portfolios, consisting of 
assets in the UK, Europe, North America, South America and Asia. Seven of these portfolios 
consist of UK residential mortgage assets held by large UK retail banks and building societies, 
whilst five are real estate investment portfolios held by ClimateWise members. The latter 
portfolios mostly comprise offices and shopping centers, with assets across Europe, North 
America, South America and Asia. The analysis compares present day losses of the portfolios 
from extreme weather events to their expected losses in the 2050s. Financial institutions with 
long-term investments, including banks and building societies providing new 35-year 
mortgages today, will have exposure to risks in this time period. 
The results derive from two natural catastrophe models that are characteristic of those used 
in the insurance industry. The application uses CLIMADA (Aznar Siguan & Bresch, 2019), an 
open source model developed by ETH Zurich, to explore European winter wind storm and 
tropical cyclone risks. A strong attraction of CLIMADA is that it is an open source model, which 
means that all assumptions behind the model are visible and, with modifications to the source 
code, can be adapted by advanced users. However, the sophistication of the modelling does 
not match that of the commercial vendors. The application also uses Future Flood Explorer 
(FFE), developed by an international team of academics and experts, to explore UK flood risk. 
The FFE was previously used as part of the 2017 Climate Change Risk Assessment for the UK 
government’s Committee on Climate Change (Sayers and Partners, 2015). 
The application explores expected losses in the 2050s in two climate change scenarios 
(acknowledging that this is just a sample of possible future climate change scenarios): 
• The first scenario is consistent with 4°C of global warming by the end of the century, 
an outcome in line with the warming implied by current trajectories of climate action.  
• The second scenario reflects the possibility that aggressive mitigation action and 
technological innovation leads to rapidly decreasing emissions levels and the global 
temperature rise being limited to 2°C by the end of the century. 
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The illustrative analysis uses results from climate models to map these changes in global 
average temperature increases into expected changes in the frequency and severity of floods 
and storms. It is recognized that this is an area subject to ongoing scientific enquiry, with the 
effects of climate change better understood for some extreme weather events such as UK 
floods, those for others such as European wind storms. Furthermore, the changes in these 
events represent just a subset of future climate impacts. 
The results show that, for these particular portfolios, climate change could have large impacts 
on the losses that investors and lenders face from floods in the UK and tropical cyclones in 
North America and the Pacific Rim, but that their increases in losses from European winter 
wind storms are likely to be lower. Under a 4°C warming scenario, the modelling suggests the 
AAL caused by UK floods to residential mortgage assets could increase by 130 percent. It also 
suggests a 40 percent increase in the number of residential properties exposed to significant 
flood risk (defined as a 1.3 percent or 1 in 75 annual probability of flooding or above), 
equivalent to 180,000 properties within the portfolios examined. These results are for large, 
geographically well-diversified portfolios; more regionally concentrated lenders may see larger 
increases. For investment portfolios, in a 4°C warming scenario, the increase in AAL from flood 
risk across four UK portfolios is modelled to be 70 percent higher in the 2050s than today. 
Across the two portfolios with assets in North America and the Pacific Rim, the analysis based 
on best evidence suggests that the equivalent expected increase from tropical cyclone risk is 
80 percent. The portfolios examined face much smaller increases in risk from European winter 
wind storms. 
The analysis also suggests that losses faced by investors and lenders are lower, but still 
substantial, if global efforts to reduce emissions are successful. For the UK residential 
portfolios, AAL from floods would increase by only half the amount of a 4°C scenario, while 
the modelling suggests that the number of properties within the portfolios at risk of significant 
flooding (1.3 percent or 1 in 75 annual probability or above) might only increase by 25 percent. 
For investment portfolios in the UK, the increase in AAL is 40 percent, which is similar to the 
potential increase in AAL from tropical cyclone risk (Table 20-4). These results reinforce that it 
is paramount for governments, business and society to try and keep warming as low as 
possible, as underlined by the most recent IPCC analysis. 
 
Table 20-4 Expected losses for two scenarios 
Peril Asset type Risk metric 
2°C warming 
by end of 
century 
4°C warming 
by end of 
century 
UK flood risk 
Residential 
mortgages 
% increase in AAL 
by 2050s 
61% 130% 
UK flood risk 
Investment 
portfolios 
% increase in AAL 
by 2050s 
40% 70% 
North America and 
Pacific Rim tropical 
cyclones 
Investment 
portfolios 
% increase in AAL 
by 2050s 
43% 80% 
European winter 
wind storms 
Investment 
portfolios 
% increase in AAL 
by 2050s 
6.3% 3.6% 
Source: CISL (2019) 
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These findings align with those from earlier studies, including those from the insurance sector. 
For instance, JBA Risk (2018) found a 25–30 percent increase in AAL for UK residential 
properties in the 2040s, while the UK’s Climate Change Risk Assessment (Sayers and Partners, 
2015), also using the Future Flood Explorer as in this analysis, found a 30–62 percent increase 
in AAL in the 2050s for UK residential properties. The smaller increases in AAL found in these 
previous analyses are likely to reflect differences in assumptions around community-based 
adaptation and in the portfolios examined, while in the case of the JBA analysis, also 
differences in model set-up and time horizon. Similarly, the relatively modest increases in AAL 
from wind storms match the findings of research carried out on behalf of the Association of 
British Insurers regarding the effect of climate change on wind storm losses to UK assets 
(Association of British Insurers, 2013). The ABI modelling exercise found the AAL from UK wind 
storms was expected to increase 11 percent by the end of the century under a 1.5°C scenario 
and 25 percent by the end of the century under a 4.5°C scenario. It is likely that differences to 
our analysis are largely attributable to the different time horizon and scenarios considered, as 
well as some differences in the model set-up and the underlying climate models used to drive 
the results. 
The potential increases in risk, especially in a 4°C scenario, raise important questions for 
investors, lenders, insurers, and policymakers as to how they can be managed in the most cost-
effective manner. In cases where commercially provided insurance policies are held in relation 
to these perils, policyholders might expect to see, on average, increases in premiums and 
insurance companies would need to purchase substantially more reinsurance to ensure 
solvency and in line with any increases in modelled uncertainty. For assets that have no 
insurance cover (such as some commercial properties), all of any increase in risk will be faced 
by investors and/or lenders. This also has important implications for the strategy of 
organizations set up to help address the insurance protection gap. In the specific case of the 
UK residential mortgage market, this applies particularly to Flood Re, whose role is to provide 
an affordable market for home insurance for properties built before 2009 that are at risk of 
flooding (Flood Re, 2018). Flood Re achieves this by offering fixed premiums according to 
council tax banding, with the funding gap between the premiums it charges and the risk-based 
price for insurance met through a levy imposed on the insurance industry (and, ultimately, its 
policyholders). This analysis suggests its funding gap could increase, reinforcing previous 
concerns about the sustainability of these arrangements. For example, although a formal 
assessment of when insurance availability for residential properties through normal market 
arrangements may become challenging has not been undertaken, a typical rule of thumb is 
that it can be challenging to provide affordable insurance in cases where the annual probability 
of flooding is 1.3 percent or above. The modelling shows that, in a 4°C warming scenario, by 
the 2050s, the number of residential properties falling into this category could increase by 40 
percent to 180,000 properties across the portfolios examined. Scaled to the UK mortgage 
portfolio as a whole this could amount to an additional 250,000 properties, and compares with 
approximately 150,000 who were benefiting from the Flood Re scheme during the most 
recently reported financial year (Flood Re, 2018). Moreover, Flood Re is, by statute, to 
transition the UK residential market back to risk-reflective pricing, meaning that after 2039 
premiums and excesses should, as well as being risk-reflective, remain affordable without the 
benefit of the levy: careful investigation will be required of whether and how Flood Re can 
achieve this in light of the projected increased risks arising from climate change. 
In the absence of Flood Re or for UK residential properties excluded from Flood Re (those built 
after 2009), the implications for both homeowners and mortgage providers could be more 
profound. It is possible that, in some cases, this increase in risk will mean that buildings 
insurance for residential properties may no longer be available for some homes at an 
affordable price (recognizing that what is seen as an affordable premium can vary by 
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household). A lack of access to affordable insurance would have adverse implications for 
homeowners living in those properties who may find that their properties suffer significant 
decreases in value, potentially leaving them in negative equity and either unable to sell their 
homes and/or unable to re-mortgage. This could have significant personal costs, as well as 
disrupting the liquidity and efficiency of the housing and mortgage markets. In turn, lenders 
may need to consider the increased risk of mortgage default, which is likely to be 
geographically concentrated, and ensure that their business strategies are robust to this risk. 
A crucial next step from this work should be for national regulators to explore in more detail 
the interlinkages between flood risk, insurance availability and the residential property market 
– with a particular focus on how these interlinkages could evolve over time. In the UK, this 
would build on the concern expressed by the Bank of England regarding the possible 
crystallization of financial risks from greater flood risk to the UK residential mortgage market 
if flood insurance would become unaffordable (Bank of England, 2018). 
While a substantial overall elevation in physical risks is expected in a 4°C scenario, not all 
lenders and investors are likely to be equally exposed. Especially in a 4°C warming scenario, 
the modelling finds significant differences in the risk of different portfolios of mortgage and 
investor assets. Under a 4°C warming scenario, the range of increase in expected losses across 
the seven UK residential mortgage portfolios varies between 108 percent and 132 percent. For 
the two portfolios of assets at risk of tropical cyclones in North America and the Pacific Rim, 
the range in the increase in losses is 17 percentage points, with much of this difference driven 
by the location of just a small number of assets. The modelling suggests that the spread in risk 
across different portfolios is substantially smaller if emission reductions are successful in 
moving the world onto a 2°C warming trajectory. 
Property-level adaptation measures can materially reduce climate change induced losses, and 
this is most effective when combined with global efforts to reduce emissions. The increase in 
losses identified above assumes relatively limited efforts to adapt to the impacts of climate 
change. In the UK, the modelling suggests that, under a 2°C scenario, around two thirds of the 
additional losses might be offset if half of at-risk households install flood protection measures. 
This includes measures to prevent flood ingress and measures to reduce damage if flood water 
does ingress, such as resilient flooring. Further reductions in losses, and a reduction in the 
number of properties at significant risk of floods (annual probability of flooding above 1.3 
percent), could be secured by increased community-level flood adaptation measures. The 
analysis of tropical cyclone risk suggests that, in a 2°C temperature scenario, roof upgrades to 
properties at risk of tropical cyclones might offset around half of the increase in AAL. However, 
adaptation measures offset a smaller proportion of the increases in losses in higher 
temperature scenarios, when extreme weather events are expected to be more severe. In 
other words, rather than considering adaptation as an alternative to efforts to reduce 
emissions, it is best thought as a complement to these efforts. 
There are several reasons why the estimates of losses by the current framework might 
underestimate the true increase in physical risks faced by investors and lenders. The analysis 
focuses on future changes in the likelihood and intensity of extreme weather events, 
overlooking other chronic changes or multiple acute events. Also, climate models which drive 
predictions of extreme weather events may also not be capable of capturing tipping points in 
the climate system. The modelled portfolios are large and diverse, while smaller or regionally 
concentrated lenders might have higher risk than these. As well, increased urbanization and 
demand for new housing might result in new buildings in high-risk locations. Indirect impacts 
from extreme weather events and the financial losses associated with that damage are 
excluded. Physical damage to assets is also likely to cause business interruption and supply 
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chain interruptions, as well as potentially increase rates for labor and materials required to 
repair damage to assets. 
5 Conclusions and outlook 
The potential increases in risk, especially in a 4°C scenario, raise important questions for 
investors, lenders, insurers and policymakers as to how they can be managed in the most cost-
effective manner. In cases where commercially provided insurance policies are held in relation 
to these perils, policyholders might expect to see, on average, increases in premiums and 
insurance companies would need to purchase substantially more reinsurance to ensure 
solvency in line with any increases in modelled uncertainty. For assets that have no insurance 
cover (such as some commercial properties), all of any increase in risk will be faced by investors 
and/or lenders. This also has important implications for the strategy of organizations set up to 
help address the insurance protection gap. 
A crucial next step from this work should be for national regulators to explore in more detail 
the interlinkages between flood risk, insurance availability and the residential property market 
– with a particular focus on how these interlinkages could evolve over time. While a substantial 
overall elevation in physical risks is expected in a 4°C scenario, not all lenders and investors are 
likely to be equally exposed. The modelling suggests that the spread in risk across different 
portfolios is substantially smaller if emission reductions are successful in moving the world 
onto a 2°C warming trajectory. Property-level adaptation measures can materially reduce 
climate change induced losses, and this is most effective when combined with global efforts 
to reduce emissions. 
There is a powerful opportunity for investors, lenders, the insurance industry and policymakers 
to target the uptake of adaptation measures in the most beneficial areas. Although it allows 
for rapid repricing of risk, the short time horizons created by the insurance industry’s practice 
of one-year insurance contracts limits the ability for insurers to incentivize adaptation 
measures. However, investors and lenders, combined with policymakers, may find it easier to 
take a longer-term perspective. They could work in concert with insurers to encourage the 
uptake of adaptation measures, for instance, by making both loans and insurance contingent 
on the installation of relevant adaptation measures. These efforts could help overcome ‘first-
mover risks’ whereby households may be unwilling to introduce adaptation measures that 
similar households do not have, for fear that their abnormality, and the signal that the 
property may be exposed to physical risks, might reduce the value of the property. A further 
area to explore is the role of adaptation at the municipal level to demonstrate the potential 
value of municipal adaptation measures and the implications for the availability and design of 
insurance products. 
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 ClimateWise Transition Risk Framework  
 
By 
Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership1 
Abstract  
Global efforts to tackle climate change by reducing carbon emissions will result in a transition 
to a low carbon economy.  This transition, already underway, presents both risks and 
opportunities for the financial sector. The ClimateWise Insurance Advisory Council has 
developed the ClimateWise Transition risk framework (CISL, 2019), an open-source model 
which explores how to quantify these risks and opportunities within infrastructure investment 
portfolios.  
The framework is set out in three steps, which can be used independently or combined to 
explore transition risks and opportunities. Specifically, the framework is designed to help 
investors 1) to assess the breadth of asset types exposed to transition risk at portfolio level 
(across different subsectors, regions, and timeframes; 2) to define the potential financial 
impact of the low carbon transition down to asset level; and 3) to incorporate transition 
impacts into asset financial models. 
Each of the three steps highlights practical actions investors might take in order to manage 
risks and capture opportunities. The framework applies this analysis to an array of global 
infrastructure asset types. 
Keywords: climate change, transition risk, infrastructure, scenario analysis, catastrophe 
modelling, risk management, insurance industry, financial sector 
1 Introduction 
The commitment to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels lies at the heart of Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2016). 
Achieving that objective will require a significant change in global energy consumption across 
all sectors. This brings material financial implications for companies, governments, and the 
wider global economy.  
In particular, markets are required to reallocate global capital in line with a pathway of low 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development (United Nations, 2016). In order 
to limit global warming to below 2°C, the remaining global carbon budget must remain below 
1,000 GtCO2 (World Resources Institute, 2014). However, the carbon potential of the earth’s 
known fossil fuel reserves is more than 2,860 Gt CO2. Consequently, if global action on climate 
policy accelerates, or the target of 2°C is enforced, many carbon intensive reserves will become 
unburnable, with implications for the infrastructure that serves them. Under current estimates, 
                                                     
1 The authors of the chapter are Dr Bronwyn Claire and Dr Nina Seega from the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability 
Leadership. The Chapter is based on a report authored by the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership. The authors 
would like to thank Kajetan Czyz and Rachel Austin of CISL, ERM, as well as the ClimateWise Insurance Advisory Council 
and the Advisory Panel which was established for the project. All queries are to be directed to climatewise@cisl.cam.ac.uk.  
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this could cut the revenues of upstream oil and gas companies by US$20 trillion, and coal 
companies’ revenues by US$5 trillion (The CO-Firm & Kepler Cheuvreux, 2014). This will result 
in a considerable knock-on impact along the value chain, ranging from transportation to 
manufacturing and chemicals to power. 
2 Overview of the ClimateWise transition risk framework 
 ClimateWise  
ClimateWise is a global network of leading insurers, reinsurers, brokers and industry service 
providers who share a commitment to reduce the impact of climate change on the insurance 
industry and society. In 2016, the ClimateWise Insurance Advisory Council was established to 
lead research on transition risk management in insurance industry. The Advisory Council is 
formed of a group of C-suite executives from across the ClimateWise membership. The 
development of the ClimateWise Transition risk framework was guided by an Advisory panel 
of representatives of policy and the market. 
 Background of the framework 
The ClimateWise Transition risk framework aligns with recommendations from the Task Force 
on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD, 2017). The ClimateWise Transition risk 
framework (CISL, 2019) provides an open-source, step-by-step guide that captures risks and 
opportunities emerging from the low carbon transition to infrastructure investments (Figure 
21-1). The definition of transition risks applied here follows CISL (2016), where transition risks 
arise from efforts to address climate change, including but not limited to abrupt or disorderly 
introduction of public policies, technological changes, investor sentiment and disruptive 
business model innovation. The framework is intended to provide real and practical value for 
chief investment officers (CIOs), asset managers, regulators and the wider financial community.  
The objectives of the framework are to: 
1. provide a structural framework to understand and measure financial implications of 
transition risks with the focus on infrastructure assets; 
2. identify scenarios and time horizons in which exposure to low carbon transition risks 
will materialized; 
3. demonstrate a transparent, adaptable and robust methodology for assessing 
transition risks.  
Investors can use the framework in multiple ways. The framework can serve as a basis for a 
high-level assessment of risk exposure across their portfolios. Alternatively, investors can use 
the framework to complete a deep-dive into a particular sector. Finally, investors can 
incorporate the quantifiable impacts of transition risks into their own financial models. 
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Figure 21-1 ClimateWise Transition risk framework  
 
Source: CISL (2019) 
 
 Assessing risk exposure of infrastructure investments  
Across the global investment community, investors hold a wide variety of infrastructure 
portfolios. This results in a range of diverse needs to manage the exposure of portfolios to the 
risks and opportunities presented by a low carbon transition. This framework is adaptable and 
therefore accommodates the diversity of investors’ needs. 
Financial driver analysis  
At the core of the framework is the analysis of the financial drivers of transition risks. It allows 
users to assess financial impacts from different transition scenarios and across a range of time 
horizons. For each asset type, the financial cost and revenue drivers (e.g. typical inputs for the 
financial model of that asset type) are identified and assessed for any potential impact from 
transition risks. The framework can also be used as a starting point for building customised 
scenarios by allowing users to sense check the underpinning financial drivers within the low 
carbon scenarios and tailor these in line with in-house views on the direction and speed of the 
transition. 
Each step of the framework can be used independently to inform various stages of risk 
mitigation and investment strategy. If all three steps are completed, the framework can 
provide a more thorough assessment and measurement of financial exposure to transition risk: 
Step 1 – Portfolio risk and opportunity exposure  
Step 1 of the framework enables investors and regulators to quickly identify where there could 
be exposure to material financial risks or opportunities, across a large portfolio of assets. This 
consists of applying the Infrastructure Risk Exposure Matrix, a tool developed to quantify the 
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transition impact on asset financial drivers. The matrix is also used as a starting point for Steps 
2 and 3 of the framework to define the potential transition impact at an asset specific level 
and to incorporate asset-specific financial drivers into a financial model.2 
The process followed to leverage and adapt the matrix is summarised as follows: 
• Set the scope and select scenarios: scenarios provide plausible alternative views of how 
the future could evolve – in this instance, the transition to a low carbon economy. The 
scenarios are not a ‘what if’ exercise for one uncertainty, and neither do they assess 
outcome probability. But rather, they provide a holistic view of potential risk impacts on 
future investments in infrastructure. A variety of transition risk factors (as defined by TCFD 
(2017)) are considered, including market and technology shifts, regulatory and policy 
changes, reputational impacts and investor sentiment. Scenarios can be developed either 
in-house or in leveraging publicly referenced scenarios. The latter provides greater 
transparency to investor stakeholders and potential for shareholder disclosure, and is 
therefore recommended in the TCFD guidelines. 
• Identify financial drivers: the next stage is to identify which revenue and cost drivers could 
be materially impacted by TCFD-defined transition risks. For each asset type, financial cost 
and revenue drivers are first identified based on typical inputs for a financial model of 
that asset type; and where transition risks could significantly impact future asset revenues 
and costs. Transition risks have been defined in line with the TCFD transition risk 
categories: market and technology shifts, emerging policy and legal requirements, 
mounting reputational pressures and investor sentiment. The impacts on the financial 
drivers are assessed by comparing the trajectory of a business-as-usual baseline to the 
transition scenarios. 
• Assess financial drivers: for the identified financial drivers, next analyse the change in 
trajectory between business-as-usual baseline and a low carbon transition scenario. Then 
assess the potential impact on each asset type’s financial driver (e.g. one revenue driver 
for a coal-fired power plant is plant utilisation) by calculating the difference in the 
trajectory between a business-as-usual baseline and the low carbon transition scenarios 
using the scenario indicators and data sets. The potential impact is then defined against 
the scale of positive/negative impact on each financial driver, based on changes to the 
scenario indicator, and assigned a risk weighting on the estimated relative contribution of 
each financial driver to the financial performance of each asset type. 
• Estimate impact on asset type: finally, the potential impact of each financial driver on 
asset financial performance is weighted. This means classifying the overall exposure from 
transition risks and opportunities on the asset financial performance, based on 
cumulative net impact of the drivers associated with each asset type, for each region, 
scenario, and timeline. 
Finally use the Infrastructure Risk Exposure Matrix to determine which asset types within the 
investor portfolio are likely to be exposed to the highest degree of transition risk and/or 
opportunity, and identify the assets from the portfolio that are highlighted as having high 
financial risk or opportunity accounting for transition risks and material value in the portfolio. 
The results can be used to: (1) inform future portfolio investment strategy – including 
                                                     
2 See the www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/transition-risk, provided with open-source access to all investor practitioners. 
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allocation of funds or divestments, and (2) select assets for more granular assessment in Steps 
2 and 3 of the framework. 
Step 2 – Asset impact identification 
Transition risks vary within asset types, down to an asset-specific level due to an asset’s specific 
location, competitive positioning, carbon intensity and exposure to low carbon technologies. 
The Asset Impact Identification Methodology provides asset managers and owners with an 
approach to define financial impact on an asset and to identify options to improve asset 
resilience. This step requires additional resources for the more granular analysis but is 
particularly useful for highly exposed assets or for direct application to a smaller, less-
diversified investment portfolio. Risks vary considerably between assets of the same type, 
depending on their geography, carbon intensity, technology (e.g. solar versus wind), and 
competitive positioning in the local market. Therefore, investors gain significant benefit in 
conducting asset-level specific analysis. 
Firstly, identify the specific assets from the portfolio for assessment based on having high risk 
or opportunity, and/or making up a significant part of the portfolio in terms of financial value. 
The methodology outlined in Step 1 is reapplied to assess the impact on financial drivers for 
the specific asset, taking into account particularly the: 
• local geography (e.g. country, or state/province) 
• asset carbon intensity (particularly for asset types where the matrix highlights carbon 
reduction as a key factor) 
• technological factors that may come into play (e.g. solar versus wind in the 
renewable sector) 
• competitive positioning in the market (e.g. lowest cost provider, government-
regulated asset) 
Where available for the specific assets, consider publicly referenced scenarios that can provide 
more asset-specific insights to analyses potential impact on the financial drivers. For instance, 
if the asset is in the UK power sector, the UK National Grid and UK Fifth Carbon Budget 
scenarios could be applied – considering technology-driven and specific government policy 
scenarios. Once this is complete, the user can identify which financial cost and revenue drivers 
for the asset could be most financially impacted. Referencing the key underlying factors from 
the selected scenario data sets, the user can use this insight to inform investment options to 
improve asset resilience or improve portfolio management processes to monitor for emerging 
risks and opportunities. 
Step 3 – Financial modelling analysis 
In Step 3, the asset impact assessment is used to build risk and contingency scenarios within 
in-house asset financial models. This will enable stress testing and opportunity identification 
through quantifying the potential financial impact from transition risks directly within financial 
models. Investors are then able to assess transition risk drivers on asset financial performance, 
helping to identify investment options for improving asset resilience or for an exit strategy, as 
well as supporting delivery of the TCFD recommendations. The portfolio or lending manager 
can then use the matrix to update their valuation models (e.g. net present value or discounted 
cashflow models) by inputting the estimated scale of the transition risk driver into their models. 
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For example, they could increase the expected revenues from their gas distribution network 
by X percent by 2030 in a low carbon scenario where a swifter shift to gas as a bridge fuel is 
likely to occur.  
The potential risk impact on each financial driver in a low carbon transition scenario can be 
estimated on an annual basis, referring to the methodology provided in the Infrastructure Risk 
Exposure Matrix and refined where possible to an asset-specific level based on the Asset 
Impact Identification Methodology. Leveraging the methodology provided and scenario data 
sets, investor practitioners can incorporate the financial drivers most materially impacted by 
the transition scenarios directly into their own financial models. 
Once the financial drivers are incorporated into the model, a key output is the ability to assess 
the financial materiality of transition risks (and opportunities) for a specific asset. Asset 
managers and owners could then assess how the low carbon transition could impact a variety 
of the asset’s financial metrics; and leverage the work to consider exit strategies where risk is 
high or develop investment options to improve asset resilience. 
 Baselines and sources  
Low carbon transition scenarios: the key enabler 
The framework leverages a scenario-based approach, as introduced by the TCFD. This helps to 
assess the potential financial impacts transition risk may have for an asset’s financial drivers 
and future financial performance. Companies typically use scenarios to test a variety of 
alternative views of the market. This ensures a robust future investment strategy. These 
scenarios provide plausible alternative views on how the transition to a lower carbon economy 
could evolve over time, including a more rapid, disorderly transition.  
Aligned with the TCFD recommendations, the framework relies on scenario data sets to assess 
potential impacts from the low carbon transition. While the framework is adaptable to a 
variety of scenarios being applied, the approach is demonstrated with scenarios from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). This is due to their transparency as a publicly referenced 
source, as well as a potential emerging benchmark for investors and the TCFD. Further, the IEA 
scenarios provide a holistic view on global market demand, supply, prices and technology 
shifts across the broad range of energy-intensive sectors. 
While a variety of transition scenarios could be applied to the framework to assess financial 
impacts, the Infrastructure Risk Exposure Matrix tool uses the Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) submitted at COP 21 in 2015 (which currently falls short of the Paris 
Agreement’s ambition) and the 2°C consistent scenarios from the IEA’s World Energy Model. 
This provides a range of plausible climate outcomes aligned with the signatory country 
governments’ current NDCs submitted at COP21, as well as the Paris Agreement’s ultimate 
target.  
Where required, any gaps in the scenario data sets have been supplemented with other 
publicly referenced sources. This includes the World Bank and government policy-driven 
scenarios.  
Some investors may also choose to stress test against a 1.5°C scenario to ensure the robustness 
of their portfolios. They may also consider alternative pathways to a 2°C scenario which focus 
on specific technological advances (e.g. energy storage, carbon capture and storage) rather 
than policy changes or carbon taxes. 
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Time frames 
Investment time frames typically vary: 5 years for banks, 10 to 15 years for infrastructure 
investment companies, 20 years or more for governments, depending on asset life. While the 
framework can be adapted to cover any year (as scenario data sets typically cover a year-by-
year basis), the Infrastructure Risk Exposure Matrix focuses on 2020, 2030 and 2040 to cover 
as broad a range of investment horizons as possible. 
Infrastructure asset types 
A variety of asset types were selected to demonstrate the breadth of potential transition risks. 
Selected sectors were chosen based on primary and secondary research on key infrastructure 
investments across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
non-OECD economies. Asset types were split into subcategories, to untangle all sector-specific 
transition risk issues. For instance, power assets were divided into sub-categories from coal to 
renewable power generation: 
• Power Assets – Coal power plants, Gas power plants, Nuclear power plants, 
Renewables (utility scale) 
• Fuel Infrastructure – Oil pipelines & midstream infrastructure, Gas pipelines & 
midstream infrastructure 
• Transport – Rail networks, Airports, Toll roads, Ports 
• Social – Public buildings 
• Water – Water utilities 
• Telecommunications – Telecommunications infrastructure 
Geographies: The US, EU and India 
Geographies were chosen to illustrate how transition risks could vary in different parts of the 
world. This ensures relevancy for all investment portfolios. The geographies chosen focused 
on: (1) governments with an interest in infrastructure aimed at supporting economic growth; 
(2) countries that are amenable to foreign investment and (3) countries offering substantial 
investment potential. Two OECD markets and one non-OECD market were selected: the US, 
EU and India. These geographies cover three of the largest markets in the world. Each varies 
greatly from the other in how the low carbon transition will take hold (e.g. US shale gas 
displacing coal-fired generation, the broad uptake of renewables in the EU and India’s 
conundrum of coal versus solar). 
3 Illustrative results 
The practicality and robustness of the framework has been validated by applying it to three 
separate case studies based on investors’ real-life portfolios – including two of the world’s 
largest insurance companies and one of the global top five investors in infrastructure. 
Examples for Step 1 portfolio risks and opportunities exposure results, Step 2 asset impact 
identification results for a UK airport and Step 3 financial modelling analysis results for a 
German gas distribution pipeline are presented in the following. 
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Step 1: Portfolio risk and opportunity exposure 
Step 1 allows investors to quickly identify the material financial impacts from transition risks 
across a large portfolio, by applying the Infrastructure Risk Exposure Matrix (Figure 21-2). This 
tool helps to assess potential exposure to transition risks across a breadth of asset types, 
geographies, climate scenarios and time frames. The Infrastructure Risk Exposure Matrix 
provides insights on the infrastructure asset types most exposed to the low carbon transition: 
• The most significant risk is coal-fired power generation globally and oil & gas 
infrastructure in the US and EU. These risks are more pronounced in the 2°C scenario 
compared to the Paris Agreement (NDC) scenario. 
• There is minimal risk associated with gas-fired power generation in India, as well as 
globally in telecommunications, ports and water utilities (excluding physical climate 
change risk). 
• The greatest opportunities exist in the renewables sector globally, and to a lesser 
extent in mass transit. 
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Figure 21-2 Summary of the Infrastructure Risk Exposure Matrix for the 
infrastructure asset types considered 
 
Source: CISL (2019) 
 
An investor would use the Infrastructure Risk Exposure Matrix to determine which asset types 
within the investor portfolio are likely to be exposed to the highest degree of transition risk 
and/or opportunity. Overlaying the matrix with a company’s portfolio of assets (risk level and 
asset value) shows how the potential risk and/or opportunity exposures could significantly 
increase through time and with the pace of change in a low carbon transition scenario (as seen 
in Figure 21-3 below). 
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Figure 21-3 Example of an investment portfolio facilitating analysis of exposure to 
transition risks and opportunities across infrastructure asset types 
 
Source: CISL (2019) 
 
Identifying the assets in the portfolio that are highlighted as facing high financial risk or 
opportunity due to transition risks, the results can be used to: (1) inform a future portfolio 
investment strategy – including allocation of funds or divestments – and (2) select assets for 
more granular assessment in Steps 2 and 3 of the framework. 
Step 2: Asset impact identification 
Step 2 allows investors to assess the financial impact from the low carbon transition at an 
asset-by-asset level, which provides insights on ways to improve asset resilience. Risks vary 
considerably between assets of the same type, depending on their geography, carbon intensity, 
technology and competitive positioning in the local market. Therefore, investors gain 
significant benefit in conducting an asset-level specific analysis. 
Depending on an investor’s portfolio size and risk appetite, the Asset Impact Identification 
Methodology can be re-applied asset-by-asset to an entire portfolio, or to the most exposed 
assets identified by overlaying the Infrastructure Risk Exposure Matrix. Additionally, stress 
testing of the portfolio under different time frames and scenarios will produce a more holistic 
understanding of transition risk and opportunity. For example, using asset-specific data, a gas 
distribution business in Germany was found to have a medium financial risk in 2030 and low 
risk in 2040 under the Paris Agreement (NDC) scenario, but a low risk in 2030 and medium risk 
in 2040 under the 2°C scenario – these were driven by shifts in the local market from coal to 
renewables. 
Leveraging the Infrastructure Risk Exposure Matrix and the Asset Impact Identification 
Methodology, investors can identify how a specific asset, and its cost and revenue drivers, 
could be impacted by transition risk (or opportunity). While an asset may be identified as 
having high exposure due to the sector or geography it operates in, it could be impacted in 
different ways due to the asset’s specific location.  
Take for example an airport in Europe (Table 21-1 and Table 21-2). If the generic scenario shows 
a fall in aviation demand in the EU driven by an uptake in high-speed electric rail infrastructure, 
then an airport could diversify more into long-haul versus short-haul flights (with the latter 
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more risk exposed). Alternatively, an airport’s competitive positioning could drive a gain in 
demand, as other airports more focused on short-haul flights are potentially driven to closure. 
Table 21-1 Example of impact assessment of financial drivers for a specific airport in 
the UK compared to generic EU airport  
 
Source: CISL (2019) 
 
Table 21-2 Example of investment strategy implications from impact assessment for 
a specific airport in the UK compared to generic EU airport 
 
Source: CISL (2019) 
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Step 3: Financial modelling analysis 
Step 3 allows investors to incorporate the potential impacts of transition risk directly into their 
own financial models. Using such a granular approach to defining asset impact enables 
investors to develop an in-house view based on their opinion of the probabilities linked to the 
key transition drivers outlined in the framework. This is done by integrating the financial 
drivers identified in Steps 1 and 2 into investors’ in-house financial models. Referring to the 
relevant scenario data sets, the potential impact on asset revenue and costs can be quantified. 
Leveraging this analysis, asset managers and owners can:  
• evaluate investment profiles required under different scenarios; 
• determine impacts on key revenue and cost drivers under different scenarios, with the 
resulting impact on cash flow, valuation, return on equity and other metrics as required; 
• explore investment options to improve asset resilience or exit strategies. 
In this instance, a gas distribution company in Germany is less impacted by the low carbon 
transition than the rest of the EU, thus altering the risk profile for the asset. The Infrastructure 
Risk Exposure Matrix (Table 21-3) indicates a risk to gas demand in the EU, with a potential 
decline of more than 25 percent by the early 2030s compared with the base case, according 
to the IEA’s 2°C scenario. Assuming a direct relationship between demand and asset utilisation, 
this suggests declining asset revenues. However, German gas demand will fall at a slower pace 
than the rest of the EU, as a substantial coal market is still being phased out in the near term. 
Thus, the impact in Germany is lower than in the rest of the EU, due to local market conditions 
and government policies on specific assets. 
Table 21-3 Example of an impact assessment of financial drivers for a gas 
distribution pipeline in Germany 
 
 
An asset manager or owner investing in this gas distribution company, could quantify the 
potential financial impact at an asset level by incorporating the outputs of the Infrastructure 
Risk Exposure Matrix or Asset Impact Identification Methodology in their own financial models. 
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The financial drivers affected by the low carbon transition, specific to the gas distribution 
company, are listed in the Infrastructure Risk Exposure Matrix (Table 21-4). 
Table 21-4 Example of the impact on asset financial drivers is determined using 
scenarios 
 
 
Taking the approach outlined above, the outputs and the suggested scenario data sets, asset 
managers can interpolate potential changes in revenue and cost (Table 21-4), incorporate 
them into an asset financial model and quantify the potential impact on the value or returns 
of the asset (Table 21-5). Accounting for potential increases in costs and a decline in asset 
utilisation, financial modelling indicates that earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) for the 
specific asset could fall by more than 70 percent against the base case, under a 2°C scenario 
(Figure 21-4 and Figure 21-5). 
Table 21-5 Interpolation of financial drivers into the asset financial model 
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Figure 21-4 Example of transition risk effects on asset returns and costs 
 
 
Figure 21-5 Example of transition risk effects on asset net present values 
 
 
Inform investment strategy and risk management 
The framework has been developed to empower investors to take practical actions to mitigate 
their exposure to transition risks, capture opportunities and disclose their exposure to key 
stakeholders. Across the three case studies, each step of the framework was applied to inform 
investment strategy and risk management. Insights were provided on how the framework 
could inform investment decisions and guide strategic responses to transition risks.  
Take for instance the EU gas distribution company case study: 
• Step 1 identified this asset as one of the more exposed assets in the investor’s portfolio 
in 2040 – highlighting options for specific risk monitoring as part of the portfolio 
investment strategy.  
• Step 2 defined the impact of transition risk on the asset’s key revenue and cost drivers. 
This included a fall in pipeline utilisation, and a rise in capital and operation expenditure 
due to emission reduction and carbon pricing – and options for asset managers and 
owners to improve the asset’s resilience to transition risk. 
• Step 3 integrated the analysis through a financial model to determine the impact on the 
asset’s financial performance in line with the Paris Agreement (NDCs) and 2°C scenario – 
and explored investment options to improve asset resilience. 
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4 Conclusion and outlook 
The ClimateWise Transition Risk Framework can support investors and regulators to assess the 
financial impact of transition risks. It enables a quantification of potential impacts, as called 
for by the TCFD. It enhances investors’ and regulators’ ability to manage risk and capture 
opportunity. Transition risk could increase significantly by 2030. The framework demonstrates 
that the low carbon transition could financially impact a variety of infrastructure asset types. 
However, it also unpacks transition risk according to sector, geography, and time horizon. 
Investors and regulators can enhance their understanding of how the financial performance 
of their infrastructure portfolios and assets could be affected. The framework provides them 
with the ability to: 
• assess portfolios for risk and opportunity exposure; 
• define potential financial impact down to an asset-specific level; 
• incorporate transition risk directly into asset managers’ and owners’ own financial models. 
Across the global investment community, investors hold a variety of infrastructure portfolios, 
and therefore, have a range of diverse needs to manage exposure to transition risk. The 
framework has been designed to allow for this variation in investors’ needs, by providing an 
open-source and adaptable methodology. CIOs, asset managers and owners, and the wider 
financial community can take practical actions to mitigate transition risks, capture transition 
opportunities and communicate their strategic response plans to key stakeholders. Each step 
of the framework provides opportunities to inform investment strategies from a large portfolio 
down to asset-specific levels. Likewise, this methodology can be leveraged by regulators to 
inform future risk mitigation approaches and policies. The framework has been developed to 
empower investors and deliver real value.  
Further pilot testing of the framework is being undertaken to gather insights as to how it could 
be improved. Feedback from this process will be pooled and used to produce a second version 
of the framework. While the scope of the initial project was constrained, the aim was to 
demonstrate the robustness of the framework’s approach and its potential wider application 
using infrastructure assets worldwide as a case study. As part of a next phase of work, it would 
be beneficial to expand coverage to more geographies and asset types. Significant differences 
can exist within asset types, and across national boundaries, for example for renewable power 
in different European countries. Asset types not yet covered include district heating systems 
and electricity transmission infrastructure. 
In terms of future development, the framework application in this report focuses on 
infrastructure, but could equally be adapted to any type of asset and serve as a tool for a broad 
range of investors. The approach could also be expanded to wider applications across the 
financial community, incorporating physical risks and a variety of low carbon transition 
scenarios. In line with TCFD recommendations, investors may wish to adapt this framework 
and embed it in the organisation’s risk management processes, metrics and targets, and 
governance framework.  
  
ClimateWise Transition Risk Framework  
349 
Bibliography 
CISL. (2016). Environmental risk analysis by financial institutions: a review of global practice. 
CISL. (2019). Transition risk framework: Managing the impacts of the low carbon transition 
on infrastructure investments. 
TCFD. (2017). Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. 
The CO-Firm, & Kepler Cheuvreux. (2014). Stranded assets, fossilized revenues. 
United Nations. (2016). Paris Agreement: Article 2.  
World Resources Institute. (2014). The Carbon Budget [Infographic].  
Chapter 22 
 350 
 MSCI Climate Value-at-Risk  
 
By 
MSCI ESG Research LLC1 
Abstract  
The Climate Value-at-Risk (Climate VaR) metric offered by MSCI ESG Research provides a 
forward-looking and returns-based measure of climate-related risks for financial institutions. 
The methodology is designed to closely align with the Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations for conducting scenario analysis on investment 
portfolios. Climate VaR includes both low-carbon transition and physical climate-modelling 
methodologies. Both methodologies use top-down and bottom-up modelling techniques. All 
Climate VaR metrics are quantitative, forward-looking and focused on either the risks or 
opportunities that climate change may pose to a company’s securities due to low-carbon 
transition or physical effects of climate change. The primary applications of Climate VaR 
include engagement, investment decision-making, risk analysis, monitoring and compliance, 
and TCFD reporting. 
Keywords: climate VaR, low-carbon transition, physical climate risks, Task Force on Climate-
related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), engagement, investment decision-making, risk analysis, 
monitoring and compliance 
1 Introduction 
MSCI ESG Research firmly believes that climate change presents clear and pressing risks and 
opportunities to financial markets. 2  In addition to risks to livelihood from increasing 
temperatures and rising oceans, climate change also highlights the economic and investment 
risks and opportunities associated with the world’s transition to a low-carbon economy. An 
extensive body of scientific evidence has established that man-made factors are driving 
climate change on our planet. Citizens are demanding action from governments, companies 
and investors, because humans face a catastrophic future unless remedial actions are taken 
swiftly. Investors everywhere need to incorporate this new reality into their investment 
practices. 
To address these needs, our Climate Value-at-Risk (Climate VaR) metric provides a forward-
looking and returns-based impact metric for financial institutions. This metric was developed 
using an integrated approach, incorporating the latest academic findings from climate science 
as well as input from the financial services industry.3 Climate VaR can be used to inform 
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Josip Spec, email: josip.spec@msci.com; Bruno Rauis, email: bruno.rauis@msci.com; and David 
Lunsford, email: david.lunsford@msci.com. 
2 For more information, see The MSCI Principles of Sustainable Investing, www.msci.com/esg-investing 
3 In 2019, Carbon Delta (an MSCI company) together with twenty institutional investors and UNEP FI piloted a metric for 
determining the value at risk for equity, bond, and real estate portfolios. https://www.unepfi.org/investment/tcfd/ 
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investors on appropriate action with regards to climate related investment risks, e.g., whether 
to diversify, divest, or engage.  
As extreme weather events manifest themselves more frequently and intensely, we have seen 
the investment industry undergo a sea change.4 Policy makers around the world have also 
begun to forge robust and decisive climate-change regulations.5 Evaluating companies’ climate 
change resilience has become a preeminent investment issue. 
Broadly speaking, there is growing evidence that tangible actions are being taken. More 
companies have disclosed the carbon-intensities of their operations, 6  more shareholder 
resolutions have urged company management to address climate change-related issues and 
investor pledges, 7  and widely publicized divestments have redirected money to more 
environmentally benign assets.8 
We believe that readying a business model for a decarbonized future goes beyond reporting 
and marketing in response to green initiatives; it requires a fundamental transition. Against 
this background, identifying business models with resilience to the low-carbon transition and 
physical climate risks associated with climate change has emerged as a financial need. By 
providing financial institutions with a climate finance metric that helps distinguish assets 
based on how much climate risk they are exposed to, we seek to support the transition to a 
low-carbon economy.  A portfolio that is effectively resilient to climate change should not see 
its value fluctuate significantly from either the physical changes associated with climate 
change or when action is taken to prevent damaging climate change from occurring.  
2 Purpose  
Climate Value-at-Risk is designed to provide a forward-looking and return-based valuation 
assessment to measure climate-related risks and opportunities in an investment portfolio. The 
overall methodology of Climate VaR is designed to be closely aligned with the Task Force on 
Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) 9  recommendations scenario analysis on 
investment portfolio Key features of the modeling approach are summarized within the box 
below: 
                                                     
4 TCFD. “Second TCFD Status Report Shows Steady Increase in TCFD Adoption,” June 2019. https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/Press-Release-2019-TCFD-Status-Report_FINAL.pdf 
5 For a list of climate change pledges by country, see MSCI ESG Research, “Who will lead the race to cut carbon?” February 
2019. https://www.msci.com/who-will-lead-the-race-to-cut-carbon 
6 In 2019, over 8,400 companies disclosed through CDP – a 20% increase on the previous year. Reporting companies now 
represent over 50% of global market capitalization according to CDP: https://www.cdp.net/en/companies/companies-
scores 
7 WSJ. “Show Us Your Climate Risks, Investors Tell Companies,” February 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/show-us-
your-climate-risks-investors-tell-companies-11551349800 
8 In 2018, nearly 1,000 institutional investors with USD 6.24 trillion in assets have committed to divest from fossil fuels, up 
from USD 52 billion four years ago: Arabella Advisors, “The Global Fossil Fuel Divestment and Clean Energy Investment 
Movement,” September 2019. https://www.arabellaadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Global-Divestment-
Report-2018.pdf 
9 TCFD, https://www.tcfdhub.org/scenario-analysis/ 
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The fully quantitative model offers deep insights into how climate change could affect 
company valuations. Our software-based and modular modeling approach enables a fast 
and flexible adaptation fit to the needs of institutional investors. The Climate VaR 
methodology integrates the following elements: 
Computations of policy- and technology-related transition risks under 1.5°C, 2°C and 3°C 
scenarios. 
Computations of physical risks due to numerous extreme weather events, such as extreme 
heat, cold, wind, precipitation, snowfall, coastal flooding and tropical cyclones. 
Scope 1 GHG footprints for all companies in the database along with intra- and inter- 
portfolio analysis. 
Warming potential of individual securities and guidance on a 2°C alignment at the portfolio 
level. 
Low carbon patent analysis articulating potential future technology opportunities on a 
company enterprise and portfolio level. 
A performance-based methodology of computing costs resulting from climate change, 
providing a simple mechanism to integrate risks directly into standard financial reporting 
frameworks. 
 Typical use cases 
We have seen a wide range of applications from financial institutions using our analysis and 
data. The main themes we observed are below. 
• Engagement: clients such as pension funds have used the Climate VaR metric in their 
discussions with portfolio companies to make them aware of the risks of climate 
change to their business operations, e.g., transition risk from regulations, physical 
damage to assets, and business interruptions. Such clients often take the view that 
divestment is the last course of action and engagement is preferable. The 
quantification of costs under different scenarios can be used during company 
engagements to communicate the potential operational risks posed by climate change. 
• Investment decision-making: clients such as asset managers have used the 
technology opportunity component of Climate VaR to identify companies that may 
have been overlooked by the market. The ‘green’ patent analysis provides extra-
financial information that can be integrated into investment decision-making 
processes. Product development is another avenue that has been actively explored by 
clients, utilizing the Climate VaR metric in dedicated ESG products as a quantitative 
model input in universe selection or screening processes. 
• Risk analysis: Climate VaR metrics can be aggregated across portfolios, so that 
investment managers can understand portfolio-wide climate risk levels. Some risk 
departments have set Climate VaR targets or risk tolerance levels for portfolio 
managers. 
• Monitoring & compliance: some jurisdictions such as France have introduced 
mandatory reporting requirements for investors. Notably, France’s Article 173 
requires investors in the country to comply or explain their portfolio’s alignment with 
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the 2°C warming target set out in the Paris Agreement in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.10  
• TCFD reporting: our analysis is closely aligned with the TCFD 11. We support clients 
with their reporting disclosure requirements and our analysis can be used to 
communicate the risks of assets and portfolios. 
3 Methodology 
 Policy risk 
Methodological approach 
We employ a top-down and bottom-up hybrid methodology to calculate potential risks from 
future climate change policies. The modelling begins with the quantification of country-level 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission-reduction targets within policies proposed under the 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)12 of the Paris Agreement. Country-level emission 
reduction targets are then broken down into sector-level targets based on details within the 
NDCs as well as recently proposed climate regulations at the national level. With our 
production facilities database (further described in section 3.3 below), sector-specific 
emission-reduction targets are then assigned to each company’s production facilities, based 
on each facility’s emission level, which gives us insights into the emission-reduction 
requirements for facilities owned and operated by companies globally. Using Integrated 
Assessment Models (IAMs) 13  and estimates of future carbon prices under specific policy 
scenarios, it is then possible to estimate the potential costs associated with such emission-
reduction targets and compute “Policy Climate Value-at-Risk” metrics for approximately 9,000 
companies and their securities. 
                                                     
10 https://www.unpri.org/climate-change/french-energy-transition-law-global-investor-briefing-on-article-
173/295.article 
11 https://www.fsb-tcfd.org, see https://www.msci.com/tcfd for more information. 
12 All NDCs are public, and can be found in a public registry maintained by the UNFCCC Secretariat at  
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx 
13 Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) are used to evaluate the technological and economic feasibility of climate goals 
such as the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goal to hold global warming well below 2˚C and pursue efforts to 
limit this warming to 1.5˚C above pre-industrial level. 
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Figure 22-1 Overview of the policy risk methodology 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC. 
 
The modelling steps to compute the Policy Climate Value-at-Risk are: 
• Quantifying forward-looking company-level GHG emissions reductions; 
• Quantifying the company-level costs associated with those reductions;  
• Quantifying the impact on the valuation of the companies and their securities. 
Quantifying company-level GHG reduction requirements 
189 countries have prepared and submitted NDCs to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat each pledging a contribution to the 
Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to below 2°C by 2100, as of the time of writing. 
Together, the 189 NDCs represent the largest body of international climate policies to be 
assembled under any single agreement to date. NDCs are required to be updated and 
resubmitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat every five years, with the next round due in late 2020. 
NDCs reflect countries’ individual circumstances in terms of (among others) climate mitigation 
and adaptation objectives, climate vulnerability, level of development, resource availability 
and institutional framework. 
As the NDCs differ based on each country’s individual reduction requirement, their direct 
comparison can be difficult. 14  However, they typically contain some common elements 
relevant for our modelling activities, including: 
• A baseline “business-as-usual” emissions pathway that underpins the NDC; 
• A commitment to reduce GHG emissions by a certain amount;  
• Details about the pathway to achieve this commitment, such as specific policies to be 
implemented, technology needs, financing needs and sometimes explicit sectoral 
breakdowns of the emission reductions. 
                                                     
14 For a tool that makes all the NDCs comparable, see: https://www.msci.com/who-will-lead-the-race-to-cut-carbon  
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We use the information in the NDCs to estimate the sectoral “burden sharing” of the national 
targets. In some cases, the NDCs include an explicit sectoral breakdown of the emissions 
reductions; in other cases, the sectoral burden-sharing must be inferred from the details of 
the policy initiatives included in the NDC. 
Once in-country sectoral GHG emission reduction targets are established, the Climate VaR 
model allocates these targets to companies active in those sectors. Each company in the 
database has a GHG emission reduction target based on the countries and sectors in which it 
is active. 
The NDCs as currently set are insufficient to achieve the stated goal of the Paris Agreement of 
limiting global warming to below 2°C by 2100, as the emission cuts they represent are not 
ambitious enough. In order to compute company-level GHG emission reduction requirements 
for 2°C and 1.5°C scenarios, we increase the scale of emission reductions, in line with carbon 
budgets for those temperature targets.  
Quantifying company-level policy costs 
To calculate a company’s costs associated with reaching emission-reduction targets, we use 
carbon price estimates from global IAMs. The carbon price estimates are consistent with 
different scenarios, each represented by different technology and policy pathways. The model 
computes the GHG emissions reduction requirements per company on an annual basis and 
then multiplies the reduction amount by scenario-specific yearly estimates of emission 
reduction prices. The formula for calculating the costs associated with reaching an emission 
reduction requirement is:  
Total Cost = Required GHG Emissions Reduction Amount * Price per tCO2e 
We run many different scenarios – some of which are characterised by smoother or more 
disruptive transition narratives, and each with its own “trajectory”. In general, as we move 
from less ambitious to more ambitious scenarios, the annual costs of inaction increase for two 
reasons: the emission reduction targets increase, and so do the carbon prices (reflecting 
increasing marginal cost of abatement). 
Quantifying company- and security-level valuation impacts 
In this last step, the forward-looking timeseries of policy costs are processed through financial 
models. Specifically, we use discounted cash-flow and Merton-inspired models of capital 
structure in order to compute the valuation impact of the future costs on companies and their 
issued securities. This valuation impact is the Policy Climate Value-at-Risk. 
For each scenario, the model computes a Policy Climate Value-at-Risk at the level of the 
company as well as at the level of its issued securities. The security-level Policy Climate Value-
at-Risk distinguishes between equity and bond securities – and among bond securities, 
differentiates by bond maturities. 
 Technology opportunity 
Methodological approach 
The transition to a low-carbon economy can also present opportunities, including growth 
potential for investors. The solar industry is one of many areas that had vastly underestimated 
growth potential over the past decade. Looking into the future, one may wonder which 
companies will emerge as the innovators of tomorrow and take advantage of these high-
growth opportunities through the successful development and deployment of key low-carbon 
technologies. 
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Our low-carbon technology opportunity assessment is based on a combination of a company’s 
current green revenues and its specific patent data. Recently published patent databases allow 
an evidence-based view into the strategic research and development investment of companies, 
which suitably complements the policy risk analysis on GHG reduction requirements. Our 
model currently covers 95 million unique patents granted by 40 patent authorities worldwide. 
Using granted patents as a proxy for low-carbon innovative capacity, our model provides an 
indication of which companies will be the likely beneficiaries if/when 3°C, 2°C or 1.5°C climate 
policies are implemented on a global level. 
The modelling steps to compute Technology Opportunities are as follows: 
• Quantifying the company’s current low-carbon revenue; 
• Quantifying company-level low-carbon patent scores; 
• Quantifying the company’s future low-carbon revenue and profits;  
• Quantifying the impact on the valuation of the company and its issued securities. 
Quantifying company-level current low-carbon revenue 
The first step is to understand a company’s exposure to clean technology products and services 
through their current green revenues. We provide estimates for the following categories: 
• Alternative Energy: products, services or infrastructure projects supporting the 
development or delivery of renewable energy and alternative fuels; 
• Energy Efficiency: products, services, infrastructure or technologies that proactively 
address the growing global demand for energy while minimizing effects on the 
environment;  
• Green Building: design, construction, redevelopment, retrofitting and management of 
‘green’ certified properties; 
• Sustainable Water: products, services and projects that attempt to address water 
scarcity and water quality issues, including minimizing and monitoring current water 
use and demand increases, improving water supply quality and improving the 
availability and reliability of water;  
• Pollution Prevention: products, services or projects that support pollution prevention, 
waste minimization or recycling as a means of alleviating the burden of brown waste 
generation.  
Quantifying company-level low-carbon patent score 
This process starts with a careful matching of the information contained in the patent 
databases with the legal entities of companies that are part of the MSCI Climate VaR universe. 
The next step is separating patents pertaining to low-carbon technologies. The patent 
databases operate a classification system defined by the European Patent Office (EPO), the 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the UNFCCC: The 
Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) system. Introduced in 2013, the system is based on the 
International Patent Classification (IPC) system and divided into nine sections, A through H and 
Y, with Section Y categorizing new emerging technologies, including more than 400 groups of 
low-carbon technologies. 
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With this process, we can determine for any given company, on a yearly basis, how many 
patents it filed, how many were granted, and how many of those pertained to low-carbon 
technologies, from the late 1990s to today. 
Since not all patents are equally valuable, a mere count of low-carbon patents can be a poor 
predictor of a company’s innovative potential or the market potential of the technologies such 
patents pertain to. To improve on this analysis, we perform a quality scoring of the patents on 
four statistical measures well accepted by academic literature and practitioners:  
Figure 22-2 Summary of patent score methodology 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
 
Forward citations  
When a patent is cited by other patents this is known as a forward citation. The number of 
forward citations received by a patent is often used as a measure of a patent's significance. 
New patents rarely earn many forward citations because it takes time for a patent to be 
recognized and cited by newer patent documents. In other words, forward citations build up 
over time and a strict citation analysis will favour older patents.  
Backward citations  
Backward citations are the opposite of forward citations, i.e., when the patent is citing other 
patents pertaining to established older patent technologies. A higher number of backward 
citations decreases the overall patent score.  
Market coverage   
Market coverage refers to the size of the market in which a patent was granted protection. We 
calculate this by looking at the cumulative GDP of all countries covered by a granted patent 
filing. The higher the cumulative GDP, the higher the patent score.  
The Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) system   
This classification system is based on the IPC system, as mentioned above. It is divided into 
nine sections, A through H and Y. The sections are further sub-divided into classes, sub-classes, 
groups and sub-groups. The Y codes classify new emerging technologies, such as low carbon. 
Overall, there are approximately 250,000 classification entries in the database15. The more CPC 
codes a patent is classified in, the higher the patent score. 
These four measures are normalized and aggregated into a unique score for each patent.  
Figure 22-3 below illustrates the methodological steps for calculating a company’s low-carbon 
patent score: 
                                                     
15 For more information, see www.epo.org  
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Figure 22-3 Patent matching and scoring process 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
 
Quantifying company-level future low-carbon revenue and profits 
At the company level, to go from current green-revenue share and low-carbon patent share to 
future low-carbon profits, we follow the following six steps: 
1. Calculate the total future low-carbon revenue in each sector. We assume that within 
a sector, the total future low-carbon revenue equals the total future policy costs, given 
that low-carbon revenues are in essence a transfer of the emission reduction costs by 
some companies to others that license or produce low-carbon technologies. As a 
result, the ambition of the transition scenario considered impacts the low-carbon 
revenue afforded to a sector – i.e., more ambitious temperature targets result in 
higher policy costs and therefore also higher low-carbon revenue. 
2. Calculate the company’s share of the total current green revenues in each sector. The 
company’s share is simply the ratio of its current green revenues in that sector to the 
cumulative current green revenues (of all companies in the universe) in that sector. 
3. Calculate the company’s share of the total score of granted low-carbon patents in each 
sector, derived from calculating the ratio of its cumulative granted patent score in that 
sector as a percentage of the sector overall. 
4. Step 1 above yields scenario-specific projections of future low-carbon revenue in 
different sectors, while the next two steps provide an indication of how much of these 
sector low-carbon revenues a company might be expected to claim based on its share 
of the sector’s current low-carbon revenues (step 2) and low-carbon patents (step 3). 
In step 4, we combine the two shares found in steps 2 and 3 in a single overall “share” 
applicable to future low-carbon revenue.16 We use this combined share to calculate 
the company-level low-carbon revenue by multiplying it by the total future low-carbon 
revenue in the sector.  
                                                     
16 The combination function gives more weight to the share of current low-carbon revenue in earlier years and more weight 
to the share of low-carbon patents in later years.  
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5. Calculate the company-level low-carbon profits in each sector by multiplying the 
company’s low-carbon revenue by a profit margin (profit margins assumptions vary by 
sector).  
6. Calculate the total future low-carbon profits for any given company in any given 
scenario by summing the low-carbon profits across the sectors to which their 
technologies relate. 
Quantifying company- and security-level valuation impacts 
This last step is very similar to the last step applied to policy risks:  the forward-looking 
timeseries of low-carbon profits are processed through discounted cash flow and capital 
structure modelling in order to calculate the valuation impact of these future profits, yielding 
the Technology Opportunities Climate Value-at-Risk metrics at the levels of both the company 
as a whole and the securities they issue.  
 Physical risks & opportunities 
Methodological approach 
Physical climate risk scenarios define possible climatic consequences resulting from increased 
levels of GHG emissions, and the ensuing financial burden (or opportunity) shouldered by 
businesses and their investors. With the observed weather patterns over the past 40 years set 
as a historical baseline, we bring both acute and chronic climate developments into 
perspective. As with the transition risk/opportunity analysis, costs/profits and 
risk/opportunity can be aggregated at regional, sectoral, or company levels, meaning that we 
can assign portions of risks or opportunities to several asset classes that have been integrated 
into our model. The physical climate risk model is hybrid in nature, meaning that it has both 
top-down and bottom-up elements within the calculations.  
MSCI ESG Research actively collaborates with climate scientists at scientific institutes, such as 
the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) and ETH Zürich, and has acquired a 
wealth of physical climate change data. Developed through a close collaboration with these 
groups, MSCI ESG Research’s physical risk framework is highly modular, meaning that new 
hazards can be added easily into the model. All physical risk modelling has global coverage and 
is based on our proprietary database of approximately 370,000 company locations and 23,500 
publicly traded companies. The typical model resolution is that of a global 0.5° grid or finer, 
depending on the physical hazard assessed. 
Forecasted costs can be integrated into standard investment metrics. As is custom practice in 
the insurance industry, most risk models follow this mathematical modeling approach: 
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Figure 22-4 A high-level overview of MSCI ESG Research’s physical risk calculation 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
 
“Exposure” (also Assets or Inventory) is to be understood as the presence of people, 
livelihoods, resources, and other assets in places and settings that could be adversely affected 
by an extreme weather event.  
“Vulnerability” (also Sensitivity or Susceptibility) means the propensity or predisposition of an 
asset to be affected by an extreme weather event, including vulnerability to financial harm (or 
opportunity) and the capacity to cope and adapt. An example is the reduction of labor 
productivity in the construction sector due to high temperatures, or the impact of heavy 
snowfall on transport companies. 
And “Hazard” (also Risk or Impact) defines present and future climatology, including the 
probability of occurrence and intensity of extreme weather events. Examples are the increase 
of extremely hot days or the measure of water stress in a certain region. 
Asset level assessment 
It is essential to understand the geographical and structural characteristics of an asset in order 
to model the effects of an extreme weather event. Accordingly, our proprietary Asset Location 
Database (ALD) is at the heart of the physical risk assessment. The database covered 
approximately 370,000 asset locations for around 23,500 companies as of April 30, 2020, 
ranging typically between 1 and 100 worldwide locations per company. For each covered 
company, this location data is combined with fundamental financial data, for example sector 
activity and sectoral revenue breakdown by country, to generate a location specific analysis of 
possible facility risk. This combined data constitutes our exposure data for physical risk 
modelling.  
Illustrated below is a graphic example of the asset-level data for a specific company, Renault 
SA. The blue squares denote locations of infrastructure assets for the company. The database 
contains detailed and high-resolution coordinates that allow for a comprehensive 
understanding of the risks associated with the location of an asset.  
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Figure 22-5 Infrastructure asset locations of Renault SA 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC; data as of June 2020 
 
The database was created using several data sources, such as manual data collection, 
commercially available databases, or open-source databases. It is updated on every release of 
data, which currently occurs every three months. 
Hazard modelling 
We model climate impacts via two distinct approaches: 
• Statistical extrapolation of historical data 
• Use of physical climate models 
We use these approaches to model two types of physical climate risk: 
• Chronic climate risks: these risks manifest slowly over time, such as extreme heat, 
cold, precipitation, snowfall and wind gusts. This modelling is based on statistical 
extrapolation of historical data.  
• Acute climate risks: these occur from relatively rare natural catastrophes such as 
tropical cyclones and floods in distinct time intervals. Such risks are modelled using 
physical climate models. 
Quantifying facility-level future extreme weather costs – deriving vulnerabilities 
Vulnerability with respect to loss modelling refers to the quantification of the costs related to 
a unit of physical impact. Location-specific vulnerabilities are assessed for each individual 
climate hazard according to the risk exposure at every company facility each year.  Every level 
of risk exposure corresponds to a level of vulnerability, on what are often referred to as 
“damage curves” or “damage functions” in loss modeling.  A change in the level of exposure 
each year corresponds to a unique cost along the damage function.  The resulting costs are 
summed up each year. It is important to note that vulnerability information is scarce and there 
are few available data sources. One of the main reasons is that vulnerability research typically 
relies on proprietary insurance data, bearing relevance for the pricing of insurance premiums 
and hence not available for commercial use. In order to classify vulnerability for different 
businesses, we have developed a specific sector system of 37 different business activities 
grouped by the impact that extreme weather may have on them. These vulnerabilities were 
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derived from scientific publications and augmented by media reports for each hazard and 
extreme weather.  
Quantifying company- and security-level valuation impacts 
Finally, the last step is again very similar to the last step for transition Climate Value-at-Risk 
metrics, i.e., the forward-looking timeseries of extreme weather costs are discounted and fed 
into a capital structure model in order to calculate the Physical Risks and Opportunities Climate 
Value-at-Risk metrics.  
4 Case study: Managing climate risks in investment portfolios 
 Introduction 
In this case study, we selected a sample portfolio representative of a global actively-managed 
fund in terms of risk-return characteristics and used the MSCI Climate Value-at-Risk (“Climate 
VaR”) model to examine the different dimensions of climate-related risks. We show how 
Climate VaR can be used to measure climate risks for the portfolio as a whole, as well as further 
explore which sectors, countries and securities were driving these risks in the portfolio. 
We also considered some approaches which a portfolio manager might follow in order to 
manage these risks. Specifically, we tested four simple exclusion strategies based on the worst-
performing decile of the portfolio on the following measures: 
• Aggregated Climate VaR 
• Transition Risks and Opportunities Climate VaR 
• Physical Risks and Opportunities Climate VaR  
• Carbon intensity 
For each exclusion strategy, we investigated the impact on climate risks as well as on the risk 
and return characteristics of the sample portfolio, including sector, country and style 
exposures. We show that while these exclusion strategies had substantial impacts on the 
measures of climate risks for the sample portfolio, they had minimal impact on the sample 
portfolio’s conventional risk, return and market exposures. We conclude that, in the case of 
the sample portfolio chosen, it was possible to substantially reduce the portfolio’s climate risk 
exposures without significantly altering the portfolio’s conventional risk and return 
characteristics or its market exposures, such as to sectors, countries and styles. 
 Portfolio climate risk assessment 
Sample portfolio 
We selected a sample portfolio from the Lipper database of mutual funds focusing on the peer 
group of global developed market funds.17 The goal of the selection process was to have a 
“typical” fund in the sense that it has a 5-year active performance relative to the fund’s own 
benchmark which is close to the median fund active performance in that peer group. We also 
aimed for a fund that has more than 50 holdings to reduce concentration. The “typical” fund 
                                                     
17 We started with all global funds available in the Lipper database and selected all the funds that have at least 75% invested 
in equity and filtered out funds with assets under management below US$1mm or above US$500bln. We also filtered out 
funds with larger than 15% exposure to emerging markets and then excluded 5% of funds with largest and smallest tracking 
error and funds with reference to index tracking in their name. 
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selected was representative of a global actively-managed fund in terms of risk-return 
characteristics: its 5-year return (10.71%) and volatility (12.76%) were in line with the median 
of global actively-managed funds in the database, as of December 2019.  
Figure 22-6 shows the country and Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS®) Industry 
Group18 breakdowns of the sample portfolio.  
Figure 22-6 Sample portfolio country and GICS Industry Group breakdowns 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
Portfolio-level Climate VaR 
Figure 22-7 displays a Climate VaR report snapshot for the sample portfolio.  
Figure 22-7 Climate VaR portfolio report snapshot 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
 
                                                     
18 GICS is a global industry classification standard jointly developed by MSCI and Standard & Poor’s. 
 
Chapter 22 
 364 
The Aggregated Climate VaR is -7.75%, resulting in a US$7.75m monetary risk contribution for 
a US$100m investment.19 This means that, under the scenarios considered, climate risk and 
opportunities were estimated to represent a downside valuation impact of 7.75% of the 
portfolio.  
This risk can be further broken between Transition Risks and Opportunities and Physical Risks 
and Opportunities: 
• Under the 2°C scenario considered, Transition Risks and Opportunities amounted to 
a downside valuation impact of -0.59%. This number is in fact comprised of two effects: 
-4.43% downside coming from Policy Risks, and +3.84% upside stemming from 
Technology Opportunities. 
• On Physical Risks and Opportunities, the overall risk of -7.16% was largely driven by 
Coastal Flooding (-6.15%) and Extreme Heat (-1.44%). We also observe that some of 
the Physical Risks and Opportunities Climate VaRs were positive – i.e., representing an 
upside. This was the case for Extreme Cold (+0.22%) and in this case stems from the 
fact that, in the scenario considered, in many locations around the globe the number 
of days with temperatures reaching below 0°C are likely to decrease, resulting in fewer 
business interruptions. 
For a more robust climate risk assessment, it is useful to look beyond the portfolio risk 
measures and into what drives them – be it at the level of sectors, countries or individual 
securities. 
Sectors 
The three GICS Industry Groups in the sample portfolio with the highest Transition Risks are 
Real Estate, Materials and Food & Staples Retailing (Figure 22-8) – activities with substantial 
carbon footprints and, in the case of the companies in this portfolio, also operating in 
jurisdictions with substantial regulatory oversight (we also note that the risk in the Real Estate 
GICS Industry Group was somewhat inflated by the fact that one company classified in this 
group owns an airline). 
Looking at Transition Opportunities, we found that the upside of the low-carbon transition 
came from the stocks in the sample portfolio in Technology Hardware & Equipment and Capital 
Goods – activities with comparatively lower direct GHG-emissions or with a focus on 
developing new technologies.  
                                                     
19 This case study is based on a hypothetical USD 100 million investment. The monetary contribution is calculated as the 
product of the Climate VaR contribution and the portfolio value.  
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Figure 22-8 Climate VaR by GICS Industry Group – Transition Risks and 
Opportunities 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
 
Turning to Physical Risks and Opportunities (Figure 22-9), the three highest risk sectors were 
Real Estate, Materials, and Consumer Durables & Apparel. This mostly reflected the location 
of the facilities of the companies classified in these sectors as well as how their facilities were 
subject to different hazards. In the case of the companies in this portfolio, coastal flooding and 
extreme heat were the main drivers of the physical risks. 
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Figure 22-9 Climate VaR by GICS Industry Group – Physical Risks and Opportunities 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
 
Countries 
We then investigated the countries showing the highest level of climate risks in the sample 
portfolio. For this analysis, the Climate VaR model looks through to a company’s activities, 
identifying the different countries in which companies operate. Doing so is necessary, as 
transition and physical risks (e.g. climate policy, extreme weather events) are likely to have 
local impacts on companies’ international operations. 
The country with the highest downside in Transition Risks and Opportunities was Canada 
(Figure 22-10), accounting for over a third of the sample portfolio’s Policy Risks (-1.49% out of 
-4.43%). The United States and China were also among the highest contributors to Policy Risks, 
an intuitive result given the large portfolio weights the two countries represent (70% and 11%, 
respectively) and the importance of those markets in the global economy, meaning that many 
companies incorporated elsewhere also tend to have operations there.  
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Figure 22-10 Countries representing the most Policy Risks 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
 
China and the United States also contributed substantially to the portfolio’s Physical Risks and 
Opportunities (Figure 22-11), with the two countries representing by far the largest 
contributions. They were followed by the Netherlands, Japan, and India. 
Figure 22-11 Countries representing the most Physical Risks 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
 
 Portfolio climate risk management 
Having used Climate VaR to review the climate risks of the sample portfolio, we then 
considered the approaches which a portfolio manager might follow to manage these risks and 
we investigated the impact that such approaches would have on the risk and return 
characteristics of the sample portfolio. 
One approach to managing climate risks is to exclude the portfolio constituents that contribute 
the most to the risks. In this section, we adopted this approach and, starting with the holdings 
of the sample portfolio, excluded the “worst” decile (8 stocks) of the sample portfolio. We 
performed this exercise four times, each time excluding the “worst” decile on the following 
criteria:20 
                                                     
20 For Climate VaR, the “worst” performers were those with the lowest Climate VaR (which in many cases means the most 
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• Aggregated Climate VaR 
• Transition Risks and Opportunities Climate VaR 
• Physical Risks and Opportunities Climate VaR 
• Carbon intensity 
Doing so, we obtained four new portfolios (A through D), which we could compare with the 
original sample portfolio (“Original”). 
Impacts on climate risks 
Figure 22-12 displays the impact that the four exclusion strategies had on climate risks.  
Figure 22-12 Climate risk impacts of the different exclusion strategies 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
 
All exclusions tended to improved Climate VaR and reduce the portfolio’s carbon intensity, 
albeit to varying degrees: exclusion strategies A through C improved Climate VaR the most, 
and exclusion strategy D reduced the carbon intensity the most. This is, of course, by design – 
but it is worth noting that the reductions achieved by the exclusions were substantial: strategy 
A reduced the Aggregated Climate VaR by 74% (from -7.75% to -2.04%); strategy B changed 
the sign of Transition Risks and Opportunities Climate VaR (from -0.59% to +2.03%); strategy 
C reduced the Physical Risks and Opportunities Climate VaR by 65% (from -7.16% to -2.48%); 
and strategy D reduced the Weighted Average Carbon Intensity (“WACI”) of Scopes 1 and 2 
(“S12”) by 89% (from 185.87 to 20.67 tCO2e/US$m sales). 
The four strategies had different impacts:  
• Strategy A improved not just the Aggregated Climate VaR but also both the sub-
components of Climate VaR and the carbon intensity;  
• On the other hand, excluding on the basis of a single component of Climate VaR 
seemed to exacerbate the other component of Climate VaR in this sample portfolio: 
strategy B improved Transition Risks and Opportunities Climate VaR, but did not have 
much impact on the Physical Risks and Opportunities Climate VaR, (a small 
improvement from -7.16% to -6.34%). The opposite was true for strategy C; 
• In strategy D, exclusions on the basis of carbon intensity not only reduced the WACI 
but also improved the Transition Risks and Opportunities Climate VaR. This result is 
intuitive, considering that the transition is likely to compel companies to reduce their 
                                                     
negative Climate VaR). For carbon intensity “worst” performers were those with the highest carbon intensity. carbon 
intensity was defined in this analysis as the amount of Scope 1 and 2 GHG-emissions, in tons of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) 
per US$ of sales. 
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carbon emissions – hence, companies with higher carbon intensities would, on 
average, face more transition risks. For the same reason we can also see that strategies 
A and B, which substantially improved the Transition Risks and Opportunities Climate 
VaR, also substantially reduced the carbon intensity. However, these results also 
highlight that carbon intensity and transition risks are not one and the same, as the 
exclusions in strategies A, B and D were not identical; for example, Northland Power 
Inc. was excluded in strategy D on account of its carbon intensity (1,294 tCO2e/US$m 
sales), but it was not excluded from strategy A or B because it had a relatively small 
Transition Risks and Opportunities Climate VaR, thanks to having 59.1% of its total 
revenue generated in alternative energy. 
Impacts on traditional risk / return profile  
The above analysis showed that it was possible to reduce the climate risks in the sample 
portfolio, as measured by four different criteria. Of course, this is only one part of the story, as 
a portfolio manager would also want to know the impact each exclusion approach might have 
on the sample portfolio’s risk/return characteristics. 
We investigated this question and show the results in Figure 22-13, which compared the 5-
year simulated performance of the five strategies. 21  Interestingly, although exclusion 
strategies A through D substantially improved the various measures of climate risks, the 
traditional risk/return characteristics of the five strategies remained largely similar to the 
original strategy: all strategies had 5-year simulated returns in the mid to high 10% range 
(compared to 10.71% in the original strategy), and volatilities in the mid 12% range (compared 
to 12.76% in the original strategy). All exclusion strategies showed tracking errors to the 
original strategy of approximately 1%. 
Figure 22-13 Risk/return impacts of the different exclusion strategies 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
 
We also investigated the impact that these exclusions had on the sector, country, style and 
other exposures of the strategy using MSCI’s Global Total Equity Market Factor model. The 
high-level contributions from the factor groups are shown in Figure 22-14. In general, the 
factor profile of the original strategy was only slightly modified by the exclusion strategies. 
Industry factors and stock-specific returns tended to have a higher impact than styles, 
                                                     
21 We use a 5-year simulation period based on the availability of historical data. 
This report may contain analysis of historical data, which may include hypothetical, backtested or simulated performance 
results. There are frequently material differences between backtested or simulated performance results and actual results 
subsequently achieved by any investment strategy. 
The analysis and observations in this report are limited solely to the period of the relevant historical data, backtest or 
simulation. Past performance — whether actual, backtested or simulated — is no indication or guarantee of future 
performance. None of the information or analysis herein is intended to constitute investment advice or a recommendation 
to make (or refrain from making) any kind of investment decision or asset allocation and should not be relied on as such. 
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countries and currencies, but overall the contributions of all five sources of return remained 
very small when compared to the overall simulated returns of these strategies. 
Figure 22-14 High-level contributions from factor groups 
 
Source: MSCI ESG Research LLC 
5 Conclusion and outlook 
Globally there is an increased drive to encourage the widespread adoption of climate scenario 
analysis among companies and financial institutions. Most leading climate change frameworks 
– TCFD, HLEG, TEG, etc. – base their recommendations and policy advice on a range of 
accepted scenarios developed by climate change scientists. Scenarios provide a forward-
looking assessment of climate change risks, giving insights into the order of magnitude for 
which assets and investments are threatened and how their return prospects are affected. 
Crucially, they also indicate which assets and investments might stand to profit from a low-
carbon transition – insights that can be leveraged into both building up portfolio-level 
resilience vis-à-vis climate change and signaling to the wider community that climate change 
risks are actively managed. In analyzing the risks and the costs of climate change in a proactive 
and forward-looking way, the management of companies can mitigate and avoid a plethora of 
possible threats ranging from class-action lawsuits, significant remediation costs, and 
irreversible damages to the reputations of corporations and their executives. 
The merits of scenarios are that they provide organizations with a method of forward-looking 
assessment to understand the strategic implications of climate-related risks, while at the same 
time informing investors, lenders, insurance providers and other stakeholders of how a 
particular organization might perform under different transition and physical risk pathways. 
Hence, scenario analysis provides an invaluable lens through which to assess a company’s 
targets, strategy and governance of sustainability issues and take a view on whether they are 
fit for purpose in a changing world. 
For all its benefits, scenario analysis also has certain drawbacks, the most obvious being that 
it is inherently unclear which scenario will eventually occur. Also, most climate reference 
targets delivered by scenario analysis come in the form of optimal energy mixes, a format ill-
suited for conducting company- or asset-level analysis, complicating the integration into 
portfolio-construction procedures which focus on individual holdings. 
To compute the Climate VaR metric, we evaluate data underpinning a particular climate 
scenario and then quantifies the potential future cost for the scenario and company in 
question. A calculation is then made to understand by how much a company’s financial 
valuation is poised to decrease or increase in the face of those climate related costs. To achieve 
this, the methodology relies on a discounted cash flow model that calculates the present-day 
value of future climate-related cost. By basing the financial impact calculation on traditional 
valuation techniques used in the financial industry, we attempt to bridge the disparate fields 
MSCI Climate Value-at-Risk        
371 
of academic climate science and the day-to-day tools used by financial practitioners to create 
resonance with the finance industry. As a result of this process, climate risks become 
embedded into an output in a format that can be processed and integrated into further 
financial analysis, so that climate risks can become a part of the fundamental analysis. 
We have seen numerous applications of Climate VaR in investment management practices. 
Most often, investors use Climate VaR for: 
• Engagement; 
• Investment decision-making; 
• Risk analysis; 
• Monitoring & compliance;   
• TCFD reporting. 
A portfolio’s Climate VaR can vary greatly depending on the detailed holdings contained 
therein. Investors need to understand security and portfolio level climate risks in order to start 
incorporating these risks into their investment practices. This is a first step for portfolios, 
companies, assets, governments, benchmarks, etc., to become resilient to the impacts that 
climate change may cause. Understanding, quantifying and managing these risks should 
become normal practices in financial management in years to come. Climate VaR is one of the 
new and innovative metrics that investors can use to help them establish the climate change 
resilience needed within investment portfolios.  
While Climate VaR is quickly becoming a recognized metric for assessing climate risks within 
and across portfolios, it is also time to take important steps forward to deliver deeper and 
more wide-ranging assessments of climate risks. For example, the Climate VaR methodologies 
outlined above can currently be used to assess direct impacts from climate change, but new 
methodologies are being explored to include indirect impacts as well. Climate VaR is also 
currently applied to equities and corporate bonds, but soon will be offered for additional asset 
classes, such as private equity and loans. This will allow for users to cover a larger portion of 
their portfolio(s) with Climate VaR analysis and also evaluate additional forms of risk via the 
assessment approach. We believe the use of Climate VaR will expand as climate risk analysis 
becomes more embedded within general risk management and reporting practices.  
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 Aviva’s Analysis of Climate Value at Risk for 
Asset Owner and Managers  
 
By 
Aviva1 
Abstract 
Aviva’s Climate Value at Risk measure enables the potential business impacts of climate-
related risks and opportunities to be assessed taking into consideration different scenarios and 
assumptions regarding policies, technologies, demand, and various other macroeconomic 
factors, as well as extreme weather. This measure looks at the evolution of climate-related 
risks and opportunities over the next 15 years, but with the ability to consider shorter time 
periods (3 to 5 years) where appropriate. Aviva was awarded the Climate Risk Initiative of the 
Year 2020 by InsuranceERM, because the “Climate value-at-risk (VaR) initiative shows the 
practical benefits that can be achieved when insurers focus resources, time and expertise on 
climate risk management, as well as collaborating with other knowledge partners”.2 
Keywords: Climate Value at Risk, climate-related risks and opportunities, transition risks, 
physical risks, climate risk management 
1 Introduction 
Aviva included the results of scenario analysis in its 2018 and 2019 Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures. The scenario analysis is based on the Climate Value at Risk or “Climate VaR” 
measure3 we have developed in conjunction with the United Nations Environment Programme 
Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) Investor pilot and Carbon Delta, an environmental FinTech (See 
UNEP FI Changing Course report for further details).4 This scenario analysis provides a forward-
looking view of climate-related transition and physical risks and opportunities. Transition risks 
and opportunities include the projected costs of policy action related to limiting greenhouse 
gas emissions as well as projected profits from green revenues arising from developing new 
technologies and patents. Physical risks cover the financial impact of acute weather events as 
well as chronic impacts.  
Aviva has extended this Climate VaR approach with Elseware, a risk management and 
quantification expert consultancy, to enable it to be applied to its whole balance sheet. In 
order to support this initiative, an inter-disciplinary team has been created with 
representation from across the business and an expert panel has been set-up to review and 
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Ben Carr, RCAM Director at Aviva, email: ben.carr@aviva.com. The authors would like to thank 
Finn Clawon, Loubna Benkirane, Tom Tayler and Paddy Arber.  
2 https://www.insuranceerm.com/content/galleries/insuranceerm-annual-awards-2020-uk-and-europe-
winners/climate-risk-initiative-of-the-year-aviva.html  
3  For further details on Aviva’s Climate VaR methodology, please see Aviva’s Climate-related Financial Disclosure at 
http://www.aviva.com/TCFD 
4 https://www.unepfi.org/publications/investment-publications/changing-course-a-comprehensive-investor-guide-to-
scenario-based-methods-for-climate-risk-assessment-in-response-to-the-tcfd/ 
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challenge the main assumptions made in the selection, development and modelling of the 
scenarios. The panel includes internal experts as well as external experts5. 
Aviva’s use of the Climate VaR approach described in this case study demonstrates the value 
of innovation and scenario analysis in climate risk modelling. It also shows the importance of 
collaboration and sharing of best practice with peers. Outputs and evaluations of this 
methodology are intended as a first step in incorporating the TCFD recommendations on 
scenario-based risk assessment in financial disclosures. We will continue to work internally 
and with external partners to develop best practice in this area.  
2 Methodology description – Climate VaR modelling approach 
Aviva developed a Climate VaR measure that enables the potential business impacts of future 
climate-related risks and opportunities to be assessed in each of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios and in aggregate. 
 Climate scenarios considered 
The IPCC scenarios aim to measure the effect on the energy balance of the global climate 
system due to changes in the composition of the atmosphere from sources like greenhouse 
gas emissions, other air pollutants (Vallero, 2014) and changes in land use. The four IPCC 
scenarios represent different Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) which describe 
the composition of the atmosphere at the end of the 21st century. Table 23-1 summarises the 
link between the RCPs, potential temperature rises by 2100 and the level of mitigation 
required, which we will use to describe the scenarios in this chapter. 
Table 23-1 Mapping for RCPs, potential temperature rises and levels of mitigations  
RCP Temperature rise Description 
RCP2.6 1.5°C Aggressive mitigation 
RCP4.5 2°C Strong mitigation 
RCP6.0 3°C Some mitigation 
RCP8.5 4°C Business as usual (BAU) 
Source: TCFD 
 
The TCFD graphic “The choice we face now” (see case study below) sets out implications for 
greenhouse gas emissions and potential temperature rise by 2100 for each scenario. The 
aggressive mitigation scenario is the only one where it is more likely than not that the 
temperature change in 2100 will be less than 2°C. Aviva developed this Climate VaR measure 
in conjunction with the UNEP FI investor pilot project, which developed models and scenario 
analysis tools to assess the potential impact on corporate assets and real estate of the four 
IPCC scenarios in conjunction with MSCI (Carbon Delta).  
MSCI (Carbon Delta) is using the AIM/CGE model6 from the Japanese National Institute for 
Environmental Studies (NIES).7 Whilst these scenarios reflect current scientific research and 
                                                     
5 Dr Simon Dietz, Dr Nick Robins & Dr Swenja Surminski from the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment at the London School of Economics, Dr Paul Pritchard – an independent sustainability advisor – and Dr 
Katharina Dittrich from Warwick Business School. 
6 The AIM/CGE model is a multi-regional, multi-sectoral, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.  
7 NIES is a Japanese research institute that undertakes a broad range of environmental research in an interdisciplinary and 
comprehensive manner. 
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the Paris agreement, there clearly remains significant uncertainty regarding future climate 
trajectories as well as political risk with respect to implementation of the Paris agreement and 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).8 It is important to note that the four scenarios 
all assume a gradual path, in which temperatures slowly rise but climate policy is ramped up 
at varying speeds with a fairly high degree of global coordination. They do not consider the 
transition risk in a more chaotic policy environment, where there is lack of global coordination 
and policy action is taken too late and too suddenly. This may result in an understatement of 
transition risk. The MSCI (Carbon Delta) model and scenario analysis tools also allow 
consideration of the five Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). These consider socio-
economic characteristics including things such as population, economic growth, education, 
urbanisation and the rate of technological development. Within SSPs, scenarios can also be 
selected that represent early policy action or late policy action. The timing of climate action 
can represent orderly and disorderly transition pathways. 
 Time horizon considered for each scenario  
In conjunction with the UNEP FI investor pilot project, it was agreed to use a single 15-year 
time horizon for the Climate VaR measure to analyse the impact of the different scenarios on 
our business but with the capability to consider transition effects over shorter time horizons 
depending on the business decision being considered. Consideration was given as to whether 
a longer time horizon was needed to capture the worst physical impacts of climate change, as 
these are not likely to manifest themselves until the second half of the century (Figure 23-1). 
To address this point in a decision-useful way and ensure consistency with the 15-year time 
horizon for transition risk, it was agreed to look at a higher, 95th percentile of physical risks as 
well as the expected outcome in the BAU scenario over the 15-year horizon. Figure 23-2 shows 
large dispersion around the mean from the impact of climate change on coastal flooding over 
the next 15 years. 
Figure 23-1 Global average surface temperature change 
 
Source: IPCC 
 
                                                     
8 Intended NDCs is a term used under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change for reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions that all countries that signed the UNFCCC were asked to publish in the lead-up to COP21. 
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Figure 23-2 Example of coastal flooding 
 
Source: MSCI (Carbon Delta) 
 
 Risks and opportunities covered  
The modelling of transition and physical risks and opportunities specifically covers the 
projected costs of policy action related to limiting greenhouse gas emissions as well as 
projected profits from green revenues arising from developing new technologies and patents. 
In addition, it captures acute weather impacts such as coastal flooding and tropical cyclones 
as well as chronic impacts from gradual changes in extreme heat and cold, heavy precipitation 
and snowfall, or wind gusts. Regional sea level rise is an important input to the risk model and 
constitutes a key driver of coastal flooding impacts. It is important to note that the changes in 
acute and chronic impacts can also have a positive as well as negative effect on individual 
companies or instruments (Figure 23-3). 
Figure 23-3 Risks and opportunities covered 
 
Source: MSCI (Carbon Delta) 
 
 Building Block Approach  
To assess these risks and opportunities, a building block approach has been adopted (Figure 
23-4).  
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Figure 23-4 Building Block Approach 
 
Source: MSCI (Carbon Delta) 
 
When assessing the impact of climate-related risks and opportunities associated with each 
scenario, different financial indicators need to be used and assumptions made. To assess the 
impact on market value of investments and the impact on reserves or premiums, for example, 
the following assumptions need to be considered:  
1. The extent to which asset valuations, reserves and premiums already take account of the 
climate-related risks and opportunities in each scenario;  
2. The likely timing of future changes to asset valuations, where not all these climate-related 
risks and opportunities are currently considered;  
3. Changes in our asset portfolio over time and the timing of such changes relative to the 
timing of any future market corrections to take account of these climate-related risks and 
opportunities; 
4. The extent to which changes in costs over the next 15 years will be passed on to 
policyholders and/or sales volumes could reduce or increase for specific lines of business; 
and  
5. The impact on reinsurance market capacity and pricing, as well as the creditworthiness 
of reinsurers, and the implications for our reinsurance strategy.  
Finally, to assess the overall impact of climate-related risks and opportunities across all 
scenarios, the relative likelihoods or probabilities of each scenario need to be assigned. To do 
this Aviva considered amongst other things the current scientific analysis of the likely 
trajectory of emissions as well as policy commitments made by countries to reduce emissions 
(Figure 23-5).  
Figure 23-5 Most Likely outcome based on where we are 
 
 Source: Aviva 
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 Transition risks and opportunities  
The financial impact of transition risks and opportunities are calculated relative to the BAU 
scenario (i.e., there are assumed to be no transition costs or opportunities in the BAU scenario, 
where current emissions are presumed to continue to rise at the current rate). The calculation 
covers both emission reduction prices and revenues from new technologies.  
 
Figure 23-6 Emission Reduction Prices (2010 US$/tCO2e) 
 
Source: MSCI (Carbon Delta) 
 
2.5.1 Investments  
The following high-level methodology is used to assess the potential downside risk from 
different transition scenarios on our investments (Figure 23-7). For both corporate bonds and 
equity securities the difference between the market value and the adjusted value after 
factoring in future climate change costs and/or revenues is measured (i.e., the impact relative 
to current climate conditions and emissions trajectory). To estimate the impact in a consistent 
way when a company has issued both shares and bonds, the Merton model is used.9 This 
model enables the impact on a business as a whole to be translated into a change in value of 
its corporate bonds and equity securities. As both costs and opportunities are covered, the 
Climate VaR can be either negative or positive depending on the balance of future anticipated 
carbon-related costs and revenues for individual companies or instruments.  
                                                     
9 Analysts and investors utilise the Merton model to understand how capable a company is at meeting financial obligations, 
servicing its debt, and weighing the general possibility that it will go into credit default. 
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Figure 23-7 High level methodology overview 
 
Source: MSCI (Carbon Delta) 
 
Carbon Delta has also developed a methodology for estimating the transition exposure of 
property assets which we have used for both direct real estate and real-estate-linked debt 
holdings. For infrastructure assets, Aviva plans to use the ClimateWise Transition Risk 
Framework to identify the key risk exposures across our portfolio of assets, taking into account 
how transition risk and opportunities vary by geography, sector and sub-sector to assess the 
potential impact in different climate scenarios. For example, a recent review of transport 
infrastructure highlighted strong potential opportunities.  
2.5.2 Insurance liabilities  
Aviva has assessed the impact on life insurance reserves from the potential reduction in 
mortality rates resulting from less air pollution in the aggressive and strong mitigation 
scenarios. This reflects an anticipated reduction in carbon emissions and an increase in electric 
vehicles replacing vehicles with internal combustion engines. For each transition scenario, 
there is potential for fewer deaths relating to air pollution, although we note that this is very 
much dependent on the fuel mix generating electrical power for the grid. Whilst waste-to-
energy plants have similar particulate outputs to gas-fired power stations, biomass plants such 
as wood pellet fired facilities, for their many positives, produce significantly more particulates 
than gas-fired power stations for example (Hajat et al., 2014). 
On the general insurance side, transition risks and opportunities may also arise. For example, 
the wider adoption of electric vehicles and the rise of car-sharing and automated cars might 
decrease the pool of vehicles to be insured leading to a decrease in claims frequencies but 
also premiums. However, these affects have not been included to date. We plan to extend our 
modelling to cover general insurance transition risks and opportunities over time.  
 Physical risks and opportunities  
The financial impact of physical risks and opportunities is based on an assessment of both the 
expected costs in the BAU scenario and the costs at a higher 95th percentile arising from 
hazards such as: extreme heat and cold, heavy precipitation and snow, coastal flooding, wind 
gusts and tropical cyclones. We use the expected costs and the costs at a higher percentile to 
define a distribution of physical risk outcomes for each scenario and thus capture some of the 
more extreme potential physical effects of climate change whilst using a consistent 15-year 
time horizon as that used for transition risk.  
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2.6.1 Investments  
The physical risks on investments are generally going to be driven by the exposure of the 
facilities (buildings, plant, infrastructure) owned or used by the company who has issued the 
financial instrument, their “facilities”, and the supply chain they rely on for producing their 
end product. We use the following high-level methodology to assess the potential physical risk 
from different scenarios on our investments in this regard. The cost in Figure 23-8 is built up 
by mapping the facilities onto a world map, with measures that define the facility’s exposure 
to different extreme weather hazards, and then combining this with a vulnerability function 
that converts the exposure and an assessment of the physical hazard impact in each scenario 
into an estimated monetary cost, per facility. 
 
Figure 23-8 Impact modelling and expected cost estimate 
 
Source: MSCI (Carbon Delta) 
 
For both corporate bonds and equity shares, the difference between the market value and the 
adjusted value after factoring in aggregated facility costs and/or revenues is measured. The 
costs and/or revenues to a business are measured relative to an assessment of physical risks 
under current conditions as these are assumed to be already factored into the market value. 
This business impact is then translated into a change in the value of its corporate bonds and 
equity securities using the Merton model.  
Aviva recognises that the current approach does not capture the impact on companies’ supply 
chains nor necessarily demand for its products and services or potential mitigating impact of 
insurance. For example, in the case of a major car manufacturer their real assets will mainly 
include their factories and machinery and possibly their dealerships. Their supply chain will be 
broad, complex and potentially geographically diverse and if disrupted it could adversely 
impact companies’ costs and/or revenues. We will continue to work internally and with 
external partners to develop best practice in this area. For directly held real estate assets, real 
estate loans and infrastructure assets, we use the same approach described above. For directly 
held real estate the impact is carried directly against the property valuation. For real estate 
loans, we assess the physical climate change risk impact by running the stressed property value 
through our debt valuation models.  
For sovereign bonds, the impact on the market value of a security is measured by assessing 
how a sovereign’s rating could change as a result of the occurrence of different extreme 
weather hazards in each scenario. The following climate-related factors may impact sovereign 
debt: exposure and vulnerability to climate change; readiness and adaptation; ability to raise 
money for mitigation and post-disaster repair; ability to raise money via taxation and debt; 
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reliance on foreign aid and support of the International Monetary Fund and other supra-
national bodies. To assess a sovereign’s vulnerability to climate change and readiness, the 
Notre-Dame University’s Notre Dame-Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN) measure for 
country climate change risk has been used. We note that the assessment of sovereign debt is 
difficult because sovereigns are exposed to climate change via several vectors: government 
buildings and government owned infrastructure, cost of emergency relief to areas effected by 
climate-related disasters, aid and rebuilding costs and the cost of acting as insurer of last resort. 
So, the ND-GAIN data has been used to help support expert judgements about the appropriate 
stresses to apply to different sovereign bonds in our modelling at this stage. We will continue 
to work internally and with external partners to develop best practice in this area.  
2.6.2 Insurance liabilities  
The Climate VaR for life insurance risks calculates the impact on reserves of a change in 
mortality rates as a result of the occurrence of different extreme weather hazards in each 
scenario based on a review of academic literature linking climate change to potential changes 
in mortality rates (Gasparrini et al., 2017). For higher temperature scenarios, where climate 
change has dramatically taken hold, the picture is complicated. For example, it is possible that 
both summers and winters will be warmer or that seasons will in fact be more extreme. The 
latter is more likely to have an adverse impact and for the UK could plausibly result from the 
Gulf Stream changing its path and missing the UK.  
On the general insurance side, the Climate VaR calculates the impact on premiums as a result 
of the occurrence of different extreme weather hazards in each scenario. The impact on 
premiums is then used to determine the impact on our business, considering the impact on 
pricing, sales volumes and our reinsurance strategy. During 2019 we have extended the scope 
of physical risks covered to different regions (UK, Canada and France) and various perils (flood, 
freeze, subsidence, wildfire, winter storm, hail and severe convective storm) noting that the 
precise list of perils is region dependent. We have worked with internal and external experts 
to consider how climate change could change the frequency and severity of UK Flood and 
leveraged our existing catastrophe modelling capability to assess the impact of this on 
premiums.  
 Aggregation of climate-related risks and opportunities  
In conjunction with Elseware, a risk management and quantification expert consultancy, we 
have used a Bayesian Network10 methodology to aggregate all the component parts of our 
exposure to derive an aggregate view of the impact of climate-related risks and opportunities. 
The attraction of this approach is that we can combine a set of beliefs, expert judgements, 
internal data and external data to assess the potential impact of these risks, on an aggregated 
basis. We can then determine an overall Climate VaR for each scenario (Figure 23-9). 
The impact distributions of each climate scenario are then combined to give a fully aggregated 
result across all four scenarios. This final step of aggregation uses the assigned likelihood given 
to each scenario taking into consideration amongst other things the current scientific analysis 
of the likely trajectory of emissions as well as policy commitments made by countries to reduce 
emissions (Figure 23-10). 
 
                                                     
10  A Bayesian Network is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of variables and their conditional 
dependencies via a directed acyclic graph. 
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Figure 23-9 Aviva’s aggregation process for each scenario 
 
Source: Aviva 
 
Figure 23-10 Overall assessed climate change impact 
 
 Source: Aviva 
 
3 Case study 
 Data inputs 
Data inputs for the Climate VaR can be broadly split into data to derive exposure and data to 
support assessing the impact of climate change. The model takes a holistic view of Aviva’s 
balance sheet and as such requires internal exposures for our assets and liabilities. Asset and 
liability data have been sourced from regulatory reporting systems (or the systems that feed 
into those). For assets the exposure is based on shareholder exposure (rather than 
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policyholder exposure), for life insurance exposure is based on reserves and for general 
insurance exposure is based on premiums. 
For assets (equity, credit and property) the physical and transitional impact of the different 
climate scenarios are provided by MSCI (Carbon Delta). This model incorporates various 
datasets (some of which we have discussed above) including but not limited to output from 
an Integrated Assessment Model. For sovereign bond exposures a key input is the ND-GAIN, 
which measures a countries potential vulnerability to climate change and readiness to adapt. 
The impact for both life and general insurance has been driven by expert judgement based on 
input from internal and external experts. 
 Scenario analysis 
The Climate VaR measure allows four potential future scenarios with respect to climate change 
developed by the IPCC to be analysed (Figure 23-11)(IPCC, 2013). Each scenario describes a 
potential trajectory for future levels of greenhouse gases and other air pollutants and can be 
mapped to potential temperature rises and levels of mitigation required: 1.5°C (aggressive 
mitigation), 2°C (strong mitigation), 3°C (some mitigation) and 4°C (Business as usual). It is 
important to note that the four scenarios all assume a gradual path, in which temperatures 
rise slowly but climate policy is ramped up at varying speeds with a fairly high degree of global 
coordination. They do not consider the transition risk in a more chaotic policy environment, 
where there is lack of global coordination and policy action is taken too late and too suddenly. 
This may result in an understatement of climate-related risks. 
Figure 23-11 The choice we face now 
 
Source: TCFD 
 
The initial results from Aviva’s Climate VaR analysis compare a plausible range of outcomes 
(5th to 95th Percentile) from the different scenarios considered. Aviva is most exposed to the 
business-as-usual 4°C scenario where physical risk dominates, negatively impacting long-term 
investment returns on equities, corporate bonds, real estate, real estate loans and sovereign 
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exposures. The aggressive mitigation 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios are the only scenarios with 
potential upside. Physical risk impacts are more limited but there is still downside risk on long-
term investment returns from carbon intensive sectors (for example utilities) as a result of 
transition policy actions. This is offset partially by revenues on new technologies from some 
sectors (for example automotive). 
Figure 23-12 Aviva’s Climate VaR output by scenario for shareholder funds as at 
30/11/2019 
 
Source: Aviva 
Note: The grey bars represent the range of outputs between the 5th percentile and 
the central estimate for each scenario and the orange bars represent the range 
between the central estimate and the 95th percentile. 
 
When aggregated together to determine an overall impact of climate-related risks and 
opportunities across all scenarios, the plausible range is dominated by the results of the 3°C 
and 4°C scenarios, reflecting that neither existing nor planned policy actions are sufficiently 
ambitious to meet the 1.5°C Paris Agreement target. In the 1.5°C scenario, transition risk is 
larger than physical risk even after considering mitigating technology opportunities (Figure 
23-3). In the 2°C scenario, transition and physical risks are somewhat balanced, whereas in the 
3°C and 4°C scenarios physical risk dominates. 
Figure 23-13 Physical versus transition risks by scenario for Aviva’s shareholder 
funds as at 30/11/2019 
 
Source: Aviva 
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In all scenarios the impact on insurance liabilities is more limited than on investment returns. 
However, there is potential for some impact on life and pensions business as a result of 
changes in mortality rates in different scenarios either from physical effects such as more 
extreme hot and cold weather or transition effects related to changes in pollution levels. The 
impact on general insurance liabilities is relatively limited because of the short-term nature of 
the business and the ability to re-price annually and mitigation provided by our reinsurance 
programme. However, the physical effects of climate change will result in more risks and perils 
becoming either uninsurable or unaffordable over the longer term. 
4 Limitations and outlook  
Aviva will continue to develop and incorporate Climate VaR into its overall strategy, risk 
management and reporting frameworks. In particular, it will refine and improve the Climate 
VaR approach in the light of new research and data as well as emerging best practice including 
using output from the UNEP FI Insurance TCFD pilot. In addition, litigation risk could be 
explicitly modelled as could transition risk for sovereign bonds or physical risk modelling 
extended to cover wider factors such the supply chain, demand for products or services and 
access to capital. We could also consider how adaptation measures could be incorporated.  
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 Using Catastrophe Risk Modeling to Help 
Understand Physical Climate Change Risk  
 
By 
Risk Management Solutions (RMS)1 
Abstract 
Catastrophe risk models are widely used by the insurance industry to quantify risk from 
climate-related events. They can also be used to quantify physical climate risk impacts beyond 
insurance – as companies, investors, governments, and regulators look for answers. This 
chapter discusses how catastrophe risk models work, what the key components are that make 
up a risk model, and how different organizations are using these models to assess physical 
climate change risk. 
Keywords: catastrophe risk models, physical climate change risk 
1 Introduction 
The impact of physical climate change risk on our world is the source of many questions. What 
could be the possible extent of the exacerbated damage caused to communities around the 
globe in 10, 20 or 50 years’ time or more due to climate change? What will be the financial 
cost of the buildings and infrastructure made unusable by continual flooding? How will asset 
prices be affected, or for interconnected, global supply chains, what will the cost of recovery 
be?  
For future development, we need to build to mitigate what climate change could have in store, 
through directly tackling carbon emissions to put us on a different path, to transition to cleaner 
industries for instance, or adaptation – adjusting construction methods and standards to cope 
with new extremes. 
There is an urgent need to quantify physical climate change risk, as warning after warning 
comes from the scientific community about how climate change is already impacting the earth, 
and what the future has in store unless radical action to curb carbon emissions is taken very 
soon. Recent catastrophes such as Hurricane Harvey in 2017, wildfires in California during 
2017-18 and the 2019-20 Australian bushfires have been attributed to some extent to climate 
change by climate scientists. Sea level rise, changes to sea ice formation, retreating glaciers, 
warming and acidifying oceans, rising temperatures and record levels of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, are all measurable aspects of climate change.  
The speed of the change is causing concern. Central banks and regulators such as the Bank of 
England Prudential Regulation Authority have issued new stress tests, with consultations 
starting for new tests in 2021. New climate change reporting standards for businesses such as 
the Financial Stability Board Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) are 
                                                     
1  This chapter is written by Ben Brookes, managing director – Capital and Resilience Solutions of RMS, email: 
Ben.Brookes@rms.com. 
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rolling in – TCFD has more than 1,000 members – asking businesses, governments to start to 
quantify physical, liability and transition risks associated with climate change, and to start 
drawing up action plans to manage them. 
The climate models themselves represent a fast-evolving science, scenarios such as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s Representative Concentration Pathways 
(RCPs) shape trajectories of greenhouse gas emissions reflecting various actions taken by 
society to either reduce or even ignore climate warnings. With all this, how can the probability 
of different scenarios be calculated, how can the dollar value of action or inaction be assessed, 
and in terms of the losses incurred as a result of future climate change events, what is in store 
for us all? 
This confluence of science, risk distribution, on-the-ground reality, and financial loss has been 
tackled before. Many of these questions have been grasped by catastrophe risk modeling, and 
physical climate change risk represents another risk to analyze and manage.  
Models for measuring catastrophe loss have been developed since the late 1980s; as growing 
computer power helped link previously disparate areas such as scientific studies of natural 
hazards, historical event datasets and geographic information systems (GIS) together. 
Historical, actuarial-based risk modeling approaches, reliant on an empirical data set of actual 
events, which might only reliably go back less than 100 years, do provide a rich, vital 
foundation for a risk model, and a means of validation.  
But these historical-based approaches were found wanting in the early 1990’s. Hurricane 
Andrew, a Category 5 storm that hit Florida in 1992 stood out as a turning point for more 
sophisticated risk modeling techniques. As we face a similar turning point with physical climate 
change risk, it is interesting to examine what happened to the risk community before and after 
Andrew, as the community learned how to better manage the risk and move forward. 
 Hurricane Andrew 
Florida had never experienced a Cat 5 strength hurricane before and for an event of this 
strength, the potential level of losses had been underestimated. Before Hurricane Andrew, a 
projected loss estimate for an event of this size was US$4 to 5 billion (1992 values). In the end 
the economic losses reached US$26.5 billion with insured losses of US$15.5 billion. It was the 
costliest natural disaster to ever hit the United States. Eight insurance companies became 
insolvent, and a number of insurers left the state resulting in the setting up of an involuntary 
insurance market (state pools). 
Similar to financial institutions now, faced with quantifying the cost of physical climate change 
risk, the insurance industry recognized that its approach to risk modeling and management 
had to change. Catastrophe risk modeling companies, such as RMS which was founded in 1989, 
began to pioneer this new approach of probabilistic risk modeling. At their core, catastrophe 
models have helped insurance companies ensure they have the capital needed to pay the 
anticipated losses and support the fundamentals of the business. These models have helped 
to create a standardized “currency of risk” that allow risk data to be transferred and 
understood from one party to another.  
As the 1990s progressed and through to the present day, risk modeling has expanded to more 
perils and regions, and introduced new forms of capital into the market, such as insurance-
linked securities (ILS), and catastrophe bonds to assist nation states with rebuilding after a 
disaster. Models continue to grow in their scope and sophistication, covering “human-made” 
perils such as terrorism and cyber, and their usage outside of the insurance industry has grown.  
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Catastrophe risk models have also acted as a catalyst for action. The ability to calculate the 
potential financial loss from perils for a country, region, through to a single structure is helping 
all stakeholders who plan, build or finance these assets. Through this understanding of a risk, 
it is possible to start to manage it – whether it is through actions such as mitigation, risk 
transfer, or effective capital management for those who hold an asset or a risk. 
Risk models have been used to begin to assess the financial impact of climate change, such as 
sea level rise. Examples from RMS include studies with the OECD in 2007 looking at the risk of 
sea level rise to port cities around the world; in 2014, RMS partnered with the Risky Business 
initiative to examine the effect of sea level rise along the East Coast of the U.S., projected 
through to 2100. These projects and others looked to establish the economic cost of the effects 
of climate change. Through modification of catastrophe risk models to attempt to reflect 
future events influenced by climate change, it is possible to make the breakthrough and 
equate the costs and impacts from a micro local level to nation states, and to examine the 
potential of mitigation. 
 How do the modular components within a risk model work? 
Looking at the basics and the original principles of catastrophe risk modeling, models, by 
definition, attempt to provide a representation of complex physical phenomena and their 
impact on portfolios of assets, whether they are owned or insured. This probabilistic approach 
lies at the heart of modeling the complexity inherent in catastrophes, but the approach is 
complex itself. Probabilistic modeling requires simulating thousands of these representative, 
or stochastic, catastrophic events in time and space; compiling detailed databases of building 
inventories and estimating physical damage to various types of structures and their contents. 
The physical damage then needs to be translated to monetary loss; and, finally, totaling this 
for a portfolio – from a single building to millions of structures in a country as big as the U.S. 
It would be impossible to include or replicate absolutely every aspect required to deliver a 
completely precise result. So, from the modeler’s perspective, the task is to simulate, 
realistically and adequately, the most important aspects of this very complex system and the 
associated uncertainty. Risk managers who use a model need to familiarize themselves with 
the underlying assumptions of the models and understand the implications and limitations of 
their output in order to utilize the results effectively. 
Catastrophe models require substantial amounts of data for model construction and validation. 
Over time, the volume of data has increased dramatically, as more data sources have been 
introduced to give more rich, granular detail from millions of data points in a wind-field or 
storm surge hitting a shore through to finite descriptions of an individual structure. 
Collaboration across many disciplines is required, as the reliability of a risk models depends 
heavily on an understanding of the underlying physical mechanisms that control the 
occurrence and behavior of natural hazards. While no single individual would claim to have a 
complete understanding of all the intricacies of these physical systems, scientists and 
engineers, aided by increasingly sophisticated instrumentation and computing capabilities, 
have accumulated vast amounts of information and knowledge in these areas. By 
incorporating this information, the sophisticated theoretical and empirical models currently 
being developed can reasonably simulate these complex phenomena. 
The basic framework for modeling the impacts of natural hazards on exposures can be broken 
down into the following four modules (Figure 24-1): 
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• Stochastic Event Module 
• Hazard Module 
• Vulnerability Module 
• Financial Analysis Module  
 
Figure 24-1 Main modules used with catastrophe risk models 
 
 
Stochastic Event Module: Defining the Hazard Phenomena 
The first stage of catastrophe modeling begins with the generation of a stochastic event set, 
which is a database of scenario events. Each event is defined by a specific strength or size, 
location or path, and probability of occurring or event rate. Thousands of possible event 
scenarios are simulated based on realistic parameters and historical data to probabilistically 
model what could happen over time. 
Hazard Module: Assessing the Level of Hazard 
The hazard component of catastrophe models assesses the level of physical hazard across a 
geographical area at risk. For hurricanes for instance, a model calculates the strength of the 
winds around a storm, considering the region’s terrain and built environment (Figure 24-2). 
Figure 24-2 Typical framework for catastrophe modeling 
 
 
Vulnerability Module: Quantifying the Physical Impact of Hazard on Properties at Risk 
The vulnerability component calculates the amount of expected damage to the properties at 
risk. Vulnerability functions are region-specific and vary by a property’s susceptibility to 
damage from earthquake ground shaking or hurricane winds, for example. Parameters 
defining this susceptibility include a building’s construction material, its occupancy type, its 
year of construction, and its height.  
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In catastrophe models, different vulnerability curves are used to estimate damage for a 
structure, its contents, and time element coverages such as business interruption loss or 
relocation expenses. Damage is quantified as a mean damage ratio, which is the ratio of the 
average anticipated loss to the replacement value of the building. This module also includes 
critical estimates of uncertainty around expected damage (i.e., standard deviations). 
Together, the stochastic event, hazard and vulnerability modules comprise what is traditionally 
known as a probabilistic risk analysis. 
Financial Module: Measuring the Monetary Loss from Various Financial Perspectives 
Catastrophe loss models can be thought of as one application of probabilistic risk analysis, 
characterized by their refinement of the financial analysis module. This module translates 
physical damage into total monetary loss. For insurers, estimates of insured losses are then 
computed by applying policy conditions (e.g. deductibles, limits) to the total loss estimates. 
Losses from a catastrophe run much deeper than just the immediate physical damage, and 
modeling will also examine the longer-term losses due to the need to restore both social and 
physical infrastructure. Power, water, sanitation, healthcare, education – through to transport, 
supply chains, law and order, each factor is interlinked to each other in terms of restoration 
after a disaster. Business interruption, common in many business insurance policies, looks to 
help as a business suffers a loss of trade – whether it is without power, supplies or customers. 
Pressure on both construction labor and materials pushes up prices and slows down recovery. 
These factors can be as detrimental as the initial losses. 
Business interruption is calculated by estimating downtime based on the physical damage to 
a building itself, as well as to critical lifelines required to support use of the building (e.g. water 
and power) for its operational purpose. Economic factors inflating losses following an event 
are captured within our post-event loss amplification model which adjusts losses upwards 
depending upon the level of demand surge, claims inflation and other secondary effects, such 
as containment failures or long-term evacuation anticipated from a particular event. 
 Modeled output 
The main output of a probabilistic catastrophe model is the Exceedance Probability (EP) curve, 
which illustrates the annual probability of exceeding a certain level of loss. Typically, EP curves 
are displayed graphically, but they can also be summarized by key return period loss levels. For 
example, a 0.4 percent annual probability of exceedance corresponds to a 250-year return 
period loss (i.e., 1/250 = 0.4 percent). The data for this is derived from the Event or Period Loss 
Table, which contains a database of all possible independent events for a given peril, and a 
calculation of the frequency and severity of individual events – all these events are used to 
total up the average annual loss (AAL). 
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Figure 24-3 Exceedance Probability (EP) curve 
 
 
The AAL is a key risk metric – an estimate of the annual excepted losses from the modeled 
peril(s) over time, assuming that the exposure remains constant. AAL is used in EP curves (see 
Figure 24-3), calculated as the area under the EP curve or as the sum product of the mean loss 
and the annual likelihood of occurrence (i.e., the event rate) for each event in the event set, 
and can be used to evaluate the catastrophe load portion of an insurance rating function. 
 
 Using modeled losses 
Modeled loss results provide valuable insight into the potential severity and frequency of 
catastrophic losses, and into the volatility of the analyzed risks. The quantification of these 
components can then be used to assist risk managers with critical decisions around key issues 
such as portfolio management, individual risk assessment, and – for insurers in particular – 
pricing. By using AAL, commonly used by insurers to understand the changes in loss drivers, 
an asset manager, for instance, can understand how losses could grow over time, make 
judgments on the potential effects on asset prices, ensure diversification and take decisions 
on whether to add or divest to a portfolio. 
2 Using catastrophe risk models to assess physical climate change 
risk 
As mentioned previously, many organizations are using catastrophe risk models to get an 
understanding of the impact of physical climate change risk for regions that they cover or a 
portfolio of liabilities or assets, for example. Developed based on physical principles to reflect 
the current risk, catastrophe models can be modified to capture forward looking projections. 
Hazard model components can be adjusted to reflect future climate change scenarios, 
vulnerability adjusted to account for population, exposure and construction changes, making 
catastrophe models a valuable tool in examining physical climate change risk. 
While catastrophe models use historical data for calibration during development, the 
stochastic events contained within them are not confined to history, representing the 
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complete range of physically possible events under the current climate. These include 
currently rare events which may become much more frequent under future climate change 
scenarios. As a result, many of the effects of future climate change can be captured through 
an adjustment to the frequency of existing events within the model. Changes to severity such 
as sea level rise may not so easily be captured via frequency adjustments, but can be 
represented through changes to the hazard of existing events within the model, for instance 
increasing the inundation extent and depth of a storm surge event to represent the greater 
hazard that would occur under higher sea levels. In this section, we examine three recent 
applications of catastrophe risk models to help assess physical climate change risk. 
 Sea level rise action plan for San Francisco 
In 2013, the City of San Francisco appointed a Sea Level Rise (SLR) Technical Committee to 
address the SLR vulnerability with a focus on the city-owned assets contained in its 10-year 
capital plan. In the twentieth century, sea levels had risen by eight inches around the San 
Francisco Bay and Pacific Coast, and by the end of the twenty-first century, sea levels were 
most likely to rise by an additional 36 inches. Tidal activity – King Tides or extreme tides caused 
by storms or El Niño, for instance, can reach up to 42 inches (100-year extreme tide) above the 
average daily tide. 
In a groundbreaking study started in 2015, coordinated across several San Francisco 
departments and asset owners from the public and private sector, the then Major Ed Lee, set 
about to produce a Sea Level Rise Action Plan. The plan would use the latest climate science 
and would help set an aggressive agenda for further analysis, adaptation, planning and 
implementation. Given the current understanding of SLR potential, San Francisco needed to 
identify the best course of action to prepare for the future. The decision-making process 
required balancing risks and costs, to be able to answer the question: If no special actions are 
taken to prepare for SLR, what would be the financial impact on public and private property? 
Taking an upper-end projection of SLR of 66 inches by the year 2100, RMS completed an 
analysis to quantify the economic risk to San Francisco property from future sea level rise. 
When discussing flooding in this context, it was important to distinguish between permanent 
flooding that will occur due to SLR and temporary flooding that will occur as a result of extreme 
tide events. The permanent inundation of a building will render its entire value completely 
unusable, while temporary flooding will cause damage that can potentially be repaired and 
will likely be far lower than the full value of the building. For this study, it was assumed that 
property located within the upper-range, 66-inch scenario will be permanently lost if nothing 
is done to protect against SLR; property within the 108-inch scenario includes these properties 
plus those that will be at risk to some level of flooding under a 100-year extreme tide.  
2.2.1 Data Requirements 
RMS used a proprietary, industry-standard valuation model and property data to create a 
building-by-building exposure dataset for privately owned properties (i.e., private property) 
within the SLR Vulnerability Zone, which was then overlaid onto the inundation footprints. This 
dataset is used as the basis of an analysis of the value of the exposed private property.  
In addition to the replacement cost, the private property data contained information used for 
catastrophe risk modeling, such as the occupancy type, number of stories, construction type, 
and year built, to give a more granular view of the type of properties in San Francisco that will 
be affected by SLR. Viewing total exposure in each scenario broken down by the property’s 
primary use, for example, reveals that the majority of vulnerable buildings currently contain 
commercial or industrial uses. Further, when the 100-year extreme tide is added to permanent 
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SLR flooding conditions, a significant amount of additional property will be at risk, almost 
doubling the exposure value. 
For public building data, this was derived by combining building information from the RMS 
exposure dataset with value information provided by San Francisco. Information about 
impacted infrastructure, certain Port of San Francisco facilities, and the San Francisco Airport 
was provided based on independent asset analyses carried out by San Francisco, and exposure 
estimates were provided for each asset, as well as each asset category and each scenario. 
Figure 24-4 Sea-level Projections for San Francisco Relative to the Year 2000 
  
Source: San Francisco Sea Level Rise Action Plan – National Research Council (NRC) 
statistics 
 
RMS found that US$55 billion of private and public sector property in the low-lying coastal 
areas around San Francisco would be permanently inundated by the end of the century – 
within a SLR vulnerability zone (Table 24-1 and Table 24-2). The calculation assumes that no 
measures are put in place to increase the city’s resilience and reflects present day costs to 
rebuild the affected buildings and infrastructure, rather than the market values in 2100. 
Table 24-1 Total property value at risk by 2100 in San Francisco by category.  Value 
expressed in 2016 US Dollar value of property replacement value and does not take 
into account any planned or anticipated adaptation efforts 
 
Source: San Francisco Sea Level Rise Action Plan/RMS 
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Table 24-2 Total value of private property at risk by 2100 in San Francisco by 
category.  Value expressed in 2016 US Dollar value of property replacement value 
and does not take into account any planned or anticipated adaptation efforts 
 
Source: San Francisco Sea Level Rise Action Plan/RMS 
 
RMS also calculated the property loss estimates for a 1-in-100-year extreme storm surge 
temporarily pushing up sea levels further to 108 inches. In this scenario, an additional US$22 
billion of property assets would be at risk, bringing the total exposure to US$77 billion. Public 
assets including San Francisco International Airport were in the vulnerability zone. 
 Regulators look to assess climate change risk 
There is a great deal of interest from financial regulators across the globe to include climate 
change risk factors into their regulatory regimes. One example of this is the U.K. Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA). In 2013, the Bank of England was given new duties in respect of 
insurers and is responsible for the prudential supervision of all authorized insurers in the U.K. 
In 2017, the Bank published an article in its Quarterly Bulletin recognizing that climate change, 
and society’s responses to it, present financial risks which impact upon the Bank’s objectives. 
It identified that these risks arise through two primary channels: the physical effects of climate 
change and the impact of changes associated with the transition to a lower carbon economy, 
and it set out its response which had two core elements. First, to engage with firms which face 
current climate-related risks, such as segments of the insurance industry. Second, enhancing 
the resilience of the U.K. financial system by supporting an orderly market transition.  
The Bank believes that forming a strategic response to the financial risks from climate change 
will help ensure it can fulfil its mission to maintain monetary and financial stability, both now 
and for the long term. The Bank has acted on many fronts, including a close interest in the 
Financial Stability Board’s TCFD and co-chairing the G20 Green Finance Study Group on behalf 
of the United Kingdom. 
The PRA is a member of the Sustainable Insurance Forum with other like-minded regulators 
looking to strengthen the understanding and response to sustainability challenges in 
regulation. One of the first major actions by the U.K. PRA was the introduction of Climate 
Change Scenarios into its biennial General Insurance Stress Test (GIST). As part of the GIST, the 
PRA asked the largest U.K. regulated general insurers and Lloyd’s syndicates to respond to a 
set of climate change scenarios. An exploratory exercise, it was designed to provide additional 
market impetus in this area. 
The exercise comprised three climate change scenarios, some based on IPCC scenarios, looking 
at the potential impact of climate change: 
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• Scenario A: In 2022 based on a disorderly transition 
• Scenario B: In 2050 based on an orderly transition in line with the Paris Agreement, 
with a maximum temperature increase well below 2 degrees 
• Scenario C: In 2100 based on failed future improvements in climate policy, with a 
temperature increase in excess of 4°C 
 
Table 24-3 Selected climate change scenarios used by the U.K. Prudential 
Regulation Authority for its 2019 General Insurance Stress Test exercise 
Assumption 
Scenario 
A  
Scenario 
B 
Scenario 
C 
U.S. Hurricane 
Percentage increase in frequency of major hurricanes 5% 20% 60% 
Uniform increase in wind speed of major hurricanes 3% 7% 15% 
Percentage increase in surface run-off resulting from 
increased tropical cyclone-induced precipitation 
(Cumecs) 
5% 10% 40% 
Increase in cm in average storm tide sea-levels for U.S. 
mainland coastline between Texas and North Carolina. 
Figures exclude wave set-up and run-up 
10cm 40cm 80cm 
U.K. Weather 
Percentage increase in surface run-off resulting from 
increased preicpitation (Cumecs) 
5% 10% 40% 
Uniform increase in cm in average storm tide sea-
levels for U.K. mainlande coastline 
2cm 10cm 50cm 
 
 
The PRA requested (re)insurers to report on the physical risks and potential losses for their 
liabilities and the transition and physical risks to their investments under these scenarios, 
together with “assumptions” – a range of examples of how climate change may impact 
particular aspects of U.S. hurricane and U.K. weather frequency and severity. The PRA 
specified different percentage or absolute changes for the assumptions associated with each 
of the three scenarios. 
To assist clients, RMS offered two potential routes to calculate the increased gross annual 
average losses and a 100-year return period aggregate exceedance probability (AEP) loss as a 
result of these scenarios, and developed internally adjusted views of its RMS North Atlantic 
Hurricane Model, RMS U.S. Inland Flood HD Model, RMS Europe Windstorm Model, and RMS 
Europe Inland Flood HD Model.  
From a modeling perspective, for U.S hurricane RMS developed internal views which reflected 
increased frequencies of U.S. hurricanes through modification of long-term rates and 
adjustments to the hurricane strength categories; increases in uniform wind speeds and 
surface water run-off and average storm tide sea levels. For U.K. flood, surface run-off was 
increased together with uniform increases in average storm tide sea levels.  
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Clients could multiply their own AAL and 100-year return period AEP by predetermined 
“industry factors” calculated by RMS which reflect the percentage loss changes for an overall 
view of the change, or use a bespoke service where RMS would run the adjusted models for a 
client’s specific portfolio. The latter approach gave a more tailored assessment that better 
reflects a client’s book of business. 
The exercise provided useful insight into where the direction of travel could be in terms of 
increased losses, with significant differences between the three scenarios. It provides 
awareness about the potential future risk and has acted as kick-start for insurers to include 
climate change risk assessment into their strategy. Other regulators across financial services 
and insurance are looking to follow suit. 
 Modeling the impact of severe drought for corporate lenders 
Drought is often overlooked when examining the physical risk of climate change, even though 
it is a significant potential source of shock to the global financial system. There is also a 
common misconception that sustained lack of water is primarily a problem for agriculture and 
food production. But, in Europe alone, it is estimated that around 40 percent of total water 
extraction is used for industry and energy production (cooling in power plants) and 15 percent 
for public water supply. Globally, the main water consumption sectors are irrigation, utilities 
and manufacturing. 
In essence, practically every industry in the world has some reliance on water availability in 
some shape or form, and in this increasingly interconnected world it means that the impact of 
drought on one industry sector or one geographic region can have a material impact on 
adjacent industries or regions, regardless of whether they themselves are impacted by that 
phenomenon or not. Corporate lenders need to be able to quantify the default losses they 
would expect if severe drought events were to occur. 
In 2016, the Natural Capital Finance Alliance, which is made up of the Global Canopy Program 
and the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative, teamed up with Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH Emerging Markets Dialogue on 
Finance (EMDF) and several leading financial institutions to launch a project to pilot scenario 
modeling for drought. Funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, RMS was appointed to develop a first-of-its-kind drought model. The aim was 
to help financial institutions and wider economies become more resilient to extreme droughts. 
RMS adapted its risk modeling frameworks frequently used by insurers with help from a 
consortium complemented by the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford – to build a tool for 
banks to stress test the impact of drought. As part of this work, RMS investigated the likelihood 
of having a severe drought event, and the extent to which climate change has modified this 
likelihood. Although in this project, scenarios were devised, it would be possible to adapt the 
modeling further to make it fully probabilistic 
Some of the findings show that extreme droughts could increase loan defaults ten-fold for 
institutions with specific portfolios that are most exposed to drought risks. Even when exposed 
to drought scenarios of medium severity, most companies see their credit ratings downgraded. 
The most affected sectors are water supply, agriculture and power generation, particularly in 
countries that are heavily reliant upon hydroelectric power. Significant impacts are also found 
in water-dependent sectors such as food and beverages. 
Some of the largest losses seen in some of the scenarios were not necessarily a result of an 
industry sector not having access to water, but because other industry sectors didn’t have 
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access to water, so demand dropped significantly and those companies were therefore not 
able to sell their wares. This was particularly true for petrochemical businesses that are heavily 
reliant on the health of the broader economy, with the model providing a broad framework 
that incorporates domestic interconnectivity and trade, as well as global macroeconomic 
effects. 
There is significant scope to apply this approach to modeling other major threats and potential 
sources of global economic shock, including natural, manmade and emerging perils, as 
drought is just one environmental risk facing the financial services industry. This approach can 
be replicated to measure the potential impact of other systemic risks on macro and micro 
economic scales. 
The banking sector is starting to see the relevance of stress testing portfolios on a geographic 
basis, and especially for mortgage books the required level of geographic information is 
emerging, making this type of modeling more readily implementable to the sector. 
 Global (re)insurer builds climate change action plan 
A global top 20 insurer and reinsurer wanted to analyze the potential impact of climate change 
on modeled losses for its portfolio. As part of the business’s climate change action plan, it 
wanted to better understand the uncertainty around climate-change driven changes in future 
losses to produce metrics and targets for how it manages climate change risk and 
opportunities across its business. 
Through identifying the drivers of changes in risk within its portfolio, it could then target areas 
and priorities for further analyses, which can then inform its internal discussions and 
ultimately its business strategy. Two perils and regions came under the spotlight; U.S. 
hurricane and Australia cyclone. RMS was asked to help establish modeled losses for three 
different timeframes, through to 2030, 2050 and as far out as 2100.  
The IPCC, founded in 1988, is an intergovernmental body of the United Nations with a stated 
aim to “provide the world with objective, scientific information relevant to understanding the 
scientific basis of the risk of human-induced climate change, its natural, political, and 
economic impacts and risks, and possible response options.”2  The IPCC publishes regular 
Assessment Reports, the first was published in 1990, and since 2000, it has included 
projections of greenhouse gas emissions, and from 2014, it includes RCPs which describe 
different climate futures. These RCPs are all considered possible depending on the volume of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) emitted in the years to come. The different pathways also reflect how 
collective mitigation efforts will affect emissions. 
                                                     
2  Please see IPCC (2013). Principles governing IPCC work, IPCC Batumi, Ga. Link: https://archive.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc-
principles/ipcc-principles.pdf. 
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Figure 24-5 Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) featured in the IPCC 
Fifth Assessment Report 
 
 
 
–RCP2.6: Most stringent mitigation is put into 
place. Emissions reach a peak by 2020 
–RCP4.5: Emissions continue to rise until 2040 
after which they begin to decline 
–RCP6.0: Emissions continue to rise until 2080 
after which they begin to decline 
–RCP8.5: Extremely high levels of emission occur 
unchecked 
 
 
 
Emissions levels and the effect of mitigation efforts are all very uncertain. But, by selecting an 
RCP it provides a basis for the analysis to assess the impact on key global climate variables, 
such as air/sea temperature and sea levels – and onward to assessing the impact on specific 
perils. 
RCP4.5 was selected as a default view for the project; it is a well-established and frequently 
quoted scenario, but also the lower RCP2.6 and extreme RCP8.5 were considered. When 
examining the impact of climate change on local and global climate variables, the most well-
respected and commonly used modeling framework is the Coupled Model Intercomparison 
Project (CMIP) model ensemble. 
When examining the resulting changes in tropical cyclone activity, RMS used the latest 
scientific reference papers to estimate future changes along the U.S. and Australia coastlines, 
and for storm surge risk in the U.S. In order to assess resulting impacts on modeled losses to 
our clients’ portfolio, RMS modified the rate assumptions underlying the latest RMS North 
Atlantic Hurricane and Australia Cyclone Models to reflect the tropical cyclone frequency 
changes projected in the two selected reference papers for each region. The RMS long-term 
view of North Atlantic hurricane risk was used as the baseline for the U.S. RMS assessed 
modeled losses across the RMS Industry Exposure Database for wind and storm surge losses 
for each timeframe and also for the client’s specific portfolio. Risk from hurricane storm surge 
saw losses increase significantly, with annual average losses more than doubling by the end of 
the century.  
 Accounting for exposure changes 
To account for possible future changes to exposure in Australia and the U.S., RMS developed 
a series of county-level factors, which reflected how the exposure for each county is projected 
to change by 2050. These factors were then applied on both the industry-wide and the client’s 
portfolio loss results, to provide view of how exposure changes might be expected to impact 
tropical cyclone risk in the future. 
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Typically, exposure projection exercises are used to forecast existing data (census housing 
counts, for example) into the very near future, usually in the order of 3-5 years. In order to 
project current exposure to 2050, a different approach needed to be developed. Population 
growth was selected as a proxy for longer-term exposure trends and used to develop a time 
series of exposure projections to 2050 based on established research and projection 
benchmarks. The key driver of the change in exposure across both countries is population 
growth. Population is expected to grow by 19 percent in the U.S. and 31 percent in Australia 
by 2050, with a trend of particularly high growth rates in urban areas. 
In addition, the redistribution of the population due to climate change (specifically, rising sea 
levels) was incorporated in the analysis. For this aspect of the analysis, the population map 
was overlaid with sea level rise inundation maps and a relationship linking time to/since 
inundation with relocation was developed to consider coastal retreat caused by rising sea 
levels. 
To determine the speed at which a population moves from an area prone to inundation, a 
distribution is applied on when residents are expected to relocate relative to when they are 
inundated (e.g. x percent will have left by the time they are inundated etc.). In terms of 
relocation location, assumptions are made on how far residents would move, such as 20 
percent staying within the same ZIP code. 
The resulting changes in population due to both growth and coastal retreat were aggregated 
into adjustment factors for each U.S. and Australian county and applied to the present-day 
industry and client portfolio. Combining the peril analysis with the exposure changes, RMS 
could then show by overall losses or at state/county level, the changes in annual average loss, 
with some areas showing greater levels of losses than the country average. 
Using this analysis as a baseline, the client can then build on this and examine other potential 
scenarios, such as a different RCP or modifications in factors such as tropical cyclone tracks, 
and precipitation. 
3 Conclusion 
The physical risk of climate change must be quantified in terms of the potential financial 
impact on businesses to help them and their stakeholders and regulators to adapt effectively 
to this emerging threat. Catastrophe risk models are well placed to do this and have previously 
been instrumental in driving change at similar times of uncertainty, such as after Hurricane 
Andrew. Probabilistic modeling is proven to capture the potential wide spread of events and 
allows for the models to reflect new possible climate change scenarios. Catastrophe risk 
models are now frequently being used by a wide range of organizations as a vital tool to help 
quantify, understand and plan for the increasing threat of climate change. 
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 Modelling Climate Change Risk for the 
Insurance Industry 
 
by 
Swiss Re Institute 1 
Abstract 
Modelling the insurance impact from climate change is complicated by uncertainties at two 
levels. First, there is a range of possible outcomes for underlying biophysical processes, and 
second, there are several confounding steps in the causal chain from emissions to temperature 
to global and regional climate variations to materialization of extreme weather events to the 
physical damages from catastrophes to insurance claims. Hence, the processes of how a 
changing climate impacts the frequency and severity of natural catastrophes are not fully 
understood. There is a higher confidence about the impacts on secondary perils. However, 
many secondary perils are more difficult to model, enhancing uncertainties around modelling 
the impact of climate change. This chapter outlines various influencing factors, time horizons, 
modelling challenges and levels of confidence for a range of natural catastrophe perils. It is 
increasingly important to regularly re-assess trends in input variables and model assumptions 
for current underwriting models. Incorporating the latest findings from climate science into 
catastrophe risk modelling is necessary for increasing the sustainability of the insurance 
industry and building socio-economic resilience. 
Keywords: climate physical risks, insurance, catastrophe risk modelling, impact of climate 
change, underwriting models 
1 Introduction 
One of the main challenges in understanding insurance risks arising from climate change lies 
in the range of uncertainties involved. Risks arise along a complex causal chain. Emissions 
influence both global climate and regional climate variations, which in turn influence the risk 
of specific natural hazards (such as storm surge, floods, droughts and wildfires), which then 
influence the risk of physical damage (such as property damages, crop shortfalls and business 
interruption), which finally translate into insurance claims. There is considerable uncertainty 
involved in quantifying the parameters of the underlying biophysical processes and 
determining what their probability distributions look like. Modelling efforts rely on 
assumptions made along the causal chain: about emission paths and adaptation schemes, 
global and regional climate models, physical damage functions, and knock-on effects. The 
further one goes along the chain, the greater the intrinsic model uncertainty (McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2020), adding another layer on top of already uncertain parameters and processes.  
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Thomas Holzheu, chief economist Americas, Swiss Re Institute, Swiss Reinsurance Americas, 
Armonk, NY, USA, email: Thomas_Holzheu@swissre.com; Michael Gloor, senior Nat Cat Specialist, Swiss Re Institute, Swiss 
Reinsurance, Zurich, Switzerland, email: Michael_Gloor@swissre.com; Kulli Tamm, senior Economist, Swiss Re Institute, 
Swiss Reinsurance Americas, Armonk, NY, USA, email: Kulli_Tamm@swissre.com. 
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Climate change is a systemic risk, affecting all parts of the economy. In terms of the impact on 
the insurance industry, climate change not only affects short-tail business lines such as 
property insurance, but it can also change the risk landscape for life & health or casualty 
insurance, thus requiring a holistic, long-term analysis of climate risks. Additionally, the risks 
arising from a changing climate do not stop on the liability side of an insurance company’s 
balance sheet but also affect the asset side if insurers’ investment portfolios include assets 
that are exposed to the effects of a transition to a low-carbon economy. This chapter primarily 
focuses on physical risks to property re/insurance. The re/insurance industry traditionally 
deploys probabilistic catastrophe models for the purposes of risk underwriting and capital 
steering. Incorporating the latest findings in climate science into catastrophe risk modelling is 
necessary to increase its usefulness to the insurance industry and society. Integrating climate 
change scenarios will allow for a more forward-looking assessment of extreme weather risk. 
2 Uncertainty about the magnitude of global warming 
The temperature of the atmosphere and the oceans has a direct or indirect impact on most 
physical processes in the Earth’s system that define our climate and its extremes. The global 
average temperature itself is influenced by the concentration (and thus the emissions) of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere. Any change in GHG concentrations and global 
temperatures, whether man-made or natural, will alter the risk exposure of humans, their 
assets, and the natural environment. The scientific community takes human influence on the 
Earth’s climate as a fact, but the implications of that fact are clouded in multiple layers of 
uncertainty. 
A lot of the analysis and reporting on climate change is focused on the expected averages 
(means) of GHG concentration and temperature changes. For example, in a recent report, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded: “Human activities are 
estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, 
with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C. Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 
2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate”(IPCC, 2018).  By the end of the 21st century, 
the IPCC projects a temperature increase of more than 4°C in a business-as-usual scenario2. 
But the uncertainty around those mid- and end-of century estimates is exceptionally wide, a 
facet that is lost in the discussion by only focusing on the means and likely outcomes. As noted 
by a number of climate change researchers, focusing on the “most likely” outcomes, even 
including some 1-2 standard deviation bands around the mean, lulls policymakers and the 
society to a false sense of security (Heal, 2017; Kunreuther et al., 2013; Wagner & Weitzman, 
2015). 
A key parameter in climate change modelling is equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS), which is 
defined as the “global average surface warming following a doubling of carbon dioxide 
concentrations.”(IPCC, 2007)  This is the metric that underpins all the estimates of future 
global temperatures, and any further impacts of those temperatures. In the IPCCs assessment, 
the ECS is “likely” (that is, with probability above 66%) to be in the range 1.5 to 4.5°C (IPCC, 
2013). However, this means that there is up to a 17% probability that climate sensitivity is 
greater than 4.5°C even with a normal distribution. Averaging more recent estimates of 14 
leading climate scientists puts that probability even higher, at 23% (Weitzman, 2012). 
Distributional assumptions around the fatness of the tails of the ECS matter greatly for this 
assessment – the probability of ECS being 6°C, though low in absolute terms, is twice as large 
                                                     
2 Refers to projections for RCP-8.5 scenario, IPCC (2014). 
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if the distribution function is lognormal rather than normal, and more than triple if the 
distribution is Pareto.3 Yet the actual distribution appears unknowable4 – the distributions in a 
number of published papers look quite different from one another and decidedly non-normal 
(see Figure 25-1). Some highly-reputed climate models give a chance of at least 15% that ECS 
is no less than 6°C (Heal, 2017). 
Figure 25-1 Estimated probability density functions for the ECS from a variety of 
published studies 
 
Source: Millner et al. (2013). Modified from Meinshausen et al. (2009). 
Taking the analysis from an uncertain ECS to estimates of GHG concentrations by end-of-
century and the resultant temperature increases, to the changes in the risk exposure profile 
for natural catastrophes, to economic and social impacts compounds the levels of scientific 
and modelling uncertainty. Uncertainty on the far-reaching implementation of climate-
mitigation and adaptation policies as well as on other macro-risk trends, such as social and 
economic development, will require the insurance industry to think in different qualitative and 
quantitative scenarios when attempting to assess the future impact of climate change. 
Uncertainty around the primary driver for change, namely increasing global average 
temperatures, will lead to even larger uncertainty on local effects of natural catastrophes. 
This uncertainty, however, should not lead to inaction: first, several changes to local risk factors 
are already observable today and need to be incorporated into risk assessment and modelling 
for an appropriate view of today’s risk landscape. Second, different projections are in sufficient 
agreement when limiting the time horizon to the next few decades. In the face of climate 
change, the focus for the re/insurance industry and for financial regulators should be on an 
accurate representation of today’s risk landscape and expected changes in the near future. 
3 Physical climate risks and their impact on the insurance industry 
The following sections will highlight how globally increasing temperatures and other macro-
risk trends change natural catastrophe risks. While the industry often focuses on key insurance 
                                                     
3 See Table 1, Ibid. 
4 See for example Pindyck (2011). 
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risks such as tropical cyclones, we show the importance of also recognizing climate-induced 
changes to secondary perils that have traditionally received less attention.  
Some effects of climate change and global warming are already evident and shaking up our 
risk landscape: warmer average temperatures, rising sea levels, melting ice caps, longer and 
more frequent heatwaves, erratic rainfall patterns and more weather extremes. There are 
increasing concerns on how societies and companies manage the short- and long-term risks 
posed by climate impacts. Risks associated with climate change include losses from both 
chronic (e.g. slow temperature increase and sea level rise) and acute physical risks (e.g. 
extreme weather events) and a repricing of financial assets in the transition to a low carbon 
economy (transition risks) (see Figure 2). While physical risks can cause actual damage to 
people, assets or the environment, transition risks primarily affect the value of assets or result 
in additional costs. The scope of this analysis focuses on modelling physical risks. A 
comprehensive risk assessment for insurance companies will require the integration of both. 
Figure 25-2 Classification of climate change risks 
 
Source: Swiss Re Institute 
The (re)insurance industry traditionally thinks about natural-catastrophe risks in two 
dimensions: frequency and severity. Climate change affects these two dimensions, but it also 
introduces two new complexities to the risk equation: time horizon and level of confidence. It 
is important to understand the time scale as this enables us to learn what changes have 
already happened and to make predictions about potential future changes. Slow but steady 
changes leave time for adaptation and measures to increase resilience. On the other hand, 
climatic changes of severe and rare events are difficult to observe because of their rare 
occurrence. Thus, many decades might be necessary to statistically prove changing trends, 
ultimately limiting (political) will to mitigate climate change and to invest in measures that 
increase resilience.  
Weather is an individual observation at a given point in space and time. Climate is the 
distribution of observations over an extended period and geography. With climate change, 
there can be a shift in the means, a change in variability or change in skew where extremes 
become more extreme and more frequent (see Figure 25-3).  
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Figure 25-3 Possible range of impact of climate change on climate variables (e.g. 
temperature) 
Source: IPCC (2013)  
 
Climate change, in combination with economic growth and rising urbanisation, is increasing 
the number of small-to-medium sized losses stemming from secondary perils and can impact 
the profitability of certain lines of business if not priced accurately. Absent a formal definition, 
industry practice has been to consider secondary perils as high-frequency, low-to-medium 
severity events as opposed to losses resulting from primary perils, which are low-frequency-
high-severity events such as earthquakes and hurricanes. Secondary perils can happen on an 
independent basis – this would include river floods, flash floods, hailstorms, tornadoes, snow 
and ice storms, drought and wildfire outbreaks. However, often the events appear as 
secondary effects of primary perils, such as the flooding of Houston after hurricane Harvey in 
2017. For the last two decades, secondary perils accounted for more than half of the insured 
losses globally. The single biggest natural catastrophe insurance loss-event of 2018 was Camp 
Fire in California (USD 12 billion), a “secondary” peril. There are areas of relatively high 
confidence in the impacts of climate change on natural hazards based on an alignment of 
empirical observations, quantitative models and unambiguous scientific theory. Many of these 
relate to the so-called secondary perils. Sea level rise, for example, caused by thermal 
expansion of water and the melting of glaciers and icecaps will directly increase the magnitude 
of storm surges and pose a material long-term risk for low-lying coastal regions. Increased 
temperature variability can lead to longer and/or more frequent heat waves, droughts, water 
scarcity and wildfires. Confidence for these trends is high and heat waves not only affect 
agriculture, productivity, water resources, health and mortality but also increase the risk of 
conflicts in certain regions. Increasingly hot and dry conditions also exacerbate wildfire risk, 
with severe consequences for exposure in the wildland-urban interface. Furthermore, 
increasing temperatures enable the atmosphere to hold more water vapor, leading (on 
average) to an increased risk of extreme rainfall and subsequent flooding. While this effect can 
occur in many regions, the effect is especially impactful for torrential rainfall associated with 
tropical cyclones. 
Currently, confidence in climate trends is considerably lower for atmospheric and 
oceanographic circulation changes, which affect natural phenomena like the frequency and 
intensity of severe tropical cyclones, European windstorms or tornado and hail storms. 
Confidence levels are partially lower due to the above-mentioned lower frequency of 
occurrence and because of the complex interplay of the climate system (IPCC, 2018). While 
warmer sea-surface temperatures will increase the probability of tropical cyclone formation 
and intensification, higher wind shear can be a counter-force. Uncertainty about the influence 
of climate change on jet streams, for example, will influence extratropical cyclones and impact 
the occurrence of anomalously stationary weather patterns (Coumou et al., 2018). These 
complex interactions introduce a “confidence barrier” (see Figure 4) that renders any 
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 
Increase in mean 
Extremes 
shift with 
mean 
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 
Increase in variability 
Extremes 
become 
more 
extreme 
and more 
frequent 
Mean remains 
the same 
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 
Becomes skewed 
Mean remains 
the same 
Extreme highs 
become more 
extreme and 
more frequent 
Extreme 
lows remain 
nearly the 
same 
Modelling Climate Change Risk for the Insurance Industry         
405 
insurance-related quantification of climate-change effects on certain high severity perils (such 
as hurricanes) as highly uncertain. Because of their material impact, insurers need to lower 
this barrier by increasing confidence through additional research or by quantifying modelling 
uncertainties if confidence remains low. 
Figure 25-4 Classification of climate change effects by drivers, perils and confidence 
levels. 
 
Source: Swiss Re Institute 
4 Confounding impacts of other exposure drivers: urbanisation, 
economic development and demographics  
As climate changes, so too are populations and economies around the world. Many loss trends 
observed today still largely originate from shifts in growing asset values and concentrations, 
as well as from changing patterns in land use. During the last six decades, the world population 
has grown by a factor of approximately 2.5 (United Nations Department of Economic Social 
Affairs, 2019), while world real gross domestic product (GDP) has grown by more than 
sevenfold. In the 1950s, approximately 30% of the global population lived in urban areas. That 
figure has increased to over 50% today. These trends are expected to continue, and by 2050 
almost 70% of the global population will live in urban centres (United Nations Department of 
Economic Social Affairs, 2018). Rapid urbanisation, especially in coastal cities, amplifies 
existing and future climate risks. B. Neumann et al. (2015) estimate that the number of people 
living in the low-elevation coastal zone, as well as the number of people exposed to storm 
surge events worldwide grow by about 1.3% annually or 0.8% faster than the overall 
population, especially in Asia and Africa. This implies that overall GDP growth for these 
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countries underestimates the pace of development exposed to flood risk. Sealing of surfaces 
in cities and building activities in flood-prone or coastal areas increase the risk of water-related 
damage. As green areas disappear, heat and air-pollution islands intensify and pose severe 
risks to human health. Climate change often amplifies the negative impacts of human activities 
that remove natural absorption or buffer zones.  
Furthermore, increasing development in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) raises the risk of 
damaging wildfire. For example, between 1990 and 2010, the number of houses in the 
wildland-urban interface grew 41% in the West of the US (Radeloff et al., 2018). Having more 
structures in the WUI increases not only the damage wildfires inflict (because they are harder 
to fight) but also the risk that they will break out in the first place. Population growth and 
development are also a contributing factor for exposures to tornado risk. Population in the 
more at-risk regions in the US grew by an annual average rate of 3.0% between 1950 and 2010 
compared to 1.8% for the country overall (Ashley & Strader, 2016). 
Beyond these demographic and urbanization factors, there are other economic drivers of 
exposure growth. Value of assets grow faster than GDP. For example, the value of tangible 
commercial assets and residential buildings in the US grew by 5% to 6% per year between 1980 
and 2003 compared to a nominal GDP growth of 4.7%5. Average US construction costs for new 
residential homes grew by an average real 1.1% per year between 1998 and 2017 because of 
higher standards of building due to insulation, air conditioning, plumbing etc. (Ford, 2017). 
The inclusion of socioeconomic factors in forward-looking climate change models for natural 
hazard losses show similar patterns. Several studies that use projected increases in the value 
of exposed assets project the contribution from socio-economic growth to be about equal or 
larger than the contribution from climate change (Bouwer, 2013; Pielke Jr, 2007; Schmidt et 
al., 2009). Studies that only use population growth estimates or similar quantities such as land-
use change project the signal from climate change to be somewhat larger than the signal from 
exposure change (Dorland et al., 1999). 
Example of modeling historic events with current exposure data 
To illustrate the impact of socio-economic contributions to exposure growth, we modeled the 
thought experiment what would happen if Hurricane Andrew were to hit South Florida in 2017, 
taking an identical track and at the same intensity. Swiss Re Institute ran Andrew’s 1992 
footprint on a market portfolio for the state of Florida, in Swiss Re’s proprietary tropical 
cyclone model. The tropical cyclone model contains every historical event in the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s HURDAT database along with probabilistic tropical 
cyclones for each historical tropical cyclone, resulting in more than 220,000 realizations of 
possible Atlantic tropical cyclones. The market portfolio is a representation of all insured 
property values (residential, commercial and automotive), along with coverage terms. 
Compared to an original insured loss of USD 27 bn in 2017 dollars, the 2017 insured losses 
would have increased to between 80bn to USD 100bn, assuming a similar coverage percentage 
(take-up rate, deductibles etc.) by the insurance industry, due to a combination of increased 
development and asset values. Adjusted for inflation, this translates into 4 to 5% annual 
growth in exposures (Linkin & Schwartz, 2017). 
                                                     
5 Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, April 2005. 
Modelling Climate Change Risk for the Insurance Industry         
407 
5 Impact of climate change on specific perils 
 Wildfires  
In the case of wildfires, warming and drying are the primary causes. Pre-historical evidence 
stored in tree rings and charcoal buried in lakes tell us that for thousands of years, periods of 
warming have coincided with periods of increased wildfire activity (Parisien et al., 2020). While 
fire is very complex and affected by much more than just climate, the data from recent decades 
indicate that the hot years are the years with the most wildfire, and as temperatures have 
increased, burned areas have increased in step.  
Some risk solutions providers such as AIR, CoreLogic, RMS, and RiskFrontier have started to 
develop full-scale probabilistic wildfire models for regions with comparatively high exposure, 
such as California, Australia, and Canada (Swiss Re Institute, 2017). These probabilistic models 
aim to provide assessment scores for wildfire risks that are based on a variety of 
region/location specific characteristics. Some of the factors that are considered include natural 
and man-made sources of ignition, long- and short-term weather and climatological conditions 
at the location of ignition that could impact how a fire spreads, prior suppression efforts in the 
area that could have an influence on the amount of existing fuel loads, as well as current 
suppression access and capabilities.  
In comparison to other modelled natural catastrophe risks, wildfire is a complex paradigm with 
many elements (Johnston, 2018). There is only a limited amount of historical data from which 
vulnerability curves can be developed to link hazard with actual damage to properties. 
Meanwhile, the number of inputs a probabilistic wildfire model needs to consider is enormous 
(Parisien et al., 2020). In addition, physical characteristics of the surrounding interface 
locations are critical – such as construction and roof type, clearance distance, surrounding 
vegetation, and more – as lofted embers often create exposure in secondary locations. 
Meanwhile, the built environment and mitigation work in the interface area is rapidly changing. 
A key factor is a change in underlying exposures, marked by growth in populations and 
properties in the WUI. With rising urbanization of wildland as well as increasing industrial 
activity across the boreal forest areas, a full mapping of the Canadian WUI was only completed 
recently (Johnston & Flannigan, 2018).  
 Drought  
The IPCC expects higher temperatures to likely lead to greater magnitudes of agricultural 
droughts in continental area of US (IPCC, 2018), in accordance to what is projected by EEA 
(European Environment Agency) regarding the frequency of meteorological and hydrological 
droughts in most of Europe over the 21st century (European Environment Agency, 2020). 
Recent reports from IPCC state with high confidence that heatwaves will increase in intensity 
and duration into the 21st century in most regions around the globe (IPCC, 2018, 2019). 
Technological advancements through different innovations are expected to be able to partly 
offset the potential increased severity of climate events in the medium time horizon (Aggarwal 
et al., 2019). These include advances in precision farming, land monitoring, irrigation efficiency, 
as well as adoption of new farm practices to mitigate and adapt to climate changes (resistant 
varieties of crops, diversification, changes in cropping patterns, etc.). This impact is expected 
to vary among regions also based on socio-economic conditions and policy support.  
 Inland flooding 
Inland flood risk, including river flood and pluvial flood risk (flooding caused by extreme 
rainfall), is expected to experience substantial changes in many regions, due to changing 
extreme precipitation patterns. As the atmosphere warms, it can hold more water vapour. In 
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addition to this effect, changes in dynamical processes (e.g. hurricanes, extratropical cyclones) 
affect extreme precipitation. Large increases in flood risk associated with hurricane rainfall are 
projected, due to a slowdown of the speed hurricanes move along their track (Kossin, 2018), 
as well as increasing rainfall rates (Liu et al., 2019). 
Observations of precipitation in the United States generally suggest an increase of heavy 
precipitation, particularly in the eastern and central parts of the country, both in terms of 
intensity and frequency (Donat et al., 2013). However, these trends vary regionally, with 
decreases in parts of the southern United States (Hoerling et al., 2016). Changes in 
precipitation may not be translated into similar changes in flooding, due to complex 
interactions between climate, catchments, rivers, and water management practices. Indeed, 
there are few sites with significant observed changes in moderate or major floods (Slater & 
Villarini, 2016). However, whilst much of the United States has shown little or no change, flood 
magnitudes have decreased in the Southwest, and increased in parts of the Midwest, and from 
the northern Appalachian Mountains to New England (Peterson et al., 2013). The trends are 
not unequivocally due to climate change, with land management practices and long-term 
cycles also potential contributors to the observed patterns (Shapley et al., 2005; Villarini et al., 
2011; Y.-K. Zhang & Schilling, 2006). 
Projections, however, show a clear impact of climate change on flood risk in the US. An 
increase in flood frequency is projected, with the annual number of 100-year flood events 
expected to increase by 50% by 2100 under RCP 4.5, and by 150% under RCP 8.5 (Wobus et 
al., 2017). Regionally, the largest fractional changes in flood frequency are expected to occur 
in the southern Appalachians and Ohio River valley, the northern and central Rocky Mountains, 
and the Northwest, with historical 1% AEP events becoming 2-5 times more frequent by 2100 
in these regions. In terms of magnitude, there is a lack of a spatially coherent trend for the US 
(Arnell & Gosling, 2016). However, regionally, increases are expected in the central US (Naz et 
al., 2016) and Pacific Northwest (Salathé Jr et al., 2014).  
Climate change impacts on flood risk may be further exacerbated by other trends, including 
urbanization. Rapid urbanisation reduces avenues for water discharge and can lead to heavy 
flooding, as highlighted by attribution studies for Hurricane Harvey flooding (Van Oldenborgh 
et al., 2017; W. Zhang et al., 2018) Another example is Mumbai (2005), when flooding after 
heavy rains resulted in one of the largest insurance loss events ever experienced in India (USD 
0.9 billion, according to sigma data). 
 Coastal flooding  
Climate change also impacts coastal flood risk, principally via two mechanisms: global 
warming-induced sea-level rise and changes to the activity of storms associated with surge 
(e.g. hurricane frequency and intensity changes). It is recognized that substantial but gradual 
changes in the probability of extreme storm surge events may take a long time to detect in 
observational records (Ceres et al., 2017). However, observations of coastal flooding have 
already noted an increase in risk during the past century along the US East Coast (Grinsted et 
al., 2012). Increased coastal flood risk may also compound river flood risk, with evidence of a 
significant increase in the number of compound flood events over the past century at many of 
the major coastal cities of the United States (Wahl et al., 2015). One such city is New York, 
which has experienced an increase in coastal flooding during the past century, with a large 
contribution from rising sea levels (Talke et al., 2014), but also from an increase in the number 
of storm surge weather patterns that are associated with high precipitation (Wahl et al., 2015). 
Projections show substantial increases in coastal flood risk for the US, with the greatest storm 
surge increases on the East and Gulf coasts (J. E. Neumann et al., 2015). For the US Florida and 
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Gulf coasts, research suggests a median increase in storm surge risk of 25-47% comparing the 
last two decades of the 20th and 21st centuries under the RCP 4.5 scenario (Balaguru et al., 
2016). Under RCP 8.5, the historical 100-year flood level is projected to occur every 1-30 years 
along the southeast Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the US, and annually in the New England and 
mid-Atlantic regions by the end of the century (Marsooli et al., 2019). The relative contribution 
of TC climatology changes to coastal flood hazard varies along the coast, with the largest 
contributions in the Gulf of Mexico, where the effect of TC climatology is larger than that of 
sea-level rise for more than 40% of coastal counties. Yet regional differences in changes in 
coastal flood risk may vary depending on which return period is examined (Buchanan et al., 
2017). For example, considering a 50 cm sea-level rise, the increased frequency of historically 
1-in-10-year floods is lower in Seattle, WA than Charleston, SC, whereas for 1-in-500 year 
floods the pattern is reversed. While sea-level rise this century is expected to be lower than 
that (Bamber et al., 2019), it will nevertheless severely alter coastal flood risk (Marsooli et al., 
2019). 
6 Modelling challenges 
 Cat models and increased parameter uncertainty 
The insurance industry uses catastrophe models to assess the risks from extreme weather 
events. These models are designed to solve the analytical problem that most disaster losses 
come from a few large events. The most extreme events are rare and therefore only 
represented with few actual observations in the historic data. Cat models generate large 
numbers of synthetic events that are designed to be realistic and fill gaps in the loss history. 
These synthetic hazard events get combined with data on the physical characteristics of assets 
(such as buildings and infrastructure) to provide information about vulnerabilities to the 
modeled hazards. As a final step, modeled vulnerabilities get combined with data about 
insurance coverage to provide information about individual insurers’ or the industry’s financial 
exposures (see Figure 25-5). Catastrophe models vary in many aspects and can result in 
different probability distributions for the same insurers’ portfolios (Weinkle & Pielke Jr, 2017). 
Figure 25-5 Layers of a typical catastrophe model 
 
Source: Swiss Re Institute 
 
Such catastrophe models have served the insurance industry well until now for underwriting 
and risk-management purposes. Standard short-tail property insurance typically gets renewed 
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on an annual basis and thus allows for continuous adjustments to underlying slow trends in 
hazard, vulnerability, exposure and insurance policies. However, these models have limitations 
when trying to assess the future medium- and long-term impact of changing climatic and 
socio-economic conditions.  
 Historical bias and uncertain socio-economic and exposure trends 
Catastrophe models have been developed based on historical hazard, vulnerability and 
insurance-loss data sets and embedded theories and interpretations, which implicitly assume 
that the present and near future will be comparable to the past. One important modelling and 
underwriting risk in the context of climate change, and all other macro-risk trends, is a 
potential underestimation of risk premiums by relying on historical loss data or incomplete / 
outdated models to assess the current risk. Especially for low-frequency perils, this can lead 
to risk assessments that lag decades behind the current risk landscape. This is illustrated 
conceptually in Figure 25-6: if a risk assessment is based on a long-term historical average of 
e.g. a physical hazard, a historical bias can create a gap between actual risk and modelled risk. 
Figure 25-6 Illustration of historical bias 
  
Source: Swiss Re Institute 
 
Model builders have developed techniques to debias and correct the models for (multi-) 
decadal variability of the underlying natural hazard, for changing building codes and protection 
measures that affect the vulnerability and to adjust for a growing insurance exposure with the 
goal to best assess the current risk landscape. However, the models are, per se, not designed 
to analyse the sensitivity of financial losses in a future and potentially rapidly changing climate, 
while also incorporating future socio-economic trends as well as climate-mitigation and 
adaptation measures that eventually affect the ultimate impact on the re/insurance industry 
(see Figure 25-7). Therefore, all layers of a natural-catastrophe re/insurance model potentially 
need to be analysed and likely changed for an adequate representation of insurance risk in a 
future climate, leading to a vast number of model parameters that are often highly uncertain 
for medium- to long-term projections. While a gradual debiasing of models remains possible 
to assess today’s property-insurance risk, even in a changing climate, the models are, by design, 
often not adequate to efficiently study the sensitivity of many highly uncertain and time-
dependent parameters. 
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Figure 25-7 Influence of macro trends on model components for weather-related 
risks 
 
  Source: Swiss Re Institute 
 
Currently, many efforts focus on incorporating potential future hazard trends for long-term 
scenarios (e.g. 2050 and beyond) for key natural-catastrophe risks (such as North-Atlantic 
Hurricanes) while keeping other model components constant (such as the underlying portfolio 
and vulnerabilities). While such exercises can be interesting, they provide little decision-useful 
information because today’s insurance exposure is inserted into a possible future climate state 
without considering the complex interaction of insurance with other (socio-economic) macro 
trends, ultimately leading to an unrealistic future representation of the insurance environment.    
An additional challenge for the re/insurance industry is that the most influential and widely 
used models are proprietary, meaning the details of their construction and output are not 
subject to open scientific debate and peer review. Finally, they are designed to be used in 
places and for assets where the insurance industry has significant exposure but tend to be less 
accurate or non-existent for countries where current risks are low and/or insurance cover is 
low (Sobel, 2019).  
 Lack of robust models for secondary perils 
Fully-probabilistic insurance models are currently well established for key perils such as 
tropical cyclone risks while secondary perils that are most affected by climate change in the 
near- and mid-term have received less attention from the modelling community. By only 
focusing on peak perils, there is therefore a considerable risk of significantly underestimating 
the overall impact of climate change by neglecting perils such as local flooding, wildfire or 
droughts. With a few exceptions (e.g. flood risk models in US), the discipline of secondary peril 
risk modelling has not been afforded the same priority as the primary peak loss-generating 
perils such as hurricanes in the North Atlantic. Also, secondary perils modelling is more 
complex. 
• The areas vulnerable to primary perils are generally well-defined (e.g. near seismic 
fault lines (earthquakes) and coastal areas (tropical cyclones)). Many secondary perils, 
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on the other hand, can happen anywhere (e.g. heavy precipitation in large urban 
centres far inland or away from river plains). Swiss Re for example developed global 
flood maps based on LiDAR data for a consistent elevation data set on a 30-meter 
resolution. For certain markets in North America, Europe and Asia Pacific, this is 
complemented with modelled events for a full probabilistic model. 
• While primary perils typically affect large areas in a relatively homogeneous way, many 
secondary perils are highly localized (e.g. hailstorms or tornados) and driven by 
complex thermodynamics. A large amount of data and computational power is 
required to model these perils. Data history is short and biased towards human 
observation. Today’s weather models still cannot reliably simulate severe convective 
storms that produce tornadoes. Thus, it is difficult for researchers to evaluate the 
impact of climate change based on current computer models because the 
counterfactual scenarios, by definition, did not actually happen (Ornes, 2018). 
• Some secondary perils are strongly influenced by unpredictable human intervention. 
The scale of wildfires for example, are impacted by human prevention, ignition (e.g. 
the mechanical failure of a vehicle that set off the Carr Fire in California in 2018), 
containment and suppression activities. Pluvial flood risks are more dependent on 
urbanization, man-made surface modifications and soil conditions than for example 
storm surge risks. 
With more than 50% of insured losses over the last decade coming from secondary perils, this 
is an obvious challenge for the insurance industry. Unlike primary perils, the regional footprint 
of secondary perils is more ubiquitous and therefore of growing relevance for many smaller 
regional and super-regional insurers outside of the traditional peak cat scenarios which did 
not need to worry too much about modelling cat risk exposures in the past. Currently, this is 
more a profitability topic, however, with the possibility of accelerating climate-driven claims 
trends, secondary perils can morph into a financial-stability risk for insurance companies and 
therefore for regulators and rating agencies.  
 Scenario analysis as the way forward 
Complexity and uncertainty should not stop the re/insurance industry from evaluating the 
impact of climate change on both today’s insurance risks and the expected future risk 
landscape. Improving our understanding and modelling capabilities on the impact of climate 
change help to a) ensure today’s risk premiums and capital requirements reflect the current 
risk landscape, b) create transparency and ultimately improve stability of financial markets by 
publicly disclosing climate-related risks to investors, and c) create a framework for decision 
makers to steer a company’s exposure to climate risks. If companies, or the industry overall, 
fail to provide meaningful answers, ambiguity will be the result. Ambiguity (also referred to as 
parameter risk) about risk distributions increases capital cost and challenges the insurability 
of perils. Cabantous et al. (2011) show that insurers charge higher premiums when faced with 
ambiguity than when the probability of a loss is well specified (risk). Furthermore, they tend 
to charge more for conflict ambiguity (different models produce diverging probability 
distributions) than imprecise ambiguity (a model produces a loss distribution with low 
confidence) for flood and hurricane hazards. 
Normally, not all model parameters can be investigated with the same level of depth. However, 
meaningful scenario analyses that can be both qualitative and quantitative can help to address 
above-mentioned key purposes. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) Task Force for Climate-
related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), which is a widely supported and accepted industry body, 
has developed recommendations on how to best analyse and disclose climate-related risks. 
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For scenario analysis, TCFD has published an extensive report (TCFD, 2017). These 
recommendations should be used as a baseline for the industry. Individual regulatory 
jurisdictions have also developed and published frameworks for the financial industry to 
address physical and transition risk originating from climate change. For physical risks, see for 
instance Bank of England (2019). 
It should also be mentioned that the insurance industry can and should play an important role 
in communicating risks to clients and governments in areas that are exposed to climate-related 
risks. Climate-scenario analysis is one of the tools that can be used for such purposes. For 
example, Swiss Re has performed an analysis for New York City to not only better understand 
the risk drivers related to a change in frequency and intensity of hurricanes and resulting storm 
surges but also to assess the economics of climate-adaptation measures (ECA, 2009). For 
example, Figure 25-8 shows that expected annual losses from sea-level rise and an increase in 
frequency and intensity of hurricanes could more than double by 2050. The cost/benefit ratios 
of different resiliency measures are shown on the right, providing an economic framework for 
decision makers. This case study also highlights again that climate-risk scenarios should not 
only focus on changes in hazard but should also incorporate potential risk adaptation 
measures. Extensive coastal flood protection measures are currently under consideration or 
development to protect many urban areas around the globe. 
Figure 25-8 Case study on changing hurricane risk in 2050 for New York City to 
analyse drivers of loss (left) and Cost/Benefit ratios of adaptation measures (right) 
  
Source: Swiss Re Institute 
 
 Limited scope of modelling for long-term time horizon 
Besides above-discussed scenario-analysis frameworks, (re)insurance firms apply a forward-
looking approach through active monitoring/research, e.g. by using emerging risk and Own 
Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) processes. The ORSA time-horizon is typically shorter 
than the timespan over which climate risks will evolve. However, firms could also assess their 
longer-term strategy as part of their ORSA, i.e., the impact of climate change for certain 
(re)insurance products. Emerging risk tools support the review of early signals. Emerging risks 
are defined as newly developing or changing risks that are difficult to quantify and could have 
a major impact on society and industry. It involves external and internal sources, e.g. databases 
and literature, and subject matter experts from different business areas. Figure 25-9 illustrates 
the complex interactions of climate change that are in scope of Swiss Re’s “SONAR” early 
warning tool, an internal crowdsourcing platform that collects input and feedback from 
underwriters, client managers, risk experts and others across the company (Swiss Re Institute, 
2019). The graph lists the natural catastrophe perils that are subject to explicit modelling 
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efforts – at various stages – as described above. The graph also shows other areas that have 
not yet been afforded the same degree of investigation such as the impact of climate change 
on human life and health.  Furthermore, there are knock-on effects on migration, urbanisation, 
food security, water scarcity, etc. These areas are observed in a more qualitative manner which 
can morph into quantitative modelling as scientific evidence and data become available. 
Figure 25-9 Climate change in the framework of Swiss Re’s emerging risk tool 
“SONAR” 
 
Source: Swiss Re Institute 
 
 Feedback loops and tipping points 
From a broader risk management perspective, traditional approaches generally extrapolate 
from historical data and assume a normal distribution for shocks. As noted above, however, 
historical data can create a downward bias and most of the climate-related risks appear to 
have fat tails, necessitating an "epistemological break" with regard to risk management (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2020). Forward-looking scenario-based analysis has started to 
develop to fill a part of this void. Nevertheless, several further modelling limitations remain to 
be addressed, including that of the timing and impact of feedback loops and tipping points.  
A major long-term risk of unmitigated climate change is posed by irreversible tipping points. 
The Earth’s climate system comprises many dynamic oceanic and atmospheric processes, 
which are strongly interlinked and thus not necessarily self-stabilising. This means that even 
relatively small perturbations can “tip” the climate into a new state or initiate positive 
feedback loops, which can significantly alter the climate for centuries to come. An example of 
a positive feedback loop is the thawing of permafrost in arctic regions, releasing immense 
quantities of carbon dioxide and methane currently stored in the frozen soil (Schuur et al., 
2015)..The release of these greenhouse gases will cause even more warming and more 
permafrost thawing. Another feedback loop is around temperature changes and ice sheet 
disintegration. However, the parameter values that determine the strength (and even the sign) 
of those feedback loops are largely unknown or possibly unknowable (Pindyck, 2013). Such 
feedback loops are often projected to act only over the very long term (centuries and millennia) 
and therefore omitted from most general circulation models (Weitzman, 2011). For example, 
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none of the IPCC’s climate models though the Fifth Assessment Report include the warming 
tundra feedback loop (Romm, 2018). Yet more recent analysis shows that some of the 
feedbacks are not as slow as previously believed (Dixon, 2019). For instance, a recent paper 
for the feedback loops from temperature to sea level rise suggests that due to non-linear ice 
sheet dynamics, it only takes decades rather than centuries or millennia for the lag between 
the two (Hansen et al., 2015). Thus, current analysis potentially significantly underestimates 
future warming. This would have follow-on implications to the risk and exposure profile on 
which catastrophe modelling depends, and the uncertainty about the changes to the risk 
landscape adds another layer of challenges to the modelling. 
7 Summary and conclusions 
The effects of climate change are already evident: warmer average temperatures, rising sea 
levels, melting ice caps, longer and more frequent heatwaves, erratic rainfall patterns and 
more weather extremes. The effects contribute most notably to growing losses from 
secondary perils. Most of the past increase in economic and insured losses from natural 
hazards has come from greater exposure to hazards rather than increases in their mean and 
tail intensity. Yet quantifying the relative contributions of socio-economic vs climate related 
divers is challenging given the data limitations and short time periods with consistent exposure 
data. In the future, hazard intensification will likely assume a greater role.  
Modelling the insurance impact from climate change is complicated by the uncertainties 
surrounding the estimated magnitude of the underlying biophysical processes, and further 
confounded by the several steps in the causal chain from emissions to temperature to global 
and regional climate variations to materialization of extreme weather events to the physical 
damages from catastrophes to insurance claims. Hence, the processes of how a changing 
climate impacts the frequency and severity of natural catastrophes are not fully understood.  
There is a higher confidence about the impacts on secondary perils. However, many secondary 
perils are more difficult to model and have received less attention by the modelling community 
in the past, enhancing the current uncertainties in modelling the impact of climate change. 
Today, the effects of climate change on property risks are still manageable for re/insurers. The 
short-term nature of most property re/insurance business allows for continuous adjustments 
of risk view and risk to reflect observed climate, exposure and vulnerability changes. However, 
it is increasingly important to regularly reassess the inherent trends in input variables and 
model assumptions for current underwriting models.  
Insurers need to keep abreast of the latest scientific findings and incorporate them into their 
natural-catastrophe models, in order to remain sustainable in the era of climate change. 
Substantial effort is needed to translate scientific results into valuable and workable risk-
assessment know-how and tools. More sophisticated modelling approaches are needed to 
account for (the growing loss impacts of) secondary perils that have been inadequately 
modelled in the past. 
Climate change is a systemic risk. Important questions for the insurance industry relate to the 
possibility of increasing tail risks and/or more correlations of risk factors. If left unmitigated, it 
will have severe consequences for the global risk landscape. Complexity and uncertainty 
should not stop the re/insurance industry from evaluating the impact of climate change on 
both today’s insurance risks and the expected future risk landscape. Scenario analysis provides 
one way forward. Qualitative emerging risks tools further support the review of early signals. 
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Transitioning to a more sustainable economy will bring transition risks, with significant 
relevance for insurers investment portfolios, but also provide opportunities for the insurance 
industry both on the asset and liability side of the balance sheet. A rapid transition will 
moreover allow for the reduction of the worst tail risks on the physical risks side.   
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 MSCI Tools for ESG Risk Management  
 
By 
MSCI ESG Research LLC1,2 
Abstract 
This chapter introduces three tools developed by MSCI to support ESG integration: ESG Ratings, 
ESG Indexes, and ESG Analytics3. ESG Ratings aims to help investors to identify and quantify 
the ESG risks and opportunities. ESG Indexes provide institutional investors with indexes that 
can be used manage and report on ESG mandates or as benchmarks to measure ESG 
investment performance. ESG Analytics can help investors integrate ESG Ratings and Indexes 
into their security selection and portfolio construction processes, stress testing, and risk and 
performance attribution analysis. We also discussed several transmission channels linking 
companies’ ESG performance with their financial performance.  
Keywords: ESG ratings, ESG indexes, ESG and financial returns  
1 Introduction  
In recent years, institutional investor adoption of environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
investing and the subsequent growth in ESG assets under management has accelerated. While 
many factors have contributed to this growth, we focus here on three primary drivers of 
increased ESG investment: sustainability challenges, shifts in investor preferences, and 
improvement in data and analytics.  
The world itself is changing: As companies face rising complexity on a global scale, modern 
investors are reevaluating traditional investment approaches global sustainability challenges 
such as flood risk and sea level rise, privacy and data security, demographic shifts, and 
regulatory pressures, are introducing new risk factors for investors that may not have been 
previously seen.  
Investor preferences are changing: A growing body of studies suggest that millennials - as well 
as women - are asking more of their investments. Over the next two to three decades, the 
millennial generation could shift between $15 trillion and $20 trillion into U.S.-domiciled ESG 
investments, roughly doubling the size of the U.S. equity market (Bank of America Corporation, 
2018). 
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Emma Wu, MSCI ESG Research LLC, email: Zhe.Wu@msci.com; and Xiaoshu Wang, MSCI ESG 
Research LLC, email: Xiaoshu.Wang@msci.com, based on publications by MSCI on ESG methodologies and related 
research topics.  
2 Certain information © 2020 and reproduced by permission of MSCI ESG Research LLC; all rights reserved. The ESG data 
contained herein is the property of MSCI ESG Research LLC, its affiliates and/or information providers (“MSCI ESG”). MSCI 
ESG makes no warranties with respect to any such ESG data. The ESG data contained herein is used under license and may 
not be further used, distributed or disseminated without the express written consent of MSCI ESG. 
3 MSCI ESG Ratings are produced by MSCI ESG Research LLC.  MSCI ESG Indexes and Analytics utilize information from, 
but are not provided by, MSCI ESG Research LLC.  MSCI Indexes and Analytics are products of MSCI Inc. MSCI Indexes are 
administered by MSCI Limited (UK). 
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Investment data and analytics are evolving: Better data and analytics have paved the way for 
numerous studies that explore ESG investing. Better data from companies, combined with 
better ESG research and analytics capabilities, have resulted in more systematic, quantitative, 
objective and financially relevant approaches to ESG key issues.  
Since its founding in 2006, the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investing (PRI) has 
attracted support from more than 1,800 signatories, representing over USD $68 trillion in 
assets under management as of April 2017. Signatories commit to six voluntary principles, the 
first of which is the incorporation of ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making. 
More than $270 billion in assets have been allocated to investments tracking / benchmarked 
to MSCI ESG equity & fixed income indexes since 2014.4  
2 MSCI Tools for ESG analysis and integration 
In this section, we introduce three sets of MSCI tools for ESG analysis: ESG ratings, indexes, 
and analytics. ESG ratings aims to help investors to identify and quantify the ESG risks and 
opportunities. MSCI’s ESG Indexes provide institutional investors with indexes that can be used 
manage and report on ESG mandates or as benchmarks to measure ESG investment 
performance. ESG analytics can help investors integrate ESG ratings and indexes into their 
security selection and portfolio construction processes, stress testing, and risk and 
performance attribution analysis. 
 MSCI ESG Ratings 
MSCI ESG Ratings help investors identify ESG risks and opportunities within their portfolio. We 
research and rate companies on a ‘CCC’ (worst) to ‘AAA’ (best) scale according to their 
exposure to industry specific ESG risks and their ability to manage those risks relative to peers 
(Figure 26-1). Currently, MSCI ESG Ratings cover approximately 7,500 companies (13,500 total 
issuers, including subsidiaries) and more than 650,000 equity and fixed income securities 
globally.  
Figure 26-1  MSCI ESG Rating scale 
 
 
Issues addressed by ESG ratings   
The overall objective of MSCI ESG Ratings is to assess how well, relative to industry peers, a 
given company manages most relevant environmental, social and governance risks and 
                                                     
4 Based on publicly available information or press releases published by MSCI from 2014 to date. 
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opportunities to ensure sustainable business growth. The MSCI ESG Rating model does so by 
addressing four key questions: 
• What are the most significant ESG risks and opportunities facing a company and its 
industry? 
• How exposed is the company to those key risks and/or opportunities?  
• How well is the company managing key risks and opportunities?  
• Based on its level of exposure and management of relevant risks and opportunities, 
how does the company compare to its global industry peers?  
Environmental, social, and governance risks and opportunities are posed by large scale trends 
(e.g. climate change, resource scarcity, demographic shifts) as well as by the nature of the 
company’s operations. Companies in the same industry generally face the same major risks 
and opportunities, though individual exposure can vary.  
A risk is considered financially relevant to an industry when it is likely that companies in a given 
industry will incur substantial costs in connection with it (for example: regulatory ban on a key 
chemical input requiring reformulation). An industry could see growth opportunity when it is 
likely that companies in a given industry could capitalize on social or environmental trends (for 
example: opportunities in clean technology for the LED lighting industry). The MSCI ESG 
Ratings model focuses only on issues that are determined to be most relevant for each industry.  
We identify relevant risks and opportunities for each industry through a quantitative model 
that looks at ranges and average values for each industry for externalized impacts such as 
carbon intensity, water intensity, and injury rates. Companies with unusual business models 
for their industry may face fewer or additional key risks and opportunities. Company-specific 
exceptions are allowed for companies with diversified business models, facing controversies, 
or based on industry rules. Once identified, these key Issues are assigned to each industry and 
company. Three examples of these key issues are provided below. 
 
Carbon Emissions: this issue evaluates the extent to which companies may face increased 
costs linked to carbon pricing or regulatory caps. Scores are based on exposure to GHG-
intensive businesses and emerging regulations; carbon reduction targets and mitigation 
programs; and carbon intensity over time and vs. peers. 
Labor Management: this issue evaluates the extent to which companies may face workflow 
disruptions due to labor unrest or reduced productivity due to poor job satisfaction. Scores 
are based on exposure to regions facing labor unrest, size of workforce, and corporate 
restructuring/layoffs; workforce policies, benefits, training, and employee engagement; 
and labor-related controversies. 
Corporate Governance – Board: this issue is scored primarily on the basis of the board’s 
independence from management, and on various measures of board experience and 
effectiveness. Metrics included in this component evaluate basic board structures such as 
overall board independence; individual director qualifications and experience, including 
industry and financial expertise, cases of executive misconduct, as well as areas of concern 
such as attendance and overboarding; and negative governance-related events. 
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Setting Key Issue weights 
Once the key issues have been selected, we set the weights that determine each key issue’s 
contribution to the overall rating. Each key issue typically comprises 5-30% of the total ESG 
Rating. The weightings take into account both the contribution of the industry, relative to all 
other industries, to the negative or positive impact on the environment or society; and the 
timeline within which we expect that risk or opportunity for companies in the industry to 
materialize. 
Key Issue assessment 
Our ESG ratings assess both ESG related risks and opportunities. To understand whether a 
company is adequately managing a key ESG risk, it is essential to understand both the 
management strategies it has employed and how exposed it is to the risk. The MSCI ESG 
Ratings model measures both of these: risk exposure and risk management. To score well on 
a key issue, management needs to be commensurate with the level of exposure: a company 
with high exposure must also have very strong management, whereas a company with limited 
exposure can have a more modest approach. Conversely, a highly exposed company with poor 
management will score worse than a company with the same management practices but lower 
exposure to the risk.  
Assessment of opportunities works similarly to risks, but the model for combining exposure 
and management differs. Exposure indicates the relevance of the opportunity to a given 
company based on its current business and geographic segments. Management indicates the 
company’s capacity to take advantage of the opportunity. Where exposure is limited, the key 
issue score is constrained toward the middle of the 0-10 range, while high exposure allows for 
both higher and lower scores. 
Constructing the rating 
The ESG Ratings model is industry relative and uses a weighted average approach. Key Issue 
weights are set at the GICS®5 Sub-Industry level (8-digit) based on each industry’s relative 
external impact and the time horizon associated with each risk. Key Issues and weights 
undergo a formal review and feedback process at the end of each calendar year. 
Corporate governance is equally relevant for all industries and therefore always weighted and 
analyzed for all companies. Where there are company-specific exceptions, weights depart 
from the industry standard weights but remain in proportion. For each company a Weighted 
Average Key Issue Score is calculated based on the underlying Key Issue scores and weights. 
To arrive at a final letter rating, the Weighted Average Key Issue Score is normalized by industry. 
The range of scores for each industry is established annually by taking a rolling three-year 
average of the top and bottom scores among the MSCI ACWI Index constituents; the values 
are set at the 97.5th and 2.5th percentile. Using these ranges, the Weighted Average Key Issue 
Score is converted to an Industry Adjusted Score from 0-10, where zero is worst and 10 is best. 
The Industry Adjusted Score corresponds to a rating between worst (CCC) and best (AAA). 
These assessments of company performance are not absolute but are explicitly intended to be 
relative to the standards and performance of a company’s industry peers.  
Data sources  
To assess companies’ exposure to and management of ESG risks and opportunities, we collect 
data from the following sources:  
                                                     
5 GICS, the global industry classification standard jointly developed by MSCI Inc. and S&P Global. 
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• Macro data at segment or geographic level from academic, government, NGO 
datasets (e.g. Transparency International, US EPA, World Bank)  
• Company disclosure (10-K, sustainability report, proxy report, AGM results, etc.) 
• Government databases, 1600+ media, NGO, other stakeholder sources regarding 
specific companies  
Issuer communications 
Companies are invited to participate in a formal data verification process prior to publication 
of their ESG Rating report. At that time, companies have the opportunity to review and 
comment on the facts contained in their existing MSCI ESG Rating report, as well as to provide 
MSCI ESG Research any additional ESG information if they wish. This process is also in 
accordance with the objective of frequently updating company reports with the latest 
available information as provided by companies. Issuers may request to see their reports 
and/or to provide updates or corrections at any time.  
Monitoring and updates  
Companies are monitored on a systematic and ongoing basis, including daily monitoring of 
controversies and governance events. New information is reflected in reports on a weekly 
basis and significant score changes trigger analyst review and re-rating. Companies receive an 
in-depth review at least annually.  
Quality review  
Formal in-depth quality review processes take place at each stage of analysis, including 
automated and quality checks of data and rating publication; industry and market lead 
oversight of ratings and reports; Methodology Committee approval of any exceptions, 
truncations, or major (two or more ratings level) rating changes; and an ESG Methodology 
Committee to review contentious cases.  
Annual consultation  
In November of each year, MSCI ESG Research reviews the Key Issues assigned to each industry 
as well as their weights. This process also identifies emerging issues and those that have 
become less significant. As part of this process, MSCI ESG Research consults with clients about 
proposed changes to Key Issue selections for each industry as well as any proposed new Key 
Issues. 
 MSCI ESG Indexes 
MSCI ESG Indexes are designed to support common approaches to ESG investing, and help 
institutional investors more effectively benchmark to ESG investment performance as well as 
manage, measure and report on ESG mandates. MSCI ESG Indexes also provide institutional 
investors with transparency into ESG sustainability and values alignment, together with the 
ability to compare holdings. 
The ESG integration indexes aim to maintain the key characteristics of the parent free float 
market capitalization indexes, either through an explicit tracking error constraint or by 
targeting sector weights that reflect the underlying parent indexes, designed to limit the 
systematic risk introduced by the ESG selection process. 
Other indexes focus on single themes or issues, such as the MSCI Low Carbon Target Indexes, 
which are designed to achieve a target level of tracking error while minimizing carbon 
exposure. Indexes in the integration category are designed to help investors efficiently 
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integrate ESG considerations into their core asset allocation without deviating from broad 
market characteristics. 
Our indexes can be grouped into the value category and impact category. The value category 
aims to help investors to align their personal or ethical values, or faith, with their investment 
processes. These include the MSCI SRI Index, MSCI KLD 400 Index and the MSCI ex 
Controversial Weapons Index.  The impact category indexes, such as the MSCI Sustainable 
Impact Index, include companies whose core business addresses at least one of the world’s 
social and environmental challenges, as defined by the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals. A few examples of these indexes are presented in the following boxes.  
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Box 1：MSCI ESG Leaders Indexes 
The MSCI ESG Leaders Indexes target companies that have the highest ESG Rating in each 
sector of the parent index. MSCI provides investors globally with ESG indexes designed to 
facilitate clients’ integration of ESG considerations into their investment process. 
The indexes use a best-in-class approach by selecting companies that have the highest MSCI 
ESG Ratings. They are free float-adjusted market capitalization weighted indexes designed 
to represent the performance of companies that have favorable ESG profiles compared to 
industry peers. Overall the indexes target a 50% sector representation vs. the parent index. 
The indexes are designed for institutional investors seeking exposure to companies with a 
strong sustainability profile and relatively low tracking error to the underlying equity 
market. The indexes aim to help investors seeking to: 
• Mitigate short- and long-term ESG risk 
• Meet their fiduciary obligations 
• Mitigate reputational risk 
• Maintain broad market exposure 
• Have sector diversification 
• Avoid taking active country or sector bets 
 
Key features of MSCI ESG Leaders Indexes 
• Leverages MSCI’s award winning MSCI ESG Research and ESG Ratings to identify 
companies that have demonstrated an ability to manage their ESG risks and 
opportunities 
• Best-in-class approach – the indexes select the highest rated companies in each 
sector 
• Designed to exclude companies involved in severe controversies 
• Based on industry leading MSCI Indexes and are designed to enable seamless 
integration 
• Parent index construction rules designed to achieve replicability 
 
The indexes can be used as follows: 
• As part of the portfolio creation process: Consistent market representation 
designed to represent a broad spectrum of the global equity opportunity set 
without home bias  
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• Performance benchmarks for ESG funds for global mandates, with regional, 
country, sector and other subsets available for more targeted investment 
mandates 
• May be licensed for use as the basis for structured products and other index-linked 
investment vehicles, such as exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and exchange-traded 
notes (ETNs) 
• A source of research to aid ESG investment strategies 
• To define a universe of securities that have a strong ESG profile 
 
Figure 26-2  Cumulative index performance of MSCI World ESG Leaders Index— 
USD gross returns (September 2007 - February 2020)6 
 
 
Table 26-1 Annual performance of MSCI World ESG Leaders Index 
 
Source: MSCI as of Feb 28, 2020 
 
                                                     
6 All index performance data is historical and for informational purposes only.  Past performance is not indicative of future 
returns, which may differ materially. 
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Figure 26-3 Cumulative Index Performance of MSCI Emerging Markets ESG 
Leaders Index — USD gross returns (September 2007 – February 2020) 
 
 
Table 26-2 Annual performance of MSCI Emerging Markets ESG Leaders Index 
 
Source: MSCI as of Feb 28, 2020 
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Box 2: MSCI Low Carbon Indexes 
MSCI offers indexes designed to represent the performance of divestment and re-weighting 
strategies to reduce carbon exposure. These approaches are summarized below: 
• Divestment strategies aim to enable institutions to have simple and clear 
communications with stakeholders but ignore short-term portfolio risks. For 
example, a portfolio replicating the MSCI Global ex Fossil Fuels Indexes aims to 
eliminate 100% of the policy benchmark’s carbon reserves exposure by excluding 
companies that own oil, gas and coal reserves. 
• Re-weighting strategies, such as those applied to portfolios that track the MSCI 
Global Low Carbon Target Indexes, seek to increase exposure to more carbon-
efficient companies while reducing short-term risk against the benchmark. 
• Combining selection and re-weighting strategies may offer a clear message in 
communicating with stakeholders while taking into account short-term tracking 
error and long-term risk exposure to carbon-intensive companies. A portfolio 
replicating the MSCI Global Low Carbon Leaders Index would include companies 
with low carbon exposure while seeking to minimize ex-ante tracking error.  
The MSCI Low Carbon Indexes are intended to help identify potential risks associated with 
the transition to a low carbon economy while representing the performance of the broad 
equity market. Launched in 2014 the index series are designed to address two dimensions 
of carbon exposure: carbon emissions and fossil fuel reserves. 
MSCI Low Carbon Indexes can be split into two index suites: 
• The MSCI Global Low Carbon Target Indexes re-weight stocks based on their 
carbon exposure in the form of carbon emissions and fossil fuel reserves. The 
indexes are designed to achieve maximum carbon exposure reduction and achieve 
0.3% (30 basis points) ex ante tracking error target while minimizing carbon 
exposure relative to their parent indexes. 
• The MSCI Global Low Carbon Leader Indexes aim to achieve at least 50% reduction 
in the carbon footprint of the parent index by excluding companies with the 
highest carbon emissions intensity and the largest owners of carbon reserves (per 
dollar of market capitalization). They also aim to minimize the tracking error 
relative to their parent index. 
 
 MSCI ESG Analytics 
Asset owners and their investment consultants increasingly demand systematic integration of 
ESG factors into their investment processes. Institutional investors often require regular 
reporting on the ESG exposures and characteristics of their investments. To meet these 
demands, user-friendly analytical tools are being developed by vendors. MSCI’s ESG research, 
data and indexes are available on its analytics systems, including the MSCI Beon platform. 
Investors can integrate MSCI ESG Ratings and MSCI Indexes into their security selection and 
portfolio construction processes, stress testing, and risk and performance attribution analysis. 
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3 Has ESG historically compromised financial returns? 
A common debate with ESG investing revolves around the idea that incorporating ESG factors 
into the investment process will hurt performance. However, many studies suggest that 
companies with robust ESG practices displayed a lower cost of capital, lower volatility, and 
fewer instances of bribery, corruption and fraud over certain time periods. And some studies 
have also shown that companies with poorer ESG performance have had a higher cost of 
capital, higher volatility due to controversies and other incidences such as spills, labor strikes 
and fraud, and accounting and other governance irregularities.7 
Figure 26-4  Gross profitability of ESG quintiles 
 
Note: Gross profitability (z-score) of size-adjusted ESG quintiles is computed as most 
recently reported sales less cost of goods sold, divided by most recently reported 
company total assets. Data from January 2007 to May 2017. Average value over 
the period is represented by blue dots; current exposure by red dots. The vertical 
bars represent the 5% to 95% range of observed values. Historical data for 
informational purposes only.  Past performance is not indicative of future results, 
which may differ materially. 
 
In a recent study (Melas et al., 2018), MSCI researchers focused on understanding how ESG 
characteristics have led to financially significant effects. The study examined how ESG 
information embedded within stocks is transmitted to the equity market. Borrowing from 
central banks, we created three “transmission channels” within a standard discounted cash 
flow (DCF) model. We call these the cash-flow channel, the idiosyncratic risk channel and the 
valuation channel. The former two channels are transmitted through corporations’ 
idiosyncratic risk profiles, whereas the latter transmission channel is linked to companies’ 
systematic risk profiles. Our research showed that ESG had an effect on valuation and 
performance of many of the companies in the study. 
                                                     
7 Sources: Chava, 2011; 20+ studies, both academic and industry; Lansilahti, 2012; Credit Suisse; Deutsche Bank; MSCI ESG 
Research, et al.; Huang, 2010; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Cremers et al., 2005; Deutsche Bank, 2012; ISS, 2011; et al. 
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Cash-flow channel: High ESG-rated companies were more competitive and generated 
abnormal returns, often leading to higher profitability and dividend payments, especially 
when compared to low ESG-rated companies. 
Idiosyncratic risk channel: High ESG-rated companies experienced a lower frequency of 
idiosyncratic risk incidents such as major drawdowns. Conversely, companies with low ESG 
ratings were more likely to experience major incidents. 
We saw that companies in the bottom fifth of the MSCI World Index experienced large 
drawdowns (above 95%) three times higher than those in the top fifth, as can be seen in the 
exhibit below, supporting the assertion that ESG has provided insight into incident risks 
throughout the 10-year period we studied. 
Figure 26-5  Large drawdown frequency of top vs. bottom ESG quintile 
 
Note: MSCI World Index, January 2007 to May 2017. We use a full three-year look-
ahead window in reporting results. For each month, we report the number of stocks 
that realized a more than 95% cumulative loss over the next three years, taking the 
price at month end as the reference point for the return calculation. Thus, the last 
data point is from May Historical data for informational purposes only.  Past 
performance is not indicative of future results, which may differ materially. 
 
Valuation channel: High ESG-rated companies have shown lower systematic risk exposure, 
evidenced by less volatile earnings and less systematic volatility. Compared to low ESG-rated 
companies, they also experienced lower betas and lower costs of capital. In a DCF model 
framework, the systematic risk exposure affects the denominator of the DCF model, and a company 
with lower cost of capital would have a higher valuation. 
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Figure 26-6  Systematic volatility of ESG quintiles 
 
Note: Systematic volatility (or common factor risk) is calculated as the volatility 
predicted by all the factors of the GEMLT model. Data from January 2007 to May 
2017. Average value over the period is represented by blue dots; current exposure 
by red dots. The vertical bars represent the 5% to 95% range of observed values. 
Historical data for informational purposes only.  Past performance is not indicative 
of future results, which may differ materially. 
4 Conclusion 
The prominence of environmental, social, and governance issues on policy makers and the 
public agenda continues to fuel and shape the ESG investing landscape. MSCI delivers ESG 
indexes and analytics, and MSCI ESG Research delivers ratings, research and metrics, to help 
investors navigate this challenging landscape. As a pioneer in ESG Research and analytical tools, 
MSCI ESG Research offers an extensive history of data, scores, and ratings that enable more 
informed analysis of ESG risks and opportunities across all aspects of the investment process 
– from defining investment policy and selecting benchmarks to research, portfolio 
construction and risk management, engagement and reporting.  
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 Moody’s Approach to Incorporating ESG Risks 
into Credit Analysis 
 
By 
Moody’s Investors Service1,2 
Abstract 
This chapter provides an overview of Moody’s approach to incorporating ESG risks into credit 
analysis.  It starts with a discussion of the general principles for assessing Environmental, Social 
and Governance (ESG) risks, followed by some key findings from Moody’s Environmental Risks 
Global Heat Map, a framework to assess carbon transition risk for corporate sectors, and the 
ESG impact analysis on the bank ratings. 
Keywords: ratings, credit impact, ESG considerations, environmental risk, social risk, 
governance risk, heat map, climate change  
1 General principles for assessing Environmental, Social and 
Governance risks 
 Introduction 
In our credit analysis, Moody’s seeks to be comprehensive, incorporating the broadest 
possible view into the material considerations that can affect the credit quality of an issuer or 
sector.3 Our objective is to capture all considerations that have a material impact on credit 
quality.4 We are focused on the material credit considerations that may influence the relative 
risk of default and expected financial loss in the event of default for issuers and debt 
obligations over all time horizons, regardless of whether or not they are classified as ESG risks. 
However, a precise and widely accepted classification of ESG risks would be useful for more 
transparently describing when ESG risks are credit drivers behind our ratings. 
In our analysis, we identify and assess credit implications arising from all material ESG 
considerations that we can discern, whether they have a current impact or a potential future 
impact. Material risks could include the impact that a prolonged drought has on a 
municipality’s tax revenue and capital spending on water infrastructure, or the likely credit 
                                                     
1 This Chapter is compiled by Moody’s Investors Service. For further details, please contact Brian Cahill, Managing Director 
– Global Head ESG, email: brian.cahill@moodys.com; Li Ma, Managing Director – Corporate Finance, email: 
li.ma@moodys.com; Jessie Tung, VP – Senior Credit Officer, Corporate Finance, email: jessie.tung@moodys.com.  
2  Contents of this chapter draw from various Moody ’ s publications, including: "General Principles for Assessing 
Environmental, Social and Governance Risks", January 2019； "Environmental Risk - Global: Heat map: 11 sectors with $2.2 
trillion debt have elevated environmental risk exposure", September 2018 ；  “ Non-financial companies –  Global: 
Framework to assess carbon transition risk for corporate sectors”, September 2019；and "Banking - Global: The impact of 
environmental, social and governance risks on bank ratings", July 2019. 
3 See “Cross-Sector Rating Methodology: General Principles for Assessing Environmental, Social and Governance Risks”, 
Moody’s Investors Service, January 2019. 
4 Considerations that are material to credit quality may not include all investment parameters that some market participants 
would regard as green, sustainable or ethical. 
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impacts that regulatory frameworks and ESG-related laws, policies and regulations will have 
on rated issuers and sectors as a whole.5 We also assess any mitigating or adaptive behavior 
that issuers undertake. In some instances, we may identify ESG trends that are positive for an 
issuer’s credit profile. 
In order to be meaningful for ratings, ESG considerations must be material with regard to the 
likelihood of default and credit loss. Issuers encounter a multitude of ESG risks and 
opportunities, many of which have little tangible impact on operating or financial performance. 
For example, a company’s volunteer work, charitable activities and other such initiatives are 
important to the extent that they produce social value, but their potential positive impact on 
the company’s financial health or credit standing is unlikely to be material. 
The materiality of a particular aspect of ESG is typically specific to a sector or even an issuer 
or a transaction. For example, air pollution emissions standards may be an important credit 
issue for the auto manufacturing sector but may not be meaningful for the credit quality of 
media companies. The strategies issuers within a given sector follow to address an ESG risk 
that is common to them all may result in improvements in credit strength for some issuers and 
deterioration in credit strength for others. 
Our approach to ESG considerations is similar to our approach for other material credit 
considerations in that it includes an assessment of the impact on an issuer’s cash flows and 
the value of its assets over time; the sufficiency of cash flows and assets in relation to the 
issuer’s debt burden and other financial obligations; and liquidity and the ability to access 
capital. Typically, for two issuers at the same rating level, the issuer with greater stability of 
cash flows can carry higher levels of leverage than the issuer that has less stable cash flows. 
Visibility into future cash flows is also an important consideration. 
For example, for a non-financial corporate, we seek to assess how ESG issues such as 
reputation for product safety and carbon transition risks influence credit drivers such as 
demand for its products, the cost of production and the need for financing to make capital 
expenditures, as well as the potential that these drivers could change meaningfully over time 
(Figure 27-1). For structured finance transactions, we typically assess how ESG considerations 
may affect underlying asset values, in addition to considering how the special purpose 
vehicle’s governance affects creditors. For sovereigns, meanwhile, we seek to assess how ESG 
considerations such as the economic effects of environmental issues, including climate change, 
or social and governance-related issues, such as control of corruption and the rule of law, could 
affect GDP, the trajectory and stability of the government’s revenues and expenditures as well 
as the government’s ability to withstand shocks, among other drivers of government 
creditworthiness (Figure 27-2). 
                                                     
5 Ratings and rating actions, even those in response to policy decisions or changes, do not express judgments on the 
appropriateness of any policy; rather, they reflect our view of how those policies affect the ability of an issuer to repay its 
financial obligations. 
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Figure 27-1 An Illustration of How ESG Considerations Are Captured in Corporate 
Credit Ratings 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service 
Note: The information in this exhibit is not exhaustive. 
 
Figure 27-2 An Illustration of How ESG Considerations Are Captured in Sovereign 
Credit Ratings 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service 
Note: The information in this exhibit is not exhaustive. 
 
 General principles for assessing environmental risk 
Environmental risks are a significant consideration for a large number of issuers in the public 
and private sectors. We view environmental risk as falling broadly into two categories: (i) the 
consequences of regulatory or policy initiatives that seek to reduce or prevent environmental 
trends or hazards or perceived trends or hazards; and (ii) the adverse effects of direct 
environmental trends and hazards, such as pollution, drought, severe natural and human-
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caused disasters, and climate change. Some environmental considerations straddle these 
categories, such as carbon transition risk, where we consider the regulatory risk and the 
potential direct effect of the hazards that may result. 
Among environmental risks, we see three tiers related to timing, certainty and severity: 
• Regulations that have been implemented or those that are likely to be introduced 
(given, for example, proposals by regulators or legislators or binding agreements 
under an international accord) have the clearest impact on the credit profiles of 
issuers and sectors. 
• Longer-term regulatory initiatives where implementation is unclear or subject to 
delays or meaningful regional variations (given, for example, very general agreements 
under an international accord with no enforcement mechanisms) provide less visibility 
into the likely impacts on the relative risk of default and credit loss for issuers. Lack of 
clarity may also diminish issuers' ability to adapt to regulations, adding a further layer 
of uncertainty regarding the credit implications. 
• Direct environmental trends such as the those arising from climate change (for 
example, rising temperatures) are typically incremental, developing over very long 
time frames, with diffuse consequences and limited immediate impact on ratings. 
High impact environmental hazards such as hurricanes or cyclones, wildfires or floods 
are episodic; they can be severe, concentrated in their impact and can sometimes 
have an immediate impact on ratings. The credit impact of long-term environmental 
trends or future hazards may be curbed or offset by other influences. These could 
include the implementation of regulations or technological changes that mitigate the 
effects of the trend, adaptation strategies such as improvements in physical and 
institutional infrastructure, or rising income levels that increase a government’s tax 
base, allowing it to finance needed improvements. 
The impact of these risks may affect factor or sub-factor scoring in methodology scorecards; 
for example, these risks could affect our forward-looking assessment of business profile, 
leverage and coverage, economic strength or GDP, or they may be considered outside of the 
scorecard. We also consider environmental risks in tandem with other issuer or sector 
characteristics that may mitigate or exacerbate their impact. 
For example, factors such as scale, high barriers to entry, the ability to recover rising costs from 
customers or taxpayers, financial flexibility, and expertise in handling operational and 
regulatory issues are important to the ability of issuers in most sectors to handle 
environmental exposures and implement adaptation strategies while maintaining their credit 
profiles. Conversely, small scale, geographic concentration, low income levels and 
deteriorating demographic trends make some issuers much more susceptible to 
environmental hazards or less likely to be able to implement adaptation strategies. 
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2 Key findings from Environmental Risks Global Heat Map 
 Eleven sectors with $2.2 trillion debt have elevated environmental risk 
exposure 
To better inform our analysis6, and in a follow-up to an original 2015 study,7 we present a heat 
map that shows the relative exposure of 84 sectors globally to material environmental risks. 
The amount of rated debt covered by this global sector review is $74.6 trillion, up 10% from 
our 2015 edition. 
The heat map provides a high-level assessment of the materiality of environmental risks to a 
sector’s overarching credit quality, and the nominal exposure of a sector to the five most 
material subcategories of environmental risks: air pollution; soil and water pollution, and land 
use restrictions; carbon regulations; water shortages; and natural and man-made hazards. 
Our heat map identifies 11 sectors, totaling roughly $2.2 trillion in rated debt, with elevated 
credit exposure to environmental risks (Figure 27-3). Again, this represents a 10% increase in 
rated debt from 2015. In Moody’s view, these sectors have clear exposure to environmental 
risks that are either already material to credit quality or could be over the next three to five 
years.  
Figure 27-3 For 11 sectors, with $2.2 trillion in rated debt, environmental risks are 
already ratings-relevant or will be in the coming few years. Breakdown of “Elevated 
Risk” (Immediate/Emerging) sectors in environmental risks heat map (in US$ billion) 
 
                                                     
6 See “Environmental Risks – Global: Heat map: 11 sectors with $2.2 trillion debt have elevated environmental risk exposure”, 
Moody’s Investors Service, September 2018.  
7 See “Environmental Risks: Heat Map Shows Wide Variations in Credit Impact Across Sectors”, Moody’s Investors Service, 
November 2015. 
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Source: Moody’s Investors Service 
Note: Boxes are sized relative to the value of rated debt (in US$ billion) and color 
indicated for overall credit exposure. 
 
The relative scoring in our 2018 environmental risks heat map remains largely stable since our 
2015 edition. However, there have been a number of changes in overall scoring, as illustrated 
in Figure 27-4. Shipping, and surface transportation and logistics are now scored as “Elevated 
Risk - Emerging,” compared with “Moderate Risk” previously, reflecting a gradual tightening 
of environmental regulations and emissions standards. Six sectors accounting for $1.8 trillion 
in rated debt move to “Moderate Risk” from “Low Risk.” While the specific rationale for these 
changes is sector-specific, the change to scores generally reflects our view that the potential 
for environmental risks to become material for these sectors over five or more years has 
increased. Meanwhile, power generation projects move down to “Moderate Risk” from 
“Elevated Risk - Emerging,” as a result of a shift in our rated portfolio toward renewable 
generation. Finally, two new sectors – pension funds and asset managers – have been added, 
both scoring “Low Risk.”  
Figure 27-4 Changes in overall sector environmental risk scores since 2015. Heat 
map score and rated debt, US$ billion. 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service  
Note: For 2015 heat map, see “Environmental Risks: Heat Map Shows Wide 
Variations in Credit Impact Across Sectors”, November 2015. 
 
 Two sectors – coal mining and terminals, and unregulated utilities and power 
companies – are scored as “Elevated Risk – Immediate” 
Coal mining and coal terminals, and unregulated utilities and power companies (with total 
outstanding rated debt of $517 billion) have already experienced material credit pressure as a 
result of environmental risks. 
Indeed, environmental considerations have constrained credit quality and contributed to 
downward pressure on the ratings of coal companies, primarily through reducing demand for 
the commodity. Such pressures are incorporated into our present and future view of coal 
producers’ revenues and margins, although the degree of impact varies by region and type of 
coal. For example, metallurgical coal producers are not facing the same demand pressures as 
thermal coal producers. Notably, the US coal industry has undergone a significant ratings 
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migration due, in part, to the impact of rising environmental concerns related to the use of 
coal and eroding cost competitiveness compared with gas and renewables. 
Unregulated utilities and power companies, meanwhile, are directly exposed to the policy 
pressure to cut emissions, which continues to disrupt business models and pressure margins 
in mature economies. The overall credit impact for a particular issuer is a function of a number 
of variables, notably the share of generation in the company’s total business, generation 
technology, and geographic location. For instance, the impact on generators is more 
pronounced in Europe than in Asia, because power demand is still growing significantly in the 
latter and emission reduction policies are less stringent in many countries there. 
 Nine sectors are categorized as “Elevated Risk – Emerging" meaning that the 
credit impact of environmental exposures is likely to crystallize over the next 
few years 
Nine sectors are categorized as “Elevated Risk - Emerging," accounting for $1.7 trillion in rated 
debt. They include automotive manufacturers, building materials, commodity chemicals, 
independent oil and gas exploration and production, oil and gas refining and marketing, mining, 
steel, shipping, and surface transportation and logistics. The latter two represent new 
additions to the “Elevated Risk - Emerging” category, as they were scored as “Moderate Risk” 
in our 2015 report. 
In Moody’s view, all of these sectors exhibit clear exposure to environmental risks that could 
be material to credit quality within the next three to five years. Issuers in these sectors tend 
to have greater flexibility than those in the “Elevated Risk - Immediate” category in responding 
to regulations, in the timing of required capital spending to remediate or prevent 
environmental hazards, or in passing on expected cost increases to customers or taxpayers. 
For example, for the global oil and gas refining and marketing industry, we expect the trend 
toward stricter requirements to continue for air, water and carbon emissions, as well as 
product specifications (for example, lower sulfur content). Furthermore, carbon regulations 
may dampen demand for refined products over the longer term. Refiners face the choice of 
incurring mandatory expenditures or closing refineries that do not meet more stringent 
requirements. Overall, we expect refiners that have better geographic or asset diversification, 
larger crude distillation capacity and stronger margins to be better positioned to cope with 
changing requirements, and environmental and disaster risks in the sector. 
 A further 22 sectors with $10.1 trillion in rated debt face moderate credit 
exposure to environmental risks 
For 22 sectors with $10.1 trillion in rated debt, we identify some exposure to environmental 
risks. However, there is less certainty that these risks will develop in a way that is material to 
ratings for most issuers in the sector, or there is a longer runway for issuers to adjust business 
models and balance sheets to substantially mitigate the overall credit impact. Developing 
economy sovereigns ($5.2 trillion), manufacturing ($1.2 trillion), integrated oil and gas 
companies ($714 billion), and regulated electric and gas utilities with generation ($673 billion) 
are the four largest sectors that face moderate risks (Figure 27-5). 
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Figure 27-5 22 Sectors have moderate credit exposure to environmental risks. 
Breakdown of “Moderate Risk” sectors in environmental risks heat map (in 
US$ billion) 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service 
Note: Boxes are sized relative to the value of rated debt (in US$ billion) and color 
indicated for overall credit exposure. 
 
 51 sectors with $62.3 trillion in rated debt have low exposure, meaning 
environmental risks are unlikely to generate material credit consequences 
For most of the remaining 51 sectors where Moody’s has rated coverage, the overall credit 
exposure to environmental risks is, in our opinion, low. There are typically four reasons these 
sectors are scored “Low Risk”. 
1. Some sectors are likely to benefit from emerging environmental trends. For example, 
the overall credit exposure to environmental risks for the mass transit sector is low 
because mass transit is an energy-efficient mode of transportation whose ridership 
will likely increase as governmental policies and public preference shift away from 
carbon-intensive travel. 
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2. There are other sectors with fundamentally low business exposure to environmental 
risks. For example, the media and broadcasting sector has very low emissions of 
pollutants and carbon, and major publishing and printing companies have transitioned 
to digital offerings, resulting in a decline in exposure to environmental risks related to 
paper products. 
3. Many sectors have business diversity and flexibility that mitigate the environmental 
risks they may face. For example, environmental risks to banks and finance companies 
are indirect, undertaken through financing clients' operations. Such risk exposure is 
unlikely to translate into a meaningful credit impact because banks and finance 
companies typically benefit from portfolio diversification, and lending is typically short 
to medium term. This provides these entities with flexibility to shift portfolio 
composition away from clients highly exposed to environmental risks. 
4. Finally, some sectors have the economic, policy or financial flexibility to adapt to the 
environmental risks they cannot avoid. For example, while climate change is a global 
phenomenon, developed economy sovereigns and regional and local governments 
typically have much greater financial resources, economic resilience and institutional 
capacity to assist in climate adaptation. 
 Descriptions of the five environmental risk subcategories 
Air Pollution 
Along with soil and water pollution, air pollution is one of the traditional areas of 
environmental risk and regulation. Air pollutants, which may stay in the atmosphere or 
eventually pollute land and waterways, have the potential to harm the health of humans, 
other organisms and habitats. This category excludes carbon dioxide emissions, but includes 
those greenhouse gases that have been regulated as pollutants outside of concerns about 
their contribution to global warming, for instance nitrous oxides, sulfur oxides, and particulate 
matters. 
Soil and Water Pollution and Land Use Restrictions 
Soil and water pollution most typically occurs from industrial, human and agricultural waste, 
as well as surface water run-off. More acute examples include the presence of toxic and 
nuclear wastes that can render land uninhabitable or poison drinking water, but more typically 
these pollutants increase risks for humans or harm wildlife. They may also render land infertile. 
An emerging area of concern is antibiotics. Environmental land restrictions may relate to 
preserving habitats, watersheds, green space or arable land, protecting species, or preventing 
certain activities due to general environmental concerns. 
Carbon Regulation 
Our focus in this category is the impact of current and future policy initiatives that seek to 
reduce the amount of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases being emitted at a national 
and global level. In this category, we do not seek to anticipate the likelihood of climate change 
or the natural consequences of climate change and its impact on rated entities (those direct 
hazards are included in the following two categories). We score carbon emission regulation 
separately from air pollution because regulatory implications are potentially very wide-ranging 
and more difficult to predict than for traditional pollutants, given the scope of activities that 
produce carbon dioxide. For these reasons, we focus on the existing and likely future policy 
responses and their potential impact on credit quality. Please see Moody’s Approach to 
Assessing the Credit Impacts of Environmental Risks, November 2015, and Environmental Risks: 
Moody's To Analyse Carbon Transition Risk Based On Emissions Reduction Scenario Consistent 
with Paris Agreement, June 2016. 
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Water Shortages 
Water shortages may be caused by a decrease in available water supplies or an increase in 
demand. Water supplies may decrease due to drought (including from climate change), the 
pollution or diversion of waterways, over-pumping of aquifers, or real estate development in 
watersheds. Water demand may increase due to population growth, urbanization, general 
economic development, or changes in economic activities (e.g. irrigation farming, shale-gas 
fracking). 
Natural and Man-made Hazards 
Natural and mad-made hazards include changing trends in the global climate that are typically 
chronic in nature. They include the trend of warming, as illustrated by rising mean 
temperatures globally, and other slow-moving trends such as rising sea levels. This category 
also covers low probability, high-severity events arising from a variety of sources, including 
(without limitation) weather events such as hurricanes, earthquakes or floods (including 
coastal flooding), regulations on activities that may cause them, industrial disasters, and 
nuclear incidents. While the occurrence of a singular, isolated event may not be the direct 
result of climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) notes that the 
probability and frequency of such shocks (e.g. damaging cyclones) will increase at higher 
temperatures and/or greater extremes in temperatures and precipitation. 
 Our heat map points to 16 sectors with “very high” or “high” nominal 
exposure to carbon regulation 
 
 
Our heat map points to 16 sectors with “very high” or “high” nominal exposure to carbon 
regulation, accounting for $3.7 trillion in rated debt (Figure 27-6). These sectors tend to be 
among the most carbon-intensive industries globally, such as utilities and power companies, 
and/or where regulations governing emissions are tightening rapidly, such as airlines.8 Of the 
16 sectors with “very high” or “high” nominal exposure to carbon regulation, 10 have 
immediate or emerging “Elevated Risk” overall credit exposure. The remaining six score 
“Moderate Risk” for a variety of reasons, including diversification of business model or ability 
to pass on costs. 
 
                                                     
8 See Unregulated utilities and power companies – Global: Carbon transition brings risks and opportunities, June 2018, and 
Passenger Airlines – Global: Pricing power, route mix to determine credit implications of carbon transition, April 2018. 
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Figure 27-6 Carbon regulation will have a tangible impact on the most exposed 
sectors. Sectors with “very high” or “high” exposure to carbon regulation (in 
US$ billion) 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service 
 
Alongside market (for example, demand substitution) and technology risks, we consider 
regulatory risks as one of the key determinants in assessing the credit effects of carbon 
transition at an entity level for the most exposed sectors globally (Figure 27-7).9 In the absence 
of substantial counterbalancing initiatives, the transition to a lower carbon future will likely 
result in increasing pressure on the affected companies’ credit profiles. 
Figure 27-7 Regulation is a key determinant in assessing the credit impact of carbon 
transition on companies 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service 
 
                                                     
9 We seek to incorporate all material credit considerations, including those related to environmental, social and governance 
elements, into our credit rating analysis. 
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 Thirteen sectors have “very high” or “high” nominal exposure to air pollution 
 
 
Thirteen sectors ($3.5 trillion in rated debt) are scored as having “very high” or “high” nominal 
exposure to air pollution, which we define as including greenhouse gases that have been 
regulated as pollutants outside of concerns about their contribution to global warming. They 
include nitrous oxides, sulfur oxides, chlorofluorocarbons and particulate matter. 
As Figure 27-8 illustrates, a similar cross-section of industrial sectors is exposed to both air 
pollution and carbon regulation. These sectors are typically susceptible to more stringent 
environmental enforcement of particulate emissions and air pollution. Environmental policies 
focused on air pollution often result in forcing an industry to move toward low-carbon 
products, even in the absence of any actual carbon regulations. For example, automobile fuel 
efficiency standards and smog regulations are moving the industry toward alternative fuel 
vehicles that also reduce carbon intensity. And policies to reduce mercury and acid gas 
emissions from power generation have resulted in the shutdown of coal-fired generation, 
which has also reduced carbon emissions. 
Figure 27-8 Industrial sectors tend to have significant exposure to both air pollution 
and carbon regulation. Selected sector exposure to air pollution and carbon 
regulation (bubble size in US$ billion) 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service 
 
 Fourteen sectors, including central and local governments in developing 
economies, score “high” for natural and man-made hazards; four score 
“high” for water shortages 
 
Natural and man-made hazards, and water shortages constitute physical environmental risks, 
potentially as a result of climate change. Hazards can relate to changing trends in the global 
Moody’s Approach to Incorporating ESG Risks into Credit Analysis   
449 
climate that are typically chronic in nature. They include the trend of warming, as illustrated 
by rising mean temperatures globally, and other slow-moving trends, such as rising sea levels. 
Hazards also encapsulate the occurrence of episodic events, including natural disasters or 
extreme weather events (such as storms, floods, wildfires, drought and cyclones). 
Physical risks can affect an issuer’s operations and capital spending directly, or have indirect 
effects such as supply chain disruptions or market volatility.10 While most sectors – particularly 
those reliant on large tangible assets and extensive supply chains – tend to have some degree 
of vulnerability to such risks, geographical footprint clearly matters. Indeed, where an issuer 
operates (or where its main markets are located), coupled with the location of its main 
suppliers, will significantly affect its exposure to natural and man-made hazards. 
Figure 27-9 Majority of sectors have “moderate” or “high” exposure to natural and 
man-made hazards. Selected sector exposure to natural and man-made hazards (in 
US$ billion) 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service 
 
                                                     
10 Moody’s contributed to a report titled Advancing TCFD Guidance on Physical Climate Risks and Opportunities produced 
on behalf of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Global Centre of Excellence on Climate 
Adaptation in May 2018. Among other issues, the report outlines how physical climate risks and opportunities can influence 
an issuer’s creditworthiness. 
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Figure 27-10 25 sectors with “moderate” or “high” exposure to water shortages. 
Selected sector exposure to water shortages (in US$ billion) 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service 
 
 Six sectors have “very high” or “high” exposure to soil and water pollution, 
and land use restrictions 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 27-11, we identify six sectors with “very high” or “high” exposure to 
this category, including mining, commodity and specialty chemicals, and shipping – with the 
latter specifically exposed to water pollution. 
 
Figure 27-11 Mining, commodity and specialty chemicals, and shipping are among 
the most exposed. Sectors with “high” or “very high” exposure to soil/water 
pollution and land use restrictions (in US$ billion) 
 
Source: Moody's Investors Service 
3 Framework to assess carbon transition risk for corporate sectors 
We published our report “Non-financial companies – Global: Framework to assess carbon 
transition risk for corporate sectors” in September 2019, which outlines our approach to 
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creating a scoring tool that provides a standalone assessment of one specific ESG risk, namely 
carbon transition risk.11  
Moody’s carbon transition assessment (CTA) tool provides a consistent, transparent and 
verifiable means to analyse carbon transition risk for rated non-financial companies. This 
report explains the framework, scoring system and data that informs the scoring of our CTAs. 
We will initially apply the framework to our analysis of sectors that we identify as having “very 
high” or “high” exposure to carbon transition risk12.  
In September 2018, we published an update to our environmental heat map (first published 
in November 2015) identifying sectors with significant exposure to carbon transition risk. As 
discussed further above, our heat map points to 16 sectors with “very high” or “high” nominal 
exposure to carbon regulation, accounting for $3.7 trillion in rated debt. These sectors tend to 
be among the most carbon-intensive industries globally, such as utilities and power companies, 
and/or where regulations governing emissions are tightening rapidly, such as airlines. 
4 The impact of environmental, social and governance risks on bank 
ratings 
 ESG risks are becoming more significant 
Some ESG risks are well-established drivers of bank creditworthiness. Governance quality, for 
instance, has long been a key contributor to bank credit strength. Nevertheless, ESG risks have 
become more significant for the banking sector in recent years. This is principally due to 
evolving regulations, policy measures, market developments, and underlying changes in social 
attitudes as a result of which banking sector activities previously considered acceptable are 
now increasingly challenged. 
Social risks, for instance, have become more pronounced for banks after the global financial 
crisis contributed to a negative shift in popular attitudes towards banks. This has made 
customer backlashes against business practices deemed to be socially unacceptable, a social 
risk, more likely. Similarly, the transition to a low carbon economy, accelerated by the 2015 
Paris Agreement, is gradually increasing environmental risk for banks. These include risks 
associated with investments in technologies which may become obsolete as less carbon-
intensive alternatives emerge. Overall, we believe that growing awareness of climate change 
and its consequences has played a key role in increasing the relevance of ESG risks. 
ESG risks typically affect banks’ creditworthiness through the same channels as conventional 
risks. For instance, an increase in customer defaults can result from an environmental hazard 
such as drought, just as it can from an increase in interest rates or unemployment. Similarly, 
an inadequate commercial strategy and socially unacceptable business practices can both 
result in a loss of customers, hitting profitability. 
Banks are exposed to ESG risks directly, but also indirectly through their balance sheets, given 
their role as lenders and investors. Governance-related risks have historically had the most 
direct impact on bank creditworthiness. Environmental risks primarily affect banks indirectly 
                                                     
11 See “Non-financial companies – Global: Framework to assess carbon transition risk for corporate sectors”, 
Moody’s Investors Service, September 2019. 
12 See “Automotive manufacturing – Global: Substantial variation exists in automakers' carbon transition risk 
profiles”, Moody’s Investors Service, November 2019. 
Chapter 27 
 452 
through their investment and lending decisions. Social risks can also arise indirectly, for 
example when the credit quality of a borrower weakens because of social considerations. 
Environmental risks may also influence bank capital in the future, as regulators may 
incorporate environmental considerations into banks' prudential requirements. The quality of 
a bank’s governance can itself influence its exposure to environmental and social risks, with 
better-governed banks likely to face fewer such risks. 
Sustainable finance is influencing banks' behaviour 
Sustainable finance has become a key theme globally in recent years, driven by international 
agreements aimed at promoting investments that take account of ESG considerations. The 
most important of these include the Paris Climate Agreement (December 2015), the UN 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (September 2015) and the European Commission Action 
Plan on Sustainable Finance (March 2018). 
The rise of sustainable finance has put banks under particular pressure for two reasons. Firstly, 
banks are the backbone of the global financial system, and consequently play a key role in 
financing the projects required to establish a sustainable economy. Secondly, banks’ expertise 
in credit risk management makes them uniquely qualified to ensure that increased funding for 
sustainable assets and activities does not come at the expense of financial stability. 
Regulators and policymakers are one of the main driving forces in the shift towards sustainable 
finance. Although banks are exposed to regulatory and policy risks as they affect their 
investment decisions, the level of environmental regulation directly aimed at banks is currently 
low. However, we expect this to change as a result of a gradual increase in regulation designed 
to: (1) ensure that the financial system is resilient to climate-related risks; and (2) support the 
implementation of environmental policies. For example, the UK's Prudential Regulation 
Authority has already proposed to incorporate environmental considerations into banks’ 
prudential frameworks.  
Sustainable finance is not driven solely by regulation. Bank stakeholders are becoming 
increasingly aware of ESG issues, and are demanding improved ESG management. This is 
illustrated by investors’ rapid integration of ESG factors into their asset allocation decisions. 
Signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), which take ESG considerations 
into account in their investment policies, had combined assets under management of USD82 
trillion in 2018, an increase of 19% from the previous year. Pressure to meet ESG targets also 
arises from bank shareholders exercising their voting rights according to ESG criteria, as well 
as from bank customers. 
In this context, banks are increasingly under pressure to re-focus their strategy and business 
models on sustainability, and to integrate ESG considerations into their investment decisions. 
The rise of sustainable finance offers banks opportunities to unlock new lending markets, and 
to reinforce their relationship with clients, for instance by advising them on the impact of ESG 
factors on their businesses. Banks can also reinforce their franchise value through strong 
management of ESG factors. 
However, it also potentially exposes banks to increased capital constraints, asset stranding, 
and fines or litigation in the event of noncompliance with new regulations. New regulation will 
also add compliance costs, and banks may forgo currently profitable businesses because of 
the way they might develop over the long-term. At the same time, engaging in or facilitating 
activities with a significant negative environmental impact may inflict reputational damage on 
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banks, tarnishing their brands. Increased credit risk can also arise from regulatory incentives 
to promote sustainable finance as they have the potential to distort risk measurement. 
Bank exposure to reputational damage largely depends on how aware their stakeholders are 
of ESG issues, but we believe that the risk is more material for larger banks. This is because 
any negative externalities they create will affect a larger number of people, given their large 
size and broader geographic footprint. 
 ESG risks are captured in our bank credit analysis 
Our assessment of a bank’s baseline credit assessment (BCA), a measure of its standalone 
credit strength,13 is based on five key financial ratios and three qualitative factors. These are 
in our view the key indicators of how likely the bank is to default in the absence of external 
support. Any positive or negative impact from ESG considerations would influence our 
assessment of these eight indicators, affecting our overall view of the risk of bank failure in 
turn. 
Strong corporate governance is at the core of a bank’s financial health. Our qualitative 
adjustment for corporate behaviour measures governance risk directly. However, the absence 
of an explicit corporate behaviour adjustment for most banks does not indicate a lack of 
governance strengths or weaknesses, rather that their governance quality is already reflected 
in other rating factors. The impact of governance risk is typically greatest in our assessment of 
asset risk, as a poor risk governance framework can lead to severe deterioration in asset quality. 
Governance risk can also materially affect profitability via fines or regulatory sanctions 
because of governance breaches. 
Environmental and social risks have historically had a low impact on banks' credit profiles, but 
their influence can still be material. Environmental factors can increase risk in banks’ 
investment portfolios, and therefore lead to a deterioration in asset risk. If they cause financial 
losses, or if banks forgo profitable businesses on environmental grounds, they can also weigh 
on profitability. 
Social risks are less likely to affect asset quality, but they can have a material impact on 
profitability, for example through litigation, regulatory fines, or regulatory measures that 
constrain earnings. Social factors can also have a positive impact on profitability, as in the case 
of banks which grow thanks to financial inclusion initiatives. 
The potential inclusion of ESG considerations in banks’ prudential frameworks may also affect 
our assessment of their capital adequacy. A number of recent regulatory proposals would 
incorporate environmental considerations into bank capital requirements. Regulators may also 
incorporate ESG risks into their supervisory work, for instance by taking account of banks' 
resilience to climate change when conducting stress tests. 
Reputational damage because of poor ESG performance can affect banks’ profitability and 
liquidity. The loss of customers whose ESG expectations have not been met may affect a bank's 
business volumes and therefore its earnings capacity. Customers may also withdraw their 
funds, and the banks’ issuances may attract less market interest, as investors increasingly 
integrate ESG considerations into their investment decisions. 
                                                     
13 Moody’s rating approach for banks builds around four components, of which the baseline credit assessment (BCA) is the 
most sensitive to the impact of ESG factors. For further details, see “Rating Methodology: Banks Methodology”, Moody’s 
Investors Service, November 2019. 
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Figure 27-12 shows the rating factors that make up Moody’s baseline credit assessment (BCA) 
methodology, with a brief description of how our assessment captures ESG risks, directly or 
indirectly. 
Figure 27-12 ESG risks relate to rating factors. Moody's bank rating methodology 
 
Source: Moody’s Investors Service 
 
ESG factors can also influence bank ratings through the Macro Profile, an assessment of banks’ 
operating and economic environment. The Macro Profile draws heavily on three of the rating 
factors used in the sovereign rating methodology14, and ESG considerations are included in the 
assessment of each of these factors. One of them, institutional strength, is directly and closely 
linked to governance risk, while environmental and social risks are indirectly related to all 
sovereign rating factors.  
 Governance is the main ESG risk for banks 
Governance quality is particularly important for banks because they operate with higher 
leverage and are generally more confidence-sensitive than corporates, particularly regarding 
their funding arrangements. The consequences of a governance breach can go beyond the 
immediate impact, such as a financial penalty or asset quality deterioration. In some cases, 
there can also be reputational damage leading to franchise erosion, resulting in a loss of 
business, or customers withdrawing funds. 
                                                     
14 See “Rating Methodology: Sovereign Ratings Methodology”, Moody’s Investors Service, November 2019.  
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We do not assign a score for quality of risk governance when determining a bank’s financial 
profile, which reflects our view of its solvency and liquidity. Rather, our assessment of 
governance quality influences the scores that we assign to the different solvency and liquidity 
scorecard factors. 
In some cases, however, credit considerations related to corporate governance are not fully 
captured in any of the solvency or liquidity factors on our scorecard. To determine such banks' 
BCAs, we apply a qualitative adjustment to their financial profile. This adjustment typically 
reflects idiosyncratic corporate governance issues captured through behavioural aspects of a 
bank, which we assess under a broad qualitative framework which we term “corporate 
behaviour”. 
We assess corporate behaviour around six factors: key person risk, insider and related-party 
risk, strategy and management, dividend policy, compensation policy and accounting policy. 
 Social risk includes a wide range of potential hazards 
Social risks arise from a bank’s interaction with its stakeholders and society at large. This is the 
broadest of the three ESG risks, and typically affects credit quality through litigation, as well 
as reputational, operational, and regulatory channels. Social risks generally have a moderate 
impact on bank credit quality. Although social risks in some cases are high, banks' financial and 
operational flexibility, and their long track record of adjusting to emerging social issues, act as 
mitigants. 
Banks are exposed to social risks directly through their dealings with customers, employees, 
and other stakeholders. Examples include the possibility of regulatory penalties or 
reputational damage for failing to treat customers fairly. Social risks can also stem from 
external factors such as legislative changes prompted by underlying changes in social attitudes. 
Regulations requiring banks to prioritize lending to particular sectors of the economy are an 
example. 
Banks are also exposed to social risk indirectly through their lending and investment decisions. 
The most significant social risks for banks are those they are directly exposed to, as their 
portfolio flexibility and diversification help mitigate risks from their indirect exposure. 
The social risks that private sector issuers generally are exposed to fall into five categories: 
customer relations, human capital, health and safety, responsible production and 
demographic and societal trends. 
 Environmental risk exposure is generally low but increasing 
Environmental risks take a number of different forms. Our global environmental risks heat map 
identifies the five categories of environmental risk that are most material to an issuer's credit 
quality. 
Banks' current balance sheet exposure to environmental risk is generally low. Their own 
environmental footprint does not typically raise credit concerns, and their main exposure to 
environmental risks is indirect, through their investment and lending decisions. This indirect 
exposure is less significant for banks that are well diversified both by industry and geography. 
Moreover, the relatively short duration of bank loans provides lenders with some ability to 
rebalance their portfolios as stranded assets and other environmental risks emerge over time. 
However, we expect environmental risks to become more significant for banks in the future, 
particularly as the transition to a low carbon economy accelerates, the physical effects of 
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climate change increase, and climate policy changes the regulatory environment. The impact 
of these developments on bank credit strength will depend on how quickly they take place, 
with longer time frames giving banks greater opportunity to adapt to changed circumstances. 
It will also depend on the level of engagement that policymakers and regulators seek from 
banks to meet their environmental objectives. 
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Abstract  
Many companies today operate in a world characterized by enormous environmental 
challenges including climate change, biodiversity losses, overexploitation of natural resources, 
and pollution. The ISS ESG Corporate Rating is a highly granular, sector-specific and risk-
oriented methodology that provides investors with a way to ascertain the degree to which 
companies are exposed to and manage such risks and to assess whether companies contribute 
to or obstruct sustainable development goals. The ESG Corporate Rating can also serve to 
identify particularly progressive companies, for instance in relation to mitigating climate-
change, and the development of indices.  
Keywords: ESG, sustainability ratings, environmental ratings, sustainability performance, 
environmental performance, climate change 
1 Introduction   
The ISS ESG Corporate Rating originated from Frankfurt-Hohenheimer Leitfaden, a 
comprehensive set of indicators conceived at the Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main in 
the late 1990s to assess companies’ sustainability performance. Over the years, the ISS ESG 
has continuously refined and calibrated the sector-specific methodology to incorporate 
industry standards and best practices, regulatory developments, social debates, and the latest 
trends in science and technology. Global norms and conventions such as the UN Global 
Compact, the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the ILO Core Labor Standards, and 
the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights are the foundation of ISS ESG’s 
philosophy. The rating methodology has thus evolved into a holistic, forward-looking approach 
capturing the most pertinent social and environmental challenges of the 21st century. It helps 
align investments with global norms and responds to new standards and regulations. It also 
highlights critical company-specific ESG risks typically not considered by traditional credit 
ratings.   
2 Methodology 
The corporate rating methodology rests on a two-pronged approach. The positive criteria, the 
backbone of the methodology, assesses the sustainability performance of companies’ 
management systems and operations along the entire value chain, and the impacts of their 
product/service portfolios. The ratings draw on a pool of more than 800 indicators, the 
majority of which sector-specific. Each sector is analyzed based on a selection of 
approximately 100 social, environmental and governance-related indicators. The total number 
                                                     
1 This chapter was written by Alexander Hellwig, Senior Associate at ISS, email: alexander.hellwig@iss-esg.com. The author 
would like to thank Kristina Rüter and Karsten Greye for their continued support and inputs.  
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and their weightings depend on a company’s inherent ESG impact profile and concomitant 
risks. ISS ESG employs particularly stringent performance requirements for business activities 
considered to entail elevated risks and negative impacts on the society and the environment. 
This holds true for companies from sectors such as oil & gas, petrochemicals, and metals & 
mining.  
Each indicator typically comprises a content element (either one or several sub-indicators) and 
a coverage. The latter examines to what extent the relevant operations of a company are 
covered by the policy, strategy or management measures under scrutiny. The basic rationale 
is that isolated company initiatives alone may not lead to satisfying results. Conversely, an 
underlying downgrading mechanism ensures that poor or average content is not upgraded 
simply because it was implemented at the corporate level. Content and coverage are graded 
separately and add up to the total indicator performance score (see Table 28-1 for an example).  
Table 28-1 Indicator example – design and operation of wind power plants 
 Performance requirements  Weight  
1.Responsible 
site selection 
Company commitment to refrain from sites in 
protected areas and areas of high biodiversity 
value. Prioritization of brownfield sites over 
greenfields. 
In
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25% 
To
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n
d
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o
r 
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o
re
 
    Coverage Percentage of relevant operations covered 
2.Environmental 
impact 
assessments 
The company conducts comprehensive 
environmental impact assessments prior to 
construction that cover relevant biodiversity 
aspects.  
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 s
co
re
 
25% 
    Coverage Percentage of relevant operations covered 
3.Onshore wind 
power plants 
The company carries out adequate measures 
to protect birds and/or bats, and engages in 
continuous monitoring of environmental 
impacts.  
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 s
co
re
 
50% 
4.Offshore wind 
power plants 
The company carries out adequate measures 
to protect marine life, including noise 
reduction and the mitigation of impacts from 
lines. Continuous monitoring of 
environmental impacts.  
    Coverage Percentage of relevant operations covered 
 
The scoring mechanism can be illustrated by these aforementioned indicators. If a company 
systematically excludes wind farms in protected areas or areas of high biodiversity and 
prioritizes brown fields, all the (content-related) requirements are met by responsible site 
selection. However, the coverage of this approach ultimately determines the indicator grade. 
If less than 20% of the relevant operations are covered, the company is assigned a D+ (based 
on a twelve-point rating scale ranging from A+ (excellent performance) to D- (poor 
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performance)). In case coverages exceeding 20%, 50% or 80%, the indicator scores a B+, A and 
A+, respectively. 
The indicators are either qualitative or quantitative and address management aspects, 
operational performance and corporate transparency. In addition, trend analyses and strategy-
related assessments help identify corporations with particularly progressive and future-proof 
business models. For each sector, four to five key topic areas are defined, reflecting the most 
material sustainability issues (see also breakout 2  for the importance of capturing sector-
specific risks). They are assigned a weighting of at least 50%. All the indicators are individually 
weighted, evaluated, and aggregated to yield an overall score.  
The positive criteria previously mentioned are complemented by an assessment of 
controversial business practices. ISS ESG’s norm-based research monitors corporate 
compliance with recognized international norms and guidelines on human rights, labor 
standards, environmental protection and business malpractice as a critical gauge of ESG 
performance. Each controversy is examined along several dimensions, including the degree to 
which a company’s misconduct has been corroborated by an authoritative source (verification), 
the severity of impacts, company involvement and accountability for the transgression 
(severity), and the prevalence of relevant countermeasures (remediation). The continuum of 
controversy classifications ranges from potential to moderate, severe and very severe 
assessments. By causing a downgrade – 20% for moderate, 50% for severe, and 80% for very 
severe cases – in the affected topic sections of the corporate rating, controversies exert a direct 
bearing on a company’s ESG performance. As such, the score of the topic area ‘climate change 
strategy’ is, for instance, downgraded in case of a climate-related misconduct. In order to paint 
a sufficiently accurate and objective picture of a controversy, information is gleaned from 
independent sources and from the company in question as a part of a comprehensive 
feedback process.   
The final ESG performance, an aggregation of the analysis of both the positive evaluation 
criteria and controversies, is reflected in a twelve-point rating scale from A+ (excellent 
performance) to D- (poor performance). The performance assessment at an indicator- and 
topic-level makes use of the same grading scale. In 2019, ISS ESG also introduced a decile 
ranking of a company’s overall performance against those of its industry peers. A rank of 1 
indicates a high relative performance, whereas 10 points to a low relative performance.  
The ISS ESG Corporate Rating assesses companies’ sustainability performance on an absolute 
best-in-class basis. The so-called ISS ESG Prime status takes account of prevailing risks and 
impacts in each sector and denotes companies that meet ISS ESG’s ambitious sustainability 
performance requirements. Companies in high-risk sectors such as oil & gas, for instance, have 
to meet more demanding standards than those in low-risk sectors to obtain the ISS ESG Prime 
status.  
The ratings are updated on an annual basis to ensure that companies reporting such as newly 
published annual and sustainability reports are continuously integrated into the assessments. 
Event-driven updates in relation to major controversies, mergers or significant company 
transactions are equally conducted on a rolling basis. Lastly, a comprehensive dialogue process 
with the rated issuers is carried out once every two to three years.  
                                                     
2 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/08/california-pge-power-shutdown-wildfire  
Chapter 28 
 460 
The corporate rating methodology is reviewed regularly to meet the latest developments in 
science, technology, society and the regulatory landscape. 
3 Environmental aspects of ISS ESG ratings  
The ISS ESG Corporate Rating has two main components: social responsibility and governance 
as well as the environment. These two elements are weighted in accordance with the 
underlying risk and impact classification of each sector. We will focus particularly on 
environmental aspects and explain how the rating and its underlying data can be used by 
investors. 
By default, the environmental rating has three integral parts (see Table 28-2 for a high-level 
overview). The section on environmental management (standard set of indicators) includes 
several topics relevant for all sectors from a risk perspective.  
 
Table 28-2 Components of the environmental rating 
1 Environmental management (standard set of indicators) 
 Environmental management systems 
 Energy management systems, energy use reduction targets, energy use by 
fuel type 
 Climate change strategy: inventories, reduction targets and action plans, 
disclosure of risks and mitigation/adaptation strategies 
 Water risk and impact management 
 Management of environmental risks in the supply chain 
2 Environmental management (sector-specific indicators) 
 Assessment of environmental impacts of the product/service portfolio in 
relation to the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) 
 Indicators specific to industry risks and impacts 
3 Eco-efficiency 
 Time-series analyses of relevant resource use efficiencies (e.g. energy, 
freshwater) and output efficiencies (e.g. greenhouse gas emissions, waste, 
pollutants) 
 
The standard set of environmental topics is complemented by a range of indicators for the 
specific risk profiles of the various industries covered by ISS ESG (section also includes the 
product portfolio assessment) and an analysis of resource use as well as output efficiencies. 
Each indicator is characterized by specific performance requirements often based on 
international standards and frameworks. The indicator ‘Greenhouse gas emission reduction 
targets and action plans’, for instance, requires companies to set science-based targets in line 
with the 2°C scenario adopted by the Paris Agreement to achieve the best possible grade. In 
doing so, ISS ESG draws on the work of the Science-Based Target Initiative. The targets need 
to be underpinned by comprehensive action plans with a clear set of measures, subgoals and 
progress reports.  
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The overall picture that emerges when analyzing the environmental performance of all the 
companies covered by ISS ESG’s universe shows severe shortcomings in all sectors. As shown 
in Figure 28-1, where companies’ environmental performances are rated from A (best) to D 
(worst), the average across all industries is only D+ and therefore largely falls short of 
expectations. More importantly, many of the sectors particularly exposed to environmental 
risks owing to their inherent business models do not fare significantly better.  
Figure 28-1  Environmental performance of selected high-risk industries (as at end 
2019) 
 
 
This subpar performance of high-risk industries holds true for almost all components of the 
environmental rating. Automobile manufacturers are among those companies that somewhat 
buck the trend. Their performance in general environmental procedures and the resource 
efficiency of their operations is clearly above the average. However, they generally perform 
poorly in sector-specific risks and valid contributions to the SDGs. The main focus of their 
corresponding indicators is on product lifecycle assessments, material efficiency, the reduction 
of substances of concern, energy and fuel efficiency, and new mobility concepts. This 
observation of wide-spread underperformance is clearly linked to the major upheaval faced 
by the industry.  
Another sector that we analyzed in depth is electric utilities. Many companies are shifting their 
operations to renewable sources of energy, significantly contributing to the mitigation of 
climate change and a more sustainable global energy system. The ISS ESG Corporate Rating 
strives to ascertain to what extent utility companies mitigate adverse environmental impacts 
from their energy generation and power grid operations. Relevant parameters include air, 
water and soil emissions, waste management, and the protection of biodiversity. In addition, 
the carbon intensity of power generation and companies’ strategies promoting renewable 
energy feature strongly in the assessment.  
Overall, the environmental performance of the companies under our study doesn’t match the 
scale of challenges confronting their sectors, exposing critical deficiencies in their risk 
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management frameworks. Nevertheless, progressive companies that are particularly mindful 
of environmental risks do exist in most industries. The following Table 28-3 illustrates some 
positive examples.  
Table 28-3 Environmental strengths and weaknesses of selected industry leaders (as 
at end 2019) 
 Environmental strengths and weaknesses (non-exhaustive) 
Ø rsted AS (Electric Utilities) 
 + Comprehensive climate change mitigation strategy (including science-based targets) 
 + Sound supplier environmental standards 
 + High-and=increasing share of using renewables 
 + Ambitious strategies to promote renewables 
 + Comprehensive measures addressing adverse environmental impacts from renewable 
power generation and power grid operations 
 - Limited evidence of taking measures to reduce environmental impacts from fossil fuel-fired 
power plants (air emissions, solid waste and wastewater)  
 - Insufficient evidence of monitoring and mitigating impacts on freshwater sources 
Kellogg Company (Food & Beverages) 
 + Convincing climate change mitigation strategy, including science-based targets and 
comprehensive measures aimed at reducing the negative carbon impact of crop farming 
along the value chain 
+ Sound supplier environmental standards 
 + Reasonable measures to promote sustainable soil and biodiversity management in 
agricultural production 
 + Using comparatively high share of certified palm oil 
 + Sound measures to ensure water conservation in agricultural production along the value 
chain 
 + Strategy and/or measures in place designed to reduce food waste in the supply chain and 
in company operations 
 - No clear evidence of monitoring and mitigating impacts on freshwater sources 
 - Low shares of raw materials/products from certified organic farming sources 
 - Limited measures in place to reduce environmental impacts of packaging 
Outokumpu (Metals & Mining) 
 + Comprehensive climate change mitigation strategy (including science-based targets) 
 + Reasonable supplier environmental standards 
 + Comprehensive measures to ensure safe handling of hazardous materials in mining and 
ore processing 
 + A higher share of recycled materials in steel production 
 + Sound measures to promote recycling of scrap metal 
 + Sound procedures managing waste water, hazardous waste and air emissions 
 + Sound measures to ensure facility safety and emergency management 
 - A significant share of energy comes from nuclear power and coal  
 - Limited evidence of measures to monitor and mitigate impacts on freshwater sources 
 - Only some indications suggesting adequate tailings and waste rock management 
   
In recent years, ESG discussions have mostly revolved around climate change, eclipsing other 
major environmental challenges. A topic drawing more attention today is biodiversity 
conservation, in part due to the publication of the Global Assessment Report by the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) in 
May 2019 and other news reports highlighting distressing levels of global biodiversity decline. 
These developments have also piqued the interest of the investment community. The critical 
ISS ESG Corporate Rating and Applications        
463 
issue of biodiversity loss will be brought into global focus by the 15th meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which will 
give new impetus to protection initiatives. The conference was originally set to take place in 
China in 2020 but is likely to be postponed until 2021.    
Companies’ biodiversity impacts are closely linked to their business models and activities. ISS 
ESG has therefore developed a range of indicators for the specific impacts of each sector. 
Industries in the spotlight include construction, chemicals, food & beverages, household & 
personal care products, metals & mining, oil & gas, paper & forest products, pharmaceuticals 
& biotechnology, and utilities. A total of 30 biodiversity-related indicators are applied across 
different sectors, typically focusing on corporate policies, conservation strategies and 
management measures designed to curb negative effects. Two of the most commonly used 
metrics look at the extent to which operational biodiversity risks and impacts are addressed 
and whether companies address the sensitivity of protected areas. Some sectors are also 
particularly subject to supply chain-related risks, underscoring the pivotal importance of 
sustainable procurement practices and corresponding compliance measures.  
4 Applications of ISS ESG corporate rating  
The ISS ESG Corporate Rating can be used in many ways. With a granular, sector-specific and 
risk-oriented methodology, it can be used in a wide range of applications, giving rise to a 
variety of ESG products, some of which are presented below.  
 SDG solutions assessment  
A key element and impact component of the ISS ESG Corporate Rating is the SDG Solutions 
Assessment (SDGA), a tool that lets investors align their investment decisions with the 
achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGA 
identifies to what extent a company’s products and services contribute to or obstruct the 15 
overriding sustainability objectives, eight of which pertain to environmental matters. These 
eight objectives include global challenges such as the mitigation of climate change, sustainable 
energy use, sustainable agriculture and forestry, the conservation of water, the optimized use 
of materials, the promotion of sustainable buildings, and the preservation of both marine and 
terrestrial ecosystems.   
The assessment takes account of companies’ unique and distinctive business impacts with 
regard to each of the objectives, which are evaluated along a continuum from significant 
obstruction (-10), limited obstruction (-5), and no net impact (0), to limited contribution (+5), 
and significant contribution (+10). An exemplary overview of product impacts on climate 
change mitigation is depicted in Figure 28-2:  
Figure 28-2 Illustration of product impacts on “Mitigation of climate change” 
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The analyses are predicated on a classification of companies’ products and services and their 
respective revenue shares. The results can be displayed as revenue percentages, objective 
scores or the aggregated SDG Solutions Score. The SDGA thus helps investors identify both 
sustainability laggards and leaders in relation to the 15 objectives. The following graph 
illustrates the aggregated SDG Solutions Score for a select group of sectors and focuses 
exclusively on environmental objectives: 
Figure 28-3 SDG Solutions Score – Environmental 
 
 
As a general rule, the number of companies across the different industries making significant 
contributions to the SDGs is somewhat limited. In many cases, it is special-solutions providers 
that stand out. Unsurprisingly, companies primarily engaged in the provision of renewable 
energy and energy-efficient equipment, for instance, tend to obtain a positive overall score. At 
the other end of the spectrum, oil exploration and production commonly run counter to the 
achievement of climate change mitigation goals, whereas natural gas is widely seen as a 
transition fuel (neutral evaluation for the time being). However, some nuances exist in the oil 
& gas sector as companies with a strong focus on biofuel production (particularly second-
generation) or renewable energy generation manage to cancel out some of the negative 
effects of their traditional oil business.  
The assessment of other sectors shows a more varied picture. In the automobile industry, for 
example, nearly all companies are seen as impeding global environmental efforts. 
Nevertheless, outliers such as Tesla and BYD demonstrate that more progressive business 
models concentrating on alternative fuels are possible. The electric utilities sector is marked 
by wide-ranging scores, a testament to the fact that many companies still largely rely on fossil 
fuels for energy generation, while others are increasingly shifting to renewable sources. A 
prime example of this transition is the Danish utility company Ørsted AS, which recently 
divested its oil and gas operations. The company is in the process of converting all of its coal-
fired power plants to sustainable biomass and has become a major player in wind power 
generation.   
Lastly, in the mining industry a substantial divergence of impacts on the SDGs can also be 
observed. The sector undoubtedly has significant environmental impacts, is generally very 
water- and energy-intensive and a major contributor of greenhouse gas emissions. Still, the 
scope of environmental impacts is largely determined by production processes and final metal 
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utilization. The multitude contexts of applications and possible uses of the products make it 
difficult to clearly attribute the impacts on the individual SDGs. However, many corporations 
solely engage in the extraction of highly sensitive materials with enormous ecological 
footprints (e.g. gold, diamonds) or operate in highly sensitive ecosystems. On a positive note, 
some companies have geared their business models towards metals recycling (particularly 
aluminium), thus making valuable contributions to the circular economy. A few other players 
are involved in the manufacturing of lightweight metals that promote fuel efficiency in the 
automobile and aviation industry.  
 Index development 
The highly granular ISS ESG Corporate Rating and its comprehensive underlying data can also 
be used for the development of (thematic) indices. Asset managers acquire index licenses for 
the development of various financial products. They can, for instance, track indices via 
exchange traded funds (ETFs) or use indices to design their own benchmarks. ISS ESG 
collaborates with index providers to develop solutions based on high quality, reliable, and 
relevant ESG data.  
In 2007, the Hanover Stock Exchange and ISS ESG (then oekom research AG) jointly developed 
the Global Challenges Index (GCX). Since its inception, the GCX has had a 174-percent rate of 
return of, outperforming several other leading indices.3 The GCX comprises the shares of 50 
companies that help tackle the following seven global challenges:  
▪ mitigating climate change 
▪ ensuring the adequate provision of drinking water 
▪ stopping deforestation and promoting sustainable forestry 
▪ protecting biodiversity  
▪ dealing with population growth 
▪ alleviating poverty  
▪ supporting responsible governance structures  
Multi-level safeguards are in place to ensure a consistent sustainability performance by all the 
companies listed in the GCX. They are premised on the application of performance standards, 
exclusion criteria (covering both controversial business areas and practices) and meaningful 
contributions to the above-mentioned fields of action. The approach is bolstered by 
continuous monitoring efforts, entailing a six-monthly rebalancing of the index coupled with a 
review by an independent expert panel. In doing so, the GCX singles out companies with 
outstanding sustainability credentials and allows investors to benefit from these companies’ 
competitive advantage in light of global transformation and the concomitant risks and 
opportunities. 
Another practical application of the ISS ESG Corporate Rating targeting a distinct impact area 
is illustrated by the newly developed Solactive ISS ESG Beyond Plastic Waste Index. The index 
was devised by Solactive and ISS ESG and only covers companies that tackle the growing plastic 
waste and contribute to the shift to a more circular economy. More specifically, these 
companies offer solutions for reducing plastic pollution, efficient plastic recycling, enhanced 
                                                     
3 https://www.dasinvestment.com/vermoegensverwalter-mark-uwe-falkenhain-nachhaltige-investments-rechnen-sich  
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plastics reusability and the development of viable substitutes for plastic-based products. 
Current index constituents include Brambles Ltd., a supplier of reusable pallets, crates, and 
containers, and BillerudKorsnäs AB, which specializes in pulp and paper manufacturing and 
renewable packaging materials4. The index is available for licensing and may be used as a basis 
for ETFs and structured products, benchmarking purposes or as a starting point for customized 
index strategies. 
 Climate solutions 
Climate change has undoubtedly become one of the most prominent issues in the investment 
community in recent years, not least because of mounting regulatory pressures and 
discussions related to financial risks. The ISS ESG Corporate Rating lays the foundation for 
holistic data insights helping investors gain a better understanding of their exposures to 
climate-related risks. The Carbon Risk Rating (CRR) is an exemplary case assessing a company’s 
climate management performance. The CRR has two components: Carbon Performance Score 
(CPS) and Carbon Risk Classification (CRC). The former draws on more than a hundred 
indicators of a company’s ability to manage climate-related risks through its value chain (see 
Table 28-4). For each company, a certain subset of indicators is applicable (typically 15 to 30 
parameters). The assessment of these indicators is compiled into the Corporate Rating. The 
grades are added up according to their relative weightings in deriving the Corporate Rating, 
thus yielding a CPS from 1.0 (poor performance) to 4.0 (excellent performance).   
The CRC measures a company’s exposure to carbon-related risks from its main business 
activities. It is derived from a proprietary classification system predicated on the GHG emission 
and energy intensity of production (including outsourced services and the transportation of 
products), and the GHG emission and energy intensity of the use of products and services. The 
resulting CRC classifies the climate risk exposure of an industry on a scale from 1.0 (very high 
exposure) to 4.0 (very low risk exposure or positive opportunities outweighing risks).  
A company’s Carbon Risk Rating (CRR) is calculated as the weighted sum of the company’s CPS 
and its CRC (w represents the weighting of the CRC, which is automatically assigned depending 
on the value of the CRC):  
CRR = w * CRC + (1 – w) * CPS 
More than a status quo assessment, the Carbon Risk Rating delivers a comprehensive climate 
and carbon performance analysis giving due consideration to forward-looking targets and 
strategic transformation processes.  
                                                     
4 https://www.solactive.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Press-Release-Solactive-and-ISS-ESG-create-new-Solactive-
ISS-Beyond-Plastic-Waste-Index.pdf  
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Table 28-4 Corporate Rating indicators feeding into the Carbon Risk Rating 
Exemplary cross-sectoral indicators 
 Position on climate change 
 Greenhouse gas emission inventory 
 Emission reduction targets and action plans 
 Disclosure of climate change risks and mitigation strategy 
 Greenhouse gas emission and energy intensity 
 Energy management 
 Business travel and transport 
 Impacts of the product portfolio: ‘Mitigating climate change’ and 
‘Sustainable energy use’ 
 Strategy shift towards a more environmentally beneficial product 
portfolio 
Exemplary industry-specific indicators – Electric Utilities 
 Share of renewables in electricity generation and trend 
 Carbon intensity of energy generation and trend 
 Strategy to promote renewable energy 
 Thermal efficiency of a company’s fossil-fired power plants  
 
Other climate-related data and the state of general climate disclosures are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 33 of this NGFS Occasional Paper. 
5 Conclusion  
The ISS ESG Corporate Rating, its underlying data and derived products provide investors with 
diverse options to realize specific investment strategies. Investors can also assess companies’ 
sustainability performances on an indicator, a topic or overall and ascertain how the selected 
players measure against their peers and industry leaders.  
More specifically, the applications include the targeted selection of stocks and bonds, portfolio 
and index construction, and reporting. Positive criteria screening, ESG integration, exclusions, 
best-in-class approaches and the alignment with global norms and standards are some of the 
widely used methods. Other popular applications include impact investing strategies, which 
intend to generate measurable social or environmental impacts alongside financial returns, 
and efforts to engage directly with companies (engagement and voting). The ISS ESG Corporate 
Rating can be instrumental in supporting all of the aforementioned sustainable investment 
strategies and applications. 
ESG ratings are embedded in a dynamic and fast-paced environment with regulatory 
developments, societal trends and shifts in customer expectations. Sustainable finance 
initiatives are emerging in many parts of the world. At the forefront of this development, the 
EU is devising a classification system, referred to as taxonomy, for economic activities that can 
be considered green or sustainable investments. Financial market participants are expected to 
use the taxonomy to disclose the sustainability of financial products, providing investors with 
transparent and clear information. These disclosures are expected to indicate to what extent 
a product contains taxonomy-compliant green economic activities (as a percentage, calculated 
based on revenue). Economic activities are deemed environmentally sustainable or green if 
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they contribute to one of the six environmental objectives without harming other objectives 
while adhering to minimum social safeguards.  
Outside the EU, several other markets are also devising their own sustainable finance 
standards. ESG ratings must evolve to account for the latest developments and ensure that 
investors are able to respond to multitude regulatory requirements or expectations.   
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  Statistical and AI Tools for ESG Assessment in 
Sustainable Lending and Investing  
 
By 
Olaf Weber1 
University of Waterloo 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the use of complex statistical methods as well as AI methods for ESG 
assessment in lending and investing. Until to date, AI has not been used commercially to 
conduct integrate ESG criteria into lending and decision making. Lending approaches mostly 
use discriminant and regression functions, including logistic regression that is able to process 
categorical data. In investing, analyses are mostly based on regression models, such as those 
based on Carhart’s and French and Fama’s studies. In contrast to financial data, however, ESG 
data is qualitative and has to be gathered from reports. In these cases, AI could be able to 
improve the integration of ESG into financial decision making through the use of data 
gathering and analysis tools. 
Keywords: lending, investment, artificial intelligence, ESG 
1 Introduction 
Statistical and AI based tools have a long tradition in credit risk assessment and in other risk 
assessment fields in finance and banking (Weber, 1997). In credit risk assessment, multivariate 
statistical algorithms have been used since the 1960s (Altman & Saunders, 1997). Particularly, 
the discriminant analysis approach by Altman (1968) revolutionized credit risks assessment. 
Later, in the 1990, banks and other lenders started to implement decision support systems 
that also have been called expert systems to support credit risk assessment (Weber, 1997). 
Also, AI tools, such as rule-based systems (Puppe, 2012), fuzzy systems (Yager & Zadeh, 2012), 
and neural networks (West, 2000) have been researched and used since the 1990s and 
complemented complex statistical approaches of credit risk assessment. 
In addition, investment decisions and financial market analyses used statistical approaches 
such as regressions (Carhart, 1997) to analyze the financial market performance of stocks. Also 
in this field, AI methods, such as artificial neural networks, expert systems and hybrid 
intelligence systems have been used successfully (Bahrammirzaee, 2010). 
Later, these methods have also been used to integrate environmental, social, and governance 
criteria into commercial credit risk assessment (Weber et al., 2015), portfolio risk analyses 
(Battiston et al., 2017), and ESG ratings of companies (Weber et al., 2008). The use of AI tools 
in ESG assessment, however, is still in a nascent phase, and to the best knowledge of the author, 
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no applications have been reported. While ESG assessment in credit risk management mainly 
relies on statistical methods, such as regression analyses, ESG assessment in investment 
decisions mainly relies on the calculation of alpha based on Carhart’s model and the 
application of regression analyses and time series models. 
This Chapter will introduce complex quantitative methods that have been used to integrate 
ESG factors into credit risk assessment and investment decision making. Examples are taken 
from commercial credit risk assessment, ESG analyses of companies, and low-carbon 
investment decisions. Furthermore, we will present some conclusions on why and how AI 
could and should be used in ESG assessment. 
2 Intended users of the study 
This study is intended for lenders, investors, and financial regulators. Lenders and investors 
will gain insights about how complex statistical approaches as well as AI are able to increase 
the validity of their risk assessment procedures through the integration of ESG criteria. 
Furthermore, regulators might integrate ESG criteria into the risk assessment of the banks and 
investors they regulate. To date, with the exception of China and the Bank of England, no 
financial regulators has addressed climate and environmental challenges in their risk 
assessment and risk evaluation of chartered banks and other financial institutions. The 
presented methods and results might help them to introduce ESG risks into their risk 
assessment procedures and practices because they are based on quantitative analyses. 
3 Credit risk assessment approaches 
The lending business has been one of the first financial services to try to integrate ESG criteria 
into business decisions because they have been affected by the introduction of environmental 
laws and regulations that address the trade of contaminated sites and the liabilities of 
polluters for environmental impacts (Weber & Remer, 2011). The first credit defaults 
influenced by environmental risks occurred in 1990s (Scholz et al., 1995). Since then, 
environmental risks have usually been integrated into commercial credit risk and project 
finance assessments. Consequently, the lending business has been the first field of banking to 
introduce systematic assessment procedures for environmental, social and governance 
impacts. 
Most models to integrate ESG risks into credit risk assessment are based on discriminant 
analytic and regression models used for conventional credit risk assessment. The conventional 
models and their use are described in Altman and Saunders (1997) and in Caouette et al. 
(1998). The quality of the prediction of the models is often evaluated by calculating the Area 
under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC) (Zhou et al., 2009). 
An example for a function for the conventional discriminant analysis used for credit risk 
prediction is 
Z = β1x1 + β2x2 + ⋯ + βnxn 
where β1, β2,…, βn,= discriminant coefficients 
 x1, x2,…, xn,= explanatory variables  
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For conventional systems, independent variables might be financial variables, such as working 
capital / total assets, retained earnings / total assets, etc. (Altman, 1968). 
Similar to discriminant analysis, logistic regression strives to predict the probability that a 
credit belongs to the group of defaults or non-defaults (Laitinen, 1999). The function for the 
logistic regression looks as follows: 
Π =
exp[B0 + ∑ BiXi
n
i=1 ]
1 + exp[B0 + BiXi]
 
Where 
Π = conditional probability that the company is risky 
X1, Xn, … Xn= explanatory variables 
B1, Bn, … Bn= parameters of the logistic regression model 
Again, financial or management indicators have been used as explanatory variables to predict 
the default probability. 
The third statistical approach to predicting credit risks is the linear regression approach that 
assumes that the dependent variable is not categorized in two groups but is continuous. The 
function can be described as follows: 
Y = B0 + ∑ BiXi
n
i=1
+ e 
Where 
Y = credit risk rating 
X1, Xn, … Xn= explanatory variables 
B1, Bn, … Bn= parameters of the linear regression model 
4 Integration of ESG risks into commercial credit risk assessment and 
credit portfolio management 
Based on these models ESG indicators have been integrated into credit risk assessment 
systems to understand the contribution of ESG indicators to credit risks and to improve the 
predictive validity of the credit risk assessment through the addition of indicators. If ESG 
indicators are correlated with the credit risk they should be able to increase the explanation 
of variance r2 of the discriminant or regression functions. 
Hence, one study used discriminant analysis to analyze whether adding ESG criteria increases 
the validity of the credit rating in commercial lending (Weber et al., 2010). The original 
function used 33 criteria that are used in a conventional credit risk assessment system. 
Furthermore, 31 economic sustainability criteria, 15 environmental, and 6 social criteria have 
been added (Weber, 1997). The results indicated a significant increase in correct default 
predictions of the function that includes the ESG criteria compared to the function without 
Statistical and AI Tools for ESG Assessment in Sustainable Lending and Investing         
473 
ESG criteria. The ratio of correct predictions without ESG criteria has been 78.9 percent while 
the ratio of correct predictions with added SESG criteria has been 86.6 percent which is 
significantly higher. 
A similar approach based on logistic regression has been used by Weber et al. (2015) to analyze 
the effect of adding ESG criteria to the credit risk rating systems in Bangladesh banks. The 
advantage of logistic regression models is that the independent variables can be categorical or 
continuous. Furthermore, the model does not assume normal distribution of the variables. In 
this study, 31 economic sustainability indicators, 16 environmental, and 7 social criteria have 
been added to the conventional assessment system used by Bangladesh banks that is based 
on 20 indicators addressing financial risks, business risk, management risk, and relationship 
risk. Again, adding ESG criteria through a multivariate regression analysis increased the 
predictive validity of the credit risk assessment system. While the indicator for variance 
explanation R2 = 0.21 for the conventional credit risk assessment system it increases to R2 = 
0.472 if ESG criteria are added to the function. In this case even the use of ESG criteria alone 
increased the predictive validity of the system to R2= 0.398. 
A third example of the use of complex statistical approaches is the analysis of the connection 
between green lending and non-performing loans in Chinese banks. Based on studies that 
found a positive connection between having a high ESG performance and financial 
performance (Friede et al., 2015), a study used a two-stage least-square regression analysis to 
analyze the connection between the green credit ratio of a bank on their non-performing loans 
ratio. 
The two-stage model looks as follows: 
First stage:  X̂ =  γ0 + γ1Z +  γ2W + u 
Second stage: Y = β0 + β1X̅ + β2W + u   
Where 
X̅ == predicted management’s decision on the proportion of green credit in terms of total loans, 
Y = NPL ratio, 
Z = instrumental variable (type of bank), 
W = exogenous variables (credit quality, Return on Assets (ROA), cost efficiency, solvency, size 
of bank). 
The results of the two-stage least-square regression can explain 39 percent of the variance of 
the non-performing loan ratio. Hence, again, multivariate statistical algorithms are able to 
explain the influence of ESG performance on financial performance. 
5 Using ESG indicators to analyze corporate financial risks 
In addition to commercial lending, multivariate approaches have been used to analyze the 
connection between the corporate sustainability performance and the financial performance 
of firms. Often regression models are used. Some studies use regression models to calculate 
abnormal returns based on Carhart’s (1997) or Fama and French’s (2004) models, while other 
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studies use statistical methods to predict corporate financial performance based on corporate 
sustainability performance. 
One example that uses logistic regression (Anderson, 1984) is a study by Weber et al. (2008) 
that employs ESG criteria to predict accounting indicators, such as EBITDA margin (EBITDA 
margin), Return on Assets (ROA), and Return on Equity (ROE) as well as financial market 
indicators, such as Total Returns (TR). Independent variables ESG drivers and outcomes have 
been used in this analysis. To calculate ESG performance the following regression function has 
been used: 
Environment = β1 * materials + β2 * energy + β3 * water + β4 * biodiversity + β5 * emissions + 
β6 * products and services + β7 * compliance and expenditures + c  
Social = β1 * employment + β2 * labour management relations + β3 * health and safety + β4 * 
training and education + β5 * diversity and opportunity + β6 * human rights + β7 * society + β8 
* product responsibility + c  
Governance = β1 * stakeholder profile and engagement + β2 * governance structure, 
management systems and overarching policies + c.  
The results indicate that the statistical approach is useful to show that ESG performance can 
explain corporate financial performance with regard to EBITDA margin, ROA, and ROE. 
However, it cannot predict TR, because there might be too many other important influences 
on TR (Cerin & Dobers, 2001) or that the shareholders do not integrate sustainability 
performance into the price of the company shares, as suggested by Schaltegger and Figge 
(2000). 
Another study with a similar goal that addresses the connection between ESG performance 
and financial performance of Chinese banks used panel regression to analyze the impact of 
ESG performance on financial performance over time (Weber, 2017). To analyze Granger 
causality (Granger, 1969) a time-lagged approach has been used to analyze cause-and-effect 
between ESG and financial performance. Compared to the methods above, time-lagged panel 
regression delivered better information about cause-and-effect. It was possible to explain 46 
percent of the variance in total assets and 52 percent of the variance in net-profits using a 
time-lag approach with one- and two-year delays for a sample that offered data for 5 years. 
6 The use of AI to improve ESG assessment 
There is no doubt that the integration of ESG data is useful for financial decision makers (Monk 
et al., 2019). However, though statistical analyses help to integrate ESG into lending and 
investment decision making, AI might be able to contribute to a better integration.  
Until to date the discussion about whether and how ESG should be integrated into financial 
decision making is ongoing. While particularly early studies suggested a trade-off between the 
ESG and financial performance (Bauer et al., 2005), more recent studies found that ESG and 
financial performance go hand in hand (Cui et al., 2018; Friede et al., 2015). One reason for 
these mixed results might be the heterogeneity of ESG ratings (Berg et al., 2019) caused by 
differences in measurement and because of subjectivity.  
AI may improve the collection and data as well as its analysis (In et al., 2019). New technologies 
are able to find and code information automatically. For instance, tools such as Twarc are able 
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to analyze Twitter with regard to ESG related tweets. These tweets, including responses, can 
be analyzed to assess the ESG performance of a company. 
Furthermore, AI provides methods to analyze mixed data. In contrast to financial data, ESG 
data can be text data, categorical data, and quantitative. Many statistical methods are not able 
to process different types of data. AI methods, such as machine learning or neural networks, 
however, are able to process different types of data. Furthermore, these methods are able to 
recognize patterns without assuming a certain distribution of the data, such as normal 
distribution. Since, ESG evaluation usually does not follow statistical distributions, AI methods 
might be better suited to simulate human decision making that statistical methods. 
7 Potential applications and outlook 
Although the use of statistical methods is great progress in analyzing the impact of ESG data, 
AI methods might be useful to achieve more detailed insights about the connection between 
ESG and financial performance. The following sections present a number of potential 
applications of AI that can help enhance the performance of ESG analysis. 
• Mixing of quantitative and qualitative data. A number of AI methods are able to 
process a mix of quantitative and qualitative data. Often ESG performance can be 
analyzed using qualitative data. One example is the analysis of ESG and CSR reports. 
Currently, most analyses are conducted by researchers that analyze reports through 
keyword searches or text analyses. Though these tasks are supported through 
software-based text analysis tools, they are often a long-term and error-prone task. AI 
methods that are able to analyze texts and extract performance indicators might be a 
next step in using AI for ESG analysis. For instance, the company RepRisk 
(www.reprisk.com) uses machine learning to extract information about the ESG 
performance of companies from information available on the internet, including 
reports. This information can be extracted and analyzed through machine learning to 
monitor firms with regard to their ESG performance. 
• Integrate both quantitative and qualitative data.  Furthermore, AI methods are often 
able to integrate both, quantitative and qualitative data into their analyses. Since, ESG 
data is often qualitative, methods, such as neural networks, rule-based systems, and 
tools based on fuzzy logic might be helpful to analyze the connection between ESG 
and financial risks. Neural networks, for instance, have been used to analyze corporate 
credit risks. The systems cluster balance sheet information and qualitative 
management evaluation to calculate commercial credit risks (Baetge et al., 1996). 
• Conducting non-linear analyses. AI tools are also able to conduct non-linear analyses 
in contrast to many statistical approaches used in the literature. Some studies found 
non-linear relations between ESG and financial performance (Wagner & Blom, 2011). 
Analyzing non-linear or fuzzy relationships, however, are not strengths of statistical 
methods. Therefore, we propose to analyze the usefulness of AI methods to analyze 
ESG. Non-parametric nearest neighbor classification, for instance, is able to classify 
commercial borrowers with regard to their credit risk based on the similarity of their 
balance sheets (Weber, 1997). 
• Creation of high frequency data. AI methods might also be helpful to create more 
frequent ESG data. Often financial analysts and researchers complain about the 
frequency of ESG data because the data is gathered annually based on corporate ESG 
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reporting or ESG databases, while financial data is much more frequently available. 
Hence, AI might be able to analyze media and stakeholder feedbacks on the ESG 
performance of firms to create real-time ESG performance data. This data can be 
integrated in standard models that analyze financial data. In China, high frequency 
data on environmental performance of companies (such as penalties imposed by 
environmental regulators, media coverage of negative news, and emission data) have 
been used by Tsinghua University to create ESG indicators.    
• Working with small databases. Multivariate statistical algorithms need relatively big 
databases to produce robust results. However, rule-based systems, an AI application, 
might be able to analyze the ESG performance of firms without a high number of data 
points. Furthermore, it might be able to create rules for cause-and-effect based on 
heterogeneous data instead of correlations that often cannot be explained. Fuzzy rule-
based credit scoring systems, for instance, are able to develop rules than can classify 
commercial loans with regard to their risk (Gorzałczany & Rudziński, 2016). The 
advantage of such systems is that the results can be better interpreted because they 
are based on rules and not on statistical classification.  
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Abstract 
Many financial institutions and corporations are turning to ESG rating agencies and ESG data 
providers to help them identify ESG factors in their investment portfolios as well as in their 
own operations. ESG rating agencies and data providers offer a wide range of products. 
However, each agency has developed its own research scope, scoring methodology, and 
sources of raw data to assess a company’s corporate sustainability and ESG factors. This 
chapter gives an overview of ESG rating and data providers and their scoring approaches. It 
further outlines ESG-related investment products and investment strategies. 
Keywords: rating agencies, ESG, SRI, CSR, impact investing, due diligence, AI, SRI indices 
1 Background to ESG investing 
The last decade has seen a surging interest in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
issues, amid recognition that non-financial risks, often referred to as ESG risks, can have an 
impact on the future financial performance of companies. As a result, institutional and retail 
investors are increasingly incorporating ESG factors, as well as traditional financial analysis, 
into their investment decision-making processes. 
Various reports and academic studies have shown that portfolios that integrate ESG factors 
into financial analysis have outperformed over the medium to long term.2 In 2016, a study 
produced by Barclays found “that a positive ESG tilt resulted in a small but steady performance 
advantage” and that “no evidence of a negative performance impact was found.”3 
There are also clear signs that investors are embracing sustainable investing. According to the 
2018 Global Sustainable Investment Review, sustainable investing assets were just over USD 
30 trillion at the beginning of 2018, a 34 percent increase from 2016.4 
As of October 2019, the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investing (PRI) had more 
than 2,500 signatories, representing over USD 80 trillion in assets under management. 5 
                                                     
1  This chapter is written by Stella Kenway, Senior ESG Research Analyst, email: stella.kenway@repriskcom (Author), 
Alessandra Oglino, Senior ESG Advisor, alessandra.oglino@reprisk.com (Editor), Gina Walser, Head of Marketing and 
Communications, email: gina.walser@reprsik.com (Editor).  
2 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3004689; https://www.bcg.com/publications/2019/asset-
managers-seize-lead-sustainable-investing.aspx; https://us.allianzgi.com/en-us/institutional/sustainability/sustainable-
ideas/how-do-esg-factors-impact-portfolio-performance  
3  https://www.investmentbank.barclays.com/content/dam/barclaysmicrosites/ibpublic/documents/our-
insights/esg/barclays-sustainable-investing-and-bond-returns-3.6mb.pdf 
4 http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/GSIR_Review2018.3.28.pdf  
5 https://www.lazardassetmanagement.com/research-insights/lazard-insights/green-bonds-growing-role-in-esg-
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Signatories of the PRI agree to implement six voluntary Principles, including three that relate 
to ESG issues:6 
• We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making 
processes. 
• We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and 
practices. 
• We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest. 
Islamic finance, sometimes known as Sharia investing, which excludes investments in sectors 
that do not fit with the principles of the Muslim religion, such as the production and sale of 
alcohol, pork, pornography, gambling, and military equipment, has also grown considerably. 
The Malaysia Islamic International Financial Center estimated that the global Islamic assets 
under management totaled USD 70.8 billion in March 2017, up from USD 47 billion in 2008.7  
2 History of ESG investing  
In Europe, ESG investing, known originally as socially responsible investing (SRI), can trace its 
roots back 200 years to when faith-based movements, such as the Christian Methodists and 
the Quakers, called on their followers to avoid investing in entities that made a profit from 
certain products and activities, such as alcohol, tobacco, weapons, or gambling, that harmed 
the community. Sharia investing dates back to the beginning of Islam in the seventh century. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries some philanthropic investors used their 
wealth to support socially beneficial ventures. 
It was in the 1960s, however, that investors began deselecting companies, such as weapons 
manufacturers, that were accused of fueling the conflict in Vietnam. A decade later, investors 
also began excluding companies operating in South Africa due to concerns over the country’s 
Apartheid regime. The 1980s saw a growth in social concerns related to investment decisions, 
and by the 1990s 400 US corporations agreed to join the Domini Social Index, which measured 
their social and environmental performance. In recent years, concerns about climate change 
have been driving sustainable investing. The UN-backed 2015 Paris Climate Accord has 
triggered calls for companies to disclose and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and 
provided momentum for investors to consider climate and environmental factors in their 
portfolio selection.  
At the beginning of the new millennium, the prevailing assumption was that companies would 
have to accept lower profits in order to maintain ethical principles. This concept changed, 
however, due to a growing recognition that non-financial factors can affect a company’s 
financial performance. Therefore, investment managers that take such ESG factors into 
consideration could potentially reduce risk and even improve the performance of their 
portfolios. A 2009 report published by the UN Environment Programme Finance Initiative 
(UNEP FI) entitled, “Fiduciary Duty,” concluded that: “we believe that the global economy has 
now reached the point where ESG issues are a critical consideration for all institutional 
                                                     
investing  
6 https://www.unpri.org/pri/an-introduction-to-responsible-investment/what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-
investment  
7 https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shariah-compliant-funds.asp  
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investors and their agents.” 8 In 2017, InvestmentNews reported that the new generation of 
investors, which includes millennials as well as women, also favor socially responsible investing.   
Early names for responsible investing included such terms as “green investing”, “eco-investing”, 
“socially responsible investing (SRI)”, “sustainable investing”, and “ethical investing”. However, 
in the financial services sector, “ESG investing” and “impact investing” seem to have now 
become the most widely accepted terms.  
3 ESG rating agencies 
The measurement of non-financial risks can be difficult, and asset managers and financial 
institutions are increasingly turning to ESG rating agencies and ESG data providers to help 
them identify ESG risks and opportunities in their portfolios. Unlike financial rating agencies, 
whose services are paid for by the entity that is seeking a rating for itself, the services of ESG 
ratings agencies are paid for by investors.  
Each ESG rating agency has developed its own methodology to research and assess a 
company’s corporate sustainability or social impact. Some ESG rating agencies combine both 
financial and non-financial data, while others provide only non-financial information. This data 
helps investors analyze ESG risks and identify trends. 
There has been considerable consolidation of ESG rating agencies over the past few years. 
Some agencies have merged or have been taken over, and there are some new players in the 
market. Examples include: In July 2017, the US financial services firm Morningstar acquired a 
40 percent stake in Sustainalytics, an ESG ratings agency headquartered in the Netherlands.9 
In April 2019, Moody’s Corporation acquired a majority stake in Paris-based Vigeo Eiris10 (itself 
a merger of Paris-based Vigeo and UK-based EIRIS which took place in 2015), and in August 
2019, the London Stock Exchange Group proposed an all share acquisition of Refinitiv, an ESG 
data provider jointly owned by the Blackstone Group and Thomson Reuters.11 Some major 
agencies have entered into research partnerships with local agencies or opened regional 
offices in order to enhance their geographic coverage, while others have partnered with 
specialist agencies to enable them to provide specific data on issues such as greenhouse gas 
emissions. For example, in March 2018, the proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder 
Services bought the German-based rating agency Oekom Research. In the same month 
Sustainalytics acquired certain assets from the Indian-based research company Solaron 
Sustainability Services to boost its coverage of Asia.   
4 ESG-related products and services 
The major ESG rating agencies and data providers offer a wide range of products: 
Norm-based analysis 
Companies are assessed according to their compliance with international standards and 
conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDR), the conventions of 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the 10 Principles of the United National Global 
                                                     
8https://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/events/2009/roundtable/WS14McQuillen.pdf   
9 https://www.sustainalytics.com/esg-investing-news/morningstar-acquire-stake-sustainalytics/  
10 https://ir.moodys.com/news-and-financials/press-releases/press-release-details/2019/Moodys-Acquires-Majority-
Stake-in-Vigeo-Eiris-a-Global-Leader-in-ESG-Assessments/default.aspx 
11 https://www.lseg.com/resources/media-centre/press-releases/proposed-all-share-acquisition-refinitiv-create-
financial-markets-infrastructure-leader-future 
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Compact (UNGC). Any incidents that conflict with these standards are then categorized 
according to severity as well as the quality of the company’s response.  
ESG analysis of companies 
ESG rating agencies use their own proprietary methodology to analyze a company’s ESG 
performance and compare it with the company’s own policies. Most agencies use 
international standards such as the World Bank Group Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Guidelines, the IFC Performance Standards, the Equator Principles, the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, and the ILO Conventions as a benchmark for their analysis and to 
provide an overall rating for the company. 
Evaluation of portfolios 
Many ESG rating agencies offer investors an ESG risk assessment at the portfolio level, which 
allows investors to compare their exposure to ESG risks across different portfolios.   
SRI indices 
Some ESG rating agencies analyze selected issuers included in traditional indices (e.g., Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index, FTSE4Good) to create an SRI index. Companies are eager to be 
included in such indices as it highlights their commitment to sustainability.  
Analysis of countries 
Some ESG ratings agencies have developed methodologies that allow them to give an ESG 
rating to countries. Such analysis is usually based on major international conventions as well 
as from data from such entities as the World Bank and Transparency International. 
Controversy alerts 
These alert services warn investors of new ESG violations and controversies associated with 
companies in their portfolio.  
Corporate engagement 
Most major ESG rating agencies offer engagement services whereby the agency has direct 
contact with the company concerned – often in the form of sending questionnaires – to assess 
the company’s response to an ESG risk incident or allegation.  
Governance and proxy voting 
Shareholder voting allows shareholders to influence a company’s corporate governance and 
social responsibility commitments. Specialized agencies deliver the required documentation 
to shareholders to allow them to vote for, or against, the resolutions presented.  
Green bonds verification 
Green bonds, also sometimes known as climate bonds or SDG-linked bonds, are fixed-income 
financial instruments linked to climate change solutions and other environmental projects. 
Some ESG rating agencies provide verification services to check whether the bonds align with 
Green and Social Bond Principles.   
5 Methodologies used by ESG rating agencies   
Most ESG rating agencies and data providers measure a company’s ESG performance by 
analyzing data points across different categories of sustainability criteria (e.g. emissions, waste 
management, transparency, executive compensation, etc.). This analysis is used to create 
sustainability scores, which are used by asset owners and managers in their investment 
strategies, for CSR and sustainability reporting, and supply chain monitoring.   
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However, each ESG rating agency has developed its own research scope, incorporating 
different categories of sustainability, different measurements, and different weightings in the 
overall ESG score.  There is also a divergence in the types of raw data sources used by ESG 
rating agencies and ESG data providers. 
ESG rating agencies 
Most traditional ESG ratings agencies analyze the performance of a finite selection of listed 
companies by basing their analysis on information obtained from the companies themselves; 
for example, performing a content analysis of corporate communications, such as the 
company’s Corporate Responsibility Report and website, to flag certain keywords related to 
ESG issues. Some agencies collect data about ESG performance by sending questionnaires to 
the companies that are being assessed, and engage with stakeholders such as NGOs, 
government bodies, or trade unions. Most agencies use international standards, such as the 
ILO Conventions, the UN Global Compact, and the Declaration of Human Rights, as a 
benchmark for their analysis. They then use their own methodologies to analyze the data and 
determine a rating for each company. The ratings and analysis are usually updated two or three 
times a year.  
ESG data providers 
The increasing demand for reliable and timely ESG data has given rise to ESG data providers 
that use technology – such as artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms – to 
screen vast quantities of unstructured data from sources external to a company, such as news 
articles, NGO reports, social media and other sources. Automated search tools using pre-
defined keywords linked to specific ESG issues (e.g., climate change, water scarcity, labor 
relations, corporate governance, etc.) can scan vast quantities of data to identify risk incidents 
and controversies related to a company’s ESG performance and sustainability. This data can 
then be used to compile ESG scores and metrics, which are used by clients such as banks, 
institutional investors and investment managers for due diligence and risk management.  
Specialist ESG data providers 
Specialist ESG data providers have developed expertise in niche markets. Some providers 
assign ratings to countries by using publicly available data from sources such as the World Bank, 
Eurostat, and Transparency International, while others focus on single issues such as climate 
change, water scarcity, plastic pollution, or CO2 emissions. There are also a growing number of 
alternative data providers that rely on non-traditional sources; for example, satellite images 
can be used to monitor risk incidents such as oil spills or natural disasters such as forest fires. 
However, these AI systems and machine learning algorithms are only as powerful as the quality 
of the data upon which they are built. To solve for this challenge, leading ESG data providers 
combine artificial intelligence with human intelligence by training analysts how to use a rules-
based methodology to evaluate raw data. This system of quality control ensures that the final 
research and analytics are relevant and actionable. These annotated or curated data points 
can also be used to train machine learning algorithms, ultimately making them faster and more 
accurate over time. By combining the best of both the machine and human worlds, these AI-
driven data providers can show whether a company’s policies actually translate into 
performance on the ground – in effect, providing a “reality check” on whether a company 
walks the walk instead of just talking the talk.  
The timeliness, granularity and availability of such data – and the scope and scale of the 
underlying databases – makes these datasets ideal as inputs into quantitative investing 
strategies. The longer the dataset, the better it can be used to back-test trading strategies or 
conduct research. This is an important differentiator among AI-driven ESG data providers, 
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since some firms have an unbroken time series of high-quality data that dates back more than 
10 years, while other firms may only have a few years of data or rely on back-filled data, which 
tends to be less reliable. 
Scoring methods 
ESG rating agencies and ESG data providers have developed their own scoring methodology 
to assess a company’s corporate sustainability performance. The scores of many ESG rating 
agencies follow the methodology of credit rating agencies, and are expressed as a letter grade, 
usually ranging from A+ – D-, with an A grade denoting a high level of corporate sustainability.  
ESG data providers more frequently use numeric values. Other ESG scoring systems include 
percentages, heat maps, Boolean logic (true/false statements), and “traffic light” 
classifications. 
6 Categories of sustainable investment 
Institutional investors take different approaches when it comes to sustainable investing. Some 
rely on ESG integration strategies, while others primarily employ exclusionary or negative 
screening strategies. There is also thematic investing, which focuses on investing in a specific 
theme such as those defined by the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and impact 
investing, which seeks to generate a measurable positive social or environment impact. The 
Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA) has defined seven categories of sustainable 
investment: 12  
Negative/exclusionary screening: the exclusion from a fund or portfolio of certain sectors, 
companies, or practices based on specific ESG criteria 
Positive/Best in class screening: investment in sectors, companies or projects selected for 
positive ESG performance relative to industry peers 
Norms-based screening: screening of investments against minimum standards of business 
practice based on international norms, such as those issued by the International Labour 
Organization, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the United Nations Global 
Compact Principles  
ESG integration: the systematic and explicit inclusion by investment managers of 
environmental, social and governance factors into financial analysis 
Sustainability themed investing: investment in themes or assets specifically related to 
sustainability such as clean energy, green technology, or sustainable agriculture 
Impact/community investing: targeted investments aimed at solving social or environmental 
problems and including community investing, where capital is specifically directed to 
traditionally underserved individuals or communities, as well as financing that is provided to 
businesses with a clear social or environmental purpose 
Corporate engagement and shareholder action: the use of shareholder power to influence 
corporate behavior, including through direct corporate engagement, filing or co-filing 
shareholder proposals, and proxy voting that is guided by comprehensive ESG guidelines 
                                                     
12 http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/GSIR_Review2018.3.28.pdf  
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According to the GSIA, although most global investors, particularly those in Europe, rely on 
negative or exclusionary screening, ESG integration has been widely adopted by US, Canadian, 
Australian, and New Zealand-based investors, and grew by 69 percent between 2016 and 2018. 
Japanese investors reportedly rely more on corporate engagement and shareholder action.  
In addition to the above-mentioned approaches to sustainable investing, many investors also 
invest via CSR or ESG index products.  CSR or ESG indices were developed at both national and 
international levels to establish a benchmark for companies involved in sustainable activities, 
and provide the basis for many ETF products. Many companies dedicate considerable 
resources to maximize their chances of being included in one of the major CSR Indices.   
7 Challenges facing ESG rating agencies and ESG data providers 
ESG ratings agencies have been the subject of recent criticism, with some investors skeptical 
about the reliability of such data. The controversy mainly revolves around inconsistencies in 
the ESG scores provided by different rating agencies for the same company. A 2018 report 
published by the Asian investment bank CLSA and the Asian Corporate Governance Association 
warns: “the quality and comparability of ESG data remains hotly contested and we would 
caution against over-reliance on simple ESG scores.”13 A graph from the report was published 
in an FT article in December 2018 highlighted the lack of consistency among company ratings 
by different providers.14  
Such inconsistencies may arise because each ESG rating agency uses its own methodology and 
those methodologies have often changed over time. Agencies may base their analysis on 
different definitions of ESG performance and may adopt different approaches to measuring 
such performance, especially by giving different weights to certain ESG factors in the final 
score. For example, one agency might include tax optimization as one of its criteria, while 
another may not, leading to differences in the final rating.  
Agencies may also use different indicators to measure the same ESG issue. For example, a 
firm’s gender equality could be evaluated on the basis of the number of female staff in 
management positions, or by comparing the salaries of male and female staff, or both. A study 
published in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance confirmed that inconsistencies lead to 
significantly different results for the same group of companies, and cited as an example over 
20 different ways companies report their employee health and safety data. Similarly, a study 
published by MIT and University of Zurich researchers entitled, “Aggregate Confusion: The 
Divergence of ESG Ratings,” found that “measurement divergence” (i.e., the different ways 
ESG criteria are measured) explains more than 50 percent of the inconsistencies across ESG 
ratings (Berg et al., 2019). 
Most ESG rating agencies primarily measure the self-reported sustainability of a company’s 
operations and do not take into account the ethical impact of the business activities. This may 
lead them to rate a weapons manufacturer as high as a manufacturer of solar panels. When it 
comes to adverse impacts and risks, self-reported information may not be reliable and sources 
from third-parties are needed to help assess whether a company’s policies and processes are 
translating into actual performance on the ground.  
ESG rating agencies that rely on questionnaires may also find that socially responsible 
companies are more likely to respond than companies that are less concerned about corporate 
                                                     
13 https://corporate-citizenship.com/2019/03/26/message-to-the-sceptics-sustainability-is-the-future-of-investing/  
14 https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/12/06/1544076001000/Lies--damned-lies-and-ESG-rating-methodologies/  
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responsibility. This bias could of course be solved by mandatory and standardized disclosures 
of information. While many government and regulatory agencies (particularly those in Europe) 
are actively working towards instituting mandated disclosures, it may be several years before 
the current patchwork of different frameworks evolves into a single universal standard (or 
standards).  
Another shortcoming among some ESG rating agencies and data providers is their limited 
coverage of private companies, emerging markets companies, and infrastructure projects, all 
of which tend to have less available data about them than large, listed companies in developed 
countries. While some data providers focus only on those companies where data is relatively 
easily accessible, other data providers take a broader approach that allows them to cover a 
larger section of the market.   
Data providers that exclusively use artificial intelligence also face the challenges of sorting the 
vast quantities of data obtained from automated searches into relevant and actionable insights 
that can be used to make better-informed investment and business decisions. These AI-driven 
data providers have also been criticized for focusing on the speed rather than the relevance of 
the information, resulting in a lot of data “noise.”15  
8 How do companies use ESG ratings and ESG data? 
Different types of companies have different uses for ESG ratings and ESG data. For a large 
corporation, an ESG rating or data point may provide senior managers with a better 
understanding of their business risks and potential areas of improvement. For example, a food 
or beverage company may discover that it uses significantly more water and energy resources 
than any of its competitors, a sign of operational inefficiencies that may have a material impact 
on that company’s share price and future financial prospects. 
For banks and insurance companies, ESG data could be used as an input into due diligence and 
risk management. Both banking and insurance professionals are often responsible for deciding 
whether to extend a loan (or an insurance policy) to a particular business, and at what interest 
rate (or insurance premium). These professionals rely on ESG data to evaluate the relevant ESG 
risks for a business, which can then be used to estimate the chances of a default or a coverage 
trigger and thereby determine an appropriate risk-return trade-off.  
By far the biggest consumers of ESG ratings and data to-date are institutional investors and 
investment management firms. This should come as no surprise given that ESG factors are well 
understood to affect a company’s performance, and therefore have the potential to affect an 
investor’s portfolio and financial returns. But there is a wide disparity in how the investment 
community incorporates ESG data into their research and investment processes, which is 
reflected in the earlier section on “Categories of sustainable investment.” 
In general, ESG data is used as one of many inputs to guide investment decision-making. For 
some investors, a low ESG rating or a high frequency of ESG risk incidents is reason enough to 
exclude a company from a portfolio (i.e., negative screening). Likewise, some investors may 
prefer to only invest in companies that score above a certain ESG rating threshold or have 
minimal controversies (i.e., positive screening). Other investors may take a more nuanced 
approach that considers the overall risk-return profile for a particular investment based on 
that company’s financial and non-financial performance. The most sophisticated investors will 
                                                     
15 https://www.ipe.com/investment/asset-class-reports/small-and-mid-caps/esg-awareness-grows/10033571.article  
Overview of ESG Rating, Data Providers and Applications         
487 
use ESG data to measure and report on a company’s performance on certain ESG issues, and 
also use shareholder engagement tactics to pressure a company to improve. 
As the quality and quantity of ESG data have improved, so too has the range of approaches 
aiming at mining the data for investment risks and opportunities. Some investment firms are 
using a number of external ESG data and research sources to complement their own in-house 
research and investment processes, thereby allowing them to get a more complete picture of 
a company’s behavior and intentions. A growing number of firms are also looking at ways to 
incorporate ESG data into their quantitative investing strategies, which rely on AI and machine 
learning algorithms to parse through large datasets at hyper speeds looking for material signals.  
These different approaches and use cases all come with their respective advantages and 
disadvantages. But there is a broad consensus in the marketplace that ESG ratings and ESG 
data can, at the very least, be used to better inform business and investment decisions. 
9 Outlook for ESG ratings 
The ESG Ratings sector is changing fast, and there is a growing call for open and transparent 
disclosure standards and transparency in ESG reporting and scoring. Traditionally, 
sustainability reporting has been primarily driven by voluntary initiatives such as the UN Global 
Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). However, legislation such as the UK Bribery 
Act, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the UK Modern Slavery Act, the Dodd-Frank Conflict 
Mineral Disclosure Provision, and the EU Directive for Multinational Enterprises are now 
forcing companies to tighten up their due diligence processes. 
There are also calls for clear legislation on responsible investing and ESG disclosure. In March 
2019, the EU Parliament agreed on new rules governing disclosure on sustainable investments 
and sustainability risks.16 In July 2019, the US held its first congressional hearing on ESG issues 
and the chair of the committee urged the US Securities and Exchange Commission to establish 
ESG disclosure standards.17 The UN-supported Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) has 
launched the ESG in Credit Risk and Ratings Initiative, which aims to ensure that ESG factors 
are considered in credit risk analysis. As of January 2019, 146 investors had signed up to the 
initiative. 18 
As investors increasingly embrace the concept that ESG criteria can affect a company’s 
financial performance, credit rating agencies are beginning to analyze ESG data when 
assessing corporate bond issuers. In January 2019, Fitch Ratings announced the launch of ESG 
Relevance Scores to show the impact of ESG on credit rating decisions. 19  John Berisford, 
President of S&P Global Ratings, has also confirmed that: “At S&P Global Ratings, our analysts 
work to ensure that we provide essential insights into ESG factors as they relate to the financial 
markets.”20  Moody’s has also confirmed that it considers ESG issues when making credit 
decisions.21  
                                                     
16 https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1571_en.htm  
17 https://www.greenbiz.com/article/us-congress-just-held-its-first-hearing-esg-issues-whats-next  
18 https://www.unpri.org/credit-ratings/esg-credit-risk-and-ratings-part-3-from-disconnects-to-action-areas-
/3996.article  
19 https://www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/10058528  
20 https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/products-benefits/products/esg-in-credit-ratings  
21 https://www.ft.com/content/c1f29e0c-6012-3ac5-9a05-13444b89c5ec  
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Banks, investors and other organizations are increasingly demanding quality ESG data as they 
realize the materiality of ESG risk incidents, which can lead to compliance, reputational, and 
financial risks.  As State Street points out: “Quality data is the lifeblood of investment analysis. 
While “quality” can be defined in several ways, most investors agree that consistency and 
comparability in the availability of data across companies are essential elements of an effective 
data set.”22  
  
                                                     
22 https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2019/03/esg-data-challenge.pdf 
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Appendix 
 
List of Major ESG Rating Agencies (information as of November 2019) 
Name HQ 
Bloomberg 
Headquartered in New York City, and with 167 locations around the world, Bloomberg 
provides financial software tools, data services, and news via its Bloomberg Terminal. 
The company also provides ESG data on publicly listed companies. 
US 
EcoVadis 
Headquartered in Paris, EcoVadis provides a collaborative platform to monitor the 
sustainability performance of supply chains. 
France 
ISS-Ethix -Oekom 
Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) provides corporate governance and 
responsible investment solutions including governance research and 
recommendations; RI data, analytics, and research; end-to-end proxy voting and 
distribution solutions; turnkey securities class-action claims management; as well as 
global governance data and modeling tools. 
US 
MSCI ESG Research 
Headquartered in New York, MSCI ESG Research provides research, ratings, and 
analysis of the environmental, social and governance-related business practices of 
companies both in developed and emerging markets. MSCI ESG Research data and 
ratings are used in the construction of the MSCI ESG Indexes. 
US 
Sustainalytics (Morningstar owns 40% as of 2017) 
Based in Amsterdam, and with offices in 17 cities around the world, Sustainalytics 
rates the sustainability of listed companies based on their ESG performance. In 
January 2019 Sustainalytics acquired GES International, a provider of engagement, 
screening, and fiduciary voting services to institutional investors. 
The 
Netherlands 
Refinitiv (acquisition by LSEG underway) 
With headquarters in London and New York, Thomson Reuters Refinitiv is a provider 
of financial markets data and infrastructure. The company, founded in 2018, is jointly 
owned by Blackstone Group LP and Thomson Reuters. In August 2019, the London 
Stock Exchange Group agreed to buy the company in an all-share transaction valuing 
Refinitiv at USD 27 billion. 
US 
TruCost (acquired by S&P in 2017) 
Based in London, TruCost estimates the hidden costs of the brown use of natural 
resources by companies. S&P Dow Jones Indices acquired a controlling stake in 
Trucost in October 2016. 
UK 
Vigeo EIRIS (acquired by Moody’s in 2019) 
The Vigeo Eiris group, headquartered in Paris and London, evaluates organizations’ 
integration of social environmental and governance factors into their strategies, 
operations and management – with a focus on promoting economic performance, 
responsible investment and sustainable value creation. Since April 2019, Vigeo Eiris is 
a subsidiary of Moody's. 
France 
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Main ESG Data Providers (Information as at January 2019) 
Name HQ 
Arabesque  
Founded in 2013 and headquartered in London, Arabesque is a global asset 
management firm that integrates ESG big data with quantitative investment 
strategies. 
UK 
RavenPack 
Headquartered in Marbella, RavenPack is a big data analytics provider for financial 
services. 
Spain 
RepRisk 
Headquartered in Zurich, RepRisk is the only provider to combine AI and human 
intelligence to screen publicly-available information and identify material ESG and 
business conduct risks related to companies and infrastructure projects around the 
world. 
Switzerland 
SenseFolio 
Based in Chicago, SenseFolio tracks and assesses a company’s ESG involvement by 
using artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms. 
US 
TruValue Labs 
Headquartered in San Francisco, TruValueLabs uses machine learning and natural 
language processing for artificial intelligence powered engines to analyze 
unstructured data in real time, extract relevant metrics, and turn them into material 
insights. 
US 
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Specialist ESG Data Providers 
Name HQ 
CDP (formerly Carbon Disclosure Project) 
CDP is a not-for-profit organization that runs the global disclosure system for 
investors, companies, cities, states and regions to manage their environmental 
impacts. 
UK 
Maplecroft 
Maplecroft analyzes key political, economic, social, and environmental risks related 
to countries, regions, and local sites. 
UK 
South Pole Group 
South Pole is a Swiss carbon finance consultancy founded in 2006 in Zurich. 
Switzerland 
SigWatch 
SigWatch tracks and analyzes NGO concerns and campaigns. 
UK 
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 Carbon Impact Analytics - an Approach to 
Measuring the Climate Performance of Investments  
 
by 
Carbone41 
Abstract 
Carbon Impact Analytics (CIA) is a methodology developed by Carbone 4, leveraging its 13 
years’ experience advising corporates in all sectors on their carbon footprint assessment and 
decarbonization strategies. It enables an in-depth analysis of the carbon performance of assets, 
including: carbon footprint of the whole value chain (including indirect emissions), the 
emissions savings from the contribution to the low-carbon transition and a forward-looking 
analysis capturing decarbonization ambition. It aims to both measure the (negative and 
positive) impact of assets on climate and the climate transition risk of financial portfolios. Used 
by asset managers, asset owners, index providers and banks, the database built by Carbon4 
Finance based on the CIA methodology enables 1) all financial actors to report on their climate 
performance and understand the carbon dependency of their portfolios; 2) financial 
institutions to develop active and passive investment strategies regarding climate transition 
(impact and/or risk related); 3) banks to implement a green weighting factor. 
Keywords: carbon footprint, scenario alignment, climate performance, transition risk, impact 
assessment 
1 Purpose of the study/methodology 
Carbon Impact Analytics (‘CIA’) is an innovative suite of methodologies to measure financial 
assets’ climate impact and identify their contributors to the low-carbon transition. 
CIA is based on a bottom-up assessment of corporate, institutional, asset or sovereign climate 
impacts and can measure the climate performance of any kind of portfolio (loans, bonds, 
stocks etc.). It assesses the key carbon metrics (induced emissions scope 1, 2 and 3 and 
emissions savings) of the underlying activities financed by the lender or investor. 
The approach was developed to be applied to listed equities and bonds, green bonds, 
sovereign bonds, private equity and debt, loans and real assets (infrastructure, real estate and 
natural resources). For listed securities, Carbone 4 develops a dataset of metrics covering 
10,000 companies based on public financial data. For sovereign, all countries have been 
assessed. For real assets and infrastructure, we applied the method on several specific 
portfolios. 
The risk metrics can be useful to various financial actors:  
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Clémence Lacharme, senior consultant at Carbone 4, email: clemence.lacharme@carbone4.com; 
Jean-Yves Wilmotte, manager at Carbone 4, email: jean-yves.wilmotte@carbone4.com.  
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- to asset managers or institutional investors to measure and manage the risks on their 
portfolio and assets and to engage with the underlying components (TCFD or the French 
article 173 reporting); 
- to commercial banks to appreciate the risks on their clients and markets, integrate the 
transition risks on their analytics and to feed their sustainability risk ratings (ex: 
integration of green supporting factor in credit risk ratings); 
- to regulators and financial actors in stress test approaches. Indeed, CIA metrics capture 
the vulnerability of issuers, enabling a bottom-up approach in stress-test models.  
The full methodology is available online (CIA & Carbon4, 2018). 
2 Fundamental components 
The fundamental concept of CIA relies on the fact that transition risk comes from misalignment 
of real carbon emissions of companies and how the emissions should be reduced to achieve 
climate outcomes. For example, for two competitors, the one with the best climate impact 
(the less emissions for the same service) will be less at risk than the other, he will pay a smaller 
carbon tax, he will need less CAPEX to be on track, whatever the type of financial impact, it 
will be smaller. The main challenge is then to calculate properly this climate impact, and this 
is made possible with the following components. 
- Bottom-up approach for more information, data precision, comparability, and qualitative 
analysis. 
- Value chain assessment including scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions, to shed light on the “real” 
carbon dependency of assets. 
- Assessment of emissions savings: going beyond carbon footprinting to measure 
contribution and steer investments towards assets best positioned for the low-carbon 
transition. 
- Forward-looking analysis: where are your assets headed? Rating system comparing 
company strategy, targets, and investments to 2-degree scenarios and sectoral 
benchmarks. 
3 Detailed methodology 
 Focus on high-stakes sectors 
The stakes for the low-carbon transition vary by economic sector. Roughly 80% of worldwide 
GHG emissions are generated by some sectors, on which transition efforts must be focused. A 
similar conclusion can be made about levers to reduce emissions and provide low-carbon 
innovations; some sectors have more to contribute than others. Therefore, the CIA 
methodology distinguishes high-stakes sectors from low-stakes sectors and carries out a very 
detailed analysis for high-stakes sectors in order to focus the analysis effort on assets that have 
a material impact on the carbon performance of the portfolio. Carbon4 Finance develops 
sector-specific indicators and calculation modules to factor in the specificities of each sector. 
This in-depth assessment of portfolio constituents covers all operating segments and is based 
on several operational and company-specific data: production volumes (tons of steel, MWh 
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per source, etc.), production or sales locations, energy efficiency of the process, sources of 
supply, etc. This operational data is collected from various reports made publicly available by 
the company (annual, CSR and ESG reports). For low-stakes companies, Scope 1 and 2 data is 
provided, based on the emissions reported by the companies, after a consistency check. When 
and only when Scope 1 and 2 data has not been published by the company, the analysis is 
based on the company’s revenue and its sector. An average ratio (emissions/M€) is calculated 
per sector on a representative sample of companies. This statistical ratio is then applied to the 
company’s revenue to estimate its GHG emissions. 
 The bottom-up advantage 
CIA measures the carbon footprint of companies through a detailed bottom-up approach. Each 
issuer is analyzed individually and in a discriminating manner before consolidation of results 
at the portfolio level. CIA therefore delivers results at both the portfolio level and at the level 
of each analyzed company. This methodological choice allows for the comparison of the 
carbon performance of companies within the same sector, contrary to statistical 
methodologies, which calculate the carbon footprint based on sectorial ratios. This method is 
ideal for distinguishing best in class and laggards within sectors. In designing a streamlined 
methodology for portfolio and portfolio carbon analysis, Carbon4 Finance made the explicit 
choice to privilege a bottom-up method, as opposed to a statistics-based approach, such as an 
input-output (I/O) model. Here stands the comparison between a bottom-up approach and an 
Input-Output model. 
Table 31-1 Comparison between CIA’s bottom-up approach and an Input-Output 
model 
 Bottom-up 
Carbon4Finance 
Input-Output 
model 
Use of physical emissions factors (rather than 
monetary EFs) 
Yes No 
Data precision and certainty level High Low 
Estimation of emissions savings (focus on 
opportunity not just risks) 
Yes No 
Ability to capture forward-looking trend 
(alignment of investments and targets with 2-
degree goals) 
Yes No 
Enables intra-sector comparison (best in class) and 
stock-picking 
Yes No 
Enables dialogue with companies on what and 
how they can improve  
Yes No 
Adapts to level of information reported by the 
company (e.g. fuel efficiency of vehicles produced 
when available vs. average) 
Yes No 
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CIA was designed by engineers, specialized by sector, and is the result of Carbone 4’s 10 years 
of experience in performing life-cycle GHG assessments in all economic sectors. Carbone 4 
cofounder Jean-Marc Jancovici developed the Bilan Carbone® method for the ADEME, 
reference accounting methodology in France which went on to influence international 
standards. Carbone 4 strongly contributed to the working group for the ISO 14069 and 
associated guide which specifies rules for GHG emissions accounting. Carbone 4 was also 
involved in the Finance for Tomorrow working group to support the construction of the 50 
ClimActs launched on the One Planet Summit in December 2017. Last but not least, Carbone 
4 is represented among the TEG (Technical Expert Group) on sustainable fi of the European 
Commission that is establishing EU-wide standards on green taxonomy. 
CIA relies on physical emissions factors (i.e., tCO2e per tonne of oil combusted) derived from 
real emissions measurements, not from statistical averages based on revenue. Emissions 
factors used by Carbone4 are sourced by independent regulatory authorities: 
- IEA (International Energy Agency) 
- ADEME (French Energy and Environment Agency) 
- FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) 
- UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 
- FCBA (Institut Technologique Forêt Cellulose Bois-construction Ameublement), etc. 
The bottom-up approach is a useful way to underline the strong link between economic 
activity and climate impact. The revenues breakdown by activity is done for each company 
analyzed. For a diversified group such as Bouygues, the GICS sector does not reflect the 
diversity of the company activities. Therefore, the CIA methodology differentiates itself from 
the Output/Input approach by giving a comprehensive vision of the economic activity in the 
results. 
The precision of this approach also limits the uncertainty on the output results as illustrated 
in Figure 31-1below. It gives a clear vision of the real impact of high-stakes company within a 
portfolio. Uncertainty is a major factor in the decision process, as conclusions can be easily 
reversed depending on the degree of uncertainty. For example, a company with a low carbon 
impact and high uncertainty vs high carbon impact but certainty on the data provided.  
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Figure 31-1 Comparison of the order of magnitude of the uncertainties depending 
on the methodology 
 
 
 Calculation of induced emissions 
Carbon4’s experience in carbon footprinting dates back to 2007. Indirect emissions 
(categorized in Scope 3) are predominant for many sectors of activity. The only way to gauge 
systemic transition risk is to apply a full value chain approach, which includes Scope 3 
emissions. 
The inclusion of all emission scopes is necessary in order to capture climate challenges in an 
exhaustive way. Carbon4 Finance recognizes the imperative to examine Scope 1, 2, and 3 
emissions, both induced and saved by corporate entities. This need is illustrated in Figure 31-2 
below.  
Figure 31-2 Example of the importance to include scope 3 emissions in GHG 
assessments 
 
In the above comparison of two listed companies, we see that analyzing only Scope 1 & 2 
emissions leads to the wrong conclusion. When only Scope 1 & 2 emissions are considered, 
windows manufacturer Saint-Gobain appears more emissions intensive. However, once Scope 
3 emissions are considered, oil and gas company Total becomes more emissions intensive. 
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Total is economically dependent on the downstream combustion of its fossil fuels, and thus 
on its Scope 3 emissions, that depends on the type and volumes of fuel traded. Scopes 1 and 
2 are recalculated, and if the result is consistent with the issuer’s reported emissions, we retain 
the issuer’s reported emissions. Scope 3 is always calculated, which ensures a consistent 
approach within a sector. 
 Calculation of emissions savings 
In order to evaluate the alignment of a portfolio with the low-carbon transition, it is necessary 
to look beyond the carbon footprint and evaluate a company’s capacity to contribute to the 
low-carbon transition: reduce its emissions, decarbonize its customers, etc. CIA measures 
emissions savings (scopes 1, 2 and 3) to steer investments towards solutions for the low-
carbon transition. Induced and saved emissions (scopes 1, 2 and 3) are calculated over the 
same scope of activity and the same period. Inclusion of emissions savings is important in 
order to help understand how disruptive an underlying firm is, either through more efficient 
processes or carbon-efficient products or services. A firm in a highly carbon intensive sector 
could contribute significantly to decreasing emissions by creating a disruptive product or 
process. 
The assessment of the emissions savings is based on the comparison of the induced emissions 
of the company with a reference scenario. This reference scenario is sector-specific. Emissions 
savings are always calculated to ensure a consistent approach within a sector, even when 
internationally recognized reference scenarios are unavailable for a sector. The principles of 
the reference scenario are described in Figure 31-3. 
Figure 31-3 How the reference scenarios are designed in CIA 
 
In addition to the absolute figure of induced or avoided emissions, the extent to which a firm 
reduces GHG emissions relative to its total emissions is a key performance indicator. 
Note: emissions savings cannot be subtracted from the induced emissions. Emissions savings 
are not a physical indicator but represent the difference between the emissions induced by 
the company and a baseline scenario. They provide information on the company's 
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contribution to global emissions reduction. On the contrary, induced emissions represent the 
amount of CO2e physically emitted by the company and therefore cannot be added to 
emissions savings. To calculate an overall performance indicator, we divide the emissions 
savings by the induced emissions. This ratio is called the CIR: Carbon Impact Ratio, which is an 
indicator of the climate performance of a company. 
Figure 31-4 Example of the added value of the emissions saving in the assessment 
of the climate performance 
 
 
In the above example (Figure 31-4), when only Scope 1, 2 & 3 emissions are considered, Saint-
Gobain and Rockwool Int, insulation manufacturer, have a similar carbon impact. Once 
emissions savings are considered, Rockwool Int has the strongest contribution in terms of 
emissions savings and consequently a better Carbon Impact Ratio (CIR)3 than Saint-Gobain: 
CIRSaint-Gobain = 0.23 < CIRRockwool Int = 0.44. 
Calculation methods vary by sector and include reduced emissions (based on changes in 
carbon intensity over the past 5 years) and avoided emissions (i.e., against an IEA 2°C scenario). 
 Forward looking rating 
In order to evaluate the company's long-term strategy, we examine four criteria: 
- the company’s long-term strategy and the evolution of its business model regarding the 
low-carbon transition; 
- the investments in R&D and projects related to low carbon activities; 
- the reduction target of scope 1&2 emissions intensity; 
- the reduction target of scope 3 emissions intensity. 
The rating of each criterion is adapted to each sector, based on sectoral benchmarks and on 
IEA’s ETP scenarios. 
For example, in the power sector, the decarbonization strategy, investment and target will be 
positioned toward IEA’s scenarios for the power sector. 
Figure 31-5 illustrates the forward-looking analysis principles. 
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Figure 31-5 Principles of the forward-looking analysis 
 
 
 The overall rating: how do we calculate it? 
An overall rating is provided for each activity, and then consolidated at company level. This 
rating seeks to assess the company’s impact on climate change and its contribution to reducing 
GHG emissions, while taking into account induced emissions, emissions savings, and the 
forward-looking analysis (indicators detailed in the following). It means that this overall rating 
aggregates the current and the future climate performance of the company. Principles are 
summarized in the following figure. 
Figure 31-6 Principles of the overall rating 
 
This rating is sector-based, which allows benchmarking within sectors and between sectors. 
We believe that this overall rating, due to its comprehensiveness (quantitative and qualitative 
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indicators, current and future performance) is especially adapted for use by Central Banks as 
a Green Weighting Factor.  
Companies with a high contribution to the low-carbon transition (CIA rating of A) would be 
considered “green” and be rewarded with more advantageous risk-weighted factor, whereas 
companies with a rating of E would be considered brown and receive less favorable risk-
weighted factor. 
It provides a synthetic view of the climate performance, positive or negative, of the corporate 
analyzed. It takes into account quantitative as well as qualitative information specific to the 
underlying corporate. It points out the most carbon intensive companies among a given sector. 
Plus, the consistency in the methodology allows the comparison of overall rating across sectors, 
in order to identify best and worst in universe and drive capital allocation. 
4 Input and output metrics/data 
CIA is a sector-specific approach to measure corporate energy and climate performance. The 
overall rating detailed above is calculated based on the aggregation of individually calculated 
Key Climate Indicators at issuer level. Then they are consolidated at portfolio level. 
These indicators are summarized in the following table. 
Figure 31-7 Indicators provided by Carbon Impact Analytics 
  
5 Case study: analysis of a company with CIA methodology 
Let’s take an example of the analysis of a company in the Energy sector, such as ENI. The 
following chapter presents an example of the analysis and data we can use and generate for 
ENI. 
The first step will be to identity all the activities of the company and the associated breakdown 
of the revenues. ENI will have activities in the oil value chain, natural gas value chain, electricity 
production and chemicals.  
The second step is to identify the “activity data” that quantifies the physical flows of the 
different activities. For the oil and gas activities, these activity data are the fossil fuels reserves 
and volumes treated on the value chain: exploration and production, trading, transportation, 
refining, supply. For the electricity production, the produced volume by energy source is 
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needed. For the chemicals activity, it is the produced volumes by type of product. This 
information comes from the public information of the company: annual report, website, CSR 
report. 
All this information is entered in the sectoral calculation modules. They will multiply the 
activity data by the corresponding emission factor (ex: how many tons of CO2 are emitted into 
the atmosphere when an oil barrel is burned) resulting in calculating the direct and indirect 
carbon footprint: scopes 1, 2 and 3 emissions. 
Scopes 1&2 emissions will be compared to the reported scopes 1&2 emissions, and if 
consistent, reported figures will be used. 
The third step is to calculate the emissions savings. For oil and gas activities, only reduced 
emissions on scopes 1+2 are assessed, no emissions savings are calculated for the scope 3 
emissions. The gathered information is the evolution of the carbon intensity in the last five 
years to calculate how many tons of CO2 have been reduced. Same principles also apply to the 
chemicals industry. For the electricity production, the calculation will be based on avoided 
emissions compared to a sectoral 2 degrees scenario for power. The carbon intensity 
(tCO2/MWh produced) of the company will be compared to the IEA’s 2DS scenario in 10 years. 
If the company’s carbon intensity is below the scenario, the avoided emissions will be 
calculated by multiplying the difference between the scenario and the company’s intensity by 
the produced volumes (MWh). 
All the activity induced emissions and emissions savings will be consolidated at the issuer level. 
The fourth step consists in performing a forward-looking analysis of the company, based on its 
main activity. In our example, it is oil and gas. 
- Company’s strategy: The Company is well aware of its climate change impact and 
considers the environment as a top priority in its long-term strategy, but without a 
quantified target of shifting its activity towards renewable energy. It does plan on 
doubling its renewables capacity by 2025, but mainly for its own energy needs. 
- This results in a score equals to 2 on 4 (1 being the best score) on this sub criteria. 
- Company’s investments in low carbon activity: The weight of 'energy transition' 
investments is less than 2% of the company's turnover, but the company dedicated ~37% 
of its R&D expenditures to low-carbon technologies, including renewables, biorefining 
and energy efficiency.  
- This results in a score equals to 2 on 4 (1 being the best score) on this sub criteria. 
- Company’s emission reduction target: Although the company didn't set a reduction 
target for its absolute Scope 1&2 emissions, it aims at reducing its carbon intensity by 2% 
each year – the targets are always recomputed in a percentage per year to be assessed 
and compared - and it has set a Zero Gas Flaring target for the year 2030 - currently, 9,37% 
achieved. 
- This results in a score equals to 2 on 4 (1 being the best score) on this sub criteria. 
The actor will thus be scored 2 on 4 for the forward-looking analysis. 
A global rating will be calculated at activity level. It will be based on the following indicators: 
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- Oil&gas: Carbon intensity of scope 3 fossil fuel emissions 
- Electricity: Carbon intensity of electricity mix 
- Chemicals: Carbon Impact Ratio = reduced emissions / induced emissions 
- + forward looking analysis 
This global rating will be calculated at issuer level based on an average weighted by the 
revenues. 
Figure 31-8 Overall rating calculating for our example 
 
6 Case study: analysis of a portfolio with CIA methodology 
The portfolio analysis will be performed by the users/clients of the database on the dedicated 
platform. To do so, the portfolio needs to be imported through a csv file describing it with to 
columns: 
- ISIN code to identify the issuer, 
- Amount invested in the selected currency. 
In a few second, all the indicators will then automatically be consolidated at portfolio level 
(including double accounting retreatments). The typical output of this analysis in presented in 
the following figure. 
Current performance
(Reference indicators)
Future performance
(Forward-looking rating)
CIA Overall Rating
2
Carbon intensity of the energy produced
Carbon Impact Ratio
Carbon intensity of electricity mix
A B C D E
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Figure 31-9 Output of a portfolio analysis (1/2) 
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Figure 31-10 Output of a portfolio analysis (2/2) 
 
 
Then top 5 and worst 5 by indicators are disclosed. 
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7 Limitations of the current approach future development 
For listed institutions, we cover all the major listed corporates of the developed countries, 
especially those listed within the Stoxx 600, SBF 120, S&P 500, and MSCI World. For institutions 
which are bond issuers (corporates and sovereigns), we initiated in June the coverage of the 
largest EURO Investment Grade issuers, including the main listed in the Bloomberg Barclays 
EURO Aggregate index. We extend the scope of our data base in bottom-up on demand to 
cover all strategic exposure or investment in a portfolio. 
A statistical approach derived from the core bottom-up approach enables to cover the largest 
portfolios, as soon as sector and revenues can be identified. 
The planned future developments are: 
- an update of the methodology for summer 2020 with an integration of the 2°C or 1.5°C 
alignment of companies that have defined a scientific and realistic target. In CIA 
methodology, Energy sectors already have this approach, but we want to take advantage 
of the methodological efforts put in place by companies.  
- Integration of the pathway to carbon neutrality assessment. A reflection is underway with 
the Net Zero initiative that Carbon 4 has implemented, which aims to define what a 
scientific and robust carbon neutrality for companies means.  
- The alignment of CIA’s green share with the EU taxonomy. 
8 Conclusion 
The CIA approach enables to provide relevant climate data in a world where reported data is 
clearly incomplete and inconsistent. The inclusion of GHG scope 3 emissions remains a “must 
have” when addressing climate change challenges, and CIA constitutes a solution to address 
it. Looking at the opportunity side with the emission savings is also important to bring a proper 
vision of a company’s climate performance. 
If CIA enables reporting at portfolio level, its strength is the ability to rank companies within a 
sector. This can be the source of several active and passive strategies, from impact investing 
to transition risk management, for financial markets as for bank loanbooks. 
This methodology had also been transposed to other asset classes like sovereign, green bonds 
or real assets, constituting a very polyvalent and complete methodology.  
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 Carbon Accounting Methods for Assessing 
Carbon Footprint and Intensity of Underlying Assets 
 
By 
ISS1 
Abstract 
Potential climate change implications pose risks to established investment positions. A key to 
understanding those risks is by measuring the carbon footprint and emissions that companies 
and facilities produce. Increased regulatory pressure has increased the visibility of these data 
collection efforts, which has brought increased participation, but also a need for common 
practices. Organizations like the TCFD seek to bring commonality to climate reporting in-line 
with current financial disclosure practices. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol gives guidance on 
standardized reporting practices, however, wide variation of actual data persists. Different 
methods to turn reported data into usable data exist, including carbon footprinting and carbon 
intensity comparisons. Despite social and regulatory backing, an overwhelming minority of 
companies effectively report their emissions, creating a challenge for analysts. Analysts are 
faced with data challenges such as incompleteness, source discrepancy, time lag, or timeframe 
creep. Scenario analysis is a useful tool for investors to conduct forward-looking assessments, 
to analyse multiple pathways of action for the companies long-term sustainability. The 2°C 
scenario is a common example offering multiple degrees to which the earth will warm over a 
given time frame, allowing investors to limit emission in order to stay aligned with a certain 
pathway. Being able to measure company environmental impacts are the first step to setting 
them on a path of change.  
Keywords: TCFD, carbon footprint, GHG protocol, exposure, carbon intensity, data quality, 
point-in-time analysis, sustainable, scenario analysis  
1 Measurement of investors’ carbon footprint 
Carbon footprint measures the absolute current emissions exposure that investors have 
through their investments. An investment portfolio’s carbon footprint is the sum of each 
portfolio company’s most recently reported emissions, proportional to the amount of stocks 
(or bonds) held in the portfolio.  
ISS ESG helped pioneer this type of assessment for equity portfolios 10 years ago. Since then, 
diversified approaches for several asset classes have emerged. This section examines the key 
considerations and the primary approaches for calculating the most commonly used metrics 
for equity and fixed income portfolios as outlined by the TCFD.  
The three key steps to evaluate the carbon footprint of an investment portfolio are:  
                                                     
1This chapter is written by Fredrik Fogde, Vice President, Head of Data Research of ISS, email: Fredrik.Fogde@iss-esg.com; 
Dr. Guido Lorenzi, Data Research Associate, email: Guido.Lorenzi@iss-esg.com; and Graeme Wilson, Data Research 
Associate, email: Graeme.Wilson@iss-esg.com. 
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1) Determination of the annual emissions for the underlying entity; 
2) Determination of investors’ ownership or exposure to the emissions of the investee; 
3) Aggregation of entities’ emissions present in the portfolio, according to the chosen 
measure for ownership and intensity metrics.  
The key challenge for investors related to point 1) concerns the reliability and the availability 
of emissions for underlying securities. Despite the increased regulatory pressure on 
companies to report emissions, in 2019, only ca. 3700 companies reported emissions 
worldwide. Moreover, there are several discrepancies and methodological inaccuracies with 
regard to reported numbers (see Challenges for additional details). 
The emissions aggregation on the portfolio level also present its challenges. The 
implementation of the TCFD recommendations gave a strong impulse to the development of 
methodologies to assess portfolios’ carbon footprints. As a result of this process, three main 
portfolio metrics have gained a diffusion level that makes them widely accepted by investors. 
These are emission exposure, relative carbon footprint, and weighted average carbon intensity. 
A detailed description of the above methods is given in the next sections.  
 Emission exposure 
The greenhouse gas emissions exposure that an investor is attributed as a result of its 
investments is the main outcome of a carbon footprint assessment. It essentially determines 
a portion of the indirect emissions of an investor. In particular, this emissions category 
(category 15 of Scope 3) is specified in the Greenhouse Gas Protocol 2  (see the section 
Reporting under the Greenhouse Gas Protocol), which is one of the most commonly adopted 
frameworks that companies use as an accounting methodology to estimate their emissions.  
In order to implement a carbon footprint analysis of an investment portfolio, the first step is 
to determine the part of an underlying companies’ carbon footprint can be attributed to the 
investor. This most often done by determining the “ownership” of the investor of an investee. 
The ownership is defined as the portion of the security held by the investor. The ownership 
calculation is influenced by the type of the portfolio (pure equity, mixed or pure fixed-income) 
and by the investors’ preferences. For equity portfolios, 3  the investor ownership has 
traditionally been calculated by dividing the value invested in a certain holding by the 
corresponding market capitalization. However, the need to analyze portfolios including fixed-
income securities requires an alternative measure of the company value. Although there is no 
standard, outstanding debt or enterprise value4 are the most common proxies to estimate the 
ownership for each entity in the portfolio. The current trend in the market shows that an 
increasing number of investors are using enterprise value as the denominator for both pure 
equity, pure fixed income, and mixed portfolios. This choice reduces complexity and double 
counting, and favors comparability among portfolios containing different types of holdings. 
Moreover, this approach is recommended by the Partnership for Carbon Accounting Financials 
                                                     
2 “GHG Protocol establishes comprehensive global standardized frameworks to measure and manage greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions from private and public sectors operations, value chains and mitigation actions” (http://ghgprotocol.org/) 
3 Equity methodologies are mainly used to assess pure-equity portfolios. In these cases, the company value is represented 
by her market capitalization (i.e., the value of a company traded on the stock market). 
4 Outstanding debt is the debt that has not yet been repaid in full, while enterprise value is the sum of market capitalization 
and outstanding debt. 
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(PCAF), that includes several banks and asset managers from all over the world5, as well as 
being a key metric for performance measurement in EU Climate Benchmarks.  
 Absolute carbon footprint 
The calculation of the emission exposure of a portfolio containing n securities, also called 
absolute carbon footprint, is reported in Equation 1, where enterprise value is used as 
denominator. 
∑
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
×
𝑛
𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖         [tCO2e] Equation 1 
The absolute carbon footprint is dependent on the size of the portfolio and this limits the 
comparison with other portfolios or with a benchmark. Therefore, larger portfolios including 
fewer polluting companies might have absolute carbon footprints lower than smaller 
portfolios with more polluting companies. Moreover, this approach is sensitive to market 
capitalization and currency fluctuations, but it is historically the first metric used to estimate 
investments’ carbon footprints, especially because it is easy to communicate and clearly shows 
the investment strategy through the concept of ownership. This metric also gives a 
representation of the absolute impact on the climate by the investor. The absolute number 
can subsequently be compared with more relatable metrics, such as the number of cars taken 
off the road in terms of CO2. 
Challenges often faced with this metric includes issues of double counting and lack of 
applicability when looking at other asset classes then fixed income or equity. For derivatives 
for example, the link between investor ownership and the underlying asset are not as straight 
forward.  
 Relative carbon footprint 
The comparability of portfolios improves when the emissions are normalized on the size of the 
portfolio. This can be achieved by referring the total emissions exposure to the total capital 
invested in the portfolio (Equation 2). Essentially, the below calculation equates to the 
Weighted Average Carbon Intensity but using enterprise value rather than revenue. This 
calculation is the metric used in the newly launched EU Climate Benchmarks to track the year 
on year decarbonization requirement. A key discussion point of this metric is the impact that 
a change in company valuation can have on results, where a drop in valuation of a company 
can have a significant impact on the intensity of a company. This makes alignment of date of 
holdings and enterprise value used an important part of the calculation. Alternatively, as 
suggested in the EU Climate Benchmark Regulations, yearly average valuations can be applied.  
∑
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
×𝑛𝑖 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜)
  [
tCO2e
M$invested
] 
Equation 2 
 Carbon intensity 
There are currently two widely used metrics that incorporate total sales of a company as a 
normalizer. In these cases, the emission intensity (expressed in terms of emissions per sales 
                                                     
5 https://carbonaccountingfinancials.com/ 
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volume), is used to give an indication of the revenues that a company produces per unit of 
emissions. This metric is a good indication of the type of the entities that are included in a 
portfolio. For instance, a portfolio containing a high share of financial companies is more likely 
to have a lower carbon intensity than one which is predominantly composed of energy and 
heavy-industry companies.  
The emissions normalized by portfolio claim on sales measure the efficiency of a portfolio in 
terms of emissions per unit of revenue (Equation 3). 
∑
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
×𝑛𝑖 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
∑
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
×𝑛𝑖 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
       [
tCO2e
M$
] Equation 3 
Comparisons with other portfolios and benchmarks are possible with this approach and the 
ownership of a security influences the final result. However, companies selling premium 
products (e.g. Porsche) have a lower intensity than companies selling lower-price products (e.g. 
Tata Motors). This suggests that sales volumes are not a perfect proxy to evaluate companies’ 
climate impact. Furthermore, as the emissions and revenue are first summed up separately, 
the effects of the largest contributors and of the outliers can be watered down by companies 
with low emissions and high revenues.  
 Weighted average carbon intensity 
The weighted average carbon intensity (WACI) is the key metric recommended in the ‘Metrics 
and Targets’ pillar section of the Final TCFD Recommendation Report (TCFD, 2017). However, 
this approach does not produce a carbon footprint estimation or an indication of absolute 
impact, since a measure of the investor ownership of the entities in the portfolio is not 
included, and cannot be applies in a similar way as the relative carbon footprint. In other words, 
the result is not affected by the share of a company that an investor owns, but rather the 
weight that the company has within the assessed portfolio. On the other hand, this metric is 
useful to establish a comparison with other portfolios or benchmarks.  
∑
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
×
𝑛
𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖
 Equation 4 
 
The intention of the metric, and the reason for using revenue, is to create a proxy for efficiency 
that can be applied across sectors. Using industry specific indicators as the denominator in 
these calculations would lead to a more accurate indication of efficiency but would be difficult 
to apply on a portfolio with companies with different types of output. Using revenue as proxy 
for output can be a stretch in many service sectors, and can to a certain extent favor companies 
with a high degree of potential stranded assets. Oil & Gas companies with high earnings is an 
example of this.  
2 Challenges 
As the field of carbon footprinting of investment portfolios is relatively new compared to GHG 
accounting of corporates, as well as the fact that methodology development has been driven 
by investor demand rather than regulation, investors are faced with a few key challenges when 
conducting such an analysis.   
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 State of reporting 
Despite the increasing focus on reporting, ISS ESG found that from a universe of 25,000 global 
companies, only 15% reported emissions, and out of these, 6% were assessed to be reporting 
incomplete or unreliable numbers and were, thus, discarded. Although the focus on 
transparency and corporate reporting has increased, basing assessments on disclosed 
information only would present incomplete pictures of many investment portfolios. For 
instance, among the equity portfolios analyzed by ISS ESG, the percentage of disclosing 
companies generally lies between 65-70%. This section gives an overview of the current state 
of climate data reported by companies and highlights some common issues of data quality 
that investors should be aware of. 
 Reporting under the Greenhouse Gas Protocol 
Under ideal circumstances, a company would catalog and disclose its full GHG inventory, thus 
making it very simple for analysts to sift through and utilize the data. In practice, it is much 
more difficult to measure and collect this data. Without a common, widely accepted 
mandatory standard, the problem is compounded. However, the Greenhouse Gas Protocol has 
developed one of the most widely accepted standards for disclosing GHG emissions.  
Figure 32-1 Representation of the standard for emissions accounting according to 
the GHG Protocol. 
 
 
 
 Data discrepancies between sources 
The widespread application of the above framework does not guarantee that investors will not 
find inconsistencies when looking at corporate emissions data. As an example, companies 
choose through which channels they wish to publish their GHG inventories. Considering the 
companies for which emissions were collected in 2018, 21% reported only through 
sustainability or annual reports, 38% reported only through the CDP, and 42% reported via 
both channels. Often, the numbers do not perfectly match between sources.  
One frequent data issue is that emissions reported to different sources can differ. Common 
reasons for this include:  
- Stricter frameworks from CDP on what types of reduction activities can be subtracted 
from scope 2 emissions. In CSR reports, companies will for example often subtract offsets 
from scope 2 emissions, something which the CDP framework does not allow.  
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- Selective inclusion/exclusion of facilities. The facilities and operations that companies 
include emissions for in their reporting can differ between sustainability and CDP reports. 
- Control approach used. The GHG protocol provides three key approaches for how to set 
the boundaries within which to include emissions: financial control, operational control, 
or equity share. These are sometimes applied differently when disclosing to different 
sources.  
 Incomplete reporting 
While many companies have felt the groundswell social pressure to increase the level and 
quality of their environmental disclosure through CSR and sustainability reports, the good 
intentions are often met with misguided understanding of how to effectively disclose the 
environmental effects of company activities. Many companies rush into including what turns 
out to be an incomplete accounting of their emissions. While they deserve credit for getting 
the ball moving in the right direction, this often leads to them missing the mark. The three 
most common forms of incomplete public emissions disclosures are loosely termed “no-
number graphs,” “intensity only,” and “total only”. 
Often, companies will proclaim that their emissions have gone down year over year, perhaps 
also meeting a goal, perhaps also mentioning a percentage with which they have declined 
relative to a base year goal or target. However, when these claims are presented in “no-
number graphs” without specific absolute inventories, the reliability decreases. The level of 
certainty and completeness that analysts attribute to such disclosures is thus limited. On the 
other hand, some companies do not report absolute emissions but just an intensity metric, 
i.e., a relative value of emissions per unit of production or revenue. This approach is referred 
to as “intensity only”. When a company discloses an emissions intensity number this is viewed 
as more valid, as the value requires that the company performed an inventory of emissions in 
order to place it into relation to production. However, the failure to disclose a specific 
inventory devalues the company’s disclosure. Doing a backwards calculation of the intensity 
to arrive at an emissions value is possible, but this is an unreliable method and is not as 
credible as best practice would require the company to disclose the emissions inventory in the 
first place. Similarly, while intensity is a useful measure, it is not an ideal metric for the quality 
of emissions disclosure. A third type of ineffective reporting is when companies give a single 
total (“total only”) for the emissions of the entire organization, without breaking it out by 
operations or by scopes. These instances are ambiguous and must be qualitatively assessed 
by analysts. Divisions between direct and indirect emissions, business travel, and third-party 
services must be searched for and identified, if possible.  
 Data lagging 
A common issue encountered in emissions collection is untimely data disclosure and the 
mismatches in reporting periods that can arise from solely using the latest available emissions 
from each company. Since companies and regions have their own fiscal year periods, which 
can vary widely across the full calendar year, it can therefore be difficult to accurately compare 
companies against each other. What is labeled as 2018 data in one platform may cover the 
fiscal year ending March 31 for company A and September 30 for Company B. Likewise, it can 
be difficult for analysts to correctly time the data collection process for the most current data 
for the coverage universe. If a company publishes its annual report or sustainability report 
after the cutoff date for a data collector’s cycle, this could lead to a one or even two-year data 
lag, depending on the timing. Some companies only disclose their GHG emissions in a 
sustainability report that is not connected to their annual report and is published arbitrarily 
within the year, thus lagging behind their mandatory financial disclosures. In both cases, 
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investors trying to make informed decisions in the present year would be operating with 
outdated data.  
 Point-in-time analysis 
While a carbon footprint assessment of a portfolio provides several comparable metrics, these 
metrics serve only as the starting point towards understanding the climate risks or 
opportunities associated with an investment portfolio. A carbon footprint assessment is a 
point-in-time analysis and, while it measures current performance and impact, it does not take 
into account forward-looking indicators on how well a company is placed to deal with 
aforementioned physical or transitional risks. For a holistic climate analysis, forward-looking 
indicators.  
 Dealing with non-disclosing companies 
With only roughly 15% of listed corporates reporting their emissions worldwide, relying only 
on reported emissions for portfolio level analysis would not suffice. Excluding companies that 
do not report could in many cases lead to ignoring the companies most exposed to climate 
related risks, i.e., those companies with high emissions that are not managing this impact at 
all.  
Several approaches towards estimating emissions exist currently in the market the 
methodologies of which can be categorized into overarching methodologies (Kepler 
Cheuvreux, 2015). 
- Industry averages and regression models. Companies that report emissions are grouped 
together and regression models run using financial indicators of the companies to create 
coefficients per sector.  
- Environmentally-extended input-output models (EEIO). This approach looks extends 
traditional input-output models to include emissions created from various parts of the 
supply chain for each unit of economic output.  
- Life cycle analysis (LCA). Life cycle databases such as EcoInvent provide emission factors 
for all raw materials that go into a product.  
The most common approach currently available is one of regression models and certain types 
of EEIOs. ISS ESG use a combination of all three models, where regression models are used for 
Scope 1 & 2 emissions, and a combination of EEIO and LCA for Scope 3.  
For the Scope 1 & 2 emissions database, ISS ESG applies an approach in five steps.  
1) Self-reported emissions are collected from a range of various sources, and aligned in 
terms of fiscal years, ensuring that numbers provided for several companies are in line, 
and so that different fiscal years’ worth of data is not provided in the same dataset 
2) Self-reported numbers are thoroughly quality-checked for consistency and completeness, 
and the extent to which the reporting methodology aligns with the GHG protocol. Several 
of the issues discussed earlier in this report are discovered in this step.  
3) For any regression model, it is important that these are run on groups that have very 
similar carbon emissions profiles. This is something that traditional financial classification 
systems fail to capture. Here ISS ESG has developed a proprietary Climate Industry 
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Classification System (CICS). In this step analysts take great care to classify companies into 
the correct industry from a carbon footprint point of view.  
4) Regression models are then run on the verified data. In most regression approaches 
currently used, revenue is used as the only factor against which to compare emissions 
with. However, for many sectors, ISS ESG research finds very little correlation between 
scope 1 & 2 emissions per revenue. The regression models are thus run on a range of 
financial indicators, where different combinations are used for each industry.  
5) The resulting regression models and accompanying financials required are then applied 
to non-reporting companies. For transparency reasons, the adjusted R-Squared for each 
underlying model is also provided to clients.  
This approach was developed in collaboration with ETH Zurich and has been used by investors 
for over a decade.  
3 Discussion & outlook 
This chapter has highlighted some of the challenges that investors may face when looking for 
reliable data on which to base carbon metric calculations. Many of these issues are dampened 
by data providers, who aggregate reported data in a comparable manner, and offer 
estimations for companies that do not report. In addition, the use of different portfolio level 
carbon metrics for reporting on the emissions of the portfolio, can often lead to conflicting 
messages from a report. For example, while the WACI may show outperformance against a 
benchmark, the relative carbon footprint could be outperforming to a lower extent, or in 
certain cases actually underperform against the benchmark. The convergence of estimation 
methodologies, the use cases for pure carbon footprint reports, and the use of different 
metrics are thus likely to dominate the discussion around carbon footprinting for the 
foreseeable future. The following section provides some concluding thoughts on these topics.  
 Diverging methodologies & use cases for carbon footprinting 
As discussed, approaches for filling the gaps in company reporting differs, and subsequently 
have an impact on the metrics discussed. This is particularly true when revenue numbers are 
both used as the primary input source for estimation, and then subsequently as the 
normalization factor to calculate the WACI. A similar argument can be made for companies 
that are yet to generate much revenue, but are none-the-less emitting a significant amount of 
emissions (see Oil & Gas Exploration or Mining companies). Using revenue numbers to 
estimate emissions for these companies can often lead to gross underestimations. Conversely, 
while using fixed assets or amount of employees (or other estimations based not only on 
revenue) may lead to a more accurate estimation of the absolute emissions, but using the low 
revenue numbers as a basis for efficiency will cause the company to be an outlier in terms of 
emissions/revenue and significantly impact the WACI.  
However, despite the differences in approaches described above, and despite some of the 
limitations of looking at backward looking performance, there are still several useful outcomes 
for the investor from a pure carbon footprint analysis:  
1) The fact that there is a need to create estimations for one of the most basic forms of 
climate risk management by companies is an indictment of how far we still need to go in 
terms of putting climate risk on the agenda of companies. Few indexes or funds, unless 
climate themed, are likely to have 100% coverage in terms of reported emissions. 
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Highlighting these companies, and those in transition-exposed sectors or with high 
estimated emissions, is still a powerful and useful starting point for any type of 
engagement activities.  
2) While several types of scenario analyses that focus on transition risk look at a company’s 
alignments with certain types of scenarios, potential changes in carbon pricing is a form 
of transition risk that will have a direct impact on absolute emission numbers. Looking at 
a company’s emissions exposure, and subsequently the aggregated absolute number on 
a portfolio level, can be directly compared to certain carbon pricing scenarios.  
3) A carbon footprint report of a portfolio also serves as a heat map to identify the potential 
hot spots of a portfolio and serve as a starting point from which to start looking at sector 
specific, forward looking indicators. By analyzing aspects such as sector contribution to 
portfolio results, top 10 lists and % of disclosed emissions by sectors and regions, 
investors can focus further research on areas most exposed to carbon emissions.  
4) Lastly, continuing to apply and calculate metrics based on an ownership approach, paves 
the way for more accurate scope 3 emission reporting by financial institutions, in 
particular the carbon footprint from investments.  
While the above use cases are valuable in their own right, a holistic climate risk analysis should 
include a scenario analysis element, whether that be looking at transition risks, physical risks 
or scenario 1.5 degree alignment of the portfolio.  
 The metrics debate 
While four key carbon footprint metrics were presented in previous chapters, we see an 
increasing preference and use of two in particular. 
- The Weighted Average Carbon Intensity – The growing application by investors of the 
TCFD recommendations, has led to many investors focusing on this metric for reporting 
and comparison. Several climate-themed indexes have also been launched where carbon 
performance is tracked with this metric.  
- Relative Carbon Footprint – This metric was one of the first metrics to measure carbon 
footprint performance of a portfolio and has been used by investors for over a decade. 
The link to ownership and potential to calculate an absolute number, which in turn can 
be compared to more relatable, still makes it a very applicable number to communicate 
to stakeholders, particularly for asset owners. As stated earlier, this metric has also been 
adopted as the metric with which to track year on year reduction progress for EU Climate 
Benchmarks.  
The launch of the EU climate benchmarks and the inclusion of the relative carbon footprint in 
tracking progress has sparked a debate surrounding which of the two above mention metrics 
are most applicable for tracking performance. Proponents of the relative carbon footprint 
argues that several big polluters (particularly Oil & Gas companies), benefit in such an analysis 
due to high recent earnings (Azizuddin, 2020). In addition, the metric is sensitive to outliers in 
cases where revenue numbers are low but emissions significant, and as mentioned earlier, the 
question remains on how suitable revenue is as a proxy for efficiency. One the other hand, the 
relative carbon footprint is sensitive to changes in valuation, as a company increases in value, 
the intensity of the company decreases. Conversely, in economic downturns, intensity can 
decrease if latest valuations and historic emissions data. This effect can be counteracted by 
using yearly average valuations. Another argument against the use of relative carbon footprint 
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is that discourages from investments in growth companies, where valuation might still be low, 
and thus potentially resulting in a high intensity, despite relatively low absolute emissions.  
As more and more non-financial companies continue to set quantifiable, science-based 
reduction targets, there will continue to be a wish from financial industry players to have a 
meaningful emissions reduction methodology of their own. What is becoming increasingly 
clear however, is that carbon metrics alone are unlikely to be the answer, and that meaningful 
climate risk reduction strategies needs to take forward-looking indicators into account. How 
to combine these factors into an agreed upon, meaningful metric, will be a key challenge for 
sustainable finance in the years to come.  
  
Carbon Accounting Methods for Assessing Carbon Footprint and Intensity of Underlying Assets         
519 
Bibliography 
Azizuddin, K. (2020). EU Climate Benchmarks: The row over carbon intensity metrics 
explained. https://www.responsible-investor.com/articles/eu-climate-benchmarks-
the-row-over-carbon-intensity-metrics-explained. Retrieved from  
Kepler Cheuvreux. (2015). Carbon compass: Investor guide to carbon footprinting. 
https://www.iigcc.org/download/carbon-compass-investor-guide-to-carbon-
footprinting/?wpdmdl=1512&refresh=5e7b5fc6bb36b1585143750. 
TCFD. (2017). Final Report: Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures. Retrieved from https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/final-
recommendations-report/. 
Chapter 33 
 520 
 ClimFIT: A Portfolio Carbon & Climate 
Accounting Tool 
 
By 
EcoAct1 
Abstract 
ClimFIT (Climate Financial Institutions Tool) is a tool designed to address multi–asset portfolio 
challenges related to climate performance measurement and management. It collects and 
analyses issuers’ financial and climate data to equip users with an optimal combination of 
Portfolio Climate Key Performance Indicators (Climate KPIs). The Climate KPIs consist of main 
ESG-Climate indicators such as financed emissions, capital carbon intensity, operational 
carbon efficiency, and portfolio exposure to high and low carbon assets. Users benefit from 
insightful information assessed at portfolio, asset class, sector, geography, issuer, and asset or 
project level. ClimFIT considers multi-level challenges related to the latest changes in 
regulatory and voluntary frameworks and uses recent data. While it is constructed around 
recommended sets of KPIs, it also allows customized settings and bespoke analysis.   
Keywords: portfolio, issuer, assets, indicator, metric, KPI, assessment, climate, carbon, impact, 
performance  
1 Purpose of the methodology 
 Financial sector challenges  
In order to accelerate the economic transition, the financial sector should transform itself 
through the integration of a climate-aligned investment strategy combining both climate and 
financial efficiency. Evolving regulations, standards and initiatives around climate issues 
hasten the process of reformation. 
Facing this rapid evolution, Financial Institutions need to grasp, evaluate and manage two 
main interconnected impacts: “impact of '' and “impact on” investments.  
• The first one is “impact on”: impact of climate change and energy transition on 
portfolio performance. This impact determines possible risks and opportunities tied 
to underlying assets and to a portfolio.  
• The second one, named “impact of,” is the impact of investments on climate change 
and sustainable development. This impact defines an investor’s contribution to the 
transition towards a carbon-neutral economy or to the 1.5°C-2°C trajectory.  
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Ekaterina Reshetnikova, Finance & Climate Expert of Research & Innovation Department, EcoAct. 
Ekaterina, email: Reshetnikova@eco-act.com. The author would like to thank Emilie Alberola, Arnaud Doré, Gauthier Faure, 
Kai Larson, Paul Stephenson, Martin Sedgwick, Laurence Guimard, Coraline Barré, Aubin Roy, Fanny Guezennec.  
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The impacts are not distributed uniformly across sectors, geographies, issuers, and assets 
which results in different implications for different investments and affects overall portfolio 
risks and returns.  
Therefore, asset managers and owners need methods, models, and tools that ensure 
consistency with regulation, recommendations, and standards, that combine growing cross-
sectional data while remaining operational for users and suitable for diversified portfolios. 
These challenges lie at the core of the ClimFIT concept (Figure 33-1), the method and tool 
developed to tackle climate-related impact assessments of investments. The tool provides 
actors with key indicators helping to identify, measure and manage associated performance, 
risk and opportunities. Thus, ClimFIT facilitates investment decision-making, as well as fits the 
specific needs and interests of various capital market actors.  
 Purpose of ClimFIT and ClimFIT framework 
The purpose of ClimFIT is to address challenges associated with portfolio climate performance 
and risk assessment, management and disclosure. The tool is designed to: 
• Identify operational efficiency.  
Measure climate performance at portfolio, asset class, sector, issuer, and asset level; 
• Manage risk and opportunities. 
Choose the manageable level of exposure to sensitive to changes in policy and market assets; 
• Drive actionable insights. 
Track progress, operationalize target setting and enhance climate-aligned capital allocation; 
• Ensure regulatory compliance. 
Meet mandatory and voluntary reporting requirements and recommendations. 
Thus, ClimFIT helps financial institutions to respond to stakeholders’ demands, enlarge 
engagement and facilitate disclosure, as well as to ease the integration of climate change 
issues into investment process and strategy.  
Aiming at providing all-inclusive and up-to-date solutions, ClimFIT is in continuous evolution 
and broadening of scope. In this regard it is important to distinguish the ClimFIT tool from the 
ClimFIT Framework. The tool development is backed by constant research projects – i.e., 
Framework. While the ClimFIT tool is designed to meet the operational needs of capital market 
agents, the ClimFiT Framework brings wider expertise to bear on the establishment of ESG and 
ESG-Climate “impact of” and “impact on” accounting at the portfolio level. Furthermore, the 
research component fosters proactive integration of ongoing market and policy changes and 
allows the tool to meet the demanding requirements of advanced actors.  
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Figure 33-1 ClimFIT framework 
 
Source: EcoAct  
 
The ClimFIT Framework intends to contribute to overall methodology and data improvement, 
and harmonization across the market. The aim of the framework is to enhance:  
• Development of advanced approaches, accounting rules and data;  
• Harmonization of methodologies, terminologies, indicators and metrics;  
• Transparency and disclosure, robustness and comparability of assessed results. 
Thereby, the Framework supports the development of advanced climate-related accounting 
methodologies, impact measurement and attribution, benchmarking, proper risk assessment, 
and science-based targets setting.  
2 Intended users and application 
 Range of users  
ClimFIT responds to needs of a wide range of financial market actors that can be divided into 
two groups.  
• The first one consists of institutional investors, banks, asset and fund managers, 
corporates as investors and issuers, investment advisors, rating agencies, and index 
makers. For banks, insurance companies, pensions and other funds the ClimFIT 
model is a step forward towards better understanding and management of climate-
related drivers for asset price corrections, portfolio composition and rebalancing, 
inflow and outflow management, factor-based strategies development.  
• The ClimFIT framework could also provide insightful information for the second 
group of actors: policymakers, supervisors, professional initiatives and associations, 
standard developers, and R&D departments of financial institutions. Namely, the 
Framework analyses the evolving context and implements various assessment 
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approaches. It can serve as a basis for (i) identification of best practices, (ii) 
establishment of common rules for climate accountancy at the financial instruments 
and portfolio levels, (iii) improvement of reported and estimated data at issuers’ level; 
(iii) better disclosure at portfolio and fund level.   
 Scope of assets  
Regarding a coverage, ClimFIT is applicable to multi-asset portfolios and products composed 
of a broad variety of holdings. All industries and geographies (countries and regions) are 
included into assessment. Concerning asset classes, the perimeter includes listed equity, 
corporate bonds, notes, loans, commercial real estate, mortgage; sovereign, municipal, 
multilateral bonds; alternatives including private equities, real estate, infrastructure, lands, 
forests. Listed and unlisted, linked and not linked to physical assets and projects instruments 
are also covered. As regards issuer’s type, the tool covers corporate, sovereign, supranational, 
sub-sovereign and agency issuers.    
 Climate decision-support system  
Based on Climate KPIs, the tool provides actors with ‘navigating’ information allowing for 
robust, practical, and dynamic steering of capital allocation in terms of climate performance 
and alignment with the 1.5°C-2°C trajectory.  
ClimFIT provides asset managers and owners with a tailored climate decision-support system. 
The tool collects and analyses data to equip users with a combination of Portfolio Climate KPIs. 
The design of the Climate KPIs considers multi-level challenges related to indicators and 
metrics construction principles that are organized into several recommended sets. The 
synthetization of quantified results serves to produce comprehensive reports and actionable 
information. The tool also contains advanced settings options allowing bespoke configurations 
and customized reports and dashboards (Figure 33-2).  
Figure 33-2 ClimFIT Settings 
 
Source: EcoAct 
 
Thus, ClimFIT supports Investors and Managers: financial analysts may use KPIs to anticipate 
the impact of the low carbon transition on a portfolio or an asset in order to: 
• determine the key elements to assess for each type of portfolio and asset class; 
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• accompany the decarbonization of issuers and the economy; 
• address issues of when and how to rebuild capital allocation; 
• define a benchmark to ensure portfolio alignment at different stages of the transition.  
Concerning the extended application, while being relevant to the process – portfolio or 
investor relation management, ClimFIT also provides assessments suitable for financial 
product structuring and design, such as thematic funds and indices. Fund structuring and 
product development specialists may rely on the tools’ functionality to design climate-aligned 
financial products and services.   
Regarding Corporates, the tool helps with providing answers regarding the adjustment of 
investment plans and the facilitation of proactive dialogue with investors. Company executives 
might use ClimFiT to assess the firm’s climate-related attractiveness from investors’ 
perspective and ensure future financial inflows.   
3 Fundamental components 
 Multi-level challenges of climate KPIs design  
ClimFIT is constructed around a concept composed of several market-, science- and 
management-related elements.  
The design of Climate KPIs is based on six fundamental components (Figure 33-3):   
• Mandatory and voluntary context alignment; 
• Applicability to portfolios diversified across different sectors, geographies, asset 
classes; 
• Climate and transition scenarios integration; 
• Science-based approaches; 
• Finance-smart climate impact attribution; 
• Operationality for a wide range of users.  
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Figure 33-3 Challenges of portfolio climate KPIs design  
 
Source: EcoAct 
 
 Alignment with context 
Concerning the context alignment, the tool offers settings enabling the production of 
indicators relevant to a targeted regulation or an initiative. Today, to meet mandatory and 
voluntary assessment, reporting requirements and recommendations, financial institutions 
should consider several levels of the framework:   
• World. The Paris Agreement and financial flows consistency with a resilient 
development; 
• G-20. TCFD recommendations, Financial Stability Board (FSB); 
• European Union. EU Regulation 2019/2088 on Sustainability-Related Disclosures in 
the Financial Services Sector, EU Regulation 2019/2089 on Climate Transition and EU 
Paris-Aligned Benchmarks, on sustainability-related disclosures in the financial 
services sector, EU Directive 2014/95/EU on non-financial disclosure, etc.;  
• National level.  French Energy Transition for Green Growth Act, art. 173-VI, 2015, UK 
Companies Act 2006. Regional and National frameworks on low carbon transition 
and sustainable finance;  
• Assessment and Reporting initiatives and standards. PRI ESG and Climate reporting, 
CDP Climate Change, CDP Financial Services, GHG Protocol Scope 3 Category 15 
Investments, Bilan Carbone®2, ISO/CD 14097 Framework and principles for assessing 
and reporting investments and financing activities related to climate change3, guides 
developed by professional associations and initiatives - PCAF, FFA, Climate Action 
100+, Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition, Science-Based Target (SBT), SBT-Financial 
Institutions (SBT-FI)4 etc.  
                                                     
2 French standard on GHG Accounting  
3 Currently the standard is under elaboration, expected to be published in February 2021.  
4 Currently methods are under development, expected to be published in Autumn 2020. 
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 From complex and heterogeneous to essential and harmonised 
In this context, asset owners and managers face growing challenges in terms of climate-related 
financial evaluation, management, and disclosure. Financial sector needs indicators and 
metrics with enhanced relevance for policy and investment decision making, methods capable 
of addressing multi-asset portfolio challenges, and tools processing various sets of historical, 
instant and forecasted data. The ambition behind ClimFIT is to face complex multi-factor 
problems within the financial sector and to pare them down to the essentials – metrics and 
indicators. Therefore, the challenge for context aligned KPIs assessment includes a variety of 
existing approaches. Different methodologies use diverse terminologies and definitions, while 
also being constructed around different indicators, metrics, impact attribution rules and data. 
Lack of uniformity causes difficulty related to the necessity of conducting several different 
analyses associated with various requirements. The ClimFIT model helps tackle this challenge 
by proposing various settings and serving as universal tool for multi-purpose assessments. KPIs 
can be calibrated according to any of the above-mentioned requirements and 
recommendations.  To enable this functionality, the tool moved through several phases: 
• examination of existing methodologies and recommendations,  
• harmonization of terminology and introduction of common language,  
• decryption of quantification approaches using common terms and language,  
• classification and description of indicators, metrics, variables, and data.  
These steps helped to systematize and integrate all existing calculation rules into the ClimFIT’s 
algorithm and settings. The approach fosters results comparability, comprehensive 
benchmarking and progress tracking.   
4 Detailed methodology 
 Range of KPIs and methodological steps 
The portfolio performance assessment method contains two main sets of indicators: Portfolio 
Climate KPIs and Portfolio Advanced Climate KPIs. The indicators are computed by compiling 
numerous climate, financial and operational data at sectoral and issuer levels using a portfolio 
composition information.  
• The first set of KPIs measures carbon footprint, capital carbon intensity, operational 
climate efficiency, and portfolio exposure to high and low carbon assets.  
• The second set of KPIs provides further information regarding the portfolio 
alignment with the 1.5°C -2°C trajectory: SBT- and TCFD-committed and aligned 
assets, portfolio temperature, market-related transition risks & carbon price, green 
and brown assets, contribution to the energy transition, climate performance score 
among issuers and sectors, carbon neutrality & net zero GHG emissions committed 
assets, the 2°C and below 2°C trajectories aligned investments.  
As illustrated in Figure 33-4, the tool’s workflow is composed of four parts: 
1. Definition and setting. The workflow starts with a formulation of specific problems 
and the determination of perimeter. This step helps to proceed with right settings 
and deliver the targeted results;  
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2. Data collection and preparation. At this stage the tool gathers issuers’ climate and 
financial reported data using information related to portfolio composition. Further 
collected data are processed in order to ensure accuracy and test availability, 
followed by the addition of estimated data if the threshold for reported data is not 
reached;  
3. Assessment. The model relies on an algorithm that simultaneously and contextually 
assesses different indicators. The algorithm within the tool relates the different 
metrics and variables at asset, issuer, sector, and geography levels in order to 
attribute the impact generated by underlying assets to an investment and aggregate 
it at a portfolio level; 
4. Results and graphics. This stage enables better understanding and communication 
of obtained results. Quantified information can be visualized using a comparison of 
Portfolio Climate KPIs with those of a chosen benchmark.  
Figure 33-4 ClimFIT workflow  
 
Source: EcoAct 
 Quantitative and bottom-up methodology  
The computation starts with a compilation of climate and financial attributes of underlying 
assets. It begins at issuer, asset or project level and continues by analysis across and within 
asset classes, industries and geographies. In order to quantify attributed impact, asset specific 
variables are combined with portfolio variables. All variables are divided into three groups: 
portfolio variables, issuer’s financial and operational variables and issuer’s GHG emissions 
variables. Table 33-1 lists all inputs used by the model.  The main inputs are:  
• Ii - market value of an investment; 
• mPV -market value of a portfolio; 
•  Oi- financial variable of an issuer; 
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• Ei- GHG emissions of an issuer; 
• Si - sales or production of an issuer. 
Where Oi is presented with such variables as: Market Capitalization, Enterprise Value, Debt 
Outstanding, Liabilities, Sum of Market Capitalization and Debt Outstanding, Assets; Ei takes 
values as GHG emissions according to a recommended Scope; and Si equals Sales, Assets, or 
Production.  
Table 33-1 ClimFIT inputs  
Variable Acronym Variables  Explanatory notes 
Portfolio variables  Ii, mPV 
     
Investment Im 𝐼𝑖  Amount of investments in 
market or nominal value 
Market value of 
Portfolio 
mPV 𝑚𝑃𝑉  Sum of values of assets 
composing a portfolio 
 
 
Corporate financial and operational variables  Oi, Si 
 
     
Market 
capitalisation 
mCap Oi  Equity value, market value 
Debt 
outstanding 
Do Oi  Financial debt, market value 
Enterprise Value EV Oi  Market Cap + Market Value 
of Debt – Cash and 
Equivalents 
Liabilities L Oi  Liabilities of an issuer 
Sales  S Si  Sales of an issuer  
Assets A Oi, Si  Assets of an issuer 
Production P Si  Production of an issuer 
 
Country financial and operational variables  Oi, Si 
 
  
Debt 
outstanding 
Do Oi   Financial debt of a country 
GDP GDP Si  Gross domestic product of a 
countru  country 
 
 
GHG Emissions variables  Ei  
 
     
Scope 1  E1 Ei  Scope 1 of GHG emissions of 
an issuer 
Scope 2  E2 Ei  Scope 2 of GHG emissions of 
an issuer 
Scope 3  E3 Ei  Scope 3 of GHG emissions of 
an issuer 
Emissions E Ei  GHG emissions of a country  
     
Source: EcoAct 
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 Data sources and key indicators  
The ClimFIT methodology links investees’ characteristics with investments using information 
about portfolio composition. It associates GHG emissions and economic outputs generated by 
financed activities with securities held by an investor (Figure 33-5). As a primary data source 
of information, the tool uses Corporate Reporting, the FactSet, OECD, Eurostat, and EcoAct 
databases.  
The quantification provides such indicators as:  
• Carbon Footprint or Absolute Carbon Emissions (ACE), expressed in tons of CO2 
equivalent (tCO2e). The indicator gives an estimation of an investor’s contribution to 
an issuer’s absolute carbon emissions. This indicator is known as the concept of 
“financed emissions”;    
• Capital Carbon Intensity or Weighted Carbon Emissions (WCE), expressed in tons of 
CO2 equivalent per unit of currency invested (tCO2e / $M invested). It provides an 
estimation of the carbon footprint of a unit of currency invested. Computing issuer’s, 
sector’s, country’s, and portfolio’s capital carbon intensity, the indicator provides 
information on the carbon-related efficiency of invested capital;  
• Operational Carbon Efficiency or Carbon Intensity (CI), expressed in tons of CO2 
equivalent per unit of currency generated by an investee (tCO2e / $M issuer’s 
sales/assets/product). It evaluates the contribution of an investor to an underlying 
company’s GHG emissions per unit of revenue or assets generated by the firm; 
• Portfolio Exposure or Weighted Average Carbon Intensity (WACI), expressed in tons 
of CO2 equivalent per unit of currency generated by an investee tCO2e / $M issuer’s 
sales/assets/product. It is derived from the carbon intensity of each individual 
investee and their weight in the entire portfolio. It measures a portfolio’s exposure 
to high and low carbon intensive companies. 
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Figure 33-5 ClimFIT process: input, model, output 
 
Source: EcoAct 
 
While the approach mainly focuses on providing an overall portfolio assessment it also 
provides users with more granular and actionable insights at asset class, sector, geography 
(countries, regions), issuer, and asset/project levels. Table 33-2 summarizes core information 
about Climate KPIs.   
 
Table 33-2 ClimFIT outputs 
Indicator ClimFIT name Variables Units Level 5 
     
CARBON FOOTPRINT 
 
 
Absolute 
Carbon 
Emissions  
ACE Ii , Oi , Ei tCO2e P, A, 
S, G, 
I, AP  
CAPITAL CARBON INTENSITY 
 
 
Weighted 
Carbon 
Emissions 
WCE  Ii , Oi , Ei , mPV tCO2e / $M invested P, A, 
S, G, 
I, AP  
OPERATIONAL CARBON 
EFFICIENCY 
 
 
Carbon 
Intensity 
 
CI Ii , Oi , Ei , Si tCO2e / $M issuer’s 
sales/assets/product 
P, A, 
S, G, 
I, AP  
PORTFOLIO EXPOSURE Weighted 
Average Carbon 
Intensity 
WACI  Ii , Ei , mPV, Si tCO2e / $M issuer’s 
sales/assets/product 
P, A, 
S, G 
Source: EcoAct 
 
The use of the combination of indicators enables a better understanding of the climate 
performance of a portfolio and assets, allows for the identification of the best and worst 
                                                     
5 Levels: P - Portfolio, A - Asset Class, S - Sector, G - Geography, I - Issuer, AP - Asset/Project  
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performers within a portfolio, and consequently enhances carbon-related risk and opportunity 
management.  
5 Sample 
A case study of the ClimFIT tool is discussed below with example outputs. Depending on the 
requirements, these outputs are tailored according to recommendations on next steps.  
 Portfolio climate KPIs 
Portfolio Climate KPIs are constructed around carbon footprint or attributed GHG emissions 
(ACE), capital carbon intensity (WCE), operational climate efficiency (CI), and portfolio 
exposure to high and low carbon assets (WACI) measured at portfolio, asset class, sector, and 
issuer level. 
Figure 33-6 Portfolio Climate KPIs 
  
Source: EcoAct  
 
5.1.1. Portfolio overview  
Portfolio 
type  
Data coverage Scope  Benchmarking  Levels  
Equity 
Bonds  
100%  
Reported - 96% 
Estimated - 4%  
Scope 1 & 2 
Scope 1, 2 & 3 
Mainstream 
index  
Low Carbon 
index 
Scope 1 & 2   
Portfolio  
Asset class 
Sector 
Issuer  
 
An initial breakdown of absolute GHG emissions in Scope 1, 2 & 3 is created to highlight the 
key areas of focus, it also further shows the detail of where the emissions occur between the 
types of assets in the portfolio. Table 33-3 above shows the emissions associated with Bonds 
and Equities. 
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Table 33-3  Breakdown of portfolio carbon footprint for Scope 1, 2 and 3 
 
Source: EcoAct 
 
In this case, the Scope 1 & 2 footprint is small in comparison to that of the Scope 3 emissions. 
Equities for both Scope 1 & 2 and Scope 3 contain the highest absolute emissions and is 
therefore the asset type that will receive the most attention in terms of further analysis. Figure 
33-7 below shows the breakdown as percentages of this portfolio. 
Figure 33-7 Breakdown of absolute emissions by asset type and associated scope 
 
Source: EcoAct 
 
5.1.2. Portfolio level   
The absolute and relative indicators of the portfolio’s GHG emissions are analyzed to identify 
and rank the companies within the equities portfolio that emit the most, and least carbon 
emissions: the top 10 and bottom 10 performers. Table 33-4 and Table 33-5 below are ranked 
by absolute emissions from Scope 1 & 2 due to the mandatory requirements on these 
emissions; weighted Carbon Emissions (WCE) and the investment share % are also shown for 
reference. Scope 3 emissions are shown separately as percentages of ACE and WCE, which 
reflects the larger emissions exposure of Scope 3 emissions within the portfolio. This type of 
analysis identifies the best and worst contributors to a portfolio’s climate performance, a 
ranking that varies depending on which Scopes of GHG emissions are considered. For instance, 
as demonstrated in Table 33-4 below: while Company A has the greatest share of Scope 1 & 2 
emissions, it is Company D that has the highest share of Scope 3 emissions. However, as the 
boundaries of scope 3 differ across each business and sector, this data can be misleading 
without further analysis.  
 
6% 5% 49% 41%
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500
tCO2eACE Equities scope1&2 ACE Bonds scope1&2 ACE Equities scope3 ACE Bonds scope3
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Figure 33-8  Analysis of portfolio carbon intensity  
 
Source: EcoAct 
 
5.1.3. Issuer level   
Figure 33-8 shows that regarding the portfolio’s capital and operational carbon intensity, there 
are three main issuers that bring the results down. More detailed analysis of Table 33-2 shows 
that the bottom ten performers represent 16% of investments while accounting for 87% of 
Scope 1 & 2 GHG emissions, or 53% if Scope 3 is included. Regarding the bottom three, 
Companies A, B, C, they account for 41.9%, 20.0%, and 9.5% of GHG emissions, and only for 
3.0%, 4.3%, and 3.7 % of investments respectively. Thus, the portfolio’s high carbon impact is 
concentrated into a limited number of issuers. The situation is different when Scope 3 is 
considered, because the associated intensity is distributed among all issuers in a less 
concentrated manner.   
Table 33-4 Top ten high carbon intensive companies  
 
Source: EcoAct 
 
As Table 33-5 demonstrates the top ten performers represent 15% of the total investment, 2% 
of Scope 1 & 2 emissions and 20% of emissions when Scope 3 is included in the analysis.  The 
Scope 3 performance is deteriorated mainly because of only one issuer - Company W from the 
banking sector that is considered as low carbon when Scope 1 & 2 are included and high 
carbon when Category 15 Investments Scope 3 enters the equation.  
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Table 33-5 Top ten low carbon intensive companies, contributing positively to 
portfolio climate KPIs  
 
Source: EcoAct 
 
5.1.4. Sector level   
Sector level analysis shows that portfolio carbon footprint is driven mainly by such sectors as 
non-energy materials and industrials if scope 1 & 2 are considered. Figure 33-9 shows that 
these two sectors account for 76% of the emissions, followed by consumer cyclicals and non-
cyclicals presenting each 7% of overall financed emissions.  
It is important to also review the data including the Scope 3 emissions to identify any further 
trends in sectoral carbon emissions. Figure 33-9 shows the difference between Scope 1 & 2 
only versus Scope 1, 2 & 3 sectoral contribution. Regarding the full scope of emissions there 
are three sectors impacting the most a portfolio footprint and accounting for 69% of overall 
emissions. Among them consumer cyclicals 31%, Industrials 19% and Finance 19%.  
Figure 33-9  Breakdown of sectoral contribution to portfolio emissions, Scope 1 & 2, 
Scope 1, 2 & 3 
  
Source: EcoAct 
 
5.1.5. Benchmarking    
Benchmarking portfolio’s Climate KPIs provides information on the portfolio’s overall 
performance. The analysis on portfolio carbon intensity, when benchmarked against both 
mainstream and low carbon indices' intensity provides more insights on portfolio efficiency.   
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Figure 33-10  Benchmarking portfolio climate KPIs, Scope 1 & 2 
 
 Source: EcoAct 
 
A comparison of capital carbon intensity (WCE) shows that the portfolio performs better 
compared to both low carbon and mainstream benchmarks. Each unit of currency invested 
thus contributes to a smaller carbon impact. One million euros within the portfolio contributes 
37 tCO2e which is 2.6 and 3.3 times less compared to low carbon and mainstream indicators 
respectively.   
From operational carbon intensity (CI) perspective, after adjusting attributed emissions (ACE) 
by issuers’ sales, portfolio holdings look more efficient since they emit 63tCO2e for each million 
euros of sales generated by underling assets. The portfolio is 1.4 and 2 times more efficient 
compared to low carbon and mainstream indices' performance.  
Concerning portfolio exposure to high carbon assets or weighted average carbon intensity 
(WACI), the portfolio’s performance is positioned between indices, being 1.2 times more 
exposed than the low carbon benchmark and twice less exposed compared to the mainstream 
index.  
It Is interesting to notice that in terms of weighted average carbon intensity the portfolio 
performs worse compared to the low carbon index despite it performs better for the previous 
two KPIs. Due to its design WACI excludes ownership metrics such as market capitalization or 
enterprise value, thus, it does not contain related to enterprise market valuation biases. Being 
constructed around weight of an issuer into a portfolio and its operational carbon intensity 
WACI shows where portfolio risks are concentrated. Despite good carbon-related capital and 
operational efficiency of the portfolio, a comparison across all indicators at once reveals the 
pattern that we see in the mainstream index – accumulation of negative exposure to carbon 
intensive assets while the low carbon index decreases exposure.  
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Such accumulation requires a deeper analysis at issuer level identifying those companies 
bringing negative exposure to the portfolio. Figure 33-11 demonstrates assets taking into 
account their individual operational carbon intensity, attributed to the portfolio emissions as 
well as amount invested.  Such analysis reveals that the portfolio exposure is driven by three 
issuers: companies A, B, and C.  
Figure 33-11  Detailed analysis on portfolio carbon exposure, Scope 1 & 2, Scope 1, 
2 & 3 
 
Source: EcoAct 
 
Portfolio Climate KPIs provide information related to basic understanding of performance 
management of portfolios and underlying assets, whereas additional indicators – including 
SDG, TCFD and SBT-aligned assets – provide a deeper assessment of climate risks and 
opportunities.  
 Advanced portfolio climate KPIs 
Advanced Portfolio Climate KPIs provide further information regarding the portfolio alignment 
with the 1.5°C-2°C trajectory: SBT- and TCFD-committed and aligned assets, portfolio 
temperature, market-related transition risks & carbon price, green and brown assets, 
contribution to the energy transition, climate performance score among issuers and sectors, 
carbon neutrality & net zero GHG emissions committed assets, the 2°C and below 2°C 
trajectory aligned investments.  
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Figure 33-12  Dashboard: TCFD and SBT-aligned assets 
 
Source: EcoAct 
 
Figure 33-13 Dashboard SDG-engagement, CDP scoring, carbon reduction and 
neutrality of assets  
 
Source: EcoAct 
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6 Future development 
There is an already urgent and growing need for advanced impact accounting rules and impact 
assessment solutions. The current context requires more data and climate and increased 
transition scenario application. Therefore, the roadmap of ClimFIT’s future development is 
based on three main axes.  
Broadening of forward-looking and science-based indicators. The current and ongoing 
medium- and long-term considerations regarding alignment with climate scenarios and 
trajectories provide fertile soil for the development of forward-looking indicators. 
Development of qualitative and quantitative approaches will be a major concern for future 
development.   
Inclusion of EU Benchmarks and EU Taxonomy indicators. EU regulation of financial markets 
motivates the development of data and solutions. Adaptive and contextualized models 
supported by better data will be vital in helping address the portfolio climate-related 
assessment and management challenges. ClimFiT will implement recommended indicators, 
enabling their quantification for large portfolios and indexes. 
Solutions for linking technical issuers with final borrowers. Another obstacle to retrieve 
appropriate data is the absence of a direct link between corporates - borrowers and their 
technical issuers, the later are used as a legal entity to raise funds for corporates. Related 
mostly to fixed-income instruments as bonds, loans, notes, legal and financial structuring - the 
usage of SPV (special purpose vehicles) - impedes the direct link between an investment and 
a financed activity and impact. One of the main focuses of the tool’s development will be an 
investigation of possible solutions to tackle this issue.
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 CARIMA – A Capital Market-Based Approach 
to Quantifying and Managing Transition Risks 
 
By 
University of Augsburg and VfU1,2 
Abstract 
The impact of uncertainty associated with the ongoing transition towards a green and in 
particular low-carbon economy affects virtually all financial market participants. If the 
transition process accelerates compared to current expectations, the values of carbon-based 
firms are likely to decline, while the values of low-carbon firms will tend to benefit from this 
development. On the other hand, if the transition process decelerates unexpectedly, the 
reverse could happen. 
The central goal of CARIMA is to quantify exactly those types of risks as well as opportunities 
for firm values via a capital-market based approach. Using a factor model, carbon risks are 
simply “extracted” from the historical returns of global stock prices using the Carbon Risk 
Factor BMG (Brown-Minus-Green) return time-series. 
The CARIMA concept is essentially directed towards key players in the financial industry, such 
as portfolio managers, who want to take carbon risks in their asset management process into 
account. CARIMA also addresses further stakeholder groups, such as firms, regulatory 
authorities, politicians, and finally scientists. 
Keywords: carbon risk, carbon beta, climate finance, economic transition, asset pricing, factor 
models, carbon risk management 
1 Introduction 
The research project Carbon Risk Management (CARIMA), funded by the German Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), aims to quantify the existing risks and 
opportunities for the values of financial assets and respective portfolios in light of climate 
change and the transition towards a green economy, since values of firms, in many cases, also 
depend on the expected developments of this transition process. If the transition process 
accelerates compared to current expectations, the values of carbon-based (“brown”) firms are 
likely to decline, while the values of low-carbon (“green”) firms will tend to benefit from this 
development. On the other hand, if the transition process decelerates unexpectedly, the 
reverse could happen. 
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Maximilian Görgen, Research Assistant, Chair of Finance and Banking, Faculty of Business 
Administration and Economics, University of Augsburg, email: maximilian.goergen@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de; Marco Wilkens, 
Professor/ Chair holder, Chair of Finance and Banking, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of 
Augsburg, email: marco.wilkens@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de; Henrik Ohlsen, Managing Director, Verein für 
Umweltmanagement und Nachhaltigkeit in Finanzinstituten e.V. (VfU), email: ohlsen@vfu.de. 
2 The project Carbon Risk Management (CARIMA; funding code: 01LA1601) is sponsored by the German Federal Ministry 
of Education and Research. 
Chapter 34 
 540 
A key challenge for policy is to plan and shape the transition process of the economy in such a 
way that it results in the lowest possible uncertainties for firm values and thus avoids 
unnecessary welfare losses that will affect not only the firms, but also society as a whole. An 
unstructured transition towards a green and low-carbon economy that does not consider such 
losses would have unforeseen consequences. It is therefore vital that the risks arising from the 
uncertainty associated with the transition process be as transparent, quantifiable, and 
manageable as possible. 
The impact of uncertainty associated with the transition process affects virtually all financial 
market participants, as the risks for firm values are directly reflected in the risks for all financial 
assets issued by firms, such as stocks, corporate bonds, loans, and hybrid financial assets. Since 
all these financial assets are in turn an integral part of a vast array of portfolios including 
investment funds, pension funds, pensions offices, life insurances, and portfolios by private 
investors, such portfolios are exposed to these risks as well.  
It is therefore a key challenge for investors and financial intermediaries to assess how well 
firms can or cannot adapt to the transition process and to take this into account in their 
investment decisions. An important challenge for central banks and supervisors is to 
understand the impact of the transition process on the financial institutions they monitor and 
the overall stability of financial markets. 
Risks threatening the existence of firms are particularly worrisome. These ultimately affect not 
only shareholders or lenders, but also employees, suppliers, and consumers. The transition 
process of the economy must not lead to unnecessary frictions due to an inappropriate 
handling of the associated risks of the transition process, as these risks ultimately determine 
the welfare of all people. 
The central goal of CARIMA is to quantify exactly those types of risks as well as opportunities 
for firm values − the so-called “carbon risks”, also often referred to as “transition risks”. A 
rational handling of these carbon risks is necessary to achieve the Paris Agreement’s target to 
keep global warming well below 2°C while avoiding unnecessary socioeconomic losses. 
As far as we are aware, CARIMA is currently the only concept to derive such a risk measure 
based on a capital market-based approach. Compared to other approaches, a crucial 
advantage of CARIMA is that when applying the CARIMA approach using the freely available 
Carbon Risk Factor BMG (Brown-Minus-Green), there is no need for detailed fundamental 
climate change-relevant information about firms, which is often difficult and expensive to 
obtain or, in the case of many small caps, may not even be available. 
The two-year project carried out by the two peer project partners, the University of Augsburg 
and the Verein für Umweltmanagement und Nachhaltigkeit in Finanzinstituten e.V. (VfU), 
ended in August 2019. The CARIMA concept was presented to financial practitioners at a 
rollout-conference and many other workshops and conferences. The CARIMA handbook as 
well as its related Excel tool and the Working Paper “Carbon Risk” (Görgen et al., 2019) 
describe the general approach and contain the key results of the project. The corresponding 
files can be accessed and downloaded free of charge from the project website.3 
The CARIMA concept is essentially directed towards key players in the financial industry, such 
as professional portfolio managers, who want to take carbon risks in their asset management 
                                                     
3 See https://carima-project.de/en/ 
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process into account. In addition, CARIMA also addresses further stakeholder groups, such as 
firms, regulatory authorities, politicians, and finally scientists. 
2 CARIMA – a capital market-based approach 
The core idea of CARIMA is to use fluctuations in stock prices to determine the risks and 
opportunities for single stocks and portfolios. The CARIMA concept thus derives the carbon 
risks directly from historical stock prices on the capital market, where new information about 
the expectations of market participants concerning the transition towards a green economy is 
constantly processed and priced. 
Thus, the CARIMA concept presents a capital market-based approach where carbon risks and 
opportunities of the economy's transition process can be quantified comparatively easy, since 
they are simply “extracted” from the historical returns of global stock prices using a Carbon 
Risk Factor BMG (Brown-Minus-Green) in a factor model. 
3 Methodology introduction of the CARIMA concept 
This section briefly outlines the different modules of the development and application of the 
CARIMA concept. Figure 34-1 shows an overview of the CARIMA concept with its five modules 
A to E. 
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Figure 34-1  The five modules of the CARIMA concept 
 
 
Module A: Master dataset 
The construction and calculation of a Carbon Risk Factor BMG with a high degree of 
discriminatory power requires a huge amount of fundamental information from firms. It is 
crucial that the data allow a sufficiently accurate assessment of a firm’s change in value in the 
event of unexpected changes in the transition process of the economy. The better firms can 
be divided into highly selective portfolios in this respect, the more efficient the carbon risk 
factor calculated will be. Therefore, data from different databases, namely Thomson Reuters 
ESG, MSCI ESG-Stats and IVA-Ratings, Sustainalytics ESG Ratings, and CDP is used. This data is 
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carefully prepared, processed, and combined with capital market data (e.g., return data) from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
The individual ESG databases used have different strengths and weaknesses. By combining the 
databases, some weaknesses in the individual databases are compensated for. For example, 
the dataset contains information on firms that was collected using various approaches, such 
as audited annual reports, external scorings, and ratings, (ESG) analyst assessments and self-
disclosures. By combining the databases, database-specific distortions can be reduced and 
various estimation methods from analysts can be integrated. This gives us an extensive 
selection of firms from which to calculate a meaningful Carbon Risk Factor BMG. 
Module B: Scoring concept 
Module B describes the 55 Carbon Risk Proxy Variables, which are selected to support a 
fundamental assessment of whether firm values (and thus their stock prices) are influenced 
positively or negatively by unexpected changes in the ongoing transition process. These 55 
variables are assigned to one of the three group indicators “Value Chain”, “Adaptability”, and 
“Public Perception”, which represent three impact channels of carbon risk.  
The first group indicator “Value Chain” contains Carbon Risk Proxy Variables that reflect the 
impact of carbon risk across a firm‘s value chain. This group indicator therefore contains 
variables that deal with all components of a firm’s value chain – such as its production, 
processes, products, technologies, and supply chain. 
The second group indicator “Public Perception” consists of Carbon Risk Proxy Variables that 
map the influence of carbon risks through another impact channel, so-called public perception. 
For example, a firm with low-emission production may still be affected by carbon risks if the 
public believes that the firm is particularly affected by unexpected changes in the transition 
process to a green economy. 
The third group indicator “Adaptability” mainly comprises Carbon Risk Proxy variables that 
deal with the strategies, guidelines, and management of a firm. A firm can be prepared for 
unexpected changes in the transition process so that it can respond to these changes 
efficiently. The effect of the carbon risk on a firm is therefore reduced by a high degree of 
adaptability. 
As part of the development of the CARIMA concept, the selection and allocation of variables 
were discussed and finalized in two specially organized workshop with climate and financial 
experts from NGOs, universities, and consulting firms to ensures the variables’ ability to 
accurately assess a firm’s change in value in the event of unexpected changes in the transition 
process of the economy as this is a prerequisite for the construction of highly selective 
portfolios and thus the efficiency of the Carbon Risk Factor BMG formed based on this 
information. 
In a next step, the information from these 55 variables is condensed into the three group 
indicators via a simple scoring concept in order to calculate the so-called Brown-Green-Score 
BGS for each firm. A detailed documentation of this scoring concept and the aggregation of 
the three subscores to the final BGS can be found in the CARIMA manual. 
 
This measure ultimately provides a fundamental assessment of the direction and strength of 
the changes in – or in other words risks to − firm values. BGS is determined annually for each 
firm. It is important to note that this scoring concept is only the prerequisite for deriving the 
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Carbon Risk Factor, which is described in the next paragraph. It is not an assessment measure 
on its own. 
Figure 34-2  Assignment of the 55 Carbon Risk Proxy Variables to group indicators 
 
 
Module C: Carbon risk factor BMG 
Next, appropriate firms for the factor construction are selected. First, all non-listed firms are 
excluded. In addition, firms in the financial sector are not included, as their carbon risk differs 
significantly from firms in other sectors. For example, banks have almost no direct emissions 
of their own, but they finance firms with high emissions that can be particularly affected by 
carbon risks. Banks may therefore be indirectly affected by carbon risks through their loan 
portfolio, but this may not be reflected in the fundamental data. An in-depth analysis of the 
financial sector’s carbon risk can be found in the CARIMA manual. 
In addition, only firms that are represented in all four databases and for which data is available 
for at least five Carbon Risk Proxy Variables are used for factor construction. These conditions 
are necessary to minimize distortions in the database-specific data collection methodology. 
In total, these criteria lead to a sample of 1,637 listed global firms from 50 countries. Table 
34-1 shows the geographical and sectoral distribution of the 1,637 firms selected. Most of 
these firms are based in the USA, followed by Japan and the United Kingdom. 
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Table 34-1 Geographical and sectoral distribution of the 1,637 firms selected for the 
construction of the Carbon Risk Factor BMG 
Country N %   Sector N % 
USA 418 25.53 
 
Industry 368 22.48 
Japan 227 13.87 
 
Consumer Cyclical 277 16.92 
UK 193 11.79 
 
Basic Materials 239 14.60 
Canada 97 5.93 
 
Technology 191 11.67 
Australia 75 4.58 
 
Consumer Defensive 167 10.20 
France 66 4.03 
 
Energy 118 7.21 
South Africa 59 3.60 
 
Utilities 104 6.35 
Germany 53 3.24 
 
Healthcare 109 6.66 
Taiwan 48 2.93 
 
Communication Services 64 3.91 
South Korea 36 2.20 
 
   
Other Europe 237 14.48 
 
   
Other Asia 78 4.76 
 
   
Other Americas 37 2.26 
 
   
Other Oceania 13 0.79 
    
Total 1,637 100.00   Total 1,637 100.00 
 
Looking at the sectoral breakdown of the dataset, most firms are active in the sectors 
“Industry”, “Consumer Cyclical” and “Basic Materials”. The Carbon Risk Factor BMG is 
constructed using firms from numerous countries and various sectors. This ensures that the 
factor contains global information from all sectors of the economy. 
Based on their average Brown-Green-Score BGS, those 1,108 firms (624 “brown” and 484 
“green” firms) are then assigned to one of two mimicking stock portfolios: the first portfolio 
consists of stocks of “brown” firms and the other of stocks of “green” firms. Breakpoints for 
this classification are the terciles of the average Brown-Green-Score BGS.  
However, the Carbon Risk Factor BMG should also be as independent as possible from the size 
of a firm. Each firm is therefore assigned the characteristic “small” or “large” based on its 
market capitalization, independently of its BGS. This classification is based on the median. 
Subsequently, the Carbon Risk Factor “Brown-Minus-Green” (BMG) can be formed from the 
historical returns of the four value-weighted portfolios described (brown/small (BS), 
brown/big (BB), green/small (GS) and green/big (GB) following formula 1: 
𝐵𝑀𝐺𝑡  =  0.5 (𝐵𝑆𝑡 +  𝐵𝐵𝑡) − 0.5 (𝐺𝑆𝑡 +  𝐺𝐵𝑡) (5) 
The Carbon Risk Factor BMG reflects a hypothetical portfolio that is invested long in “brown” 
and short in “green” stocks, thus reflecting the return difference between fundamentally 
“brown” and “green” firms. 
Of course, it is also possible to consider other ways of constructing the Carbon Risk Factor 
BMG. For example, the threshold value of a characteristic that serves as the basis for the 
sorting into the different portfolios can be varied. Country-specific or sector-specific factors 
are also conceivable, depending on requirements. More information on such modifications 
can be found in the CARIMA manual. 
We check the correlation between BMG and other risk factors and test an orthogonalized 
variant of the factor to ensure that BMG is not already covered by other common risk factors. 
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We also test the scoring concept for robustness by varying the weights for the subscores and 
breakpoints. More details can be found in the CARIMA manual. 
Module D: Factor model 
Module D describes how the carbon risk of practically all stocks and other financial assets, as 
well as the portfolios containing them, can be estimated relatively easily based on the Carbon 
Risk Factor BMG.  
Since stock market prices at any time reflect the speed of the transition process that market 
participants currently assume is occurring and thus which transition path is expected by 
society, the return time series of the Carbon Risk Factor BMG, constructed as a mimicking 
portfolio for carbon risk, contains such information in a condensed form. This information can 
be extracted by breaking down the firm's (or generally speaking a financial asset’s) return time 
series into its individual components using a simple regression analysis. One of these 
components, besides other known risk components, such as a firm’s exposure to common risk 
factors like SMB or HML, is a firm’s carbon risk exposure, which is assessed by the Carbon Beta 
through the Carbon Risk Factor BMG. Thus, the Carbon Beta reflects the capital market’s 
assessment of the carbon risk of the respective financial asset or portfolio. 
So, who determines the Carbon Beta in the end? The answer is simple: all market participants, 
i.e., all buyers and sellers of the stocks and portfolios under consideration, i.e., all equity 
analysts and other capital market participants worldwide, because they determine the 
changes in stock prices worldwide, from which the Carbon Risk Factor BMG is calculated. It 
can also be said that the Carbon Beta is in principle the aggregated assessment of the carbon 
risk (of all participants) on the capital market. 
Only the historical returns of the financial assets or portfolios are required as the dependent 
variable in the regression. The return time series of the explaining variables, such as the 
Carbon Risk Factor BMG and the other factors, are available on the project website and further 
publicly accessible websites, respectively.  
Economic intuition and interpretation of the Carbon Beta 
The Carbon Beta estimates the impacts or effects on firms, and their values or stock prices, of 
possible changes in expectations that may occur as the present economy moves towards a 
green economy. Sudden changes in expectations regarding the transition process of the 
economy are reflected in the Carbon Beta. The higher the absolute Carbon Beta value, the 
greater the impact (either upward or downward) on the stock price. 
Estimation of the market’s carbon risk 
However, there may also be unexpected changes in the transition process that affect all firms 
(“brown”, “neutral”, and “green”) to the same or at least a very similar extent. This “general 
market carbon risk” is not captured with the individual Carbon Betas of the stocks, as it is part 
of the total market risk. In general, the Carbon Beta is used to estimate the individual risk of a 
stock in relation to the overall market. It thus determines how the value of a stock is likely to 
change in relation to the market as a whole if expectations about the transition process of the 
economy change. The “general market carbon risk” can be estimated through the correlation 
between the market factor and the Carbon Risk Factor BMG. Our empirical research shows a 
(slightly) positive and constant correlation between the (global) market index and the Carbon 
Risk Factor BMG. This suggests that an acceleration of the transition process of the economy 
towards a green economy will tend to reduce the value of all stocks in the overall market. 
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In this context, as already described above, the CARIMA manual offers details on the use of an 
orthogonalized variant of risk factors in the regression model. Here, the correlation between 
BMG and the other factors in the factor model is set to zero without changing its variance 
structure. This ensures that the factor continues to explain only those risks that are specific to 
it and does not capture any other systematic effects. 
Carbon Betas quantify risks and opportunities 
The CARIMA concept does not only quantify the risk of losses, but also the chance of profits. 
When talking about risks in the following, not only negative events (i.e., risks in conventional 
language), but also positive events (i.e., opportunities in conventional language) are 
considered. In this respect, the Carbon Beta is comparable to the volatility (standard deviation) 
of equity returns, which is widely used in financial practice. This indicator also subsumes 
opportunities and risks. 
Module E: Applications 
A variety of potential applications for the Carbon Beta is included in Module E. The Carbon 
Beta can be determined for different asset classes such as stocks, corporate bonds, loans, 
portfolios, and funds. Furthermore, various country and sector aggregations and 
corresponding analyses are possible. Scenarios for stress testing the values of financial assets 
and portfolios can be generated based on the Carbon Beta. In portfolio management, the 
Carbon Beta can be integrated into investment strategies, such as Factor Investing and Best-
in-class approaches and can be used for hedging carbon risks. The potential applications 
mentioned here are explained in more detail in the CARIMA manual and supported by 
exemplary Excel applications. 
The CARIMA concept for different user groups 
The CARIMA concept is applicable for both, users who “only” want to estimate carbon risk 
exposure, and for advanced users, who want to construct and validate the Carbon Risk Factor 
BMG by themselves. By making the Carbon Risk Factor BMG publicly available, any user can 
start directly with determining the carbon risk of financial assets and portfolios easily and 
quickly by themselves, since only the historical return time series of the respective financial 
assets or portfolios are needed. 
More detailed explanations of modules A to D are given in the CARIMA manual, which is 
available on the project website. These explanations address advanced users in particular, who 
would like to adapt and further develop the CARIMA concept to their individual needs and 
have the appropriate resources to do so. 
4 Determination of Carbon Beta with the Carbon Risk Factor BMG 
As already described, the CARIMA concept offers a market-based approach to quantify carbon 
risks by using factor models. The relevance of factor models is reflected not only in their 
acceptance as study content at practically all universities, but also in their broad recognition 
in academia and in a wide range of applications in financial practice. 
Factor models as the starting point for the calculation of Carbon Betas 
A typical factor model that is widely used in both financial practice and science is the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model, which is a further development of the very well-known Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model, which is again a further development of the Nobel Prize-
winning Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin 
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(1966). However, the Carbon Risk Factor BMG can in principle be added to any factor model 
as long as no other factor is too highly correlated with the Carbon Risk Factor BMG. 
In the following applications, the Carbon Risk Factor “Brown-Minus-Green” (BMG) extends the 
Carhart model so that it has the following form: 
eri,t = αi + 𝛽i
mkterM,t + 𝛽i
smb SMBt + 𝛽i
hml HMLt + 𝛽i
wml WMLt + 𝛽i
bmg
 BMGt + εi,t (6) 
With:  
• eri,t = return on an asset i minus return on a risk-free investment in period t (excess 
return) 
• erM,t = excess return of the market in period t 
• SMBt = return of the global size factor in period t 
• HMLt = return of the global value factor in period t 
• WMLt = return of the global momentum factor in period t 
• BMGt = return on the global Carbon Risk Factor BMG in period t 
• αi, 𝛽i
mkt, 𝛽i
smb, 𝛽i
hml und 𝛽i
wml = parameters αi and 𝛽i
x of the Carhart Model 
• 𝛽i
bmg= Carbon Beta of the asset i. This key figure serves as the central carbon risk 
measure. It is estimated via a simple multiple linear regression according to this 
factor model 
The central idea of factor models is that the returns on assets and thus the overall risks of 
those assets can be broken down into various components (“factors”). One of these 
components is the sensitivity of an asset’s value towards unexpected changes in the transition 
process of the economy. Assets can be equities, funds or portfolios. In addition, the CARIMA 
concept is also suitable in principle for determining the carbon risk of corporate bonds and 
loans. For this, however, some additional considerations and modifications are necessary. 
For example, the carbon risk of corporate bonds can be determined using different factor 
models that are specifically designed to explain the returns of corporate bonds, such as the 
models by Fama and French (1993) or Elton et al. (1995). However, determining Carbon Betas 
for loans is somewhat more demanding, because unlike, e.g., stocks or bonds, there are 
typically no market prices and thus no historical time series of returns for loans. Without these 
time series returns, no direct estimation of the Carbon Beta using a factor model is possible. 
Under certain circumstances, the Carbon Betas of firms’ stocks and corporate bonds can be 
used to estimate the Carbon Betas of loans more or less accurately (see Table 34-2). More 
information can be found in the CARIMA manual. 
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Table 34-2 Using Carbon Betas from stocks and corporate bonds to determine 
Carbon Betas of loans 
 
Carbon Beta of the stock of 
the same firm is known 
Carbon Beta of the stock of 
the same firm is unknown 
Carbon Beta of a corporate 
bond of the firm is known 
Using the Carbon Beta of the 
stock or a corporate bond to 
determine the Carbon Beta of 
the loan 
Using the Carbon Beta of a 
corporate bond to determine 
the Carbon Beta of the loan 
Carbon Beta of a corporate 
bond of the firm is unknown 
Using the Carbon Beta of the 
stock to determine the Carbon 
Beta of the loan 
Using the Carbon Beta of 
comparable firms to 
determine the Carbon Beta of 
the loan 
 
General interpretation of the Carbon Beta 
The Carbon Beta 𝛽i
bmg
 of an asset can be interpreted as follows: if the Carbon Beta is greater 
than zero, it can be expected that the value of this asset will fall compared to the market, if 
the transition process of the economy towards a green economy accelerates unexpectedly. If, 
on the other hand, the Carbon Beta is less than zero, the value of this asset will rise compared 
to an average asset in expectation, if the transition process of the economy towards a green 
economy decelerates unexpectedly. The value of an asset with a Carbon Beta close to zero is 
influenced to a market-average extent by the transition process. 
Input for calculating Carbon Betas: Historical returns of the Carbon Risk Factor BMG 
and other risk factors 
One of the explanatory variables on the right side of Equation (6) is the Carbon Risk Factor 
BMG. BMG is simply a time series of historical returns on a specific hypothetical stock portfolio; 
more precisely, it is the difference between the historical returns from “brown” firms and 
those from “green” firms. This time series is illustrated in Figure 34-3 on a monthly basis from 
January 2010 to December 2018. 
Figure 34-3  Monthly returns of the Carbon Risk Factor BMG (2010-2018) 
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Figure 34-4 shows the historical cumulative returns of the “brown” portfolio and the “green” 
portfolio as well as the historical returns of the Carbon Risk Factor BMG. The cumulative return 
on the Carbon Risk Factor BMG is slightly positive in the first years of the reviewed period but 
falls back to zero by the end of 2012. From 2013 to the end of 2015, the cumulative return on 
the factor fell almost steadily to almost –30% overall. During this period, “brown” firms thus 
had a much lower return than “green” firms. In the last years of the reviewed period, however, 
there was a slight increase again, so that the Carbon Risk Factor BMG shows a cumulative 
return of –20% overall. 
Figure 34-4  Cumulative returns of the Carbon Risk Factor BMG and the two 
portfolios “green” and “brown” 
 
 
Table 34-3 shows descriptive statistics of the monthly Carbon Risk Factor BMG and its 
correlations with other global risk factors of the reference model. The average monthly return 
on the Carbon Risk Factor BMG is negative at −0.25%, the standard deviation is 1.95%. The 
correlations between the Carbon Risk Factor BMG and the market, size, value, and momentum 
factors are all relatively low. As mentioned above, a low correlation with other risk factors of 
the Carhart model is a good first indication for the factor model. 
Table 34-3 Descriptive statistics and correlations of the Carbon Risk Factor BMG 
Factor 
Ø  Return 
(%) 
Standard-
deviation (%) 
t-
stat. 
Correlations 
BMG erM SMB HML WML 
 
BMG −0.25 1.95 −1.17 1.00     
erM 0.76 4.02 1.74 0.09 1.00    
SMB 0.06 1.39 0.37 0.20 −0.02 1.00   
HML −0.00 1.68 −0.02 0.27 0.19 −0.06 1.00  
WML 0.57 2.53 2.06 −0.24 −0.20 0.00 −0.41 1.00 
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Input for calculating Carbon Betas: Historical returns of other risk factors  
Other key explanatory variables include the excess returns of the entire stock market erM,t, 
SMBt, a global size factor, HMLt, a global value factor, and WMLt, a global momentum factor at 
the time of t. These factors are available free of charge on the Internet. They can for example 
be downloaded from the Kenneth R. French Data Library 4  or the AQR Data Library 5 . All 
common factors based on the published literature can also be reproduced individually. 
Output: Carbon Betas for stocks 
Figure 34-5  Carbon Betas of some example stocks 
 
 
Figure 34-5 shows the calculated Carbon Betas for some well-known example firms. It is clear 
that in particular those firms have a high Carbon Beta, which are usually classified as “brown”. 
On the other hand, especially "green" firms show low Carbon Betas. Similarly, some firms have 
Carbon Betas close to zero, i.e., apart from the general market carbon risk mentioned above, 
they are not exposed to carbon risk. 
It is not surprising that the Carbon Betas of “brown” stocks are usually more or less positive, 
and the Carbon Betas of “green” stocks are more or less negative. However, at this point it is 
worth mentioning that it may also be the case that a firm that, e.g., does not burn fossil fuels 
itself and is therefore commonly seen as “clean”, also has a positive Carbon Beta and belongs 
by CARIMA-definition to the “brown” firms.  
This could be the case if the firm relies heavily on “brown” inputs or is a supplier to “brown” 
firms. In this case, an unexpected acceleration in the transition process of the economy could 
be expected to lead to a decline in profits for this “clean” firm as well, since this firm depends 
                                                     
4 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
5 See https://www.aqr.com/Insights/Datasets/ 
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in turn on firms whose value and business models are negatively affected by the unexpected 
acceleration. The same, of course, applies vice versa. 
The level of the estimated Carbon Betas can be used very easily to compare the carbon risk 
exposures of different firms. 
Output: Carbon Beta for portfolios 
In a similar way as for stocks, carbon risk can also be determined for portfolios. When assessing 
the current carbon risk in portfolios for today or future periods, respectively, two approaches, 
in particular the top-down and bottom-up approach, are conceivable. In both cases, historical 
return time series serve to estimate a portfolio’s current carbon risk. The composition of the 
portfolio, or more precisely its change over time, is a key factor in choosing the appropriate 
approach. 
For the top-down approach, only the portfolio’s historical time series of returns must be 
known, while the bottom-up approach requires the current portfolio weights of the individual 
assets and their return time series. 
To determine a portfolio’s Carbon Beta using the top-down approach, the user only needs to 
have the portfolio’s historical time series of the excess returns. This corresponds to the 
weighted excess returns of the individual stocks in the portfolio. These excess returns are used 
as a dependent variable in the regression, as previously described for stocks. Thus, the Carbon 
Beta can be determined directly from the regression Equation (6). This once again illustrates 
the great advantage of the CARIMA concept. For portfolios with any number of different types 
of financial securities, the carbon risk can be estimated with just one regression. 
However, to ensure that this approach does not lead to wrong results in the estimation of 
current Carbon Betas, the composition of the portfolio must, strictly speaking, have remained 
the same over the entire historical period under consideration. Note that the weights of the 
stocks in the portfolio can change automatically over time depending on the performance of 
stocks in the portfolio. 
If the assumption of a constant portfolio composition over time is (severely) violated, it is more 
reasonable to determine the portfolio’s Carbon Beta using the bottom-up approach. However, 
for this approach, the historical time series of (excess) returns of the individual stocks and their 
weighting in the portfolio are required. Subsequently, the Carbon Betas of each stock in the 
portfolio can be determined using Formula (6). The Carbon Beta of the portfolio is then 
calculated as the weighted sum of the Carbon Betas of the stocks held in the portfolio. 
Output: Carbon Beta of funds 
The following section describes how to determine the Carbon Beta of funds, in particular, 
equity funds. Equity funds are investment funds that invest their assets primarily or exclusively 
in (individual) stocks. 
Determining the Carbon Beta at fund level is basically analogous to the procedure for 
portfolios, since funds are basically special forms of portfolios that also consist of various 
individual securities. The carbon risk of a fund can thus also be determined bottom-up or top-
down. Nevertheless, some differences between funds and portfolios must be considered. 
Certainly, the main difference is the fact that, unlike a private portfolio, funds are managed 
externally. This typically leads to different degrees of knowledge about the composition and 
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the historical time series of returns of the portfolio and fund. In many cases, the historical time 
series of returns is unknown for a private portfolio, while the composition of the portfolio is 
known. In contrast, the historical time series of returns is often available for funds, but the 
(historical) composition of a fund is often unknown. Therefore, the top-down approach is 
particularly relevant for funds. 
Figure 34-6  Carbon Betas of various example funds 
 
 
As an example, the Carbon Betas for some funds were determined above. Based on a Carhart 
four-factor model extended by the Carbon Risk Factor BMG, a (constant) Carbon Beta for the 
period from January 2010 to December 2018 is estimated using monthly return data. The 
results are visualized in Figure 34-6. The US GI World Precious Minerals fund has a high carbon 
risk with a Carbon Beta of 2.59. This suggests that in the event of an unexpected change in the 
transition towards a green economy, the fund would be severely adversely affected. However, 
it is also possible to find funds with a negative Carbon Beta that would develop positively in 
the event of an unexpected change in the transition process towards a green economy. This 
applies to ProShares UltraShort Oil & Gas (Carbon Beta –1.92) and to a lesser extent to Triodos 
Sustainable Equity (Carbon Beta –0.20) and UniNachhaltig Aktien Global (Carbon Beta –0.17). 
This is offset by funds such as RobecoSam Sustainable EE and iShares Global Clean Energy ETF, 
for which no Carbon Beta significantly different from zero can be measured. A possible 
explanation for the relatively low (negative) Carbon Betas of these funds is the fact that the 
Carbon Beta estimates the individual carbon risk of a stock (or an asset in general) in relation 
to the market. It thus determines how the value of a stock is likely to change in relation to the 
market as a whole if expectations about the transition process of the economy change. 
However, since funds are mostly very broadly invested, i.e., their returns depend more on the 
movements of the market, the funds’ return time series primarily load on the market factor. 
In other words, these funds are only affected by the average carbon risk of the market. 
5 Further applications of the CARIMA concept 
This chapter presents some more practical applications of the CARIMA concept from a 
perspective of a portfolio manager. In the CARIMA manual, the applications shown in the 
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following as well as further applications are described in detail. Many of these applications can 
also be reproduced with the corresponding Excel tool. 
Management and hedging of carbon risks 
The Carbon Beta enables portfolio managers and investors to manage the carbon risk of their 
portfolios. For example, they can steer the exposure to carbon risks of a certain portfolio to 
the desired level. Portfolio managers can construct “green” and “brown” portfolios in a 
targeted manner and speculate on developments that may occur in the economy’s transition 
process (unexpected by the market). Furthermore, portfolio managers can use the Carbon 
Beta to create portfolios that are neutral to carbon risks, in other words, portfolios hedged 
against this risk. In this way, not only hedging strategies can be implemented into existing 
portfolio strategies, but also new portfolios and products with a certain carbon risk exposure 
can be generated. 
Example application: hedging carbon risk 
It is assumed that a portfolio manager has various investment opportunities, in this example 
the US Global Investors Precious Minerals Fund, the iShares MSCI World Exchange Traded Fund 
(ETF), and the stock of Vestas. Initially, the portfolio manager is invested solely in the US Global 
Investors Precious Minerals Fund. This fund shows a relatively high Carbon Beta of 2.59 and 
can thus be classified as “brown”. The portfolio manager is now urged by his investors to 
actively reduce the carbon risk of this portfolio. If he includes the stock of Vestas in his portfolio 
with a Carbon Beta of –2.13, the carbon risk can be reduced. For example, if the portfolio 
manager opts for an equal weighting of the fund and the stock in the portfolio, the Carbon 
Beta is 0.23. Thus, this portfolio formation enables the manager to reduce the carbon risk of 
his portfolio. The returns and values of the Carbon Beta of the hedged portfolio and its 
respective underlyings are shown in Figure 34-7. 
Figure 34-7  Returns and Carbon Betas of the hedged portfolio and its respective 
underlyings 
 
Of course, due to the additivity of the betas, it is also possible to achieve other degrees of 
exposure to carbon risks. This example makes clear that portfolio managers and investors can 
use the Carbon Beta to hedge their portfolios easily. In addition, Carbon Betas can be realized 
at almost any magnitude, i.e., any investment strategy can be pursued through the 
composition of “green”, “neutral”, and “brown” portfolios. 
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Portfolio allocation strategies: “Best-in-class” approach based on the Carbon Beta 
The idea of a best-in-class approach is to select the stocks with the lowest Carbon Beta in a 
particular group of firms, in this example from each sector. This group of stocks is referred to 
as the “Best-in-class” portfolio. The other way around, stocks with the highest Carbon Beta 
within their sector are grouped into the “Worst-in-class” portfolio, i.e., the “brown” portfolio. 
For these two portfolios, different thresholds for the classification into “green” or “brown” are 
conceivable. Such best-in-class approaches are often used for the construction of 
(sustainability) indices. For example, the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index is constructed 
in such a way that the selected firms are among the top ten percent of sustainable firms in 
terms of the defined sustainability characteristics. Such indices serve as benchmarks and thus 
as a basis for other financial products. 
Example application: “Best-in-class” approach 
Figure 34-8  Best-in-class approach across eleven sectors 
 
 
Figure 34-8 shows an example for this approach and the respective results. The threshold value 
in this example is defined as the median of the Carbon Beta within each sector. Stocks below 
the median of a particular sector are included in the Best-in-class portfolio, while stocks with 
a Carbon Beta above the median enter into the Worst-in-class portfolio for that sector. The 
average values across eleven sectors per portfolio are shown. In this example, a global 
investment universe is assumed. The global investment universe shows a Carbon Beta of 0.01 
and a Sharpe Ratio of 0.41, whereas the Best(Worst)-in-class Portfolio shows a Carbon Beta of 
–0.50 (0.52) and a Sharpe Ratio of 0.44 (0.39). 
Thus, the difference between the Carbon Betas of the Best-in-class and Worst-in-class 
portfolios amounts to –1.02, whereas the Sharpe Ratios do not show any major differences. 
In this scenario, portfolio managers and investors can maintain the sector allocation of their 
portfolios with a corresponding Sharpe Ratio while simultaneously managing carbon risk via 
the Best-in-class approach. 
Factor Investing taking carbon risks into account 
In Factor Investing, stocks are selected based on certain factors, such as firm size or book-to-
market ratio. The ultimate objective is to generate a stock portfolio that shows certain 
characteristics (exposures) with respect to these factors across all stocks. 
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According to Invesco's Global Factor Investing Study (Invesco, 2018), risk reduction and better 
control over the risk exposure of a portfolio are key reasons to implement Factor Investing 
strategies. In addition, factor strategies can be used to easily map thematic focuses, e.g., 
regarding ESG risks in the portfolio. 
It can be assumed that the integration of ESG issues into Factor Investing will gain in 
importance in upcoming years. It is therefore obvious that carbon risks will also find their way 
into new factor strategies. By taking the Carbon Beta into account, portfolio managers and 
investors can incorporate carbon risk into the composition of their portfolios. The Carbon Beta, 
for example, can be used to develop a multi-factor strategy aimed at specifying a specific 
carbon risk without deviating from the original investment strategy. This allows portfolio 
managers to consider investors’ preferences for carbon risks in conventional factor strategies. 
Example application: “Factor Investing” approach 
In the following scenario, a portfolio manager wants to achieve a certain level of carbon risk 
for his portfolio while maintaining the sensitivity (betas) to the risk factors market, SMB, and 
HML. The portfolio manager’s investment universe consists of global stocks. He determines all 
factor sensitivities for each of these stocks, in other words he uses a multi-factor strategy. The 
sensitivities with regard to the factors market, SMB, and HML are crucial, whereby two 
portfolios with similar sensitivities should exist while being “brown” or “green” depending on 
investors’ preferences. In a three-step procedure, the portfolio manager sorts all stocks into 
portfolios according to their sensitivities with regard to the factors market, SMB, and HML. For 
portfolio formation, a quintile classification is carried out. First, all firms are divided into 
quintile portfolios based on their market beta. The companies in each of these five portfolios 
are then sequentially divided into further portfolios based on their SMB-beta and finally their 
HML-beta. This results in a total of 125 (5x5x5) portfolios which each show a certain sensitivity, 
i.e., beta, to the factors market, SMB, and HML. Each of these portfolios is then categorized as 
either a “green” or “brown” Carbon Beta portfolio based on the median of the Carbon Betas 
of the stocks in that specific portfolio. Investments can now be made into these portfolios 
according to the multi-factor strategy selected. 
Figure 34-9  Carbon Betas in Factor Investing 
 
 
Figure 34-9 shows four potential portfolios. If the portfolio manager adopts a multi-factor 
strategy based on the entire investment universe without taking the Carbon Beta into account, 
he obtains a portfolio with a Carbon Beta of –0.02, which is almost neutral to carbon risks. 
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From this investment universe, portfolios are constructed with a Carbon Beta below the 
median (“Green” Portfolio) and above the median (“Brown” Portfolio). These two portfolios 
represent the extreme cases, with a Carbon Beta of –0.44 for the “Green Portfolio” and 0.47 
for the “Brown Portfolio”, respectively. The other factor loadings, i.e., Beta MKT, Beta SMB, 
and Beta HML, on the other hand, hardly differ at all. 
Generally, a portfolio manager will set a bandwidth for the carbon risk of his portfolio. In this 
case, one could imagine that the portfolio manager prefers a slightly positive Carbon Beta 
between 0.15 and 0.25. He can easily implement this by composing his portfolio accordingly, 
for example by combining the “Brown” and “Green” Portfolios with different weightings. This 
is demonstrated by the Investor Portfolio with a Carbon Beta of 0.20. The portfolio manager 
can thus realize any level of the Carbon Beta. Again, the betas of the factors market, SMB, and 
HML differ only marginally, while the Carbon Beta can be steered towards any desired level. 
6 Conclusion 
CARIMA provides a new measure for financial market actors to assess risks and opportunities 
in stocks and portfolios arising from climate change and the transition process of the economy 
towards a green and in particular low-carbon economy, based on capital market information. 
In other words, CARIMA supports the financial sector in the transition process of the economy 
towards a green economy and can thus contribute to the overall societal goal of preventing 
welfare losses. 
Nevertheless, a number of related topics in research and practice are relevant for the future. 
Examples include the integrative consideration of carbon risks in asset management, the 
evaluation of carbon risks in derivative financial instruments, and the question how carbon 
risks influence expected returns of stocks and other financial assets. Subsequent work will not 
only fill gaps in scientific and applied research, but will also support the financing of the 
transition process of the economy towards the 2°C target and, where appropriate, the 
fulfillment of further sustainable development goals.  
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 A Review of Methodologies Analyzing 
Physical Climate Risks 
 
By 
Institute for Climate Economics (I4CE)1 
Abstract 
This chapter reviews and compares the approaches developed by several service providers to 
inform financial institutions on their exposures to physical climate risks. We introduce 
common concepts and terminology defining these approaches as “physical climate risks 
analysis in finance,” and present several available approaches developed by service providers 
to analyze these risks. We also review further details on the underlying methodologies, and 
discuss the limitations of these methodologies. 
Keywords: financial sector, physical climate risk, climate services, review 
1 Introduction 
In January 2019, the California utility giant PG&E filed for bankruptcy protection with billions 
of dollars in potential liabilities resulted from damages to its equipment during the 2017 and 
2018 major wildfires. 2  This demonstrated that climate change had already caused major 
financial losses to a major economy. While climate change is materializing and expected to 
continue for decades, financial institutions need to understand how their portfolios are 
vulnerable to potential impacts of climate change, known as “physical climate risks”. 
In 2018, only a few financial institutions reportedly conducted analyses on physical climate 
risks, most of which done jointly with external service providers with developed 
methodologies to analyze such risks (Hubert & Cardona, 2018).  
This chapter compares the approaches developed by several service providers to inform 
financial institutions on their exposures to physical climate risks. Section two introduces 
common concepts and terminology defining these approaches as “physical climate risks 
analysis in finance,” Section three introduces the background of available approaches 
developed by service providers to analyze these risks, and Section four provides further details 
on the underlying methodologies, while the final conclusion discusses the limitations of the 
methodologies. 
                                                     
1  This chapter is written by Romain Hubert, Project Manager, I4CE – Institute for Climate Economics, email: 
romain.hubert@i4ce.org; and Michel Cardona, Senior Advisor, I4CE – Institute for Climate Economics, email: 
michel.cardona@i4ce.org. This chapter is based on I4CE’s contribution to ClimINVEST. Project ClimINVEST is a part of 
ERA4CS, an ERA-NET initiated by JPI Climate, with funding from RCN (NO), ANR (FR), NWO (NL) and the European Union 
(Grant 690462). 
2 More detail at: https://fr.reuters.com/article/bankingfinancial-SP/idUKL3N27N41U. 
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The approaches described in this chapter were those accessible to the authors in 2018 when 
they undertook the ClimINVEST research project.3 The methodologies were not described in 
full detail.  
2 Common framework for reviewing the approaches 
The methodologies reviewed in this chapter were developed to inform financial institutions 
about their exposures to potential impacts of climate change. This section presents a common 
framework of physical climate risk analysis in finance.  
 Analyzing impact chains: from climate hazards to financial activities 
2.1.1 Climate hazards are the drivers of physical climate risks 
As shown on Figure 35-1, physical climate risks in finance arise from a set of risk drivers called 
“climate hazards”. The approaches generally define them as persistent or acute changes in 
weather conditions.4 In reference to the TCFD’s language, the approaches can focus on “acute 
climate hazards” defined as changes in frequency, intensity, duration and geographical spread 
of extreme events (e.g., typhoons; heatwaves). They can also cover “chronic climate hazards” 
defined as the gradual changes in the broader climate-related conditions (e.g., gradual air and 
ocean warming, changing rain patterns including seasonality, intensity, changing wind 
patterns). 
Climate hazards in available approaches also include both the gradual and acute consequences 
of climate change for the natural environment where human activities take place in, including 
consequences on the natural physical environment (e.g., sea-level rise, drier soils or floods) 
and consequences on animals, plants and ecosystems (e.g., species proliferation, extinction or 
migration).5 
These different categories of climate hazards can compound each other. For instance, a 
gradual sea-level rise can exacerbate coastal flooding, as two types of hazards can occur at the 
same time with compounded impact. 
2.1.2 Climate hazards impact financial activities through the real economy 
The available approaches analyzing physical climate risks in finance aim to study how climate 
hazards translate into potential impacts on financial institutions. These methods recognize 
that the potential impacts manifest through the economic entities that institutions finance in 
their portfolios. These entities can be physical assets (e.g., plants and buildings), governments, 
individuals or companies. Therefore, physical climate risk analysis in finance consists in 
analyzing the chain of impact from climate hazards to the financed entities and ultimately the 
financial institutions.  
Exploring the complete chains of impacts step by step, the approaches analyze how a specific 
climate hazard triggers physical impacts on an entity in the real economy, how it leads to 
financial impacts at the scale of the entity, and ultimately how this affects the main categories 
of financial risks, namely underwriting, credit or market risks, that a financial institution is 
exposed to. Indeed, climate hazards can cause an entity to be liable for insurance claims, 
                                                     
3 The complete information validated by the service providers is available online in annex to I4CE’s 2018 report “Getting 
started on physical climate risk analysis in finance”. 
4 In a few instances, the approaches developed by the service providers define “climate hazards” in reference to past or 
current climate conditions. 
5 In IPCC reports the consequences of climate change on natural physical systems are called “physical impacts of climate 
change”. 
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jeopardize its ability to repay loans and generate financial returns for investors. Climate 
hazards may also create macroeconomic impacts with broader implications for financial 
activities.  
The implementation of this general “impact chain” framework has different implications 
depending on the financed entity.  
 Relevance of the characteristics of the financed entity 
2.2.1 The general setting of impact chains depends on the type of financed entity 
Different types of physical and financial impacts can be analyzed according to the nature of 
the entity (e.g., a company, a project or a government). Figure 35-1 synthesizes the categories 
of physical and financial impacts that can be analyzed when the financed entity is a company. 
Climate hazards can impact the operation sites (e.g., damages to physical installations, losses 
of workforce productivity and natural resources available for industrial production). As 
importantly, the company is exposed to climate hazards across its value chain and broader 
business environment. The approaches reviewed in this chapter address different aspects of 
this analytical framework and provide various levels of details on specific impacts. For example, 
some approaches present separately the impacts on the suppliers or upstream value chain, 
the market or downstream value chain, and the logistics. 
Figure 35-1 Propagation channels of climate risks to a company in the real economy 
 
Source: Authors, after Hubert et al. 2018. Getting started on Physical climate risk 
analysis in finance 
 
2.2.2 The appropriate level of data granularity depends on the type of financed 
entity  
The developers of the approaches reviewed in this chapter seek to use the appropriate level 
of data according to the type of entity in the portfolio. 
Sectoral and regional information may be appropriate for analyzing physical climate risks at 
the scale of governments. For most entities in the portfolios such as corporates, this 
information may be useful6 but insufficient. The climate impacts on these entities propagate 
along complex channels that may vary with the specific activities of the company. The 
                                                     
6 For example, floods in a region may lead to general increase in insurance premia, while the company itself may not be 
actually be impacted. 
Chapter 35 
 562 
magnitude of impacts may also vary widely with specific characteristics of the entity and its 
environment. 
Two companies operating in the same activity and geographic area may sustain different 
impacts depending on their characteristics. For instance, flood damages to operation sites may 
depend on the elevation of the machines or the resilience of the building materials to water. 
Impacts on the value chain may also depend on the location of the specific network of key 
suppliers and markets, and on a company’s bargaining power. Other elements can influence 
the vulnerability and adaptability of the company when facing climate hazards, like its financial 
capacity or insurance coverage. 
 Relevance of different time horizons and accounting for future uncertainties  
2.3.1 Uncertain climate impacts can be analyzed from near- to long-term horizons 
The approaches reviewed in this chapter look at the potential impact of climate hazards in 
different timeframes from the current moment to 2100. The potential impact at these 
different horizons depends on the specific types of uncertainties. 
Physical climate risk analysis is relevant for the near term. The trends in climate hazards are 
already set for the coming decades, no matter how much we limit GHG emissions 7 . The 
resulting impacts from climate change will depend on short-term decisions that humans make 
to change their systems to adapt.  
Physical climate risk analysis is also relevant for longer-term horizons, when potential impacts 
may be more severe. The evolution of climate hazards in longer-term horizons depends heavily 
on short-term actions to reduce GHG emissions, and the resulting impacts also depend on the 
decisions that humans make on adaptation. In a pessimistic-case scenario where GHG 
emissions continue at the same pace, every region in the world will be exposed to intensified 
climate hazards by the end of the century as analyzed by Mora et al. (2018). 8 Conversely, the 
most optimistic perspective is that drastic limitations of GHG emissions are implemented to 
successfully limit global warming below 1.5°C. The global scientific community reckons that 
some significant climate impacts will remain even in this best-case scenario (IPCC, 2018) 9. 
The explanation above on time horizons introduces the broader topic of uncertainties about 
future climate impacts. For instance, the uncertain evolution of climate hazards depends not 
only on uncertain GHG emission trajectories, but also on the potential tipping points in the 
response of the climate system to GHG emissions, or on the unpredictable evolution of natural 
phenomena affecting the climate. In addition, climate models do not fully agree on the 
representation of climate evolutions. The relative importance of these uncertainties varies 
across climate hazards and time horizons. 
2.3.2 Some uncertainties can be addressed with scenario analysis 
Available approaches can use specific tools to account for major uncertainties when analyzing 
potential climate impacts. 
                                                     
7 The impact of humans on the climate in the near term is already done, given GHG emissions accumulated in the 
atmosphere and that response of the climate system may be delayed. 
8 Mora et al (2018) in Nature Climate Change concluded that a joint evolution of 10 selected types of climate hazards (e.g. 
drought; heatwaves) may result in overall increased exposure to intensified climate hazards worldwide by 2095 compared 
to 1955. 
9 Global scientific community also believes that each half degree of global warming goes with large differences in terms of 
impacts. 
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Many uncertainties over climate hazards and resulting impacts arise from unpredictable future 
societal choices. Therefore, physical climate risk analyses cannot rely exclusively on historical 
information. For long-term horizons, climate scenario analyses can be useful for exploring 
plausible climate trajectories depending on the future GHG emissions from human activities. 
For short- and long-term horizons, climate impact and adaptation scenarios can also be used 
to explore how societal choices may affect ‘humans’ exposure and vulnerability to changing 
climate conditions (Colin et al., 2019). 
Other tools can be used to account for diverse types of uncertainties. For instance, in order to 
account for the divergence of results across climate models, some scientists generate climate 
data from multiple climate models instead of a single model. This generates a consolidated 
result accounting for the divergence of the results across models. 
3 Main aspects of available approaches 
All available approaches seek to inform financial institutions on their exposures to physical 
climate risks. However, they target different audiences at financial institutions and provide 
them with different types of information outputs as shown in this section. 
 A limited number of approaches with diverse targets 
There are only a limited number of approaches on physical climate risk analysis tailored for 
financial institutions. The specialized institutions that developed these approaches include 
Acclimatise (Asian Development Bank, 2016), WRI (Gassert et al., 2014; Luck et al., 2015), Four 
Twenty Seven (Four Twenty Seven & Deutsche Asset Management, 2017), Carbone 4 (Carbone 
4, 2017), Carbon Delta (Carbon Delta, 2019), Mercer (Mercer, 2015; Mercer & CALStrs, 2016), 
and Trucost (Ecolab, 2017). Moody’s (MOODY, 2016) also developed research to study how its 
rating system correlates with climate risk exposures. Figure 35-2 below details the name of 
approaches under in-depth studies in the context of the ClimINVEST project during 2018.  
The UNEP FI also gathered financial institutions and service providers to pilot methodologies 
on scenario-based climate risk assessment, in response to the TCFD. In this context, 16 leading 
banks and Acclimatise piloted methodological guidelines on physical climate risk analysis that 
were released in July 2018 (UNEP FI & Acclimatise, 2018). These are summarized in Box 1 
below and differ significantly from the Acclimatise’s Aware for Project platform used in the 
ClimINVEST project and detailed in this chapter. In 2018-2019, 20 institutional investors and 
Carbon Delta also tested available methodologies and built their work upon Carbon Delta’s 
Climate Value at Risk methodology used in the ClimINVEST project and detailed further in this 
chapter (UNEP FI & Carbon Delta, 2019).  
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Box 1: The UNEP FI’s pilot exercise on physical climate risk analysis for banks 
In July 2018, 16 leading banks gathered by the UNEP FI and supported by the consultancy 
Acclimatise released methodological frameworks on physical climate risk analysis (UNEP FI 
& Acclimatise, 2018). They sought to help banks make in-house estimates of the financial 
physical climate risks in their loan portfolios, expressed as key credit risk metrics: 
probability of default (PD) and loan-to-value ratio (LTV). The methodological framework 
was piloted specifically for agriculture10, energy11 and real estate portfolios12. 
The methodology on agriculture and energy 
This methodology provides guidance for recalculating the default probability of borrowers 
under climate impacts. The output can be generated per time period (2020s and 2040s) and 
climate scenario (2°C and 4°C) on sectoral borrowers or portfolios. The output builds on:  
- Estimated impacts from incremental climate change (temperatures and precipitations) on 
production (agriculture and energy) and prices (agriculture) per sub-sector and 
region/country, sourced from peer-reviewed impact studies. These impacts are translated 
into equivalent percentages of annual revenue losses for all borrowers in a sub-sector and 
region/country.  
- Estimated impacts from extreme events (tropical cyclones, flood, wildfire, drought and 
extreme heat) in terms of production losses (proportion of crops lost in agriculture sector; 
electricity production downtime or reduction in energy production). They are estimated 
from empirical evidence on observed losses and projected into the future with high-level 
assumptions of future changing frequency of each type of extreme event. These impacts 
are translated into equivalent percentages of annual revenue losses. Through Risk 
Management Solutions (RMS) models, the variations in annual revenue can also estimate 
changes in cost of goods sold. 
The methodology stresses directly the variables in PD modelling with revenue and cost 
components. The authors acknowledge that other PD modelling factors may be modified, 
but are left unchanged for practical reasons. In order to assess PD variations in a bank’s 
specific portfolio, the methodology assesses a sample of borrowers in terms of PD, range 
of debt and geographic distribution. This requires data from the bank on the borrower: 
annual revenue, cost of goods sold, key operating assets and their location and output. The 
methodology extrapolates results of this representative sample to the sectoral portfolio. 
To improve the overall quality of the assessment, the UNEP FI partners flag the need for 
understanding better the historic relationships between extreme climate-related events 
and PDs. 
The methodology on real estate 
This approach provides some guidance for revising LTV ratios per climate scenario (2°C or 
4°C) and time period (2020s and 2040s). The output builds on high-level estimates of 
impacts of extreme climate-related events on property value, sourced from high-level 
observed losses and projected into the future (see the agriculture and energy methodology 
above). The UNEP FI partners recommend that the banks carry out historical analyses on 
their portfolios to specify how extreme events impact specific property markets. 
The estimated sectoral impact on property values is used as a basis for calculating impact 
on the LTV for the bank’s portfolio. The bank calculates the average remaining mortgage 
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term for its portfolio, multiplies it by the probability of hazards occur in this period. This is 
combined with the high-level estimated change in property value to provide a “risk to 
property value” factor. Then the bank combines it with the original property value and 
locations in its portfolio as well as outstanding loan amounts to arrive at revised LTV ratios. 
Limitations of the methodologies as described in the UNEP FI and Acclimatise report 
The UNEP FI partners explain that macroeconomic impacts are not included in the pilot 
project methodologies. They highlight the need for research on the macroeconomic 
impacts of climate change, for instance in terms of interest rates or inflation. The partners 
also flag that most macroeconomic modeling approaches focus on GDP and provide a very 
wide range of estimates. In addition, the pilot project focuses on publicly available data 
which preclude the integration of value chain considerations. Insurance is excluded due to 
uncertainties on present-day coverage and future changes in insurance availability and 
pricing. The methodologies do not account for adaptation actions that borrowers may 
undertake. 
Source: UNEP FI and Acclimatise (2018) 
 
All these approaches try to answer the same question: how climate change affects the entities 
receiving funding from a financial institution. However, they have different targets as detailed 
in Figure 35-2 below. They seek to inform different users at financial institutions, at different 
stages of decision making, and can apply to different portfolios depending on the types of 
entities funded by this financial institution. The WRI’s Aqueduct - Water Risk Atlas is included 
in this review as a salient example of an online tool that financial institutions can use as a part 
of their physical climate risk analysis. More specifically, this tool maps some physical climate-
related hazards. As such, the WRI’s tool does not focus on one particular entity. 
                                                     
10 With 3 sub-sectors: crop production, livestock farming, timber production 
11 With 5 sub-sectors: thermal power production, hydropower production, power transmission, oil and gas upstream 
(exploration and production), oil and gas midstream and downstream (liquefied natural gas, gas-to-liquids, refining, 
petrochemicals 
12 Applicable to retail mortgages, income-producing real estate 
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Figure 35-2 Selected approaches and targets 
 
Source: Authors, after Hubert et al. 2018. Getting started on Physical climate risk 
analysis in finance 
 
 Approaches providing two main types of output information 
The selected approaches provide two broad types of information to the targeted audience in 
financial institutions. On the one hand, some service providers choose to generate risk 
indicators in terms of normalized scores. Except for WRI, the construction of such scores 
considers at some point how climate hazards may generate financial impacts on the entity in 
a portfolio. On the other hand, some approaches provide quantitative estimates of financial 
impacts. Trucost explains the financial impacts at the scale of the financed entity with revenue 
at risk and total cost of water while Carbon Delta and Mercer explain impacts in terms of 
financial returns. 
In both cases, the output metrics can provide different levels of aggregation and details, as 
illustrated in Figure 35-3, and provide diverse insights to decision making. For instance, Mercer 
provides financial return impact depending on the type of impact at the scale of the company 
(i.e., climate sensitive resources or physical damaged) while Four Twenty Seven provides 
scores on different aspects of a company’s value chain (i.e., supply, operations and markets). 
1 Moody’s approach is exploratory in the sense that it does not constitute a new 
product to investors and it is based on illustrative data.
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Figure 35-3 Selected approaches and output information 
 
Source: Authors, after Hubert et al. 2018. Getting started on Physical climate risk 
analysis in finance 
4 Key aspects of the methodologies underpinning the available 
approaches  
The approaches under review apply the general analytical framework presented in section two 
on different perimeters, with specific data and tools as shown in this section. 
 A common analytical framework 
To analyze the physical climate risks of a financial institution, the approaches usually focus first 
on the “risk exposure”, i.e., scale at which climate hazards generate physical and financial 
impacts on the financed entity. Financial institutions can then use the information to compute 
impacts on their portfolios.  
This requires setting the perimeter of analysis on several aspects: the set of hazards considered, 
the types of physical and financial impacts, the perimeter of the entity being studied (e.g., the 
entire  company, one business unit doing a specific activity or in one particular country, key 
operation sites, the whole value chain and the evolution of its broader business environment), 
the time horizon of the analysis, and the range of uncertainties about the future (e.g., one or 
several climate scenarios). 
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To implement the analysis of physical and financial impacts on the financed entity in the 
chosen perimeter, the approaches may combine information on four broad aspects: climate 
hazards, exposure to these hazards; the sensitivity of the entity to this exposure, and its 
capacity to address these potential impacts (also called adaptive capacity). The term 
vulnerability is also frequently used to describe concepts such as sensitivity and adaptive 
capacity. 
As illustrated in Figure 35-4 with the case of a corporate entity, the assessment relies on 
“indicators,” with each describing one or several aspects of the risk to the entity (i.e., hazard, 
exposure, sensitivity, adaptive capacity), which combine to produce an output describing a 
type of impact. These indicators are chosen according to the available data and tools 
calculating them. Thus, some indicators provide a very precise picture of a specific variable 
while others are proxies of a more complex reality. 
Figure 35-4 Implementing physical climate risk analysis on a corporate entity13 
 
Source: ClimINVEST project, 2019 
 
The service providers implement this analytical framework with variations in terms of 
perimeter of hazards and impacts on the entity, time horizons and uncertainties, but also 
different data and modeling approaches. The subsections below summarize these 
methodological aspects of the approaches. More complete information can be found about 
the methodology of each approach in I4CE’s 2018 report “Getting started on physical climate 
risk analysis in finance” written for the ClimINVEST project (Hubert et al., 2018). 
 Different perimeters of hazards, impacts and adaptive capacity 
4.2.1 Hazards 
“Climate hazards” are defined either in absolute terms – as climate conditions at a point in 
time – or in relative terms – as the delta in climate conditions between a future period and a 
reference period. 
The scope of climate-related phenomena differs across the methodologies. Most of the 
approaches cover disruptive and extreme events (e.g., hurricanes, heat waves, drought and 
floods) while the overage of gradual changes in the broader climate-related conditions is only 
emerging (e.g., the WRI and Trucost focus specifically on water availability). 
Some methodologies show differences in the indicators that describe a given hazard (e.g., 
water stress can be studied through mean yearly water supply or intra-year variability of water 
supply). However, the choice of indicators is not fully transparent in several approaches. 
                                                     
13 An exemplar -- financial impacts of physical climate risks on Company A. One material risk analyzed here is potential 
impacts from floods on the buildings that Company A uses for its operations. “Indicators” can be the output information 
or intermediary building blocks. 
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Figure 35-5 Selected approaches and perimeter of climate hazards 
 
Source: Authors, after Hubert et al. 2018. Getting started on Physical climate risk 
analysis in finance 
 
4.2.2 Impacts 
Available methodologies recognize that climate hazards may lead to an array of physical 
impacts on the entity, translating into financial impacts on this entity and ultimately impacts 
on financial institutions providing capital and services. However, the methodologies 
concentrate efforts on analyzing diverse subsets of impacts, as shown with the example below 
on corporate entities. 
The scope of physical impacts on the companies 
The available methodologies apply different scopes of analysis to characterize physical impacts 
to companies. Depending on the data and analytical tools, the scope of impacts can be explicit 
or not. 
The methodologies can target different segments of the company’s value chain (i.e., supply 
chain, logistics, operations, markets). The methodologies can also cover different types of 
vulnerabilities on each segment of the value chain (e.g., vulnerability of labor in terms of 
productivity; vulnerability of infrastructure in terms of damage; vulnerability of natural 
resources in terms of availability or quality). Some approaches directly target the 
consequences of climate hazards on production (e.g., in terms of downtime or quantity) or 
sales. 
For instance, Carbon Delta focuses on damages and disruption of activities arising on 
operation sites and the downstream value chain. Four Twenty Seven and Carbone 4 focus 
qualitatively on operations and markets but also on the supply chain. Depending on the 
segment of value chain, they can cover for instance physical damage, labor productivity, 
availability of natural resources and climate-sensitivity of market preferences. Mercer provides 
implicit coverage of the value chain through aggregate physical impacts on the built 
environment and on business interruptions on the one side and through the investment 
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impact of climate change on natural and material resource distribution/availability on the 
other.14 
When analyzing climate impacts on corporates, the available approaches usually do not 
integrate the consequences of climate hazards on the broader business environment of the 
company. As an exception, Four Twenty Seven includes some indicators about the climate 
resilience of countries as a part of the general business environment, with the perspective that 
such context may influence the resilience of the company. 
It is worth noting that in some instances the methodologies are not hazard-centric as in the 
case of Mercer. Such methodologies identify impacts from a set of climate hazards instead of 
individual hazards. 
The scope of financial impacts on the companies 
The methodologies that provide qualitative indicators on climate impacts consider financial 
impacts to some extent even though it is not reflected transparently in the output information. 
Such considerations can guide the choice of indicators that help characterize the level of 
physical climate risks on an entity in a portfolio. 
Some methodologies quantify financial impacts on the entity, on a non-exhaustive set of 
financial parameters (e.g. impacts on production costs; on sales; on asset value). Carbon Delta 
provides cost estimates from asset damages and disruptions in the value chain. Mercer starts 
with estimates of GDP loss from various climate-related hazards and allocates it to different 
sectors, thus producing an indicator of the impact on the company’s production. 
In all cases, the current methodologies are not integrating complex mechanisms including 
dynamics within the financial system and feedback loops between the real economy and the 
financial system. 
4.2.3 Adaptive capacity 
Adaptive capacity is defined here as the resources that an entity can use to deal with the 
consequences of climate hazards and keep working. Adaptive capacity can take the form of 
early warning systems; contingency plans; financial capacity of the company to absorb shocks; 
insurance policies; etc. The adaptive capacity is often addressed for sovereign entities but less 
covered for corporates. This is due largely to the lack of data for analysis.  
 Modelling techniques for generating output indicators on impacts 
4.3.1 Quantitative modelling techniques to estimate financial impacts 
Quantitative estimates of financial impacts at the scale of the entity usually rely on 
vulnerability functions.  Carbon Delta provides cost estimates from disruptions in the value 
chain, arising from a sectoral cost function. Based on scientific publications in combination 
with information from media reports, Carbon Delta specifies further the vulnerability factors 
at the subsector level. They also provide cost estimates from asset damage with regionally 
calibrated damage functions as detailed by UNEP FI and Carbon Delta (2019). Mercer uses 
essentially a top-down strategy. The methodology starts from GDP losses simulated with 
damage functions of the FUND IAM. This model calculates impacts in different domains that 
are not necessarily economic sectors. Thus, these impacts are spread across economic sectors 
based on expert judgment in order to generate sectoral sensitivities. 
                                                     
14 Detailed information on the scope of impacts addressed by each methodology is available in section 2.6 of Hubert et 
el.2018. Getting started on Physical climate risk analysis in finance. 
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It is worth noting that vulnerability functions in IAMs are specified from diverse academic 
studies (Diaz & Moore, 2017). They do not necessarily include specific behavior of impacts in 
extreme future climate conditions and the data used to calibrate the damage functions are 
not necessarily forward-looking. 
Carbon Delta and Mercer also quantify financial market impacts on financial securities with 
discounted cashflow valuation models. Climate impacts can factor in the model through 
correction of the cashflow sequence, or through the correction of the risk premium into the 
discounting factor (which integrates risk in terms of return volatility). 
4.3.2 Other techniques 
Some methodologies use correlation matrices between hazards and types of impacts. These 
are based on different information sources, including potentially published sources or expert 
judgment. This work can help define the entity’s sensitivity factors. This can also be used to 
prioritize material issues to be analyzed. For instance, Carbone 4 (2017) uses correlation 
between hazards, economic impacts along the value chain and sector of activity to help 
prioritize data search accordingly. 
 Approaches with analyses at the appropriate granularity 
As discussed in section 2, the appropriate granularity and specificity of analyses depend on 
the type of financed entity. Sovereigns can be analyzed essentially with macro information. 
The analysis of companies or projects requires an additional level of granularity and specificity 
on many aspects, which results in intensive data needs. The case of corporate entities creates 
a greater data challenge since financial institutions have limited access to corporate level data. 
Concerning the case of corporate entities, each service provider makes its own efforts 
regarding the granularity of data and parameters. As summarized in Figure 35-6, big-data 
strategies contribute mostly to identifying exposures from operations to markets in the value 
chain. They provide company specific data, at the scale of latitude and longitude coordinates 
or on a wider scale (e.g., location of sales at country scale). The exposure of supply-chain 
networks is addressed only by Four Twenty Seven and at sectoral scales. Sensitivities are also 
calculated at sectoral scales on limited perimeters by the service providers. At this stage, no 
data is used on adaptive capacity. 
Figure 35-6 Selected approaches and granularity of input data for corporate micro 
analysis 
 
Source: Authors, after Hubert et al. 2018. Getting started on Physical climate risk 
analysis in finance 
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While Mercer’s approach to corporate analysis is essentially top-down, service providers 
generally provide hybrid scale analyses. For instance, Four Twenty Seven’s corporate analysis 
integrates the macro climate resilience of the country where the company sells its products, 
in addition to the other micro and sectoral qualitative indicators (However no public 
information is available on how these indicators combine).15 
 Forward-looking analysis on climate hazards and the evolution of human 
systems  
Most approaches analyze physical climate risks over future horizons. This would require 
accounting for the uncertainties on how climate conditions and socio-economic behaviors will 
evolve. While this usually comes down to the evolution of climate conditions with appropriate 
use of scenario analysis, this is not the case for the evolution of socio-economic behaviors. 
Figure 35-7 Selected approaches and forward-looking analysis 
 
Source: Authors, after Hubert et al. 2018. Getting started on Physical climate risk 
analysis in finance 
 
4.5.1 Exploring the evolution of climate hazards 
Except for Moody’s Investors Service, the approaches analyze future hazards with climate 
scenario analysis on variable time horizons ranging from the next 15 years to 2100. 
Most approaches focusing on the longer term analyze several up-to-date IPCC climate 
scenarios. They take as input different trajectories of future GHG emissions broadly used in 
academic research. This is recommended since future GHG emissions can make a large 
difference on climate conditions in distant horizons.  
One approach produces climate scenarios as a part of a broader simulation from an Integrated 
Assessment Model (IAM). As opposed to the climate models used for IPCC’s scenarios, the 
                                                     
15 For more examples see the synthesis in section 2.8.4 and detailed analysis in annex to Hubert et al. 2018. Getting started 
on Physical climate risk analysis in finance. 
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IAM generates climate data through simplified equation that translates a GHG trajectory into 
a climate hazard. The GHG trajectory is also a hypothetical construct by the service provider. 
One approach focusing on the short term also makes use of “trend scenarios” that extrapolate 
past weather events onto a 15-year horizon. However, this methodology does not account for 
potentially unprecedented combinations of hazards possibly in concentrated timeline and on 
different key locations affecting a financed entity. It does not account either for fluctuations 
arising from natural variability in the climate system. 
4.5.2 Exploring the evolution of socio-economic behaviors 
Beside the influence of human-caused GHG emissions on climate hazards, socio-economic 
systems may be more or less affected by the resulting impacts depending on their future 
development choices that modify their own exposure, vulnerability and adaptability. Societies 
may even undergo structural changes in the future, for instance in relation to climate impacts 
or the transition towards a low-carbon economy. Such evolutions may also deserve scenario-
based analyses, for instance using a range of impact scenarios or adaptation scenarios. 
However, the current methodologies adopt essentially a historical perspective on the behavior 
of socio-economic systems. 
 Conclusion: limitations in current approaches  
The approaches analyzed in this chapter are pioneering efforts to provide financial institutions 
with decision-useful information on their exposures to physical climate risks. However, these 
approaches also faced significant limitations as they stood in 2018 when the authors reviewed 
them for the ClimINVEST project. 
1. Limited scope of analysis. The approaches are insufficiently addressing network effects of 
climate impacts in both the real economy and the financial sector as well as potential systemic 
risks. Most approaches analyzing climate impacts on companies insufficiently address the 
macro-economic consequences of climate hazards. The scope of impacts on company’s value 
chains is also patchy on certain approaches while the others cover a broader scope but this 
comes at the expense of the separability of information per specific types of impacts. 
2. Limited consideration of entities’ specific characteristics due to heavy data requirements. 
Approaches analyzing impacts on companies require a large amount of company-specific data. 
The approaches still face difficulties obtaining the data on locations of production sites and 
partners that are key contributors to the benefits of the company. Adaptive capacity is not 
accounted for due to the lack of data. Sensitivities are still approached at sectoral level and 
there is a need for empirical evidence to make them more precise. Forward-looking approach 
could also be enhanced to anticipate how counterparties’ behaviors will evolve and change 
their adaptation to climate hazards. 
3. Limited transparency. Most approaches still lack transparency on core aspects of the 
methodology such as the characteristics of some databases and the sensitivity of entities that 
are exposed to climate hazards. This is partly because the approaches are provided by 
commercial vendors. Hence, the quality of information is not totally ensured. Financial actors 
consider that transparency is a key requirement for them to use this information for their 
decisions (Bruin et al., 2019). 
4. Limited compatibility with decision-making at financial institutions. There are 
discrepancies between some characteristics of physical climate risk information and decision-
making processes at financial institutions. Some approaches provide information on long-term 
impacts that is not relevant for day-to-day operations at financial institutions. They also 
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explore the uncertainties on future climate conditions and socio-economic behaviors as well 
as secular changes that financial models do not properly integrate. In addition, data intensity 
combined with little data availability make these approaches difficult to replicate on an array 
of large portfolios. Further research is needed so that financial institutions can make a better 
use of physical climate risk information (Dépoues et al., 2019).  
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  Transition Risk Assessment Methodologies 
 
By 
Carbon Trust1 
Abstract 
Currently, multiple methodologies are available to asses transition risks for financial 
institutions. In this paper we discuss the key characteristics of existing approaches and develop 
a criteria framework to help financial institutions select the most suitable methodologies. The 
criteria are separated into three broad groups: i) General applicability, based on the types of 
transition risks covered, scenarios and outputs; ii) Coverage considerations, based on 
geographies, asset classes, sectors and levels of analysis; iii) Practicality and implementation, 
based on data requirements, integration challenges, costs and development stage of the 
methodologies. We also identify overarching methodological limitations to inform end-users, 
supervisors and methodology developers.  
Keywords: transition risk assessment methodology, climate risk for financial institutions, 
methodology selection, methodology review  
1 Introduction and purpose of the chapter 
The aim of transition risk assessment is to understand climate-related transition risks in 
relation to other mainstream risks. It also serves to identify, disclose and manage the impact 
of these risks on the underlying business, strategy, and financial planning of a company (TCFD, 
2017a). Climate-related transition risks, as well as their potential impacts, differ significantly 
across sectors, regions and time horizons. Various transition risk assessment methodologies 
have been developed in response to the challenge of pricing and addressing increasingly 
material transition risks that drive demand from end users and regulators. It is crucial for end 
users to identify their objectives for risk assessment, and prioritise their requirements, given 
the diversity of methodological approaches.  
This chapter presents a discussion of the characteristics of available transition risk assessment 
methodologies as applicable to a variety of financial institutions. Originally based on a 
comprehensive assessment of a sample of methodologies carried out by the Carbon Trust, the 
chapter outlines the key, high-level criteria for different financial institutions to consider when 
selecting an appropriate methodology. The chapter also helps supervisors to take account of 
the constraints and limitations of transition risk assessment tools material for financial 
institutions. This can then inform the expectations put in place in supervising financial 
                                                     
1 This chapter is written by Nick Harris, Senior Manager, Green Finance, nick.harris@carbontrust.com; Ben Peel, Consultant, 
email: ben.peel@carbontrust.com; Tianyue Wu, Analyst, email: tianyue.wu@carbontrust.com; Alp Katalan, Analyst, email: 
alp.katalan@carbontrust.com; Vitaliy Komar, Analyst, email: vitaliy.komar@carbontrust.com; Lijian Zhao, China Country 
Manager, email: lijian.zhao@carbontrust.com; Gina Hall, Global Head of Sustainable Finance, email: 
gina.hall@carbontrust.com. 
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institutions, helping to build systemic resilience within the constraints of existing 
methodologies. A conceptual framework of the criteria is summarised in Figure 36-1 below: 
 
Figure 36-1 Summary of the key criteria to consider when selecting a transition risk 
methodology 
 
Note: The order of criteria above does not reflect their relative importance or stages 
of analysis. Readers can refer to individual sections independent of order. 
 
The structure of this chapter reflects the above high-level criteria groupings:   
• General considerations are the key factors that financial institutions should consider 
when determining their objectives for a risk assessment exercise.  
• Coverage considerations refer to the applicability of different methodologies based 
on a financial institution’s needs and portfolios. 
• Practicality and implementation refer to the ease of implementation (cost, time and 
effort, systems requirements etc.) of a given methodology. 
This chapter also outlines several key limitations of the current methodological field, and 
suggests avenues for overcoming them. These include incomplete risk coverage, neglecting 
transition risks beyond of the direct operations of counterparties, and inadequate integration 
of risk assessment into internal processes.   
Our conceptual mapping of methodologies and selection criteria are simplified and can be 
further refined. Notably, UNEP FI has previously produced a detailed review of the field, 
categorising a range of existing methodology providers and presenting findings of their own 
pilot (UNEP FI & Carbon Delta, 2019). Our simplified approach has been informed by this and 
other similar publications, empirical methodology reviews, and sectoral expertise of the 
authors.    
2 General considerations and alignment with needs 
As outlined in the conceptual framework in Figure 36-1, the high level characteristics of any 
given methodology include three main criteria: a) types of transition risks covered; b) types of 
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scenarios used; c) types of outputs produced. While these characteristics might not always be 
the primary considerations for all financial institutions when considering risk assessment 
implementation, they tackle some of the main aspects of the exercise. Specifically, these 
criteria help the reader to navigate the general landscape of transition risks, better understand 
available climate scenarios, and types of assessment outcomes.  
Figure 36-2 Criteria for general consideration 
   
 
Key takeaways of the section: 
• Transition risks, as defined by the TCFD, include technology, market, reputation, and 
policy and legal risks. The ease of risk assessment can vary according to type of risk, 
for example, policy and technology risks are easier to assess than market, legal and 
reputation risks. Not all methodologies cover all types of transition risks.   
• The type of scenario used will depend on whether the financial institution is trying 
to understand its vulnerability to gradual policy and market shifts caused by climate 
change (temperature-based), or whether it is trying to understand the impact from 
a single occurrence (event-based). The number of scenarios available in the risk 
assessment vary by methodology.  
• The outputs produced by existing tools can be quantitative, qualitative, or a 
combination of both. This will be largely dependent on the types of transition risks 
assessed, and can be adjusted to cater to specific needs of a financial institution.  
 Types of transition risks  
The TCFD has identified four overarching categories for transition risk that all companies, 
including financial institutions, should consider. However, not all methodologies cover all types 
of transition risks. The most common transition risks assessed are policy risk (often via an 
assumed carbon price) and technology risk (often via assumed technology cost trajectories). 
Impacts from legal risk and reputation risk are likely omitted from methodologies because they 
are harder to quantify (UNEP FI & Carbon Delta, 2019), however this is not to say they cannot 
and will not be integrated into future iterations of risk assessments. Figure 36-3 lists the types 
of transition risks, as defined by the TCFD, which methodologies may assess.   
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Figure 36-3 Types of climate-related transition risks 
 
Source: adapted from TCFD (2017a)  
 
Financial institutions should select methodologies that best cover the risks that are most 
material to their counterparties and portfolios, as well as meet their objectives for undertaking 
the transition risk assessment in the first place (e.g. whether it is for reporting their transition 
risks to regulators, or simply understanding which of their counterparties are most exposed to 
transition risks).   
The TCFD also provides supplemental guidance for the financial sector in considering transition 
risks (TCFD, 2017a). For example, the TCFD recommends banks to consider characterising their 
climate-related risks in the context of traditional banking industry risk categories such as credit 
risk, market risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk. Similarly, they recommend insurance 
companies to assess transition risks resulting from a reduction in insurable interest due to a 
decline in value, changing energy costs, implementation of carbon regulation, and liability risks 
from a possible increase in litigation.    
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 Types of scenarios used 
Box 2: Low-carbon transition scenarios 
A scenario describes a path of development leading to a particular outcome. They are 
intended to highlight core elements of a possible future and to draw attention to the key 
factors that will drive future developments (TCFD, 2017c). Different scenarios allow financial 
institutions to conduct ‘what-if’ analyses of how different transition pathways could affect 
their assets and/or portfolios, and to explore the resilience and vulnerabilities of a firm’s 
business model to a range of outcomes.  
Two types of scenarios that financial institutions could consider when selecting an 
appropriate methodology, as identified by Oliver Wyman (2019), are: 
• Temperature-based scenarios: these often describe a smooth and orderly 
transition to a low carbon economy, and have a long-term view. However, they 
can also describe a disorderly transition where stringent policies kick off at a 
later date to meet climate commitments. Temperature-based scenarios are 
comprehensive and holistic scenarios analysing how the world might develop, 
and the corresponding impacts that these pathways have on average global 
temperatures and climate change.  
• Event-based scenarios: these are often used to illustrate aspects of an abrupt 
or a disorderly transition to a low-carbon economy, and take a short-term 
outlook when compared to temperature-based scenarios. Event-based 
scenarios focus on the potential impacts of one triggering event, such as a 
sudden change in government policy or the introduction of a disruptive energy 
technology. 
Currently, industry at large is increasingly looking into longer-term, orderly, temperature-
based scenarios. This is in-line with the TCFD’s recommendation that organisations use a 
2°C or lower scenario in addition to two or three other scenarios most relevant to their 
circumstances (TCFD, 2017b). Though event-based scenarios are not common in transition 
risk assessment methodologies at the moment, they may be relevant to consider as 
supervisors are interested in abrupt and disorderly transition scenarios, which are likely to 
result in higher stress for financial entities as they do not provide the time horizon for a 
planned movement out of exposed sectors to lower carbon assets.  
 
Multiple methodologies look at a range of temperature-based scenarios – from a smooth 
and orderly transition keeping global temperature rise to 1.5°C, to overshooting 2-3°C warming 
through the implementation of current national pledges and objectives, or even ‘no-additional 
policy’ scenarios exceeding 4°C of warming. In addition, some methodologies can also 
compute implied temperature alignment of portfolios according to the collated total emissions 
and/or future decarbonisation plans. 
Temperature-based scenarios are underpinned by models which translate underlying 
assumptions around the climate, the economy, and societies into scenario outputs. For 
transition risk assessments, the most relevant types of underlying models used in scenarios 
are: 
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• Sector-specific models: energy system models (e.g. looking at interlinked energy and 
transport systems) and land-use models (e.g. looking at agriculture and forestry) 
explore how different economic sectors evolve based on changing policy, technology 
and market conditions. Popular developers of scenarios using these models are the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) respectively.   
• Macroeconomic models: these are often computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models and cover various macroeconomic variables, including an economy’s 
resources (e.g. capital and labour), sectoral composition, and international trade. 
They look at how changes in one part of the economy affect the whole system. 
Examples of developers of macroeconomic models for transition risk assessments 
are Vivid Economics and E3ME.  
• Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs): consider the socioeconomic factors that 
affect the earth systems to determine how these then affect human welfare. These 
are based on the best available science and underpin policymaking and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s assessments, particularly, IAMs 
aligned to the use of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) will be used for the 
upcoming IPCC assessment. Scenarios using IAMs are developed by IIASA, the 
Potsdam Institute for Climate Research (PIK), and the Joint Global Change Research 
Institute (JGCRI), among others.   
Sector-specific models produce scenarios that can be used for transition risk assessments, 
whereas IAMs are often used when assessing both transition and physical climate risk (UNEP 
FI & Carbon Delta, 2019). Other types of scenario models include climate models (to simulate 
the response of the climate to GHG emissions) and hazard models (to determine the risk of 
hazards like droughts, floods, and hurricanes based on different climatic conditions). These are 
relevant for assessing physical climate risk rather than transition risk.  
Some methodologies allow the user to run any chosen scenario, while others offer a pre-
determined set. Using multiple scenarios allows for an assessment of the portfolio against 
various possible temperature goals, technological trajectories and national contributions. 
Therefore, methodologies allowing for multiple scenarios can help financial institutions to 
develop a better understanding of their exposure to transition risks. However, using varying 
scenarios can also make the comparability of climate related disclosures across institutions 
challenging. 
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Box 3. The difference between scenario alignment and risk assessment 
It is important to note that the assessment of climate-related transition risk is a separate 
task to aligning operational and financial activities to mitigation and climate resilience goals, 
such as the Paris Agreement goals, which have the objective of “holding the increase in the 
global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 
2015). A portfolio that is aligned to a 2° pathway is one in which the counterparties, 
collectively, are developing in a way that is consistent with a 2° transition. As such they are 
likely to avoid being caught out by policies, are bringing low carbon technologies to market, 
and responding to climate change driven market signals, which are the hallmarks of 
transition risk exposure. There is still some divergence though as a 2° alignment focuses only 
on one transition scenario and does not quantify the potential downside risk of the 
transition, instead only identifying whether counterparties are on the right path.    
There is strong correlation between those companies that are not aligned to the 2° 
transition and those who are most exposed to transition risks, due to their lack or readiness 
for a low carbon transition. An aligned portfolio is, on balance, investing in counterparties 
who are already in the process of low carbon transition, and therefore have a likely lower 
level of transition risk exposure – there is not perfect correlation though, as some sectors 
ultimately will carry greater financial risk on an absolute basis. Therefore, even financial 
institutions aligned with a 1.5°C scenario need to undertake further transition risk 
assessments.  
 
 Output of assessments  
The types of outputs produced by existing transition risk assessment tools can vary 
considerably. In the broadest sense, risk assessment outputs can be separated into:  
• Quantitative outputs: these include metrics such as projected changes in EBITDA, 
VaR, as well as CapEx and OpEx impacts.  
• Qualitative outputs: these can be graphical, such as risk prioritisation heat-maps, as 
well as descriptive or numerical, such as discrete scale risk scores. 
• Combined outputs: some methodology providers can use a combination of the two 
formats, e.g. producing an initial qualitative screening with a subsequent 
quantitative deep dive. 
As highlighted previously, transition risk is not affecting portfolios and counterparties in a 
uniform way. A commercial bank, for instance, might be primarily interested in quantifying 
medium-term risks to its utility sector loans, and would therefore look for a methodology that 
produces a climate-related Probability of Default, or Expected Shortfall metric. On the other 
hand, a pension fund in the initial stages of risk assessment might favour a qualitative mapping 
of their total portfolio by asset class, in order to identify potential risk hotspots for subsequent 
quantitative analysis, or identify sectors for direct investee engagement. In line with these 
various user demands, risk assessment tools by design produce various outcomes: some can 
act as screening tools whereas others quantify the financial impacts of transition risks. Per 
TCFD guidance, effective disclosures on implications of transition risk can be both quantitative 
and qualitative, depending on the institution and economic sector in question.  
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3 Coverage considerations 
Despite the existence of more than 40 methodologies on assessing climate-related transition 
risks, many of them are designed for specific target portfolios and users.  No one methodology 
covers all regions, all types of financial instruments, and all industry sectors exhaustively. These 
considerations are summarised in Figure 36-4 below: 
Figure 36-4 Criteria for coverage considerations 
 
Key takeaways of the section: 
• Geographic location of counterparties2 and their supply chains is a major source of 
transition risk, and users should conceptually determine its potential portfolio 
significance before choosing the appropriate methodology. 
• The breadth of asset class coverage has been a clear differentiator between 
methodologies, and further asset classes are being added on an ongoing basis.  
• Sector-specific transition risks can be addressed by single-sector focused 
methodologies as well as cross-sectoral methodologies. A suitable methodology 
usually covers the majority of a financial institution’s sector exposure.  
• Effects of transition risks manifest on different levels: from individual physical assets 
to whole economic sectors of counterparties. Thus, tools provide various level of 
analysis, using bottom-up or top-down or both approaches to capture various 
aspects of transition risk. Choosing the right level of output is essential for effective 
implementation of the results of the risk assessment. The choice of analysis level 
depends on objective of the assessment and requires different input data granularity, 
which will be further elaborated in the next section Practicality and Implementation.  
 Geographic coverage  
Location matters to transition risk analysis because each location has unique policy 
requirements, technology development level, market traits and trends, as well as specific 
consumer and investor behaviours. For example, certain technology that is still regarded as 
“clean” in South-east Asia region might not be acceptable or bankable in the European Union 
region (“EU”). Therefore, for financial institutions with international asset exposure, choosing 
a tool developed for the right geography is fundamental.  
                                                     
2 This chapter used the definition of UNEP FI on the term counterparty. It refers to “entities that investors, through their 
portfolios, have exposure to and that are more directly affected by climate-related risk. These range from countries to 
companies and individual facilities/projects”. 
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Different tools’ geographic risk coverage provides various levels of granularity and generally 
varies in three ways: risks at global level, regional level (e.g. EU) or country-specific level. Often, 
a methodology will offer a mix of two levels, and some methodologies provide analysis on all 
three. When a financial institution selects a methodology, it is critical to answer the following 
four questions:   
• Where are your counterparties’ activities predominantly located? 
• Where will their future activities be located? 
• Are key sectors driven by global trends or local trends?  
• Does it matter for your portfolio to differentiate risks at a country-specific level? 
The hypothetical example below showcases the differences in geographic coverage:  
Tool A provides regional-level data and limited country-level data. This framework covers 
broader regions like EU, and some country-level analysis for Germany and India. Tool B can 
assess data over 58 different countries globally and greater country specification is offered in 
sectors which require further differentiation.  
If a financial institution is exposed to EU-based equity assets and also has significant holdings 
in real assets in India, both methodologies above could be a good fit, as EU countries share a 
similar climate-related policy framework, and any more granular coverage at European 
country-level would be less necessary in this case.  
 Asset class coverage 
Given the wide range of financial instruments across financial institutions’ portfolios, asset 
class applicability is an important practical consideration for selecting an appropriate 
methodology. Some methodologies were designed specifically for certain end user portfolios, 
e.g. bank loan portfolios focusing on credit risk, or project finance, focusing on market risk. 
Others offer a broader range of instrument coverage.  As such, financial institutions need to 
be mindful of each methodology’s asset class coverage in relation to their specific needs.  
Figure 36-5 Examples for asset class coverage 
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As shown in Figure 36-5, if Asset Management Firm B mostly invests in equity and fixed 
income, Tool I could be a suitable option. On the other hand, this tool may not be suitable for 
Commercial Bank A, which holds more assets in cash and real asset debt.  
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that instrument coverage is generally an evolving variable as 
many methodologies are increasingly adding to the number of instruments they cover.  
 Sectoral coverage 
This assessment reflects the coverage provided by methodologies for a financial institution’s 
sectoral exposure. Climate-related transition risks vary across economic sectors. For example, 
high risk energy and resource intensive sectors, such as power, transport and industry (cement, 
iron and steel in particular) have traditionally received the most attention from tool developers. 
Other sectors widely covered include, but are not limited to, real estate and other 
infrastructure. Some tools can be adapted to almost all sectors after bespoke collaboration 
with tool developers.  
It is also noteworthy that different methodologies cover sectors at different levels of 
granularity. For example, while two methodologies might both cover transport, one might 
analyse at the whole transport sector level, while the other breaks the sector down into 
automotive, aviation and shipping sub-sectors.  
Some of the reasons for this variation are suggested below:  
• Underlying scenarios used  
• Expertise of a developer (e.g. developers having existing intellectual property in 
infrastructure) 
• Intrinsic variable significance of transition risk across sectors (e.g. tool developers 
tend to prioritise analysis on those with higher perceived risks) 
• Reference materials (e.g. some tools define sectors according to various taxonomies 
but others take a practical approach in defining sectors according to the target 
audience’s internal segmentation)  
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 Level of analysis 
Transition risk exposure can manifest at various 
levels, from total portfolio, through to the 
individual physical assets of a counterparty (as 
shown in Figure 36-6). The UNEP FI’s Investor 
Guide in response to TCFD recommendations 
(UNEP FI & Carbon Delta, 2019), notes that risks 
tend to materialise at the physical asset level, 
subsequently translating to a counterparty and 
later portfolio impact. Nevertheless, aggregating 
risk exposure on a portfolio level can be a desired 
output for financial institutions, allowing 
informed strategic decision making and disclosure.  
Existing tool providers often offer a combined 
approach, for example informing portfolio level 
analysis with asset level data, or executing asset 
level quantitative analysis after portfolio level risk 
hotspot identification. The results of different 
scopes of analysis vary in their applicability among 
financial institutions. For instance, identifying 
drivers of transition risks at a physical asset level 
could help active asset owners inform their 
engagement strategies with investee companies, 
while portfolio level insights would enable 
shareholder disclosure. Assessment granularity also has practical implications, such as data 
requirements and costs, further addressed in section 1.3. 
While the level of analysis relates to the type of outputs produced, it should be noted that the 
underlying methodologies can take different analytical approaches: 
4 Practicality and implementation  
This section deals with the practicality and ease of implementation of risk assessment 
methodologies. These criteria are important primarily at the implementation stage of the risk 
Box 4. Top-down and bottom-up approaches 
Tool providers currently can take either one of these approaches, or a combination of both:  
• A top-down assessment typically looks at portfolio impacts as a result of either 
country-specific or sector-specific variables.  
• A bottom-up approach will individually assess each counterparty or asset in a 
portfolio, before integrating the results to provide a portfolio-wide viewpoint. 
Some tools will, for example, only provide a top-down view on listed companies, while 
others will have a capability to deliver a bottom-up view on physical assets of all listed 
portfolio companies. On the other hand, methodologies might factor in firms’ adaptative 
capacity in bottom-up assessment, but then find it challenging to apply the conclusions at 
the sector or the portfolio level. 
Figure 36-6 Investor risk exposure 
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assessment process and have direct implications for the exercise’s feasibility. Figure 36-7 
below summarises the criteria:  
Figure 36-7 Practicality and implementation criteria 
 
 
Key takeaways of the section: 
• For certain asset classes, e.g. listed equity, it is possible to carry out insightful 
transition risk assessment with minimum data inputs. However, there is a trade-off 
between input data granularity and level of bespoke insights on risk. 
• Important trade-offs exist between simplicity and applicability of risk assessment, 
and the level of time and internal integration effort needed.  
• Other practical considerations include the cost structure (ranging from open-source 
to bespoke consulting pricing) of tool offerings, as well as their development stage, 
given the dynamic nature of the space. 
 Input data requirements 
The level of input data required depends on the depth of analysis and would normally include 
financial asset level or portfolio level data. There is a trade-off between the amount of input 
data and the level of insights gleaned from the analysis. The less data financial institutions 
input into the tool (either due to the lack of internal data system consolidation, or simply 
because of lack of reporting from the counterparty), the more generic the output analysis will 
be. Therefore, financial institutions can opt to provide less data if they simply want a snapshot 
view of portfolio transition risks, or alternatively, provide granular data for bespoke in-depth 
analysis.   
Typically, general data requirements include portfolio breakdown, such as security names, 
International Securities Identification Number (ISIN), total asset value, and currency. However, 
the data required will vary by asset class. For example, in addition to the above inputs, equity 
portfolios may require portfolio weights.  
More granular data (such as asset geography, carbon emissions data, and technology data) 
may be required for a project finance portfolio, or in the case of a deep-dive analysis of 
transition risks. This could also include detailed balance sheet data, as well as profit and loss 
data at the individual counterparty or asset level. When granular data is not available, top-
down, rather than bottom-up, approaches can be applied (see Box 4 for further reference).  
Some methodologies may use proprietary asset-level datasets, significantly reducing data 
requirements from the end user. However, these datasets are often applicable only to large 
listed entities, and therefore may not be appropriate for alternative asset classes. Also, in this 
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case the quality of transition-risk assessment will be dependent on the accuracy of the third-
party dataset, rather than the internally collected data.   
 Internal integration  
The ideal tool, besides meeting all relevant requirements, would be easily incorporated into 
end users’ risk management practices and general decision-making procedures. This is a 
challenging task, given the diverse levels of internal process complexity across financial 
institutions. Below this chapter outlines two common trade-offs to consider in terms of 
implementation complexity: 
Trade-off 1: time efficiency vs. depth of analysis  
The time frame of an assessment process will depend on portfolio composition, data 
availability and complexity of results expected. Some tools are available online, which makes 
it possible to assess portfolios relatively quickly. However, this type of general tool likely offers 
less flexibility for users to include tailored variables. Some tools, on the other hand, might take 
up to six months to analyse an institution’s portfolio in detail, but once the screening session 
is completed, the assessment is less time intensive and the result is more detailed.  
Trade-off 2: tool feasibility vs. applicability to internal stakeholders 
A specific tool may not produce easy to use outcomes for a range of internal divisions within 
an institution. For example, certain tools are explicitly targeted at commercial banking risk 
management, while others cater to the needs of equity portfolio managers. This may make 
results less helpful for another type of financial institution, or even different internal divisions, 
requiring additional work for refining data and output types. It is critical to ensure the outputs 
are ‘translatable’ and can be used broadly across an organisation. In general, climate risk 
assessment data can be used for strategic asset allocation, stock selection, sector risk 
identification, due diligence, internal buy-in, external engagement, monitoring and 
compliance, disclosure and reporting, and more, depending on end users’ needs.  
In the selection of tools, having a clear objective is at the essence of making the right trade-
off. The objective might vary from targeting specific types of risks to particular level of analysis 
to be achieved. External factors such as pressure from investors and regulatory disclosure 
requirements, or internal incentives such as group’s long-term strategy and risk appetite will 
lead end users to make different trade-offs.  
In summary, it is in the interest of the end user to select a tool that aligns the best to their goal, 
while also requiring relatively less additional effort in implementation (e.g., a tool that can 
produce the most flexible output, which can be used across a financial institution’s various 
business units and with a range of stakeholders). 
 Other considerations 
Cost structure  
Costs of transition risk assessment tools on the market can vary widely depending on types of 
outcome and general methodological approach. Tool developers may also provide tiered 
access to their product, e.g. ‘basic’ or ‘premium’ services at different prices. In general, their 
cost structure falls into the following categories: 
• Free: some tools are free to use and may be hosted online or may be available as 
open-source spreadsheet models. However, it is important to note that these are 
often in a pilot phase, or when a provider is looking to attract initial customers. 
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Therefore, the cost of the tool during this development stage may not be 
representative of its full cost when it is eventually rolled out to a wider client base. 
• Licensing fee: licensing a tool will scale in price depending on the assessment 
undertaken. The cost of licensing depends on a variety of factors such as: number 
and size of assets/portfolios, number of sectors, frequency of analysis, granularity of 
the financial risk, and number of metrics used. Moreover, there may be additional 
costs related to the level of customisation required, quality assurance, and data 
updates.  
• Consulting services: some bespoke tools cannot be licensed and the cost will be 
structured as a consulting fee for implementation, with a scaling cost similar to that 
of licensing models.   
Development stage 
The current market for transition risk assessment methodologies is still quite young, but 
nevertheless a rapidly growing one. Tools and methods will have various maturity levels, from 
research and pilot stage to established commercial offering. The development stage is 
therefore important for practical implementation of a given methodology in the context of 
immediate applicability for financial institutions’ portfolios. End users are also advised to 
monitor the space and contribute to tool and method development through pilot participation. 
Similarly, the use of climate scenarios by the private sector and financial institutions is a 
relatively new phenomenon. Scenarios are continuously adjusted and developed to adjust to 
the needs of the sector, given that their initial audience has historically been scientists and 
policymakers. 
5 General limitations  
In a relatively short period of time the market for transition risk assessment methodologies 
has grown rapidly, catering to the needs of a wide range of financial institutions. The space is 
very dynamic, and several tools and methodologies are still in early stage development. 
Transition risk assessment is intrinsically a complex process, and some key limitations can be 
identified. These limitations do not relate to any one specific tool or its methodology, but 
rather highlight some of the systemic considerations for effective implementation of transition 
risk assessment.  
Key limitations and suggested avenues for addressing them are given below: 
• Scenario analysis rarely addresses whether the counterparty can pass the cost of the 
transition to consumers. The adaptive ability of the counterparty is one the direct 
determinants of risk, and should therefore be explored. Counterparties’ strategies 
developed to transform and adapt themselves to the transition pathways are 
examples of adaptive capacity indicators that should be addressed. Increased TCFD-
aligned disclosures by counterparties, as well as upskilling of financial institution 
analyst teams are examples of positive developments to tackle the issue. 
• Drivers of transition risk currently covered across methodologies are often limited to 
policy, quantified through a carbon price variable. There is still low coverage of legal 
and reputational risk drivers, and policy risk coverage is yet to expand beyond just a 
carbon price to include wider climate policy landscape factors such as minimum 
standards, energy regulations, emissions caps and technology phase outs. 
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• Integration of risk assessment results into a financial institution’s actual risk 
management process requires strategic commitment from end users, not only 
output adjustment from the tool provider.  
• The risk assessment approach might focus on specific financial risk categories or 
sectors, preventing a systemic approach to the exercise. For instance, scope 2 and 3 
emissions are often excluded from counterparty analysis, making conclusions less 
coherent for several sectors, such for example, retail. Leveraging financial research 
capabilities and expanding beyond simple carbon metrics is imperative.  
• Standardised counterparty reporting at high levels of granularity is essential as an 
input for risk assessment. Forward looking and TCFD compliant disclosures have only 
recently started to pick up, and consistent coverage across sectors will be an 
important facilitator of effective risk assessments. Multiple national and 
international level policy programmes to support this are currently being rolled out, 
such as the Bank of England stress testing, Article 173 in France, and the EU Non-
financial Reporting Directive. 
• Quantitative methodologies may still face some fundamental challenges such as 
extending the conventional modelling time horizon from short to medium and long 
term. Similarly, building forward looking climate change transition risk models based 
on historical data can be challenging. This time horizon misalignment is also one of 
the key barriers to wider integration of transition risk to general financial risk 
management frameworks.  
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  Framing Scenarios for Transition and Physical 
Risks  
 
By 
CICERO1 
Abstract 
Climate and energy scenarios are being used in new ways to assess financial risks. While 
current policies seem to point towards 3°C warming by the end of the century, higher and 
lower temperature scenarios need to be considered for their potential impact on physical and 
transition risk. However, improvements need to be made in the availability of near-term risk-
based scenario information for financial decision makers, and in the comparability of reported 
scenario information from companies. 
Keywords: scenarios, climate risk, physical risk, transition risk, finance 
1 Introduction 
The Paris Agreement was a call to action for policy makers, businesses, and financial actors. 
The role of the financial sector is critical to accelerating a transition to a low carbon society. 
First, the financial sector must play an important role by redirecting capital towards low carbon 
and climate-resilient infrastructure in support of the Paris Agreement. Second, the financial 
sector must manage risk in a dynamic climate policy landscape and with the intensification of 
physical climate impacts.  
Climate change can affect firms’ profitability and investment portfolio returns via regulations 
that imply carbon prices and climate-related damages from flooding or other physical impacts 
(Figure 37-1). Investment funds, pension funds, and bank loans can all be exposed to climate 
risks. Clear messaging from financial authorities have shifted attention to the financial risk that 
can result from climate risks. The framing of climate change in terms of potential impact on 
financial bottom lines brought climate change onto the radar screen of many financial actors. 
Two different types of climate risk that can have financial impact have been delineated by the 
Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD, 2017): 
Transition risks associated to the transition to a low carbon economy, which are dependent on 
scenario analysis and the speed of political, societal and technological changes as well as the 
associated legal risks; and 
Physical risks associated with physical impacts of the changing climate, some of which are 
already occurring and resulting in significant costs, such as extreme precipitation. In the short-
                                                     
1  This chapter is written by Christa Clapp, Research Director on climate finance at CICERO, email: 
christa.clapp@cicero.oslo.no; Glen Peters Research Director on climate mitigation at CICERO; and Alexander Berg, Senior 
Advisor on climate finance at CICERO. 
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term, physical risks are largely independent of the climate scenario, and other ongoing 
projects address physical risk (CICERO, 2019). 
Figure 37-1 Scope of climate risk and financial impacts  
 
Source: (CICERO, 2018) 
 
Climate scenario stress-testing features strongly in recommendations from financial and 
regulatory authorities to financial institutions and companies. The TCFD recommends 
disclosure for all financial institutions and companies on “the resilience of an organization’s 
strategy, taking into consideration different climate-related scenarios, including a 2° Celsius or 
lower scenario” (TCFD, 2017). Regulatory developments in France and at the European Union 
(EU) level echo the focus on climate risk disclosure and climate scenario stress-testing. France 
became the first country to mandate climate risk disclosure for financial institutions in 2015 
via Article 173. The current draft of the EU Sustainable Finance Action Plan proposes 
mandatory disclosure of a similar nature. 
This chapter provides an overview of the landscape of scenarios for assessing transition and 
physical risks. We highlight that with today’s policy ambitions, an average global warming of 
approximately 3°C is the most likely future scenario but note that a range of scenarios is 
necessary to stress-test against the transition to possible futures. To analyze physical risk in 
the next decade, other tools are required given that we have locked-in greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions in the atmosphere already that will have consequences for near term impacts. Going 
forward, financial decision-makers could benefit from more consistent near-term risk-based 
information from scenarios.  
2 Scenarios in transition risk assessment 
Scenarios are coherent futures, each with advantages and disadvantages. They are used to 
explore key uncertainties, not to predict the future. There is no one ‘correct’ scenario. 
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There are many ways to get to an emissions or temperature target depending on 
socioeconomic and modelling assumptions. To reach the target in the Paris Agreement of 2°C 
or lower, there are many different pathways, however, all 2°C scenarios require rapid 
decarbonization in the short term, net-zero emissions between 2050 and 2100, and net-
negative emissions thereafter – such as with afforestation or by using bioenergy with carbon 
capture and storage (CCS). 
 What are the different types of climate and energy scenarios used in stress-
testing?  
In practice, climate scenario stress-testing may involve using scenarios from very different 
types of models. The choice of modelling platform and the underlying technological and socio-
economic assumptions can have significant impact on the scenario outcomes. Two commonly 
used model types are:  
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) link various aspects of the economic, energy, land, and 
climate system to assess future emissions pathways under various types of climate policy. 
Some models may focus on specific aspects of the system (e.g., energy), while others may 
broadly cover all activities leading to emissions IAMs are useful to examine potential transition 
impacts, and it is possible to explore hundreds of alternate futures. 
Climate models have a detailed representation of the climate system, translating emissions or 
concentrations into climate variables such as temperature and precipitation. These models are 
useful for physical impacts, and it is possible to explore only a few representative scenarios 
due to the computational time. 
Transition impacts can be examined using scenarios of socioeconomic and technical systems, 
with emission pathways changing with policy choices. It is possible to focus on specific aspects 
of society (e.g., the energy system) or to consider the interlinkages between systems (e.g., 
energy and land). The International Energy Agency (IEA)’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) is 
perhaps the most known and publicized energy-system model with detailed annual releases. 
There are a range of other IAMs, often run by research groups, that generate scenarios across 
socioeconomic systems (energy, land, and agriculture). These research groups often cooperate 
to develop model inter-comparison projects, where many IAMs are used to address the same 
research question to assess uncertainties. These IAMs, either individually or in inter-
comparison projects, generate thousands of scenarios that are often compiled into databases 
that are assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. These scenarios are 
developed continuously, but major assessments are released every 5-7 years. 
Physical impacts can be examined using the output of climate system models. Because of 
computational constraints, these climate models generally take a few selected scenarios from 
IAMs and translate the emissions or concentrations into climate variables (e.g. temperature, 
precipitation and wind). The Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) are four well 
known pathways used by these climate models, but these are being replaced by a selection of 
the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs).  These pathways allow the exploration of different 
temperature outcomes. The outputs of these climate models are generally quite coarse 
(greater than 100’s of kilometers), but can be downscaled using either models or empirical 
approaches to give more detailed regional information.  
In combination, IAMs and climate system models enable us to link models of the energy and 
other societal systems to temperature increases in coherent scenarios. Scenarios from the IEA 
and assessed by the IPCC are independently produced and well-known (Table 37-1 
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Table 37-1 Commonly used scenario families 
). In addition, business organizations (e.g. World Business Council for Sustainable Development) 
and companies (e.g. Equinor, BP) produce their own scenarios. Scenarios vary in how often 
they are updated and the end year that they model.  
Table 37-1 Commonly used scenario families 
Scenario Purpose 
Update 
frequency 
Number 
scenarios 
End 
year 
Key focus 
IPCC 
community: 
Marker 
Scenarios 
(RCPs) 
Physical 
and 
transition 
risk 
5-7 years 4-6 2100 
Focus on the climate 
system and impacts 
IPCC 
community: 
Scenario 
databases 
Physical 
and 
transition 
risk 
5-7 years ~1000 2100 
Comprehensive 
exploration of 
socioeconomic 
pathways using a range 
of models and model 
intercomparisons 
IEA WEO 
Transition 
risk 
Annual 3 2040 Focus on markets 
IEA Energy 
Technology 
Perspectives 
(ETP) 
Transition 
risk 
Annual 3 2060 
Focus on energy 
technology 
Source: CICERO (2018) 
Approximate alignment of commonly used scenarios with various temperature targets is 
mapped out in Figure 37-2. The IPCC’s Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) RCP1.9 
and RCP2.6 roughly map to 1.5°C and well below 2°C warming at the end of the century, and 
the WEO Sustainable Development Scenario (IEA, 2018) describes a pathway that stretches to 
2050 and with around 1.8°C at the end of the century, assuming net-zero emissions from the 
year 2070. 
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Figure 37-2 Mapping a range of emission scenarios to temperature levels 
 
Source: Rogelj et al. (2018); Riahi et al. (2017) 
 
 Which range of scenarios is useful for stress-testing?  
The global average temperature is likely to be approximately 1.5°C higher pre-industrial levels 
in the next 10-20 years, regardless of the emissions scenario. Historical emissions accumulate 
in the atmosphere and there is a time lag before they result in temperature impacts. Towards 
the end of the century, temperatures could span from approximately 2°C to 4°C, across a range 
of average emission scenarios.  
Reaching approximately 3°C degrees in 2100 is more likely than 2°C, given today’s policy 
ambition. Still, 2°C is considered to be somewhat more likely than 4-5°C, given the possibility 
of tightening ambition under the Paris Agreement design, and the rapid progress made with 
low-carbon technologies like solar, wind, and electric vehicles. Reaching approximately 4-5°C 
would mean that current climate policies would be rescinded or relaxed. 
Political, social, or technological events can influence the temperature increase, pushing it up 
to 4-5°C or pulling it lower towards 2°C. Examples of push factors towards a higher 
temperature outcome include key emitting countries (i.e., China, EU, India, US – which are 
jointly responsible for 60% of global emissions) failing to implement their climate targets 
(Nationally Determined Contributions, NDCs), or CCS deployment is delayed due to cost and 
public opposition. Examples of pull factors towards a lower temperature outcome include 
rapid deployment of clean technologies, CCS being deployed more rapidly (CCS plants are built 
at the historical pace of coal plants in China or nuclear plants in Europe), or key emitting 
countries ambitiously tighten their climate targets every 5 years under the Paris agreement. 
Stress testing against a range of scenarios can help prepare for transition risk, across all periods. 
Given today’s policy ambition, approximately 3°C global warming by 2100 is the most likely 
scenario, but we don’t know enough to quantify the probability of reaching that temperature 
outcome (Figure 37-3). We also do not know much about the distribution curve at higher 
emission levels, which could be a fat-tail risk with a lower probability of occurrence but with 
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higher potential financial impacts from systemic climate disruptions (Wagner, 2015). Thus, a 
range of scenarios should be examined to understand the range of transition and physical risks, 
including 2°C, 3°C, and even 4°C scenarios. 
Figure 37-3 Probability distribution of scenarios based on expert judgement  
 
Source: (CICERO, 2018) 
3 Scenarios in physical risk assessments  
Physical impacts are observed in all regions today and can have abrupt consequences across 
all sectors (CICERO, 2017). Physical impacts manifest themselves mainly by rare events 
becoming more variable, (sometimes much) more frequent and intense. Observed impacts 
today include: 
• Extreme weather such as stronger hurricanes and flooding,  
• Flooding in already wet areas is increasing,  
• Drought is observed in all regions, and 
• Sea level rise is accelerating faster than expected. 
While physical impacts are highly location-specific, they can have wide-reaching financial 
impacts across all sectors. Physical climate change can be felt both directly (via infrastructure 
damage) and indirectly (via supply chain and transportation disruptions). Physical impacts can 
be chronic or abrupt, which may require different stress testing for companies.  
We do not need elaborate scenario testing to prepare for physical climate change for the next 
10-20 years. We are already locked in for 1.5°C global warming, because of historical emissions. 
Changes such as extreme events and flooding are impacting all sectors and regions already. 
These impacts will become clearer over the next 10-20 years.  
There is a trade-off between mitigation and adaptation, and policy decisions now can impact 
physical risk in the future. Using a higher temperature scenario e.g. 4°C can be useful for 
examining a possible worst-case scenario of potential physical impacts in the long run. 
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However, commonly used climate models for IPCC scenario analysis may be underestimating 
the recent non-linear increase in extreme weather trends related to climate change (Sutton, 
2019). Furthermore, the accumulated impacts of compounded extreme weather events have 
the possibility to lead to systemic disruption of the climate. The potential for financial 
instability from this fat-tail risk is not well explored. 
The risk of physical climate change is a factor of the probability of the event occurring, the 
vulnerability of the asset or infrastructure to the event, and the exposure of a portfolio or 
company to the event. Regional assessments of specific hazards, many of which are available 
from government sources e.g. on flooding, can provide information to help assess the 
probability of a hazard occurring. 
A global overview of the potential for physical hazards occurring across different scenarios can 
be distilled from the IPCC 5th Assessment Report, however some of the information is patchy 
depending on literature focused on particular hazards or regions. Using a color-coding 
indication of when a hazard was observed or projected to occur in a region across different 
time frames and scenarios, the Shades of Climate Risk study from CICERO shows high risk 
coding for some hazards in each region of the world (Figure 37-4)(CICERO, 2017). Regional 
studies and information from meteorological institutes can provide additional data at a much 
more granular level. 
Figure 37-4 Physical climate hazard overview from IPCC AR5  
 
Source: (CICERO, 2017) 
 
There are several service providers of physical risk assessment tools with diverse scope of 
coverage and methodologies that offer tailored risk assessment. Since most of these 
approaches use proprietary methods, it is difficult to assess the indicators, data, scenarios and 
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methodology they incorporate (CICERO, 2019). Publicly available data is available for water 
scarcity only.  
4 Challenges in adapting climate scenarios to assess financial risk 
The regulatory push on climate risk stress-testing and disclosure has created a whole new 
customer base for scenarios, with financial actors struggling to respond to assess risk across a 
range of future scenarios (Clapp & Sillmann, 2019). Climate and energy scenarios were largely 
designed for policy makers to examine emission pathways towards a global or national 
emissions targets decades in the future. Existing climate scenarios are ill-adapted to the short 
term and risk-based “stress-testing” needs of financial actors. Challenges in using existing 
scenario information include: 
• Time scale. Many emission scenarios only present data in decade time steps, and are 
updated only every 5-7 years, well outside the timescales for financial decision making 
(CICERO, 2018). 
• Risk framing. Available scenario outputs focus on emissions rather than forward-
looking investment considerations. Further, focusing on outcomes from a single model 
and for a limited number of economic sectors greatly limits the ability to assess climate 
risk. 
• Granularity. Scenarios that are updated annually, such as those from the IEA (IEA, 
2018), provide more detail and regularity, but only cover the energy sector. Further, 
some users may need regional or sectoral detail, which is not available in many 
scenarios. 
Several recent initiatives have focused on improving limited aspects of scenario information. 
CICERO has developed a manual to help build capacity within the financial sector on climate 
scenarios (CICERO, 2018), and has used this as a platform to discuss user needs with similar 
findings to other initiatives. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) has 
a 1.5°C Scenario Explorer that presents comparable data from scenarios used in the recent 
IPCC 1.5°C (Huppmann et al., 2018). The World Resources Institute has an Emissions Scenario 
Portal that compiles data from various scenarios. The 2 Degrees Investing Initiative and KPMG 
have developed independent tools to test if a portfolio is aligned with 2°C. Other approaches 
such as the Climate Risk Impact Screening (CRIS) by Carbone4 is focused only on physical risk. 
Another initiative to pull investment decision information from transition scenarios is 
convened by the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) for a 
group of banks (UNEP FI, 2018). 
However, the financial sector generally needs metrics not commonly included in scenario 
databases and relevant on short timescales, greater granularity, and importantly, flexibility to 
meet their specific activities. Scenario information for the financial sector is not yet reflected 
in the scientific literature (Weber et al., 2018). While the academic scenario community is 
becoming more transparent, existing scenario data and tools do not yet meet the needs of the 
financial sector. Some tools are purely descriptive, which help build capacity but do not help 
users perform analysis. Other tools are proprietary, or not transparent, making it difficult to 
assess their robustness. None of the initiatives provide the data that users need to perform 
their own in-house analysis, nor do they provide guidance on how to report and respond to 
climate-related risks.  
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5 How can we move towards more consistent scenario stress-
testing? 
Portfolio managers and bankers face a challenge in comparing the application of climate risk 
stress-testing across companies. Implementing scenario stress testing requires information 
that is tailored to sector and company characteristics. However, a common understanding, and 
transparency on a consistent set of assumptions for climate scenarios can support investors in 
doing due diligence on companies or portfolios (CICERO, 2018). To this end, the macro-
financial work stream of NGFS (Workstream 2) is, in joint effort with the climate science 
community, in the process of developing a consistent and comparable set of data-driven 
scenarios encompassing a range of different plausible future states of the world. 
Looking across the strategic risk planning needs of companies and financial decision makers, 
principles for the implementation of scenario stress testing that support investor due diligence 
could include: 
• Coherency of the storyline assumptions embedded within a scenario,  
• Consistency of key driver assumptions across scenarios, 
• Flexibility for companies to adapt scenarios to what they know about their 
sector/business, and 
• Compatibility with common reporting metrics on scenarios. 
While one-size-fits-all scenarios are not suited to capture the range of climate risk, 
benchmarking against commonly used scenarios such as WEO and IPCC for 2°C could be used 
to illustrate scenario due diligence.  
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